Hobbes: Context

La silogística aristotélica muestra algunos antecedentes del formalismo lógico en tanto sistema deductivo axiomático que emplea nociones de implicación y validez, además de usar variables en los términos. Los megárico-estoicos estudiaron la implicación material y formal o estricta, mientras que los escolásticos formaron ideas sobre un lenguaje depurado para la lógica. Además de las ideas de Lulio, Descartes, Leibniz o Hobbes, los estudios combinatorios de Alberto Magno, la insistencia de Roger Bacon en la importancia de la matemática como paradigma de (...) la demostración en las ciencias y en la lógica, y las consideraciones formales de Juan Buridan y Walter Burleigh sobre la lógica pura en tanto estudio sitáctico-semántico de los esquemas de inferencia y los principios primitivos que comandan el funcionamiento de la lógica, son algunos antecedentes del cálculo lógico que vino por primera vez con George Boole en el siglo XIX. (shrink)

This article argues that there is much more continuity in Hobbes’s thinking on the church and religion than critics have recognized. I consider three issues which have been taken as prime illustrations of Hobbes’s alleged ‘new departure’ in the Leviathan: the nature and fate of the soul; the character of magic and revelation; and church-state relations. I show that in particular Richard Tuck’s interpretation of Hobbes’s intellecual development is mistaken. There is no ‘fundamental reversal’ or ‘new direction’ in Hobbes’s position, (...) but rather a development and an extension of a line of thinking which is already clearly visible in the earlier works. (shrink)

Idiosyncrasies of Hobbes's composition process, together with a paucity of reliable autobiographical materials and the norms of seventeenth-century manuscript production, render interpretation of his political theory particularly difficult and contentious. These difficulties are surveyed here under three headings: the process of "serial" composition, which was common in the period; the relationship between Hobbes's three political-theory texts-- the "Elements of Law, De Cive ", and "Leviathan", which is basic to defining the textual embodiment of his theory, and controversial; and his method (...) of writing. I argue that Hobbes's composition process undercut his intention to produce a deductive, logical theory of politics and opened the door to inconsistency and muddle in his arguments. (shrink)

No doctrine of Pufendorf's is better known than that of socialitas. The reason is that Pufendorf himself declared that socialitas was the foundation of natural law. No interpreter of Pufendorf can therefore avoid dealing with it. Moreover, Pufendorf linked the issue of socialitas to the question of the state of nature, thus raising important issues with both theological and philosophical implications. Given the prominence and importance of this theme in Pufendorf's work, a close analysis of what he meant by it (...) is central to the interpretation of his work, even though this means to pose again a new number of questions already discussed in the scholarly literature. In particular, this article examines the relationship between Pufendorf and Hobbes with regard to this central theme. In fact, a traditional historiographic topos is that Pufendorf and Hobbes fundamentally disagree on the doctrine of socialitas, while the former is closer to Grotius and to the Aristotelian-classic tradition that see man as a social animal. This article takes, instead, Pufendorf to be a follower of Hobbes, and tries to explain how the more traditional view of Pufendorf as a critic of Hobbes was in some way due to Pufendorf's own attempt to distance himself from the accusations of Hobbesism (and hence of atheism and moral indifference) that the critics made against him when his work first appeared. In order to do this, Pufendorf tried to rethink his own position within the history of ethics, and put himself on the side of the Stoics, of Grotius and of Cumberland, against Epicurus and Hobbes. This retrospective ‘illusion’ has greatly influenced later scholarship, giving us a distorted image of Pufendorf's own view of socialitas. A more precise account of the latter gives a better prospective from which to look at the relationship between Pufendorf and Hobbes. ☆ The publication of this text, in this form, may require some explanation. In what it now appears the very distant June 1989, the Max-Planck-Institut für Geschichte in Göttingen organised an International Workshop on ‘Unsocial Sociability: Modern natural Law and the 18th-Century Discourse of Politics, History and Society’. The proceedings of that Workshop were never published, even though individual contributions have piecemeal appeared since then. My own contribution consisted in a short extract from a chapter from my book Samuel Pufendorf discepolo di Hobbes. Per una reinterpretazione del giusnaturalismo moderno (Bologna, 1990), which appeared in print the following year. For this reason, I considered the separate publication of that intervention as superfluous. Rather naively I underestimated the fact that the publication of my book in Italian restricted its circulation in the Anglo-American academic circles, and even if occasionally quoted, the book would not be much read. Recently, following the solicitations of many friends to present in English part of the theses developed in that book, I had decided to have my intervention at the Göttingen Workshop finally published. After all, this had amply circulated as a manuscript and been cited by many in that form. But while I was planning to revise that manuscript, I was presented with the draft translation of the second chapter of my book done by Dr. Melissa Calaresu of Cambridge University, when she was still a graduate student. It is probably better to leave aside the story of why Melissa did that translation, but I am extremely grateful to her for having allowed me to use it as the basis for this piece, which is therefore a revised version of the second chapter of my Italian book on Hobbes. I have decided to publish it in English with some hesitation, at least for two reasons. First, because with the publication in English of only part of my book I may risk to reinforce a rather simplified interpretation of my work, and consequently of Pufendorf's thought, that his main contribution lies in his doctrine of socialitas and of the state of nature. I am instead firmly convinced that the most important parts of my own work are those that are still untranslated, that is those on the nature of moral obligation and that of moral entities, beside the comparison I make in the second part of the book between the first and the second edition of De iure. Secondly, because during the intervening years I have distanced myself from a conception of the history of philosophy understood as an internal analysis of the texts, and have become more attentive to the context in which to place philosophical texts. I have therefore developed a slight impatience towards the rather nick-picking analysis of texts, which with a certain virtuosism I performed in the book. Nonetheless, since even after so many years I do not believe that the theses I developed in that book have lost their force, I am happy for this partial translation, with some essential bibliographic updating, to appear, in the hope that such theses will be finally discussed for what they are and not on the basis of second-hand reports. I am grateful to Dario Castiglione for his precious help with the final revision of the text, and to Richard Whatmore and Brian Young for their willingness to publish this translation in their Journal. (shrink)

