Heterodox/Nastika Philosophy

Partiendo de la distinción entre śivaísmo pre-tántrico y śivaísmo tántrico proponemos una introducción al śivaísmo no dualista de Cachemira, especialmente de las escuelas que componen el sistema Trika y de una de sus principales figuras, tanto místicas como intelectuales: Abhinavagupta (ss. X-XI d.n.e.). Conocida como el «darśana de la reconciliación», la filosofía tántrica de Cachemira se caracteriza por conjugar liberación (mokṣa) y placer (bhoga) en una actitud vital y filosófica diferente y, en ocasiones, incluso opuesta al resto de darśanas propias (...) del conservadurismo brahmánico. Finalmente, describiremos las tres vías de liberación principales y la no-vía siguiendo el célebre tratado de Abhinavagupta, el Tantrāloka. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

Finally, by means of a canonical sevenfold typology, the relation of the various grades of liberated individuals to the accomplishment of mundane jhana is investigated. The conclusion emerges that though liberation from suffering, the ultimate goal of the discipline, is attainable by wisdom with or without mundane jhana, Theravada Buddhism places additional value on liberation when it is accompanied by mastery over the jhanas and skill in the modes of supernormal knowledge. ;The dissertation also explains the two approaches to meditation (...) and shows how they lead by stages to the higher realizations. The supramundane jhanas are examined analytically both in themselves and in comparison with their mundane counterparts. Also discussed are two additional attainments connected with the jhanas--fruition and cessation. ;Theravada Buddhism regards the mundane jhana as neither sufficient nor indispensable for reaching liberation. They are insufficient as they only suppress the defilements and must be supplemented by wisdom. They are optional rather than indispensable since they need not be developed by all practitioners. Meditators belong to the "vehicle of serenity" utilize jhana to produce the concentration required as a basis for wisdom, meditators belonging to the "vehicle of bare insight" can employ a lower degree of concentration without achieving mundane jhana. But supramundane jhana pertains to the experience of all meditators who reach the paths and fruits, since these latter always occur in the level of jhanic absorption. ;Regarding the second issue, the work brings to light several significant findings concerning the soteriological function of the jhanas. Fundamental to the conclusions in this area is the discovery that the Theravada tradition distinguishes two kinds of jhana, one mundane , the other supramundane . Mundane jhana, comprising the eight attainments, belongs to the concentration group of the threefold Buddhist discipline--morality, concentration, and wisdom. Supramundane jhana is the mental absorption immediately concomitant with the higher realizations called the supramundane paths and fruits, which issue from the full threefold discipline. ;Regarding the first issue it is shown that Theravada Buddhism treats the process of jhana attainment from a philosophical perspective which views the mind as a complex of factors alterable by methodical training. The eight attainments of jhana--four fine material jhanas and four immaterial jhanas--are examined individually in terms of their components and in their progressive scale of development. Also discussed are the supernormal powers of knowledge resulting from jhana and the connections between the jhanas and rebirth. ;The examination covers two major areas: first the dynamics of jhana attainment, and second, the function of the jhanas in realizing the ultimate goal of Buddhism, nibbana or final liberation from suffering. ;For source material the work relies upon the three principal classes of authoritative Theravada texts--the Pali Tipitaka, its commentaries, and its subcommentaries. To traditional canonical investigations modern methods of philosophical and psychological analysis are applied in order to clarify the meanings implicit in the original sources. ;This work provides an analytical study of the jhanas, an important set of meditative attainments in the contemplative discipline of Theravada Buddhism. Despite their frequent appearance in the texts, the exact role of the jhanas in the Buddhist path has not been settled with unanimity by Theravada scholars, who are still divided over the question as to whether they are necessary for attaining nibbana. The primary purpose of this dissertation is to determine the precise role of the jhanas in the Theravada Buddhist presentation of the way to liberation. (shrink)

In this Essay, I want to give a short account of Buddhist psychology as found in some pieces in the Pali literature, the scriptures the Theravada tradition. This school of Buddhism is the only one of the Hīnayāna schools still existing, and is spread in Sri Lanka and South-East Asia. For a full account of Buddhist psychology more topics should have to be included. But I think, it is enough to give a basic understanding of Buddhist psychology and a further (...) elaboration wouldn’t improve that first understanding. It would only introduce more terminitechnici of an ancient and foreign language. After giving a short account of Buddhist philosophy, I will quote and interpret two passages from the Majjhima-nikāya. The first is the Madhupiṇḍika-sutta dealing with perception and the second is the Mūlaparyāya-sutta dealing with psychic differences of worldlings and Arhats. After this I will have a look on the Abhidhamma philosophy as it is described in the Abhidhammaṭṭhasaṅgaha. This is a comprise textbook on Abhidhamma written in the 12th century. It must be clear that there is a difference of time of 17 centuries between the Suttas I discuss here and the Abhidhammaṭṭhasaṅgaha. (shrink)

