Hobbes: Philosophy of Religion, Misc

Are human beings purely material creatures, or is there something else to them, an immaterial part that does some of the thinking, and might even be able to outlive the death of the body? This book is about how a series of seventeenth-century philosophers tried to answer that question. It begins by looking at the views of Thomas Hobbes, who developed a thoroughly materialist account of the human mind, and later of God as well. This is in obvious contrast to (...) the approach of his contemporary René Descartes. After examining Hobbes's materialism, Stewart Duncan considers the views of three of his English critics: Henry More, Ralph Cudworth, and Margaret Cavendish. Both More and Cudworth thought Hobbes's materialism radically inadequate to explain the workings of the world, while Cavendish developed a distinctive, anti-Hobbesian materialism of her own. The second half of the book focuses on the discussion of materialism in John Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding, arguing that we can better understand Locke's discussion if we see how and where he is responding to this earlier debate. At crucial points Locke draws on More and Cudworth to argue against Hobbes and other materialists. Nevertheless, Locke did a good deal to reveal how materialism was a genuinely possible view, by showing how one could develop a detailed account of the human mind without presuming it was an immaterial substance. This work probes the thought and debates that originated in the seventeenth-century yet extended far beyond it. And it offers a distinctive, new understanding of Locke's discussion of the human mind. (shrink)

This chapter considers Ralph Cudworth as a philosophical critic of Hobbes. Cudworth saw Hobbes as a representative of the three views he was attacking: atheism, determinism, and the denial that morality is eternal and immutable. Moreover, he did not just criticize Hobbes by assuming that a general critique of those views applied to Hobbes’s particular case. Rather, he singled out Hobbes, often by quoting him, and argued against the distinctively Hobbesian positions he had identified. In this chapter I look at (...) Cudworth as a critic of Hobbes in two of the three central areas, atheism and ethics, focusing on passages where we see him explicitly picking out Hobbes. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn Leviathan, Hobbes outlines the concept of the ‘Kingdome of God by Nature’ or ‘Naturall Kingdome of God’, terms rarely found in English texts at the time. This article traces the concept back to the Catechism of the Council of Trent, which sets forth a threefold understanding of God’s kingdom – the kingdoms of nature, grace, and glory – none of which refer to civil commonwealths on earth. Hobbes abandons this Catholic typology and transforms the concept of the natural kingdom (...) of God to advance a claim often missed by his interpreters: Leviathan-states are the manifestation of a real, not metaphorical, kingdom of God. This argument plays a key role in Leviathan, which identifies the kingdom of God as the Christian doctrine most subject to abuse. Hobbes harshly criticizes Catholic and Presbyterian clergy for claiming to represent God’s kingdom. This claim, he argues, comes with the subversive implication that the church possesses spiritual and temporal authority, and caused great turmoil during the English Civil War. As an alternative, Hobbes points to civil commonwealths as the manifestation of God’s natural kingdom, which is the only form his kingdom currently takes. (shrink)

By the time Hobbes wrote Leviathan, he was a theist, but not in the sense presumed by either side of the present-day debate concerning the sincerity of his professed theism. On the one hand, Hobbes’s expressed theology was neither merely deistic, nor confined to natural theology: the Hobbesian God is not merely a first mover, but a person who counsels, commands, and threatens. On the other hand, the Hobbesian God’s existence depends on being constructed artificially by human convention. The Hobbesian (...) God is not a natural person; he exists as a person only insofar as he is by fiction represented. Like the state and pagan gods, he is an artificial person by fiction. The upshot is that Hobbes was a sincere theist and that his seventeenth-century critics were right to think that, in their sense, he was an atheist: he did not steadfastly believe in an independently existing deity who precedes human convention. Hobbes was agnostic on this question. He nevertheless believed that God is brought into being as an artificial person. This ‘personal theology’ not only involved a heretical interpretation of the Trinity, it also came to play a significant role in his moral and political philosophy. (shrink)

Trata sobre los presupuestos metafísicos de aceptar la Biblia como Palabra de Dios. En particular, trata sobre la posibilidad de las intervenciones divinas, de los milagros y profecías. Responde al argumento de Hobbes por el determinismo, al principio de la clausura causal del mundo, a la crítica de Hume a la posibilidad de probar un milagro y a la negación de las profecías. This paper deals with the metaphysical presuppositions which underlie the acceptance of the Bible as the Word of (...) God. In particular, it deals with the possibility of divine interventions, miracles and prophecies. It answers to the Hobbesian argument for determinism, to the principle of the causal closure of the world, to Hume’s criticism of the possibility to prove miracles and to the negation of prophecies. (shrink)