This article recounts Foucault’s critical reevaluation of Thomas Hobbes in his 1975-76 lecture course, published as Society Must Be Defended (2003). In probing Hobbes’ pivotal role in the foundation of the modern nation-state, Foucault delineates the ”philosophico-juridical” discourse of Leviathan from the ”historico-political” discourses of the English insurrectionists whose uncompromising demands were ultimately paved over by the more conventional seventeenth century debate between royalists and parliamentarians. In his most sustained engagement with political philosophy proper, Foucault effectively severs the two co-constitutive (...) terms, enumerating the damning consequences of thinking politics apart from history and philosophy apart from the laws and codes that had been “born in the mud and blood of battles.” Displacing himself in the archive, Foucault doubles the Levellers and Diggers’ efforts to restage the violent conquests that undergird our seemingly calm governmental regimes. This doubling, I argue, evinces the profound influence of Deleuze’s innovative ontology of time on Foucault’s genealogical method. Foucault’s research strategy takes a fundamental turn towards specific techniques of cultural memory in the wake of his colleague’s radical reconceptualization of virtuality, difference, and repetition. To this end, I take up Foucault’s review essay ”Theatrum Philosophicum” and his comments on method in ”Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” in order to draw an analogy between what he does in 1976 and what the Levellers and Diggers were doing in 1651. In the final analysis, genealogy means war, and, in this war, it is the very being of the virtual itself that is at stake. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), whose current reputation rests largely on his political philosophy, was a thinker with wide ranging interests. In philosophy, he defended a range of materialist, nominalist, and empiricist views against Cartesian and Aristotelian alternatives. In physics, his work was influential on Leibniz, and lead him into disputes with Boyle and the experimentalists of the early Royal Society. In history, he translated Thucydides's History of the Peloponnesian War into English, and later wrote his own history of the Long Parliament. (...) In mathematics he was less successful, and is best remembered for his repeated unsuccessful attempts to square the circle. But despite that, Hobbes was a serious and prominent participant in the intellectual life of his time. (shrink)

