Kant: Normative Ethics

Kant's Incorporation Thesis states that inclinations do not determine the will independently of reason. But do inclinations represent objects as desirable independently of reason? Or, is reason involved in the very constitution of an inclination so that inclinations without reason are impossible? The former interpretation is held by Christine Korsgaard and Tamar Schapiro. The latter is given by Janelle DeWitt and Allen Wood. I argue for a novel version of the latter interpretation by appealing to Kant's hylomorphism. On my interpretation, (...) reason makes inclinations possible in the way that form does matter. Reason orders the objects of our possible inclinations amongst all our ends in a system. Rather than these relations being consequent to or dependent upon the contents of our inclinations, I argue that these relations are a priori conditions of the possibility of our inclinations. For, we come to have particular inclinations only by their objects coming to occupy places in our system of ends, where such places are antecedently marked out by reason's determination of the interrelations among all our ends. (shrink)

Kant's Incorporation Thesis states that inclinations do not determine the will independently of reason. But do inclinations represent objects as desirable independently of reason? Or, is reason involved in the very constitution of an inclination so that inclinations without reason are impossible? The former interpretation is held by Christine Korsgaard and Tamar Schapiro. The latter is given by Janelle DeWitt and Allen Wood. I argue for a novel version of the latter interpretation by appealing to Kant's hylomorphism. On my interpretation, (...) reason makes inclinations possible in the way that form does matter. Reason orders the objects of our possible inclinations amongst all our ends in a system. Rather than these relations being consequent to or dependent upon the contents of our inclinations, I argue that these relations are a priori conditions of the possibility of our inclinations. For, we come to have particular inclinations only by their objects coming to occupy places in our system of ends, where such places are antecedently marked out by reason's determination of the interrelations among all our ends. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 56, Issue 2, Page 281-289, April 2022.

Although Kant is one of the very few classical writers referred to in the current literature on lying, hardly any attention is paid to how his views relate to the contemporary discussion on the definition of lying. I argue that, in Kant’s account, deception is not the defining feature of lying. Furthermore, his view is able to acknowledge non-deceptive lies. Kant thus holds, I suggest, a version of what is currently labelled Intrinsic Anti-Deceptionism. In his specific version of such a (...) view, furthermore, dishonesty is the distinctive feature of lying. Finally, I highlight the important methodological differences between Kant’s normatively minded account and the primarily descriptive contemporary discussion, with regard to the role of intuitions and definitions in building a moral theory: In contrast to the current debate, Kant does not rely on intuitions, but defines lying in terms of the obligation it violates. (shrink)

In Kant scholarship, the concept of maxims is discussed, for the most part, from the perspective of the universalization procedure of the Categorical Imperative. In fact, however, it has a much wider relevance. As is shown in this contribution, maxims are fundamental to Kant’s theory of action and value. Since the agent expresses her pro-attitudes, i.e., interests, preferences, and life-plans based on maxims, they figure as constitutive elements of her practical identity. After some general and historical considerations on Kant’s concept (...) of maxims, it is shown that their function in the theory of the ‘practical syllogism’ implies that maxims play an important role in considerations on the agent’s ends, goals, and purposes. Additionally, I will discuss the function of maxims in Kant’s action theory. I will defend an interpretation of the Kantian idea according to which practical deliberation can be understood based on a hierarchical order of maxims. Finally, the problem of higher-order maxims and the issue of the unity and inner consistency of maxims is debated. (shrink)

In this chapter, I will address the philosophical ambivalence of the concept of Willkür in and after Kant. The aim of my chapter is to defend it against the charge of irrationality and mere chance, and to rehabilitate it from a historical and analytic point of view. I will analyze Kant’s use of the word “Willkür”, and chronologically follow the semantic and systematic changes in his philosophical work. Finally, I address recent attempts to revitalize the concept of Willkür in the (...) analytic debate by referring to the work of Harry Frankfurt and Robert Kane. I shall argue that we need to distinguish between two kinds of libera arbitria. Whereas the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae can be interpreted in terms of the pejorative sense of “Willkür”—as mere chance—the liberum arbitrium voluntatis equals a reflective kind of Willkür—literal Will-kür —which involves freedom of the will. (shrink)

