Indian Philosophy

Viśiṣṭādvaita treatise against the Advaita school in Hindu philosophy.

Study of the fundamentals of Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy, with special reference to Samavāya (inherence) one of the six catagories of the system.

Index to the Praśastapādabhāṣya, Vaiśeṣika school in Hindu philosophy by Praśastapādācārya; includes a portion of the text.

Ignorance becomes a philosophical issue when it is first-personal, i.e., _x_’s awareness about _x_’s own ignorance. It raises exciting and apparently paradoxical questions about cognition. Keeping first-personal experience of ignorance at the centre, some Indian philosophical schools discuss extensively the nature of ignorance. Vyāsatīrtha from the Dualist school (Dvaita Vedānta), along with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school propound that ignorance belongs to a negative category (_abhāvapadārtha_) or in other words, that it must be understood as an absence of some cognition. The Non-dualist (...) school (Advaita Vedānta) thinks that ignorance is not an absence of cognition, but a positive entity (_bhāvarūpa_) that obstructs our cognition. The first group objects for considering ignorance as a positive entity arguing that it leads to the problem of profligacy of ontological entities, whereas the Non-dualists argue that considering ignorance as an absence of cognition leads to contradictions in cases of first-personal experiences of ignorance. In this paper, I present a small segment of the extensive arguments from both sides, alongside two Western philosophical theories that support the views of the Dualists and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Through a critical analysis of these arguments, I demonstrate that, with respect to the specific set of arguments examined, the view of ignorance as an absence of cognition fails to sufficiently account for cases of first-personal experiences of ignorance. In contrast, the Non-dualist conceptualization proves more robust, given its successful applicability to all instances of ignorance. (shrink)

This paper deals with the debates over _kālamṛtyu_ (“timely death” or human death at the end of the life span) and _akālamṛtyu_ (“untimely death” or premature death that occurs when the life span still remains). In cultural areas like ancient India, where the _karman_ doctrine or the law of _karman_ is firmly rooted, such “timely death” and “untimely death” have seemed to be the catalysts for the philosophical and ethical debates. Assuming that a person’s life itself would be affected by (...) the person’s past _karman_s, each life span and death of individual persons would have been predetermined by their past _karman_s, and consequently, any efforts for preserving or prolonging life span in this world would have no meaning. If it were so, in the first place, does the _karman_ doctrine leave room for “untimely death”? This paper discusses how Buddhist literature, especially the _Questions of King Milinda_ (_Milindapañha_), and the Āyurvedic literature approach the above issues. (shrink)

The paper covers a topic that sits between theology and philosophy of language and is based on completely unpublished material. The bulk of the paper consists in the critical edition and annotated translation of a section of an unpublished and anonymous commentary on the _Ratnatrayaparīkṣā_ by Śrīkaṇṭha. This section describes the transition of the indeterminate knowledge to the determined one according to the early Śaiva Siddhānta perspective. The introduction contains parts that are more “philological” or “historical” and others that are (...) more “philosophical”. The paper contains one appendix on the significant variant readings of the _mūla_ text. (shrink)

Among the many works that Vedānta Deśikaṉ—(traditional dates: 1268-1369), a most eminent theologian of all times—composed in his lifetime, his minor works—thirty in number and collectively known as the _Cillaṟai rahasyam_ (‘miscellaneous esoterica’)—stand out like guides meant to help those eager Śrīvaiṣṇavas who lack time to deepen their knowledge of Viśiṣṭādvaita by the study of longer and deeper texts. One such _rahasyam_ is the _Upakārasaṅgraham_, in which Deśikaṉ deals (almost exhaustively) with the theme of God’s countless acts of _upakāra_ (‘aid, (...) help, favour’) upon the individual souls. This beneficence of God’s forms the very basis of Viśiṣṭādvaita, as it involves a discussion of one the three _tattvas_ (‘realities’), namely, God, (and by extension, the sentient entity), as well as on _mokṣa_ (‘liberation’), which is the ultimate aim of the Śrīvaiṣṇava Ācāryas. In this article, which is ultimately meant to introduce to the reader an important but little-known text, I shall explore the topic of infinite divine _upakāra_ as elaborated upon by Vedānta Deśikaṉ in his _Upakārasaṅgraham_, which, according to this text, ought to inspire human gratitude. And in the process, we shall also examine the nature and object(s) of God’s acts of _upakāra_, and the means through which He proceeds to bestow them. (shrink)