Stewart Duncan’s excellent book Materialism from Hobbes to Locke offers an insightful study of the debates concerning materialism during the seventeenth century. When we hear the expression ‘materialism’, we often associate with it the question of whether the human mind is an entirely material entity. Although the question of whether the human mind is material plays an important role throughout the seventeenth-century debates examined in this book, Duncan offers a broader understanding of materialism that is not restricted to the human (...) mind. According to Duncan, materialism is ‘a view about some object or a group of objects. Often that object is the human mind’ (2), but materialism can also concern other objects such as animal minds or God. This leads Duncan to introduce materialism as ‘the view that the thing in question is wholly material, and has no immaterial part’ (2). He deliberately leaves open what it means to be material, because different philosophers featured in his book disagree about this question. (shrink)

Margaret Cavendish is widely known as a materialist. However, since Cavendishian matter is always in motion, “matter” and “motion” are equally important foundational concepts for her natural philosophy. In Philosophical Letters (1664), she takes to task her materialist rival Thomas Hobbes by assaulting his account of accidents in general and his concept of “rest” in particular. In this article, I argue that Cavendish defends her continuous-motion view in two ways: first, she claims that her account avoids seeing accidents as capable (...) of generation and annihilation, which she argues is inconceivable; and second, she contends that according to Hobbes’s own view “rest” is an absurd conception since it cannot be drawn from experience. Beyond its function as a defense, I claim that Cavendish’s focused criticism of “rest” shows that she is a perceptive reader of Hobbes’s natural philosophy, insofar as her criticisms undercut the two a priori principles of Hobbesian physics. Finally, I show how her views developed in more detail in Philosophical and Physical Opinions (1663) and Observations upon Experimental Philosophy ([1666] 2001) avoid the worries she raises for Hobbesian materialism. (shrink)

Les tacitistes utilisent l’œuvre de l’historien pour en extraire des conseils aux gouvernants. Hobbes et Spinoza se servent au contraire des récits de Tacite comme matériaux pour constituer leur théorie des affects et expliquer le rôle que jouent ceux-ci dans la politique. Dans leur structure théorique, ils donnent aux exemples une fonction confirmative et une fonction anthropologique ; Spinoza leur donne en outre une fonction anticipatrice. La fonction confirmative a également pour rôle d’empêcher la théorie politique de se transformer en (...) utopie. (shrink)

The centrality of glory, contempt, and revengefulness to Leviathan’s account of war is highlighted by three contextual features: Hobbes’s displacement of the traditional conception of glory as intrinsically intersubjective and comparative; his incorporation of the Aristotelian view that revengefulness is provoked by expressions of mere contempt; and the evolution of his account between 1640 and 1651. An archeology of Leviathan’s famous chapter thirteen confirms that Hobbes’s thesis throughout his career was that disagreement is the universal cause of war because prickly, (...) glory-seeking humans view its expression as a sign of contempt: although Leviathan abandons Hobbes’s previous argument that war is primarily rooted in vainglorious individuals pursuing domination, Leviathan’s ‘glory’ argument for war is a descendent of the older ‘comparison’, not ‘vanity’, argument. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article traces the considerable development of a language of representation derived from Cicero's De officiis from late antiquity into early modern scholastic political thought. Cicero turned to the term persona, which signified the mask worn by actors of ancient theatre, to describe the particular duty of a magistrate who was understood ‘to bear the person of the city [se gerere personam civitatis]’. Thomas Hobbes's reliance on this terminology for his theory of the state in Leviathan is well known, (...) and we are now increasingly aware of its centrality before Hobbes in parliamentary and humanist discourse. What we have yet to register, however, is the extent and depth of scholastic appropriations and refashionings of this vocabulary. Cicero's language of representation is persistently at work in scholastic writing, from Augustine and Aquinas to Suárez and Bellarmine, and it functions in ways that reveal remarkable continuities and discontinuities with respect to its classical origins. The first task of this article is to expose this neglected channel through which this language was transmitted into early modernity. The second is to begin illuminating the early stages of political representation in the ‘second scholastic’ with an analysis of Francisco de Vitoria's De potestate civili (1528). (shrink)

Volume 25, Issue 2, February - March 2020, Page 229-231.