Kant holds that transcendental freedom of the will—“a faculty of absolutely beginning a state, and hence also a series of consequences”—is a necessary condition for moral imputation. The question of whether we are really free is a vexed issue. In this contribution, I pursue two aims: On the one hand, I provide an account of how, according to Kant, theoretical and practical reason work together in a way that allows us to affirm that we are free. On the other hand, (...) I bring Kant’s position into contact with the contemporary debate and defend Kant’s decidedly practical justification of freedom against objections. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Several interpreters argue that Kant believes we have a duty to act “from duty.” If there is such a duty, however, then Kant's moral theory faces a serious problem, namely that of an allegedly vicious infinite regress of duties. No serious attempt has been made to determine how Kant might respond to this problem and insufficient work has been done to determine whether he even believes we have a duty to act from duty. In this paper I argue that not (...) only does Kant not hold that there is a duty to act from duty, but he also explicitly rejects the idea. (shrink)

Compare Mill and Kant's ethical theories; which makes a better societal order? John Stuart Mill (1808-73) believed in an ethical theory known as utilitarianism. There are many formulation of this theory. One such is, \"Everyone should act in such a way to bring the largest possibly balance of good over evil for everyone involved.\" However, good is a relative term. What is good? Utilitarians disagreed on this subject. Mill made a distinction between happiness and sheer sensual pleasure. He defines happiness (...) in terms of higher order pleasure (i.e. social enjoyments, intellectual). In his Utilitarianism (1861), Mill described this principle as follows:According to the Greatest Happiness Principle … The ultimate end, end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of other people), is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible enjoyments. (shrink)

Este volumen presenta la primera recopilación sistemática de diálogos y discusiones que especialistas hispanohablantes en el pensamiento de Immanuel Kant mantienen desde hace años con la dilatada obra de la Profesora Emérita de la Universidad de Cambridge, Onora O´Neill, Baronesa de Bengarve. Las contribuciones de destacados estudiosos de Argentina, México y España se centran en la actualización de la racionalidad práctica kantiana por parte de O´Neill, con especial atención a la interpretación del contractualismo, las condiciones de la justicia, la construcción (...) del espacio público, la fundamentación de los derechos humanos y la lógica de la autoconfianza en la acción, sin la que la autonomía quedaría carente de una base sólida. La Profesora O´Neill ha redactado un texto expreso para presentar los trabajos reunidos en el volumen, en el que realiza un balance de su amplio itinerario intelectual, señalando algunos hitos en torno a los que se articulan los capítulos. Las editoras confían en que esta publicación resulte del interés del público especializado en la discusión contemporánea sobre el pensamiento práctico de Kant, tomando como guía en esta ocasión a una de sus intérpretes actuales más prestigiosas. (shrink)

the essay examines why Kant was conflicted about vaccination, on why vaccination can still be seen as a moral duty and on why a vaccination mandate is not (necessarily) consistent with our rightful, external freedom. It is an essay, not a scholarly paper.

It is a common picture that Kant is committed to an uncompromising account of moral responsibility that leaves no room for excuses. I argue that this picture is mistaken. More specifically, I reconstruct a Kantian quality of will account of excuses according to which an agent is excused for performing a morally wrong (or omitting a morally obligatory) action if and only if the action (or omission) does not manifest a lack of good will on the part of the agent. (...) Based on this Kantian quality of will account of excuses, I explain why agents are often excused in cases that involve physical constraint, unintentional bodily movement, ignorance, coercion or necessity. (shrink)

Kant on Reflection and Virtue, by MerrittMelissa. Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 2018. Pp. xvi + 219.

This interview with Professor Dr Jürgen Stolzenberg, board member of the Kant-Gesellschaft and co-editor of the Kant-Lexikon (2015), explores a wide range of topics — from Leibniz and Wolff to Heidegger and Husserl. The leading idea of Stolzenberg’s philosophical research is the justification of the principle of modern subjectivity in Kant’s philosophy and its transformations until our days. He discusses the meaning and development of the concept of self-consciousness and the understanding of subjectivity in Kant’s ethics as well as in (...) Fichte’s philosophy. Stolzenberg shows the significance of Heidegger’s philosophical relations with Kant, Fichte, and the Neo-Kantians. He outlines the reasons which explain the different structures of the philosophical theories after Kant in comparison with the structure of Kant’s philosophy itself. Answering the question of Kant’s role in affirming the value of human dignity, he emphasises the non-empirical essence of this concept as it is presented in Kant’s ethics and as it should be defended against recent critics. According to Stolzenberg, the principle of modern subjectivity proves to be fruitful in understanding the development of the history of modern music, too. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 109 Heft: 3 Seiten: 473-475.