Inductive inference faces the problem of induction, while Nyāya inference confronts Cārvāka objections. It has been generally agreed that the problem of induction is essentially similar to the Cārvāka objections against the validity of Nyāya inference. In this article, I will endeavor to refute this claim. The objections Cārvāka raised against inference, I shall argue, do not construe the problem of induction. I will analyze Udayana and Mādhavācārya's works on Cārvāka objections against inference to support my claim. Following Udayanācārya, I (...) will distinguish between naive and sophisticated versions of the Cārvāka attack on inference and try to show that neither version of the Cārvāka objection poses the problem of induction. I will also examine Mādhava's formulation of Cārvāka objection to support the same. Moreover, a detailed analysis and interpretation of Udayanācārya's replies to the Cārvāka objections against inference will be presented. I will conclude the paper by showing that Udayanācārya's replies also do not constitute a solution to the problem of induction. (shrink)

This paper delves into the enigmatic figure of Tom Bombadil in J.R.R. Tolkien’s 'The Lord of the Rings', offering a fresh reinterpretation through the lens of Indian metaphysics. Bombadil’s detachment from the One Ring and his carefree existence suggest philosophical parallels with non-dual traditions, particularly Advaita Vedanta and Kashmir Shaivism. By analyzing Bombadil alongside the concepts of the Avadhūta and Jivanmukta, this paper aligns his character with the Indian metaphysical notion of transcendence beyond dualism. -/- Moreover, Bombadil’s relationship with Goldberry (...) is interpreted as a reflection of the Shiva-Shakti dynamic from Kashmir Shaivism, representing the archetypal union of consciousness and energy. This paper further positions Bombadil as embodying pure, formless consciousness—a non-dual, attributeless aspect of Eru Ilúvatar. While acknowledging Tolkien's Catholic influences, this paper demonstrates that Bombadil's role resonates with universal themes of transcendence and consciousness, revealing his centrality as a figure that challenges the dualistic moral and metaphysical structures of Middle-earth. (shrink)

When someone is in a conscious state, must they be aware of it? The Buddhist philosopher Dignāga offers a brilliant route to answering this question by leveraging the role awareness might play as a constraint on memory. I begin by clarifying his strategy and what conclusions it might be used to establish, and then turn to explain why it fails. The first main problem is that, contrary to his contemporary defenders, there is no good way to use it to reach (...) a conclusion about all conscious states. The second main problem is that the proposed awareness constraint on memory is highly problematic, in tension both with ancient objections as well as current psychology. (shrink)

Exhaustive study of Yoga philosophy of Patañjali with reference to Tattvavaiśāradī, commentary of Vācaspatimiśra, active 976-1000.

The Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy tells the story of philosophy in India through a series of exceptional individual acts of philosophical virtuosity. It brings together forty leading international scholars to record the diverse figures, movements, and approaches that constitute philosophy in the geographical region of the Indian subcontinent, a region sometimes nowadays designated South Asia. The chapters provide a synopsis of the liveliest areas of contemporary research and set new agendas for nascent directions of exploration. Each of the chapters (...) provides compelling evidence that in the global exercise of human intellectual skills India, throughout its history, has been a hugely sophisticated and important presence, host to an astonishing range of exceptionally creative minds engaged in an extraordinary diversity of the most astute philosophical exploration conceivable. It spans philosophy of law, logic, politics, environment, and society, but is most strongly associated with wide-ranging discussions in the philosophy of mind and language, epistemology and metaphysics (how we know and what is there to be known), ethics, meta-ethics, and aesthetics, and meta-philosophy. The reach of Indian ideas has been vast, both historically and geographically, and it has been and continues to be a major influence in world philosophy. In the breadth as well as the depth of its philosophical investigation, in the sheer bulk of surviving texts and in the diffusion of its ideas, the philosophical heritage of India easily stands comparison with that of China, Greece, the Latin West, or the Islamic world. (shrink)

Aphoristic work on Sankhya philosophy with Sanskrit commentary and Hindi translation of Sāṅkhyaśāstra, Maithili commentary by Durgādhara Jhā.

Treatise, with Sanskrit and Gujarati commentaries, Gujarati translation, on the epistemology of the Advaita philosophy.

Knowledge as a means of liberation in Advaitin Hinduism: evaluation from a Christian perspective.