Despite the importance of Leibniz's mature philosophy, his early work has been relatively neglected. This collection begins with an overview of his formative years and includes 12 original papers by internationally-known scholars. The contributions reflect the wide range of the young Leibniz's philosophical interests and his interests in related subjects, including law, physics and theology. Some chapters explore his relationship to other philosophers, including his teachers in Leipzig and Jena and his Paris friend Tschirnhaus, as well as Hobbes and Spinoza. (...) Others focus on particular periods or texts and deal with themes ranging from ethics and free-will to his philosophically-significant account of transubstantiation and his early monadology. Some of the topics are familiar to Leibniz students - harmony, sufficient reason and possible worlds, for instance - but others are less familiar - for instance, his attitude to historical truth, millenarianism and the relation of mathematics to the natural world. The book provides an introduction to Leibniz's early philosophy and throws light on the development of some of the doctrines with which he is particularly associated. (shrink)

This chapter concentrates on the mimetic theory of Rene Girard in evaluating foundational myths of violence. It shows Girard's notion of the scapegoating mechanism, whereby a substitute victim absorbs the mimetic animosities of the entire group and thereby promotes peace, as applicable to the disturbing tendency to direct violence outward toward exogenous groups. According to Girard, competition is the main source of human violence. His explanation, that violence has its roots in competition or mimetic rivalry, contributes to Thomas Hobbes, who (...) also highlighted this cause of violence at the beginning of the modern era. The Abrahamic solidarity with the victim easily becomes an aggressive weapon if taking the side of the victim is not connected with the forgiveness of persecutors. Girard interprets the imitation of Christ in the context of rivalries prohibited in the tenth commandment of the First Testament. -/- . (shrink)

RESUMEN Se busca mostrar la fuerte herencia voluntarista tardo-medieval de origen escotista en la filosofía política moderna, sobre todo en Bodino, Maquiavelo y Hobbes, pero también en Locke, Rousseau y Kant. Se examina la concepción escotista del poder y su fundamentación filosófico-teológica, así como algunos tópicos de su "nueva" metafísica y antropología para desglosar sus consecuencias directas o indirectas en la filosofía política moderna. ABSTRACT The article seeks to demonstrate the strong late medieval voluntaristic legacy of Scotus in modern political (...) philosophy, especially in Bodin, Machiavelli, and Hobbes, but also in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. It examines the Scotist conception of power and its philosophical-theological foundations, as well as some of the topics of his "new" metaphysics and anthropology in order to identify their direct or indirect consequences for modern political philosophy. (shrink)