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 110 Heft: 1 Seiten: 163-166.

This article builds on David Velleman’s recent work on moral relativism to argue that Kant’s account of moral judgement is best read in a contextualist manner. More specifically, I argue that while for Kant the form of moral judgement is invariant, substantive moral judgements are nonetheless context-dependent. The same form of moral willing can give rise to divergent substantive judgements. To some limited extent, Kantian contextualism is a development out of Rawlsian constructivism. Yet while for constructivists the primary concern is (...) with the derivation of generally valid principles of morality, Velleman’s Kant-inspired form of moral relativism demonstrates the indispensability to a Kantian approach of indexical reasons for action. I argue in turn that Velleman’s focus on the indexical nature of reasons for action must be supplemented by an account of agential reflexivity. The latter divides Kantian contextualism from Kantian relativism. (shrink)

In spite of its dominance, there are well-known problems with Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium (MRE), as a method of justification in meta-ethics. One issue in particular has preoccupied commentators, namely, the capacity of this method to provide a convincing account of the objectivity of our moral beliefs. Call this the Lack-of-Objectivity Charge. One aim of this article is to examine the charge within the context of Rawls’s later philosophy, and I claim that the lack-of-objectivity charge remains unanswered. A second (...) aim of this article is to examine the extent to which, despite Rawls’s express intention to avoid reliance on Kant’s moral philosophy, supplementing Rawls’s political constructivism with some Kantian elements, in particular Kant’s idea of a universal principle of right, not only addresses some of the issues raised by the lack-of-objectivity charge, but also does so without compromising the ability of the Rawlsian account to accommodate the pluralism of conceptions of the good, which he takes to be a fact of modern democracies. I argue for a revised justificatory methodology, which combines Rawls’s MRE and Kant’s Critical Method. (shrink)

Despite a misleading title, a superfluous introduction, and a dubious concluding argument, this book succeeds in demonstrating the unorthodox thesis that a concept of a "history of reason" is "genuine and central" to Kant’s system. The first part demonstrates a decisive and highly problematic shift in Kant’s practical philosophy, where a synthesis of morality and nature, the idea of the highest good, is made the object of duty. In this way the highest good, initially a "rational version of the notion (...) of the next world," becomes Kant’s regulative idea of history, "the kingdom of God on earth," comprising both "inner disposition and external institution". The ability to realize the highest good is a logical condition of the concept of duty and a "psychological condition of the ‘inner act’ of intention". The latter condition, Yovel suggests, explains why Kant identifies the ground of this ability with God. The sole objective significance of Kant’s idea of God, however, is said to reside in duty’s logical condition, viz., "the assertion that the given world is the highest good in potentia, and that human praxis can make it so actually". Though much more needs to be said, Yovel thus makes a strong case that Kant’s concept of God is "only a subjective decor" and "strictly humanistic". (shrink)

This paper examines Kant’s accounts of friendship and marriage, and argues for what can be called an ideal of “moral marriage” based on Kant’s notion of moral friendship. After explaining why Kant values friendship so highly, it gives an account of the ways in which marriage falls far short, according to Kant, of what friendship has to offer. The paper then argues that many of Kant’s reasons for finding marriage morally impoverished compared with friendship are wrong-headed. The paper further argues (...) that a few of Kant’s views about friendship are false. The main point is that, when we slightly revise Kant’s account of friendship and jettison Kant’s misguided notions about marriage, we see that marriages can aspire to much of the same moral richness as friendships. Finally, the paper argues that this friendship model of marriage does not obscure the important ways in which marriages and friendships differ. (shrink)

Introduction Recent accounts of humility, such as Norvin Richards', emphatically set aside any “Catholic metaphysics” that might ground the state, finding its view of human nature – one which asks us to consider ourselves as “contemptible” and “foul” – to be deeply problematic. Richards turns instead to an empirical and behavioral analysis of humility, focusing upon an individual agent's awareness of the flaws, failings and limits specific to her to ground humility. For example, when he asks what it would mean (...) to be “humble” about having a scholarly article accepted for publication in a prestigious journal, he says the following: Suppose, for example, that you have just had an article accepted by a leading journal. You have never been successful there before. In fact, this is much better than you ever did earlier in your career, and as you think of your progress, you are pleased. There are other ways to look at things, though. How does your work compare to what your colleagues are doing? To the work of contemporaries at similar institutions? To that of the leading philosophers of the day? To the Nichomachean Ethics, or the Theory of Descriptions? (shrink)

Andrews Reath presents a selection of his best essays on various features of Kant's moral psychology and moral theory, with particular emphasis on his conception of rational agency and his conception of autonomy. Together the essays articulate Reath's original approach to Kant's views about human autonomy, which explains Kant's belief that objective moral requirements are based on principles we choose for ourselves. With two new papers, and revised versions of several others, the volume will be of great interest to all (...) students and scholars of Kant and of moral philosophy. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 1 Seiten: 2-33.