SummaryScholars of international relations generally invoke Hobbes as the quintessential theorist of international anarchy. David Armitage challenges this characterisation, arguing that Hobbes is regarded as a foundational figure in international relations theory in spite of as much as because of what he wrote on the subject. Thus, for Armitage, Hobbes is not the theorist of anarchy that he is made out to be. This article agrees with the general thrust of Armitage's critique while maintaining that it is still possible to (...) imagine Hobbes as a theorist of anarchy. Hobbes is a theorist of anarchy, not in a political sense, but in a metaphysical sense. This conception of anarchy is a reflection of a comprehensive theological account of reality that is grounded in an omnipotent God. Any historical inquiry into the foundations of modern international thought must take account of theology, because theology defines the ultimate coordinates of reality in terms of which the concepts of international thought are intelligible. (shrink)

can natural human reason establish the existence of a first cause of all things? Hobbes tells us quite plainly that it can. Yet on other occasions he also tells us that our natural reason cannot rule out an eternal chain of causes with no beginning at all. The plot thickens when we consider his ambidextrous treatment of the only proof to which he gives any serious attention. On the one hand, Hobbes seems to endorse a fairly conventional version of the (...) cosmological argument in The Elements of Law and Leviathan, reasoning without apparent irony from the inadmissibility of an infinite regress of causes to the existence of a first cause of all. On the other hand, he systematically attacks this sort of cosmological.. (shrink)

The increasing secularization of political thought between the mid-seventeenth and mid-nineteenth centuries has often been noted, but rarely described in detail. The contributors to this volume consider the significance of the relationship between religious beliefs, dogma and secular ideas in British political philosophy from Thomas Hobbes to J.S. Mill. During this period, Britain experienced the advance of natural science, the spread of education and other social improvements, and reforms in the political realm. These changes forced religion to account for itself (...) and to justify its existence, both as a social institution and as a collection of fundamental articles of belief about the world and its operations. This book, originally published in 1990, conveys the crucial importance of the association between religion, secularization and political thought. (shrink)

The argument laid out in this book discusses and interprets the work of Hobbes in relation to religion. It compares a traditional interpretation of Hobbes where Hobbes’ use of conventional terminology when talking about natural law is seen as ironic or merely convenient despite an atheist viewpoint, with the view that Hobbes’ morality is truly traditional and Christian. The book considers other thinkers of the age in tandem with Hobbes and discusses in detail his theology inspired by corporeal mechanics. The (...) position is that there are significant senses in which Hobbes can be said to be a traditional natural law theorist. (shrink)

This paper tests the extent of Spinoza’s liberalism through examining the question whether he would tolerate atheists. The first section analyzes the meaning of atheism through the epistolary exchange with Lambert van Velthuysen. It argues that it makes a difference whether Spinoza is an atheist in the strict sense—someone who explicitly denies the existence of God—or a deist—someone who holds a view of unorthodox God. Spinoza denies the charge that his idea of God undermines morality and he also defends his (...) claim that other monotheistic religions than Christianity might contain a kernel of truth. In the second section, the paper discusses Spinoza’s views on toleration. It argues that the state has a limited interest in regulating religious views and it does this through the “dogmas of universal faith.” The state should tolerate a variety of beliefs about God, including those labeled deist, but strict atheistic beliefs, however, are not to be tolerated. In the third section the paper discusses the challenge of the “virtuous atheist” and compares Spinoza’s views to those of Locke and Bayle. Not only Spinoza’s metaphysics but also his ethical project depends on the proper idea of God. Spinoza explicitly contrasts his view, based on a deist conception of God, with that of Hobbes. He reads Hobbes as an epicurean and an atheist. Spinoza’s critical description of Hobbes’s view helps us understand what he thought atheism was and why he was not very sympathetic to it. Spinoza is intolerant towards atheism because it leads to an immoral life and justifies an absolutist state. (shrink)

This paper brings new work to bear on the perennial question about Hobbes's atheism to show that as a debate about scepticism it is falsely framed. Hobbes, like fellow members of the Mersenne circle, Descartes and Gassendi, was no sceptic, but rather concerned to rescue physics and metaphysics from radical scepticism by exploring corporealism. In his early letter of November 1640, Hobbes had issued a provocative challenge to Descartes to abandon metaphysical dualism and subscribe to a ?corporeal God?; a provocation (...) to which the Frenchman angrily responded, but was perhaps importantly influenced. Hobbes's minimal realism was consonant with atheism, to which Descartes felt he was being forced. Moreover, Hobbes was unrelenting in his battle against Cartesian dualism, for which he saw Robert Boyle's experimental science as a surrogate. (shrink)