En este artículo, se estudiará la defensa de Suárez de la potestad indirecta, así como la crítica de Hobbes, tema descuidado por la bibliografía. A pesar de que se suele considerar la postura suareciana como moderada, insistiré en su similitud con la teocracia. Por otra parte, aunque se reconocerá a Hobbes como más cercano a la solución contemporánea, se recordará que su pulsión monocrática le impide dar cuenta de cómo es posible la coexistencia armónica de un poder civil y otro (...) religioso. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and Religious Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England 1640–1700A. P. MartinichJon Parkin. Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and Religious Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England 1640–1700. Ideas in Context, 82. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Pp. xi + 449. Cloth, $115.Parkin’s book covers the same period and much of the same material as John Bowle’s Hobbes (...) and his Critics (1951) and Samuel Mintz’s The Hunting of Leviathan (1962), but his scholarship is more extensive and significantly better than that of the earlier books. The scholarship is similar to that of Jeffrey Collins in Hobbes’s Allegiance and belongs to the same school of Cambridge contextualism. Parkin’s book contains good summaries of the books and pamphlets that were published about Hobbes’ political and religious philosophy from 1640 until 1700. While much of this material is known to Hobbes scholars, Parkin has discovered or brought into play a large number of other works. It is good to have all of this material discussed in one place.The book contains, in addition to an Introduction and Conclusion, seven chapters: 1. Reading Hobbes before Leviathan (1640–1651); 2. Leviathan (1651–1654); 3. The Storm (1654–1658); 4. Restoration (1658–1666); 5. Hobbes and Hobbism (1666–1675); [End Page 142] 6. Hobbes and the Restoration Crisis (1675–1685); and 7. Hobbes in the Glorious Revolution (1685–1700).Parkin’s explications of the arguments of Hobbes’ contemporaries, his judgments about their criticisms of Hobbes, and the nature of Hobbes’ own work are too often unsuccessful. He usually does not discuss the structures of the arguments at all, as if narrative is incompatible with analysis, and he often uses tendentious language where argumentation is needed. Parkin uncritically uses “success” words where a hedged phrase is needed. It is quite doubtful that “[Samuel] Ward showed that reason and philosophy” did not subvert “traditional natural ethics” (167; my italics) rather than only trying or purporting to show that. Also, Parkin rarely notices that Hobbes’ critics often misunderstood him. For example, they all think that Hobbes claims that the whole world was in the state of nature at one time. Parkin gives little or no indication that he understands that the state of nature is primarily a concept in a thought experiment (167). The primary lesson of the reception of Hobbes’ philosophy between 1640 and 1700 was that his critics thoroughly misunderstood it, but Parkin ultimately does not appreciate it (e.g., 411; cf. 2, 5, 9). Some critics thought that Hobbes was a republican. There is good evidence that some of his critics never read Hobbes. William Sherlock, for example, writing after the Glorious Revolution, rejects Hobbes’ imagined de facto-ism to embrace a supposedly non-Hobbesian consent theory. In the 1690s, Hobbes the atheist was a convenient bogy. Ironies abound. The nonjurors who railed against Hob-bes, now over a decade dead, and deplored the Toleration Act, were in fact supporting his preference for a strong national church. A good book could be written with the title From Hobbes to Hobbism (cf. 3–4). Parkin does not emphasize that Hobbes’ critics “often absorbed his ideas at the same time as they attacked him” (412).As for his interpretation of Hobbes’ philosophy, Parkin seems uncritically to accept the interpretations of Quentin Skinner, even where they are fairly obviously mistaken. For example, following some of Skinner’s early essays on Hobbes, Parkin says that Leviathan defended de facto theory (193), although later in the book, he seems not to accept this position (e.g., 362, 373). What Skinner ignored is a central feature of Hobbes’ philosophy, namely that no obligation is incurred except through some act of one’s own. This feature is incompatible with a central feature of de facto theory, namely, that a government is legitimate when it has the power to coerce. Parkin thinks that consent theory is a form of de facto theory (387, 412). Even Skinner in his collected essays, Visions of Politics, has backed off somewhat from his earlier view.Parkin writes, “One of the aims of this study has been... (shrink)

Lemos’s examination of the political philosophies of Hobbes and Locke has as its intended focus "the timeless philosophical significance of their positions and arguments." He is as much concerned, however, with correcting their arguments and carrying out the implications of his own corrections as he is with their thought. Lemos’s decision to disregard the metaphysics, physics, psychology, and epistemology of Hobbes and Locke is merely stated, without support. One might dispute its validity. Likewise, his exclusion of any references to the (...) predecessors or contemporaries of Hobbes and Locke and references to other interpretations costs his book valuable perspective. (shrink)

Causality is without doubt one of the main topics of Hobbes's philosophy. Quite justifiably, F. Brandt stated that Chapters 9 and 10 of De Corpore, which expound Hobbes's doctrine of causality, are the most crucial ones ever written by Hobbes. According to Hobbes the quest for causes is the quintessence of all philosophical inquiry. "Philosophy is such knowledge of effects or appearances, as we acquire by true ratiocination from the knowledge we have first of their causes or generation. And again, (...) of such causes or generations as may be from knowing first their effects." Although this definition as such is quite peculiar and fraught with difficulties, the description of philosophy in terms of causal knowledge is in itself rather traditional. Hobbes himself admits that he follows the Aristotelian dictum scire est per causas scire. However, although Hobbes agrees with the Aristotelians that knowledge bears a causal character, he fundamentally disagrees with them as to "what he saw to be genuinely causative." Hobbes's doctrine of causes may be seen as a systematic attempt to discard the scholastic view on causality and replace it with strict mechanistic explanatory principles. Therefore, Hobbes's theory of causality can only be understood properly if we put it against its scholastic background, which is the line of interpretation followed in the present article. It will be made clear that Hobbes's relation to scholasticism is rather complex, ranging from downright rejection to the adoption of terminological distinctions as well as of specific arguments and doctrines. (shrink)