Samuel Kerstein argues that an asymmetry between moral worth and maxims prevents Kant from accepting a category of acts that are impermissible, but have moral worth. Kerstein contends that an act performed from the motive of duty should be considered as a candidate for moral worth, even if the action's maxim turns out to be impermissible, since moral worth depends on the correct moral motivation of an act, rather than on the moral lightness of an act. I argue that Kant (...) cannot consistently maintain that there are morally forbidden, though good, acts since one of the conditions of acting from the moral law should be that one has a true belief about what the moral law requires. My project, then, rejects the possibility of morally impermissible, worthy acts for Kant, and qualifies the conditions for moral worth Kerstein gives with an epistemological constraint on moral worth. (shrink)

Anne Margaret Baxley offers a systematic interpretation of Kant's theory of virtue, whose most distinctive features have not been properly understood. She explores the rich moral psychology in Kant's later and less widely read works on ethics, and argues that the key to understanding his account of virtue is the concept of autocracy, a form of moral self-government in which reason rules over sensibility. Although certain aspects of Kant's theory bear comparison to more familiar Aristotelian claims about virtue, Baxley contends (...) that its most important aspects combine to produce something different - a distinctively modern, egalitarian conception of virtue which is an important and overlooked alternative to the more traditional Greek views which have dominated contemporary virtue ethics. (shrink)

Kant infamously claimed that all human beings, without exception, are evil by nature. This collection of essays critically examines and elucidates what he must have meant by this indictment. It shows the role which evil plays in his overall philosophical project and analyses its relation to individual autonomy. Furthermore, it explores the relevance of Kant's views for understanding contemporary questions such as crimes against humanity and moral reconstruction. Leading scholars in the field engage a wide range of sources from which (...) a distinctly Kantian theory of evil emerges, both subtle and robust, and capable of shedding light on the complex dynamics of human immorality. (shrink)

In western philosophy today, the three leading approaches to normative ethics are those of Kantian ethics, virtue ethics and utilitarianism. In recent years the debate between Kantian ethicists and virtue ethicists has assumed an especially prominent position. The twelve newly commissioned essays in this volume, by leading scholars in both traditions, explore key aspects of each approach as related to the debate, and identify new common ground but also real and lasting differences between these approaches. The volume provides a rich (...) overview of the continuing debate between two powerful forms of enquiry, and will be valuable for a wide range of students and scholars working in these fields. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the relationship between Kant and the traditional view of dignity. I argue that some amendments to Sensen’s description of the traditional paradigm enable us to see more clearly both where Kant adheres to the latter and where his view is original. First, a consideration of Pufendorf’s use of dignity suggests (1) that, contrary to Sensen’s reconstruction, the traditional paradigm does not entail a connection between dignity and duties to oneself, and (2) that Pufendorf’s understanding of dignity (...) as a kind of esteem, as opposed to price, provides a crucial mediation between the traditional view and Kant’s view. Finally, I argue that the traditional understanding of dignity also includes a subordinate justificatory element that helps to explain Kant’s use of dignity in the Doctrine of Virtue. (shrink)

Book Reviews Melissa Seymour Fahmy, Kantian Review, FirstView Article.

