Karl Popper

In this article, I discuss the relationship between Karl Popper’s conception of critical rationalism and William Bartley’s conception of pancritical rationalism. Both Popper and Bartley tended to identify rationality with openness to criticism, but they are usually considered to be disagreeing about whether rationality is limited or comprehensive and whether or not it applies to moral attitudes. These traditional interpretations are found wanting, and I make the case that there is—and was—no genuine, substantial conflict between Popper’s critical and Bartley’s pancritical (...) rationalism. The apparent disagreement between Popper and Bartley about critical versus pancritical rationalism is nothing but a tangle of several factors, including the misconstrual of Popper’s critical rationalism by Bartley, Popper’s disagreement with Bartley’s criticism of critical rationalism, Popper’s disagreement with Bartley’s claim that his formulation is superior to Popper’s formulation of critical rationalism in The Open Society and Its Enemies, and the clash of Bartley’s ambitions with Popper’s rather cold attitude toward his cherished ideas. New (so far unpublished and not discussed) archival material—Popper’s interview and two letters to Leslie Graves dated 1992—is invoked to provide crucial evidence for this interpretation. (shrink)

The compatibility of scientific realism and evolutionary epistemology is a controversial issue in contemporary philosophy of science. Scientific realism is the view that scientific theories aim to describe the true nature of reality, while evolutionary epistemology is the view that scientific knowledge is the product of natural selection and adaptation. Some philosophers argue that evolutionary epistemology undermines the epistemic status of scientific theories and thus poses a serious challenge to scientific realism. This paper examines this problem and explores whether scientific (...) realism can be reconciled with evolutionary epistemology. The paper argues that critical rationalism (CR), a philosophical approach that rejects justificationism and emphasizes the role of criticism, rationality, and objectivity in science, can provide a viable framework for integrating scientific realism and evolutionary epistemology. The paper shows that by adopting a non-justificationist fallibilist stance toward scientific theories, CR can reconcile the realist and the evolutionary views on scientific knowledge. (shrink)

Despite the moral underpinnings of Karl Popper’s philosophy, he has not presented a well-established moral theory for critical rationalism (CR). This paper addresses the ontological status of _moral agents_ as part of a research program for developing a moral theory for CR. It argues that moral agents are _selves_ who have achieved the cognitive capacity of _personhood_ through an evolutionary scenario and interaction with the environment. This proposal draws on Popper’s theory of the self and his theory of three worlds, (...) which offer both epistemological and ontological insights into the emergence and evolution of _moral agents_. The paper also discusses some of the consequences of this proposal for the _objectivity_ and _criticizability_ of moral judgments and the moral agency of artificial intelligence. It concludes by suggesting some directions for future research on the epistemological and ontological problems of ethics in CR. (shrink)

‘Post-truth’ has become a buzzword for numerous current crises: the fragmentation of the media landscape, the ongoing debate about ‘fake news’, the loss of trust in science, etc. Although these crises take place in society, it is claimed that the roots of post-truth can be traced back to the history of philosophy. Occasionally, it is asserted that Karl Popper’s critical rationalism gave rise to post-truth: His rejection of verificationism has limited truth claims in the realm of science. Given the absence (...) of infallible evidence and certainty, critical rationalism calls for challenging scientific authority. I argue that post-truth is compatible with critical rationalism from an epistemological point of view, considering that both positions are critical of certainty. However, in critical rationalism, fallibilism, responsibility, and the idea of criticism are combined, and in this respect, it offers a possible way to overcome the problems that are associated with post-truth. This treatment of the problems of post-truth results from the recognition of moral responsibility to take action on the basis of a hypothesis that remains open to revision. (shrink)

Rational discussion guides, but does not compel individual decisions, and the best process of inquiry and decision should vary with a person’s goals and situation. Sir Karl Popper noted that after a result of observation or experiment has been obtained by independent researchers, scientists agree to reject as false theories that are contradicted by accepted facts. Popper, though, wrongly assumed this consensus also applies to acceptance for purposes of research. In reality researchers develop competing theories about which evidence is currently (...) in conflict, and sometimes even refuting the theories in their current form. Further, Popper asserted that only negative arguments should be used in rational inquiry. In reality, productive inquiry involves also positive arguments, even in science. Positive considerations such as which basic theories are justified by the researcher’s preferred metaphysics, or what theories in applied science are justified by existing accepted basic theories, are also used productively. (shrink)