An Introduction to Indian Philosophy offers a profound yet accessible survey of the development of India's philosophical tradition. Beginning with the formation of Brhmaical, Jaina, Materialist, and Buddhist traditions, Bina Gupta guides the reader through the classical schools of Indian thought, culminating in a look at how these traditions inform Indian philosophy and society in modern times. Offering translations from source texts and clear explanations of philosophical terms, this text provides a rigorous overview of Indian philosophical contributions to epistemology, metaphysics, (...) philosophy of language, and ethics. This is a must-read for anyone seeking a reliable and illuminating introduction to Indian philosophy. Key Updates in the Second Edition Reorganized into seven parts and fifteen chapters, making it easier for instructors to assign chapters for a semester-long course. Continues to introduce systems historically, but focuses on new key questions and issues within each system. Details new arguments, counter-arguments, objections, and their reformulations in the nine schools of Indian philosophy. Offers expanded discussion of how various schools of Indian philosophy are engaged with each other. Highlights key concepts and adds new grey boxes to explain selected key concepts. Includes a new section that problematizes the Western notion of "philosophy." New Suggested Readings sections are placed at the end of each chapter, which include recommended translations, a bibliography of important works, and pertinent recent scholarship for eachschool. Adds a new part (Part III) that explains the difficulties involved in translating from Sanskrit into English, discusses fundamental concepts and conceptual distinctions often used to present Indian philosophy to Western students, and reviews important features and maxims that most daranas follow. Provides new examples of applications to illustrate more obscure concepts and principles. (shrink)

On fundamentals of Yoga in Vedic literature and Indic philosophy.

Part 1. The nature of the absolute according to scriptures (samanvaya-adhyāya).

The first introduction of the Yogsutra to present the Sanskrit text as a classic of world philosophy.

Classical text on non-dualistic (Advaita) Vedanta philosophy.

Jean Klein a été l'un des principaux passeurs de la non-dualité indienne (advaita) et du yoga en France. Il a exercé et continue d'exercer une influence considérable dans les cercles de chercheurs spirituels. Dans cet ouvrage, Ludovic Fontaine a choisi d'interviewer trois enseignants, trois des principaux élèves de Jean Klein, qui s'inscrivent de manière originale et ouverte dans la perspective de leur maître. Eric Baret, Francis Lucille, et Jean-Marc Mantel présentent ici leur parcours spirituel, leur perspective propre sur la non-dualité, (...) l'éveil, la nature de la réalité. Ludovic les interroge également sur leur méthode d'enseignement : comment transmettent-ils l'éveil? Quel est leur rapport aux traditions (advaita vedanta, tantrisme cachemirien, yoga)? Quelles pratiques préconisent-ils? Qu'est-ce que ces pratiques non-duelles peuvent changer dans notre vie? Chacun pourra trouver dans ces magnifiques entretiens des renseignements précieux sur le chemin vers la liberté et la joie."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Treatise, with Saṃskr̥tacandrikā and Bhāṣācandrikā commentaries on the epistemology of the Advaita philosophy.

A detailed guide to Samkhya Vedic philosophy and how to break free from the cycles of rebirth.

Introductory chapter.--The Vedas.--The systems of philosophy.--Vedânta or Uttara-Mîmâmsâ.--Pûrva Mîmâmsâ.--Sâmkhyaphilosophy.--Yoga-philosophy.--Nyâya and Vaiseshika.--Vaiseshika philosophy.

The relation of the individual to the universe.--Soul consciousness.--The problem of evil.--The problem of self.--Realisation in love.--Realisation in action.--The realisation of beauty.--The realisation of the infinite.

The title refers to an unusual instance of ten occurrences of one stanza in a single philosophical work. The stanza in question highlighted here is the outcome of a previous study on the faults (_doṣas_) levelled against the non-one-sided position of the Jainas, the theory of manifoldness that aims at avoiding any absolutistic standpoint or perspective concerning an object of investigation (_anekāntavāda_). This article draws on a study published in 2007 on _doṣas_ or faults levelled against the Jainas. One aspect (...) of the debate on it is dealt with here in a bit more detail: the ten occurrences of the identical stanza in Samantabhadra’s 6th century _Āptamīmāṃsā_ (ĀM). Vidyānandin’s tenth century _Aṣṭasahasrī-_commentary to _Āptamīmāṃsā_ 71 and 72 mentions a list of seven faults (_doṣas)_ which, he says, do not apply to the Jaina _anekāntavāda_, with ĀM 70 thematically belonging to these two stanzas.The unique feature of ĀM 70 (which thematically belongs to ĀM 71 and 72 dealt with in the 2007 paper) in the context of Vidyānandin’s commentary is specifically dealt with here, because ĀM 70 is identical with ĀM 13, which is repeated ten times in all in Samantabhadra’s seminal work divided into ten chapters or sections (_paricchedas_) in the form now published. The paper will deal with some aspects of the repetitions of ĀM 70, the first occurrence being ĀM 13. (shrink)