This study presents four cardinal Buddhist suttas, and demonstrates their dynamic psychological relevance to Abhidhamma Pitaka. Scholars have often overlooked the psychological elements of the Sutta Pitaka. The aim of this project is to show the suttas as reservoirs of dynamic and applied psychology. ;The suttas examined in this project are categorized under two headings. In the first section, Pariyatti , two suttas are presented: the Dhammacakkappavatana Sutta and the Anattalakkhana Sutta. The second section, Patipatti , contains: the Kalama Sutta (...) and the Mahasatipatthana Sutta. ;This study demonstrates that Buddhism is a soteriological system founded on a triadic discipline of Sila , Samiadhi , and Panna . Its specific purpose is threefold: to show that psychology, the study of mind, plays a significant role in Buddhism; to show the psychological relevance of the selected cardinal suttas to Abhidhamma Pitaka; and to illustrate the rich teachings of the Buddha, showing how they can be applied today with potentially transcendental benefits for all. (shrink)

The Abhidhamma brings a student of Buddhism immediately into the subjects of the ultimate realities, causation, correlation and liberation. These are the indispensable subjects for the understanding and realization of the teachings of the Buddha. ;The primary object of this treatise is to illuminate terminology extracted from the Theravadan Pali texts concerning the objects of mind, Causal Genesis , and correlation found in the Abhidhamma's seven composite volumes. ;With these methods students of Buddhism are able to integrate knowledge and practice (...) for a number of useful reasons: It will give insight to student about the Buddhist Doctrine. It will point to the underlying unity of expression between apparently divergent definitions, thus promoting simple understanding. It will establish a practical guide toward harmonized living that is essential to attain the goal, Nibbana , the 'summun bonum' of Buddhism. ;The focus of this treatise is on the application of methodology that brings to the forefront the virtuous attributes of the Dhamma, particularly that which belongs to this life . The student of Buddhism can realize the value of causation and correlation theory in the present moment applying directly what has been conveyed in the ancient canonical Burmese Pali Theravadan texts. ;The full contents of the Abhidhamma Pit&dotbelow;aka have been sourced and approached in a prioritized fashion including the Dhammasan˙gani, Vibhan˙ga, Dhatukatha, Puggalapannatti, Kattha-vatthu, Yamaka and Patthana. Each of the seven texts, when studied in a clear order have a specific and distinct developmental composition for guiding a student to clear objects of mind which detail the causes of suffering. This process forms the auxiliary framework for tranquillity and insight meditation practices. ;How we, as learners of Buddhism connect to the causal sequence, interpret the material in present time, and structure the objects of mind formed by a contemporary framework is a spiritually inspiring activity and recognized in Buddhism as a noble pursuit. Every individual will eventually find their Path to realization. The Path that benefits the individual the most is the one that is won through experience. The Great Teacher indicated this when he spoke to his disciples about the benefits of the Dhamma . ;All knowledge won by experience is truly of great value not only because it regenerates and vitalizes the life but because it flows to others in an unending stream of compassion. It is here that the philosophy of Buddha is handed down to posterity and is honored. (shrink)

"A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in religious studies, Department of Comparative Literature, Religion and Film/Media Studies.".

The present paper explores some pre-Vibhāṣika sources including the Kathāvatthu, *Śāriputrābhidharma, and Vijñānakāya. These sources suggest an early origin of the concept of the cognition of nonexistent objects (asad-ālambana-jñāna) among the Mahāsāṃghikas and some of its sub-schools. These scattered sources also indicate some different aspects of this theory from that held by the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Sautrāntikas. In particular, some Mahāsāṃghika arguments for the cognition of nonexistent objects reveal how a soteriologically-oriented issue gradually develops into a sophisticated philosophical concept.

