Knowledge of Syntax

What is the relation of logic to thinking? My dissertation offers a new argument for the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking in the following sense: representational activity counts as thinking only if it manifests sensitivity to logical rules. In short, thinking has to be minimally logical. An account of thinking has to allow for our freedom to question or revise our commitments – even seemingly obvious conceptual connections – without loss of understanding. This freedom, I argue, requires that (...) thinkers have general abilities to respond to support and tension among their thoughts. And these abilities are constituted by following logical rules. So thinkers have to follow logical rules. But there isn’t just one correct logic for thinking. I show that my view is consistent with logical pluralism: there are a range of correct logics, any one of which a thinker might follow. A logic for thinking does, however, have to contain certain minimal principles: Modus Ponens and Non-Contradiction, and perhaps others. We follow logical rules by exercising logical capacities, which display a distinctive first-person/third-person asymmetry: a subject can find the instances of a rule compelling without seeing them as instances of a rule. As a result, there are two limits on illogical thinking. First, thinkers have to tend to find instances of logical rules compelling. Second, thinkers can’t think in obviously illogical ways. So thinking has to be logical – but not perfectly so. When we try to think, but fail, we produce nonsense. But our failures to think are often subjectively indistinguishable from thinking. To explain how this occurs, I offer an account of nonsense. To be under the illusion that some nonsense makes sense is to enter a pretence that the nonsense is meaningful. Our use of nonsense within the pretence relies on the role of logical form in understanding. Finally, while the normativity of logic doesn’t fall directly out of logical constitutivism, it’s possible to build an attractive account of logical normativity which has logical constitutivism as an integral part. I argue that thinking is necessary for human flourishing, and that this is the source of logical normativity. (shrink)

الملخص قاعدة "الأصل" و "استصحاب الحال" قراءة في منهج النحاة من الاستعمال إلى التعليل إلى القاعدة ملخص تعدّ فكرة "الأصل" (=علة الأصل) منهجـًا اتّبعه النّحاة لتقديم تفسيرات منطقية في بعض مسائل الكلم في العربية، إذ أخذ النحاة إجراء منهج تحليليّ يعتمد افتراض أو استحضار مكوّن بنيوي على أنّه "أصل الاستعمال" غاية إيجاد مقاربات منطقية تربط الاستعمال المنجز بالقاعدة، فـ"الأصل"–وفق النحاة- إمّا "نمطٌ لغويٌّ مهجورٌ غير أنّه اُستعمل في طور من أطوار العربية"، أو "نمط لغوي افتراضي" يجريه النحاة على معيارية الاستعمال (...) بحيث يصحّ عدّه منجزًا لغويًا تقابليًّا لاستعمالات تجري والقاعدة؛ وقد أجرى سيبيويه منهج قياسٍ افتراضي وَفْقَ عبارته:"وهذا تمثيلٌ ولم يُتكلّم به" ليجعل "المكوّن" الافتراضي شاهدًا نحويًّا يمثّل "أصل الاستعمال" ويصحّ الرجوع إليه في اشتقاق القاعدة والوصول إلى التعليل. يدرس البحث علاقة الوظيفة التعليلية بين "الأصل" و"استصحاب الحال" أجْل الوقوف على منهج النحاة في إطلاق الأحكام القواعدية في المسائل التي اعتمدوا فيها فكرة التعليل بـ"الأصل"، وهل كانت أحكامهم في تلك المسائل مقنعة أو غير مقنعة؟ ويسعى البحث إلى بيان العلاقة بين فكرة "الأصل" و"أدلة النحو" (الأصول) من وجهة تسعى إلى بيان منطق التعليل بـ"علة الأصل". The original rule of the historical usage of the primary sentence and the semi-original rules of the grammatical thinking A reading in the grammarian's approach, from usage to the reasoning to the rules Abstract The original rule of the historical usage of the primary sentence is considered one of the methods that followed by the grammarians to provide a logical explanation sequence for some of the language issues. Most of the grammarians assume that there is a new sentence style that referred to an old usage in some of the sentence’s structure. According to the grammarians that these old structures are being the reference rules and evidences to explain the structure of the new structure style. Also based on the grammarian approach the old structure is divided into two parts: the first, sentence structure that have been actually used in the language history. The second is an imagination assumption where such kind of structures have not been used before and therefore can be considered as a hypothetical lingual style only, Sebaweeh has conducted a standard approach according to his phrase "This is a an example only, it has not been spoken". It is important to know that the grammarians have followed an analytical approach to make a center point between the original rule and the semi-original rule so as to provide a logical explanation of these structure styles. This research seeks to study the relation between the original rule and semi-original rules of the grammatical thinking. In addition, this search seeks to study the relation between the original rule and the Grammatical evidence (=OSOL) Key Words: The original rule - the semi-original rules -/- الكلمات المفتاحية أصول النحو، قاعدة الأصل، استصحاب الحال. (shrink)

One well known problem regarding quantifiers, in particular the 1st order quantifiers, is connected with their syntactic categories and denotations.The unsatisfactory efforts to establish the syntactic and ontological categories of quantifiers in formalized first-order languages can be solved by means of the so called principle of categorial compatibility formulated by Roman Suszko, referring to some innovative ideas of Gottlob Frege and visible in syntactic and semantic compatibility of language expressions. In the paper the principle is introduced for categorial languages generated (...) by the Ajdukiewicz’s classical categorial grammar. The 1st-order quantifiers are typically ambiguous. Every 1st-order quantifier of the type k > 0 is treated as a two-argument functor-function defined on the variable standing at this quantifier and its scope (the sentential function with exactly k free variables, including the variable bound by this quantifier); a binary function defined on denotations of its two arguments is its denotation. Denotations of sentential functions, and hence also quantifiers, are defined separately in Fregean and in situational semantics. They belong to the ontological categories that correspond to the syntactic categories of these sentential functions and the considered quantifiers. The main result of the paper is a solution of the problem of categories of the 1st-order quantifiers based on the principle of categorial compatibility. (shrink)