This article revisits Karl Popper’s falsificationist methodology with respect to three tasks. The first is to illuminate and systematize Popper’s methodological views in light of his core epistemological commitments. A second and related objective is to gauge which aspects of falsificationism should be identified as “conventionalist”—a label that Popper himself uses (albeit with qualifications) but that is compromised by and, thus, stands in need of elucidation because of Popper’s idiosyncratic understanding of conventionalism. Third, by elaborating Popper’s virtue-epistemological, dialogical model of (...) rationality, I show how Popper’s conventionalism, fallibilism, and critical rationalism form a coherent system. This system allows Popper to accord science the status of a privileged source of knowledge—without naïve appeal to authority. My systematization of Popper’s views yields an intrinsically and exegetically more satisfactory reading of Popper’s falsificationism than usual presentations. Thanks to its marked flexibility and methodological liberalism, it bypasses many standard objections but still offers sound and relevant methodological advice. With its “virtue-methodological” thrust, Popper sketches an original and promising approach to methodology, the fertility of which deserves further exploration for contemporary debates. (shrink)

In his Empirical Stance, van Fraassen introduces a new version of empiricism and elaborates its relation with science and religion. van Fraassen's empirical stance, characterized by a negative attitude towards metaphysics, is to result in a coherent view alongside his new epistemology called voluntarism - a non-dogmatic approach to rationality. This paper aims to show that its coherency is unstable. Because traces of dogmatism still plague van Fraassen's account of empiricism, and attempts to eliminate them lead to critical rationalism, affecting (...) his encounter with metaphysics. In the end, while stating some cases from the history of science, it will be emphasized that empiricism should not tie its identity with the opposition to metaphysics. (shrink)

De l'épistémologie à la politique, le rationalisme critique de Karl Popper se présente comme une solution théorique à la difficulté que rencontra Kant du lien entre philosophie théorique et philosophie pratique. Ce qui est en jeu ici, c'est la façon particulière que l'oeuvre de Popper a de montrer qu'une théorie de la connaissance peut servir de fondement théorique à une théorie politique et à une théorie de la société sans, pour autant, tomber dans le positivisme ou le scientisme.

Based on an epistemological approach, humanities and natural sciences are two completely different realms that are governed by different rules. From this position, it is usually concluded that these two should not interfere in each other's territory. This idea, which also has supporters in other categorizations such as science and theology, relies mainly on Wittgenstein's doctrines. The purpose of the article is to argue that such an approach ultimately leads to the isolation of different realms of knowledge. We argue why (...) this position is incorrect and has adverse consequences for the development of knowledge in all domains. (shrink)

The recent pandemic is a reminder of several important lessons from Popper's philosophy. My aim in this paper is to address some of these lessons. By making use of Popper's theory of three worlds, I explain how coronavirus has a far-reaching impact on the ecosystem of rationality, and how the viruses that threaten humans could also be a threat to the whole life on Earth. Applying the epistemological distinction between science and technology, I go on to explain the pivotal role (...) of science in preventing further crises. This, I argue, is done by putting technology in the sphere of rationality; through both criticizing technologies and inspiring the invention of clean technologies, and also technologies that serve us as alerting systems. I shall argue that critical rationalism helps us to understand the ‘pandemic problem situation’ in a more informed manner and thus helps us to find out about the vulnerable points of our ecosystem of rationality in a more efficient way. In the latter part of the paper, I shall develop the thesis that while during the recent pandemic, science did it best to warn us about its dangers, the policy-makers, who are technologists of a sort, in many countries did not take those warnings seriously. Even when the crisis turned into a global catastrophe, the three types of technologies (health-care, lock-down, and diagnosis and treatment) were not fully efficient in controlling the pandemic. Drawing on Popper’s ideas I shall argue that in the face of the current emergency, our best chance to improve our situation is to apply the method of piecemeal social engineering to alleviate people’s suffering. (shrink)