Accounts of Hobbes’s ‘system’ of sciences oscillate between two extremes. On one extreme, the system is portrayed as wholly axiomtic-deductive, with statecraft being deduced in an unbroken chain from the principles of logic and first philosophy. On the other, it is portrayed as rife with conceptual cracks and fissures, with Hobbes’s statements about its deductive structure amounting to mere window-dressing. This paper argues that a middle way is found by conceiving of Hobbes’s _Elements of Philosophy_ on the model of a (...) mixed-mathematical science, not the model provided by Euclid’s _Elements of Geometry_. I suggest that Hobbes is a test case for understanding early-modern system-construction more generally, as inspired by the structure of the applied mathematical sciences. This approach has the additional virtue of bolstering, in a novel way, the thesis that the transformation of philosophy in the long seventeenth century was heavily indebted to mathematics, a thesis that has increasingly come under attack in recent years. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes is widely acknowledged as the most important political philosopher to have written in English. Originally published in 2007, Taming the Leviathan is a wide-ranging study of the English reception of Hobbes's ideas. In the first book-length treatment of the topic for over forty years, Jon Parkin follows the fate of Hobbes's texts and the development of his controversial reputation during the seventeenth century, revealing the stakes in the critical discussion of the philosopher and his ideas. Revising the traditional (...) view that Hobbes was simply rejected by his contemporaries, Parkin demonstrates that Hobbes's work was too useful for them to ignore, but too radical to leave unchallenged. His texts therefore had to be controlled, their lessons absorbed and their author discredited. In other words the Leviathan had to be tamed. Taming the Leviathan significantly revised our understanding of the role of Hobbes and Hobbism in seventeenth-century England. (shrink)

Certain English writers of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, whom scholars often associate with classical republicanism, were not, in fact, hostile to liberalism. Indeed, these thinkers contributed to a synthesis of liberalism and modern republicanism. As this book argues, Marchamont Nedham, James Harrington, Henry Neville, Algernon Sidney, and John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, the co-authors of a series of editorials entitled Cato's Letters, provide a synthesis that responds to the demands of both republicans and liberals by offering a politically (...) engaged citizenry as well as the protection of individual rights. The book also reinterprets the writings of Machiavelli and Hobbes to show that each contributed in a fundamental way to the formation of this liberal republicanism. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 29, Issue 1, pp 66 - 85 This paper will deal with the notion of _conatus_ and the role it plays in Hobbes’s program for natural philosophy. As defined by Hobbes, the _conatus_ of a body is essentially its instantaneous motion, and he sees this as the means to account for a variety of phenomena in both natural philosophy and mathematics. Although I foucs principally on Hobbesian physics, I will also consider the extent to which Hobbes’s account (...) of _conatus_ does important explanatory work in his theory of human perception, psychology, and political philosophy. I argue that, in the end, there are important limitations in Hobbes’s account of _conatus_, but that Leibniz adapted the concept in important ways in developing his science of dynamics. (shrink)

Shakespeare between Machiavelli and Hobbes explores Shakespeare’s political outlook by comparing some of the playwright’s best-known works to the works of Italian political theorist Niccolò Machiavelli and English social contract theorist Thomas Hobbes. This ultimately reveals the materialist principles that underpin Shakespeare’s imaginary states.