This study pursues Kant's philosophy of history in the systematic context of his philosophy as a whole. Men's temporal or historical deeds may be assessed, Kant suggests, by timeless moral measures. These noumenal measures are archetypes or ideals, which display a completeness that renders them true wholes. This wholeness defines a maximum of perfection. Men must seek this maximum by imitating such archetypes. They and their ectypal counterparts are for Kant the true aims of human history. ;Such moral mimesis requires, (...) however, a prior recognition of these authentic goals. This recognition, I claim, may be evoked by a provocative range of analogies. They may elicit the recollection of these true aims. Analogies invite one to bring to light from within and for oneself such essential goals. ;I suggest that the relation among these aims too must be recalled and articulated. This is the architectonic task of human reason. As such, it is a cosmopolitan rather than merely scholastic task, for it concerns essential ends, which every man's reason rightly upholds. ;These communal aims are a true republic, a perpetual peace among such states, a universal commonwealth of virtue, and a final end higher than all the rest. The architectonic ordering of these ends depends upon such an ultimate telos, a supreme and perfect good. While all these lesser goods can be pursued as historical aims, this telos is timeless, and so beyond the bounds of history. ;The recognition and pursuit of this highest good Kant calls wisdom. I conclude by exploring its cosmopolitan nature, and why it is allied to a timeless telos. A love of such wisdom, I suggest, reconciles reason's speculative, practical and architectonic interests. Kant's philosophy of history, when so construed, thus truly becomes philosophia. (shrink)

I argue that Kantian ethics needs to be supplemented with a conception of moral judgment modeled on judgments of taste. In the first part of the thesis, I compare Kant's account of determinative judgments of duty to his account of reflective judgments of taste and consider his reasons for barring the latter from ethics. In the second part, I reconstruct Schiller's claim that aesthetic evaluations are needed for the proper cultivation of virtue and Emerson's claim that an aesthetic ideal is (...) needed for guiding permissible choices. In the third part, I adapt Kantian arguments for the thesis that reflective judgments of taste are free and universal to support Schiller's and Emerson's claims about moral judgments. ;Kant divides all judgments into two basic forms: determinative and reflective. Judgments of duty are determinative because they begin with a universal principle and apply it to a particular case; judgments of taste are reflective because they start with a particular case and move to a universal claim of beauty. Since Kant bars reflective judgments from moral deliberation, his theory has been faulted for denying that dispositions of character can have a worth other than that derived from principles of duty, and for denying that agents can make moral judgments independently of principles of duty. These objections can be met by supplementing Kantian ethics with a conception of reflective moral judgments, because reflective judgments enable agents to construct ideals of conduct on a case-by case basis without having to appeal to determinate principles. (shrink)

This thesis attempts to trace the origin and development of the Hegelian critique of the Understanding as it appears in his early writings beginning from his studies in Tubingen up to the early Jena period, before the writing of the Phenomenology of Spirit. We examine the parallels that Hegel develops between the categories of the Understanding as first elaborated by Kant, and the genesis of specific forms individual and political self-understanding that become dependent upon them. Hegel's critique is an exposition (...) of the domination of the subjective categories of the Understanding over the realms of nature and more relevant for this thesis the moral-political dimensions of life. ;In chapter one the focus is on the Tubingen-Berne period where an examination is made of Hegel's emerging pantheistic concept of Life and its antipode the Understanding. We follow the development of this idea as it originates in confrontation with Kant's moral philosophy Judaeo-Christian theology. Then an examination is made of the ramifications of Hegel's attempt to find a religious solution to this opposition. ;Next the focus moves to a detailed analysis of Hegel's Jena criticism of Kantian and Fichtean transcendental idealism. The concentration is on the categories of Relation and more specifically the category of Causality. Hegel is highly critical of the way that the Causality relation has infiltrated into and shaped the logical underpinnings of moral and political discourse including the institutional manifestations of these theories. Hegel sees the Understanding as a faculty of division and separation but is, at the same time, inwardly compelled towards identity by the latent power of Reason. The Causality relation, , is at the source of relations of inequalities of power, of independence and dependence, forming the ultimate logical basis of the master-slave relation. ;Finally, the thesis concludes by showing how Hegel comes to see these relations dialectically as a moments in a systematic whole, but in his quest for system, I argue his philosophy loses much of its critical force. (shrink)

The overall theme of this superb collection concerns the complex of relations among Kant's views of art and aesthetic experience, the interests of morality and society in the latter, and more generally the connection between morality and human sensibility. Except for the last and perhaps the penultimate chapter, Guyer's main approach is from the direction of issues raised by the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment." However, the last and longest chapter, specially written for the book, is a detailed and penetrating examination (...) of the extent to which Kant recognizes the moral significance of human sensibility. The chapter includes interesting comment on Kant's development and motivations, as well as helpful commentary on the different frameworks employed by Kant in his classification of virtues and duties. (shrink)

Demonstrates the systematic connection between Kant's ethics and his philosophy of history.