Dharmakīrti, elaborating one of the Buddhist tradition's most complete defenses of rebirth, advanced some of this tradition's most explicitly formulated arguments for mind-body dualism. At the same time, Dharmakīrti himself may turn out to be vulnerable to some of the same kinds of arguments pressed against physicalists. It is revealing, then, that in arguing against physicalism himself, Dharmakīrti does not have available to him what some would judge to be more promising arguments for dualism (arguments, in particular, following Kant's 2nd (...) Critique) – and indeed, that these arguments actually cut against Dharmakīrti's own position. After elaborating and characterizing Dharmakīrti's case for rebirth, then, this article briefly considers an argument that Dharmakīrti cannot himself enlist for this purpose. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Nāgārjuna's Fundamental Doctrine of PratītyasamutpādaEwing ChinnIt seems fitting that the very last verse of Nāgārjuna's challenging work, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way), would present the reader with what seems to be a riddle: "I prostrate to Gautama, who through compassion, taught the true doctrine, which leads to the relinquishing of all views" (27 :30). This should be read with an earlier verse (13 : 8): "The victorious (...) ones have said that emptiness is the relinquishing of all views. For whomever emptiness is a view, that one will accomplish nothing."1 Since the last chapter deals with questions about the self and the world, it is understandable that so many commentators would assume that the "true doctrine" of which Nāgārjuna speaks is the doctrine of śūnyatā, but that gives a paradoxical character to these verses. Gautama recommends to us a doctrine that all this (we and all that we experience of the world) is śūnya, that is, empty of essence and thus of inherent, independent existence. And does this anti-realist, anti-essentialist view of things (as some would interpret śūnyatā) make possible and even constitute the relinquishing of all views, including his own? It cannot simply be the trivial and disingenuous claim that to accept the truth of śūnyatā is to relinquish all other wrong views. So is Nāgārjuna mysteriously refuting himself? Or is he uttering a paradox?I will argue that there is no paradox or problem of self-refutation, because the true doctrine that Nāgārjuna refers to is not śūnyatā but the doctrine of pratītyasa-mutpāda (dependent arising or origination). And what the verses assert is that if we understand and accept this doctrine, we will no longer have the need or inclination to hold any view about the nature of things, including the inclination to construct a view out of the declaration that "all this is śūnya." How this is possible, how accepting the doctrine makes possible the "relinquishing of all views," certainly depends on what kind of doctrine this is and how it is to be distinguished from a "view." Part of my argument, of course, is that neither pratītyasamutpāda nor the assertion that "all this is śūnya" should be taken as even implying any metaphysical views—either nihilism, absolutism, or anti-realism (the most common metaphysical interpretations). There is no doubt that a major target of Nāgārjuna's philosophical criticism is metaphysical realism. But this does not mean that the critic must hold some alternative metaphysical view.The logical place to begin is chapter 1, "Examination of Conditions," where the subject of discussion is the concept of pratītyasamutpāda, but it is not clear at all what Nāgārjuna is trying to establish about this concept. Jay Garfield, in his recent translation of and commentary on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā titled The Fundamental Wisdom of the MiddleWay, offers a unique interpretation of the point of this chapter, [End Page 54] and I will follow him to some extent in his analysis of the text.2 However, we will part ways at a crucial point in the chapter with regard to what Nāgārjuna is about.On the Nature and Significance of PratītyasamutpādaIn this first chapter, Garfield notes that "Nāgārjuna distinguishes two possible views of dependent origination or the causal process—one according to which causes bring about their effects in virtue of causal powers and one according to which causal relations simply amount to explanatorily useful regularities—and defends the latter."3 That is to say, according to Garfield, Nāgārjuna defends pratītyasamutpāda as a regularity or Humean theory of causation against an essentialist or realist interpretation. The latter contends that while we may cite one or more factors or events as the causal condition of some effect, it is the force or power in these conditions that is actually the cause of the effect. Nāgārjuna's basic criticism of this realist view is summarized in the fourth verse:Power to act does not have conditions. There... (shrink)

: Nagarjuna seems willing to embrace contradictions while at the same time making use of classic reductio arguments. He asserts that he rejects all philosophical views including his own-that he asserts nothing-and appears to mean it. It is argued here that he, like many philosophers in the West and, indeed, like many of his Buddhist colleagues, discovers and explores true contradictions arising at the limits of thought. For those who share a dialetheist's comfort with the possibility of true contradictions commanding (...) rational assent, for Nagarjuna to endorse such contradictions would not undermine but instead confirm the impression that he is indeed a highly rational thinker. It is argued that the contradictions he discovers are structurally analogous to many discovered by Western philosophers and mathematicians. (shrink)

Nāgārjuna argues for the fundamental importance of causality, and dependence more generally, to our understanding of reality and of human life: his account of these matters is generally correct. First, his account of interdependence shows how we can clearly understand the nature of scientific explanation, the relationship between distinct levels of theoretical analysis in the sciences (with particular attention to cognitive science), and how we can sidestep difficulties in understanding the relations between apparently competing ontologies induced by levels of description (...) or explanation supervening on one another. Then rGyal tshab's exposition of Dharmakīrti's account, in the pramānasiddhi chapter of the "Pramāṇavarttika", of the necessity of a belief in rebirth for the cultivation of bodhicitta is examined. This account is accepted in the dGe lugs tradition both as an accurate representation of Dharmakīrti's views and as authoritative regarding bodhicitta and the mahākarunā that is its necessary condition. But Dharmakīrti, rGyal tshab, and their followers, by virtue of accepting this argument, neglect Nāgārjuna's account of dependent arising and in consequence are implicated in what might be seen from a proper Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka point of view as the very subtlest form of self-grasping. (shrink)