The Medieval period was one of the richest eras for the philosophical study of religion. Covering the period from the 6th to the 16th century, reaching into the Renaissance, "The History of Western Philosophy of Religion 2" shows how Christian, Islamic and Jewish thinkers explicated and defended their religious faith in light of the philosophical traditions they inherited from the ancient Greeks and Romans. The enterprise of 'faith seeking understanding', as it was dubbed by the medievals themselves, emerges as a (...) vibrant encounter between - and a complex synthesis of - the Platonic, Aristotelian and Hellenistic traditions of antiquity on the one hand, and the scholastic and monastic religious schools of the medieval West, on the other. "Medieval Philosophy of Religion" will be of interest to scholars and students of Philosophy, Medieval Studies, the History of Ideas, and Religion, while remaining accessible to any interested in the rich cultural heritage of medieval religious thought. (shrink)

Dieu est corps : parmi toutes les doctrines polémiques de Thomas Hobbes, celle qui affirme la corporéité de Dieu l’est tout particulièrement.De nombreux philosophes et théologiens contemporains de Hobbes l’ont du reste perçue comme un immense et insupportable « scandale ». Cependant, bien souvent, ils y ont vu aussi une thèse véritablement centrale de la philosophie de Hobbes, alors que de nombreux interprètes ultérieurs, encore aujourd’hui, ont été tentés de la renvoyer plutôt à ses marges. La présente recherche essaie de (...) montrer que cette thèse, liée à sa décision théorique de fond en faveur de l’univocité de l’étant, joue bien un rôle majeur dans la pensée de Hobbes. (shrink)

A.P. Martinich's interpretation that in Leviathan Thomas Hobbes believed that the laws of nature are the commands of God and that he did not rely on the Bible to prove this has been criticized by Greg Forster in this journal (2003). Forster uses these criticisms to develop his own view that Hobbes was insincere when he professed religious beliefs. We argue that Forster misrepresents Martinich's view, is mistaken about what evidence is relevant to interpreting whether Hobbes was sincere or not, (...) and is mistaken about some of Hobbes's central doctrines. Forster's criticisms are worth discussing at length for at least three reasons. He takes the debate about Hobbes's sincerity to a new level of sophistication; his misinterpretations of Hobbes may become accepted as correct; and his criticisms raise issues about the proper method of interpreting historical texts. (shrink)

The charge of Hobbism assumes a prominent position in some accounts of Locke's thought. This essay argues that the charge is misconceived, not least because it fails to appreciate the true character of Hobbes's thinking and its relation to Locke's. Hobbes's architectonic retains the traditional intellectual structure of natural law thinking, articulating it around the demands of his metaphysics in ways important for his political theory. Locke decisively rejects this structure and in doing so opens up the conceptual space that (...) makes his own, very different political theory possible. At the same time, the essay establishes how Locke's account of natural law implies, and receives support from, views of Jesus Christ and Christianity quite different to those preferred by his contemporaries -- including Hobbes -- but consonant with the demands of his political theory. (shrink)

In this paper I provide an interpretation of Hobbes 's account of miracles in Leviathan. Four main theses are defended: that Hobbes affirms a single account of miracles, not several non-equivalent accounts, that Hobbes 's main objective is political – he wants to explain how the doctrine of miracles must be understood in order for it not to pose a threat to political stability, that Hobbes 's discussion is not designed to undermine the doctrine of miracles in its entirety, and (...) that Hobbes 's considered view of miracles is compatible with the modern scientific worldview to which he is committed. (shrink)

Il saggio illustra le ragioni alla base di quella tradizione politica che indica in un raffinamento culturale delle strategie della paura la soluzione dei conflitti mortali che minacciano la vita sociale, e si spinge oltre, a indagare la corposa sezione del Leviatano che affronta questioni religiose, cioè quell’area della vita umana in cui i conflitti non riguardano i beni morali bensì la diversità di opinioni relative alle condizioni della salvezza. Qui gli strumenti della violenza politica risultano inservibili e si rende (...) necessario ‘persuadere’ gli individui della compatibilità fra obbedienza al sovrano e obbedienza a Dio.The paper examines the foundations of a political tradition according to which culturally sophisticated strategies of fear represent the most powerful tool to resolve social conflicts. Moreover the paper focuses on that part of Leviathan, dealing with religious issues, with that side of human life where conflicts stem from the variety of opinions regarding the conditions of salvation. In this case the tool of political violence is not useful. Hobbes thinks that this kind of conflicts can be resolved only if all the individuals involved will be persuaded of the consistency between obedience to the King and obedience to God. (shrink)