The paper focuses upon two samples of early modern “civil sciences”: rhetorical inquiry dealing with contingency and mathesis politica traditionally referring to the intellectual context of early Enlightenment. The study deals with the main tendencies that shaped early Enlightenment political science consisting of criticism of the necessitarian ethical rhetorical paradigm, an appeal to rhetorical competence, search for a way to “tame” contingency and thus to learn how to understand the human will’s universe of effects and how to control it. Special (...) attention is paid to the famous “new sciences”: Giambattista Vico’s scienza nuova and Thomas Hobbes scientia civilis. The fundamental difference in Vico’s and Hobbes’ theoretical styles is emphasized. While Hobbs is “macro-sociological” and handles issues extreme and ultimate, that allow neither interim decisions nor close attention to historical niceties, Vico considers the matter of his science as a universe of contingency, defining scienza nuova as history. Particular attention is paid to the function of the topical-rhetorical discourse in Hobbes’ political science, used for the description of the prepolitical man. Drawing upon almost unknown 17th-century Dutch political writings, the study examines ways of the reception of Hobbes’ civil science conceived as a rhetorical inquiry. The authors also explore Vico’s alternative to Hobbes’ constructionist theoretical style. A vast array of contemporary theoretical approaches to the early modern political thought is analyzed, from the “Cambridge history of concepts” to N.S. Struever’s “modal rhetoric”. (shrink)

I offer an alternative account of the relationship of Hobbesian geometry to natural philosophy by arguing that mixed mathematics provided Hobbes with a model for thinking about it. In mixed mathematics, one may borrow causal principles from one science and use them in another science without there being a deductive relationship between those two sciences. Natural philosophy for Hobbes is mixed because an explanation may combine observations from experience (the ‘that’) with causal principles from geometry (the ‘why’). My argument shows (...) that Hobbesian natural philosophy relies upon suppositions that bodies plausibly behave according to these borrowed causal principles from geometry, acknowledging that bodies in the world may not actually behave this way. First, I consider Hobbes's relation to Aristotelian mixed mathematics and to Isaac Barrow's broadening of mixed mathematics in Mathematical Lectures (1683). I show that for Hobbes maker's knowledge from geometry provides the ‘why’ in mixed-mathematical explanations. Next, I examine two explanations from De corpore Part IV: (1) the explanation of sense in De corpore 25.1-2; and (2) the explanation of the swelling of parts of the body when they become warm in De corpore 27.3. In both explanations, I show Hobbes borrowing and citing geometrical principles and mixing these principles with appeals to experience. (shrink)

In this major 2003 study of the foundations of modern political theory the eminent political philosopher Ross Harrison explains, analyzes, and criticizes the work of Hobbes, Locke, and their contemporaries. He provides a full account of the turbulent historical background that shaped the political, intellectual, and religious content of this philosophy. The book explores such questions as the limits of political authority and the relation of the legitimacy of government to the will of its people in non-technical, accessible prose that (...) will appeal to students of philosophy, politics, theology and history. (shrink)

This is a review of a book by Ted H. Miller.

This is a review of a book edited by Richard Talaska.

There is no doubt about considering Thomas Hobbes as one of the most radical shields of XVII century mechanistic materialism, which explains phenomena according to laws of bodily motion. Agreeing to such an explicatory system, every single movement is caused by an external one, which implies that there is neither a self-moving body nor a body whose cause of motion is itself. However, a main idea is conceived by Hobbes himself, namely, the consideration of a vital or animal motion in (...) certain bodies. Is such a suggestion about qualitative difference between bodies? Are animated bodies able to be grounded to equal explicatory principles of mechanism? William Harvey's blood circulation and heart beating claims allow us to safeguard the Hobbes' theory coherence. (shrink)

In addition to an account of that most irascible, dogmatic, and revolutionary philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, a primary objective of this dissertation was to explore the climate of opinion during the first seventy years of seventeenth-century England, as expressed by the scholars and writers who sounded that consensus, not only in direct response to the disturbing doctrines of Hobbes, but indirectly reflected the defense of traditional ideas and institutions, together with the hopeful acceptance of change in matters religious and political in (...) a period of tumult and turmoil. ;The Hobbesian philosophy, portending the future in its materialism, yet aberrational in its acknowledgement of complete absolutism, excited responses from intellectuals--churchmen, politicians, schoolmen, and scientists, both at home and abroad, responses that supply us with an additional understanding of seventeenth-century thought. The bold and insensitive pronouncements of this complex genius were not only disturbing to his fellows but were to influence scholars and stimulate debate for centuries to come. ;The purpose of this dissertation, then, is not only to study and reassess Hobbes, the most controversial figure of his century, but what is certainly more important in an historical sense, to learn more about the century in which he lived through the responses of his critics. (shrink)