Scholars generally divide into two camps regarding the role of religion in Hobbes's Leviathan. One side claims that the natural-law doctrine of Leviathan cannot work without sincere belief in God, and Leviathan's theology is sincerely intended to support it. The other side insists that the natural-law doctrine is intended to replace religious ethics and that the theology is insincere. This article first considers two arguments for the 'insincere' reading, the strangeness of Hobbes's theology and his use of certain rhetorical devices, (...) and finds them inadequate. It then analyses Hobbes's natural-law doctrine and argues that there is a fatal interpretive flaw in the 'sincere' reading -- no argument can be made consistent with Hobbes's philosophy to show that the natural law of self-preservation is in fact God's law, so his natural-law doctrine cannot rely on God's moral authority as Hobbes claims it does. (shrink)

It is uncontroversial that the main goal of Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan is to show the inhabitants of a commonwealth, notably England, how they can obtain lasting internal peace. Given his absolutism, Hobbes must provide an argument for absolutism and criteria for the identification of the absolute sovereign in order to achieve this goal. However, there is an important related question: are both halves of Leviathan, with Parts 1 and 2 making up the first half and Parts 3 and 4 the (...) second, necessary in order to satisfy these two conditions? ;In this dissertation, I give an affirmative answer to this question by offering an interpretation of Leviathan that explains how the four parts fit together to form a coherent whole. I argue that Leviathan, much like Hobbes' Christian commonwealth, should be viewed as a unified work that has two aspects, secular and religious. The Christian commonwealth has its civil and ecclesiastical sides that are united in the person of the sovereign. Likewise, Leviathan is clearly divided in half, with the first half based upon reason and the second half arguing from reason and revelation. Yet, these two halves, the secular and the religious, are united by parallel arguments for absolutism and the identification of the sovereign that, ultimately, are founded upon materialism. Hobbes' materialism provides the foundation for his conception of human nature and his deduction of the laws of nature in Part 1 and for his theory of sovereignty in Part 2. This same materialism, along with the other principles of biblical exegesis used by Hobbes, forms the foundation for the interpretations of Scripture that are used to argue in Part 3 that the nominal civil authority is the absolute sovereign in Christian commonwealths. Part 4 relies on materialism in order to undermine the dualistic metaphysics, and certain religious doctrines that it supports, that Hobbes feels threatens the positive arguments that he has presented in Part 3. In this way, materialism unites the work in terms of substance and the parallel argumentative strategy unites the work in terms of logical structure. (shrink)

La problematique politique de Hobbes se presente comme une charniere entre deux types de problematiques: la problematique theologique, ou la politique etait englobee par la transcendance, et la "moderne" problematique anthropologique qui fonde la politique sur l'essence et la volonte de l'homme. La pensee de Hobbes n'est reductible a aucune de ces deux problematiques. ;De ce double mouvement decoule une tentative d'autonomisation du discours politique: le champ politique devient objet et matiere de science, il requiert une realite autonome. Cette autonomisation (...) peut etre assimilee a une liberation du champ politique: il se degage de l'emprise de la transcendance, il n'est plus un "moment" du discours philosophique, metaphysique ou religieux. L'autonomie est ainsi un retour sur lui-meme du discours politique. ;Par la meme, le probleme religieux est envisage sous l'angle de la notion de pouvoir. Le probleme de Hobbes s'enonce ainsi: quelle est l'organisation politique qui peut atteindre au maximum de puissance, au maximum de securite? ;Le probleme politique, c'est le probleme du pouvoir. Et le pouvoir requiert un absolu incompatible avec un absolu de type religieux. ;A plusieurs reprises, Hobbes precise qu'il ecrit sur le pouvoir en tant que tel, sur ses mecanismes. Il veut parler du pouvoir dans l'absolu, et non de ses formes concretes et contingentes d'exercice. ;L'objectif est double: d'une part faire une oeuvre "realiste", "utile", tenant compte de la realite des passions humaines , et de la situation presente de l'Angleterre au dix-septieme siecle. ;D'autre part faire une oeuvre scientifique, enoncant des verites speculatives, des "regles", des "theoremes" politiques valables en tous les temps et en tous les lieux. Il s'agit en quelque sorte de rendre la science efficiente. ;Le probleme primordial de l'homme: sa survie au milieu de ses semblables, n'a jamais fait l'objet d'une etude systematique. Sous le pretexte que la politique est le domaine ou s'affrontent les passions humaines, on a toujours neglige une approche scientifique du probleme. Plus exactement, on a laisse se repandre de vaines chimeres, des mauvaises litteratures sur le sujet. On trouve en germe, chez Hobbes, une idee proche de Rousseau: les hommes ont ete corrompus et ainsi, ils ne cessent de se combattre et de renverser leurs princes: "Si j'avais ecrit, comme sur une table rase, dans des coeurs purs, j'aurais pu etre plus bref...mais comme je savais que les esprits avaient auparavant ete barbouilles de doctrines contraires, j'ai pense devoir expliquer cela plus longuement" 2 conclut Hobbes. ;2Leviathan. Chap. XLVII, edition latine. p. 711. (shrink)

George Wright - Curley and Martinich in Dubious Battle - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.4 461-476 Curley and Martinich in Dubious Battle George Wright the division of opinion as to the place of religion in the thought of Thomas Hobbes figures today as perhaps the key facet of a general rift in understanding the philosopher's thought and work. A recent conference at University College, London, confirms this observation, but readers of this (...) journal had some time before witnessed an encounter between Edwin Curley, University of Michigan, and A. P. Martinich, University of Texas, which laid out lines of argument that continue to figure in the debate. When two highly accomplished and learned philosophers divide on fundamental points, the result must be of interest. But here the theme itself also compelled attention: Hobbes's theology. Had these dry bones risen? If so, could the dancing angels be far to seek, and what then of the filioque? While there were gestures of accommodation and agreement throughout the exchange, the essentials that divided the two at the beginning largely remained at the end. What assumptions underlay this disagreement and determined its rather unsatisfying conclusion? In answer, I would draw the reader's attention to the peculiarities of the contested concept, that of authorial sincerity: Martinich tenaciously ascribing it to Hobbes's theologus; Curley steadfastly withholding.. (shrink)

This paper explores an internal relation between wrong-doing and the ability to think in moral terms, through Hobbes ’ thought. I use his neglected retelling of our ‘original sin’ as a springboard, seeing how we then discover a need to vindicate our own projects in terms shared by others. We become normatively demanding creatures: greedy for normative vindication, eager to judge others amid the difficulties of our world. However there is, of course, no choice for us but to choose our (...) own principles of judgment, or at least some authority to provide these. Unconvinced by Hobbes ’ remedies, I conclude with one implication for moral [email protected] a need to look rather differently at agency and responsibility. (shrink)

There are three views on the meaning of Hobbes's theology for his political theory: Hobbes's political theory can be understood completely without taking account of his theology ; Hobbes in fact teaches a "divine command theory of political obligation"; his theology is a rhetorical weapon in his polemics against Catholics and Presbyterians, whom he suspects of seeking to endanger the political peace in the interest of their own religious goals. To show that the third is the most plausible, the author (...) examines Hobbes's reversal of the medieval doctrine of the "two swords" as a departure point for a consideration of the content of Hobbes's theology as well as its function in his argument. The author suggests that, with his functional view of faith, Hobbes is the founding father of modern political theology and that the realization of this fact might rightly raise doubts about the theological defensibility of political theology. (shrink)

Since a comprehensive assessment of the ideological reasons, authenticity and role of Hobbes's explicit adherence to Luther's teachings is missing up to this day, the present essay attempts to address the important issue of Hobbes's Lutheranism afresh in three successive steps. First of all, it is necessary to make out at what particular time and under which specific circumstances Hobbes made the most substantial use of Luther's theology. Only if the historical context of Hobbes's most emphatic display of Lutheran doctrines (...) becomes firmly established can we hope to understand what the strategical point of his Lutheranism might have been. Secondly, it is indispensable for an evaluation of the authenticity of Hobbes's Lutheranism to explore whether Hobbes quoted Luther correctly or whether he, perhaps deliberatedly, misrepresented Luther's teachings to further his own cause. Thirdly, a comprehensive appraisal of Hobbes's allegiance to Lutheran doctrines ought not to overlook how his coevals reacted to his claims. Since, among his contemporaries, both philosophers and theologians responded to his Lutheranism in a highly critical manner, the most relevant of their opinions have to be carefully examined. (shrink)