German Philosophy, Misc

The article focuses on the scholarly career of German sociologist, philosopher, and musicologist Theodor W. Adorno. Examined are his leading publications, his notable teachers and collaborators, and his time in exile in the United States, among other places. Special emphasis is placed on his negative dialectics, including how this perspective formed a method of communication in itself. Adorno's contributions to the Frankfurt School, and to 20th-century Continental philosophy, sociology, and musicology, are also covered.

The writings and speeches of the Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018-2024) have been characterized by a constant reference to a teleological history. Using Karl Löwith’s proposals, I analyse the president’s liberal-progressive idea of history and I propose that in this respect he has followed a certain speculative philosophy of history, which I call philosophy of Trans-Historic-History.

The Emergence of Relativism offers a range of perspectives on how “the problem of relativism” was framed in German intellectual discourses over the course of the long nineteenth century. The review suggests that the volume is at odds with itself in various ways and, both wittingly and unwittingly, illuminates some problems of philosophy, both across the period examined and in our own.

What exactly do we mean when we refer to disability as a social construction? How viable are the justifications for this? These questions are explored in this paper. To this end, various theories that are influential in German-language disability studies are examined and criticised. These include Oliver's social model, furthermore the "Thomas theorem", Berger and Luckmann's sociology of knowledge, Foucault's discourse theory and Waldschmidt's theory. Subsequently, social constructivist approaches of Watzlawick and Gergen and Gergen are discussed. It is shown that (...) a relativistic understanding of social construction can be used to deny facticity and thus undermines the foundations of scientific knowledge. This danger must be taken seriously when defending the scientificity of disability studies. (shrink)

Johan Vilhelm Snellman (1806–1881) tunnetaan valtiomiehenä, sanomalehtimiehenä ja kansallisena herättäjänä, mutta hänen filosofiansa on usein jäänyt hänen yhteiskunnallisen vaikutuksensa varjoon. "Maailmanhenki Pohjolassa" piirtää yleiskuvan Snellmanin ja hänen esikuvansa G. W. F. Hegelin (1770–1831) filosofiasta. Se toimii johdantoteoksena heidän ajatteluunsa ja kertoo samalla 1800-luvun Suomen henkisen elämän kansainvälisyydestä. "Maailmanhenki Pohjolassa" selittää, miten Snellman Hegelin ajattelua käytti ja tulkitsi, ja korostaa, millaisissa asioissa Snellman teki pesäeron sekä Hegeliin että maineikkaisiin hegeliläisiin kuten Ludwig Feuerbachiin ja David Friedrich Straussiin. "Maailmanhenki Pohjolassa" on perusteos suomalaisesta (...) filosofiasta ja Suomen kulttuurihistoriasta kiinnostuneille. (shrink)

Plato's penchant for mythmaking sits uneasily beside his reputation as the inventor of rationalist philosophy. Hegel's solution was to ignore the myths. Popper thought them disqualifying. Tae-Yeoun Keum responds by carving out a place for myth in the context of rationalism and shows how Plato's tales inspired history's great political thinkers.

У статті підсумовано основні результати багаторічного дослідження «веймарської класики» і раннього німецького романтизму, розкрито суть «модерністичного проекту», спрямованого на інтелектуально-культурне оновлення всього європейського суспільства. Розглянуто три світоглядні «кризи модерну». Перша – на зламі XVIII–ХІХ ст. Романтики тоді розділили мистецтво естетично і соціологічно на масове і високе, а історично – на сучасний і «класичний» мейнстріми. Простежено подальшу долю «проекту» в умовах другої кризи доби Модерн на зламі ХІХ–ХХ ст. (тут естафету романтиків підхопив Ф. Ніцше) і уже в наш час – останньої (...) і остаточної третьої кризи Модерну. (shrink)

Orientierung steht am Anfang von allem, ohne selbst ein greifbarer Anfang zu sein. Als Letzt- und Grundbegriff geht sie jedem Denken und jeder Lebenstätigkeit voraus und ermöglicht sie. Dennoch war sie selbst bislang kaum Gegenstand philosophischer Reflexion. In seiner Philosophie der Orientierung macht Werner Stegmaier – bekannt durch seine Beiträge zu Nietzsche, Dilthey, Luhmann und Levinas – sie zum Ausgangspunkt, um die Philosophie selbst im Hinblick auf ihr praktisches, lebensweltliches Potential hin neu zu denken. Das breite Spektrum des Sich-Orientierens und (...) des Orientiert-Seins im Denken, die Bedingungen und Strategien der Orientierung im Alltag und ihr Ziel, die Ungewissheit, das Grundproblem der Orientierung, zu bewältigen, werden von ihm in die Perspektive der Philosophiegeschichte gestellt und im Blick auf aktuelle philosophische Fragestellungen systematisch untersucht. Die Beiträge des Bandes, abgerundet von einem Nachwort Werner Stegmaiers, eröffnen diesem genuinen Ansatz einen breiten Reflexions- und Diskussionsraum und zeigen so seine Bedeutsamkeit nicht nur für die Philosophie im Ganzen, sondern auch über ihre Grenzen hinaus. (shrink)

The following issues are considered in the paper: The proper understanding of the ‘attempt to doubt’ recommended by Husserl in Ideas, Book I, as a point of departure on a way to the transcendental reduction. How intentional reference of an act of consciousness is possible and what it consists in, according to Husserl. A logical dependence between the characteristics of intentional reference and the standpoint of transcendental idealism in Husserl’s Ideas, Book I. How to understand Husserl’s claim that the intentional (...) object is equivalent to sense. I arrive at the conclusion that a fully consistent interpretation of Husserl’s declarations regarding the aforementioned issues does not seem to be possible; for one needs to modify Husserl’s standpoint in certain respects. These considerations will be carried on in an article titled ‘The Noema as Sense. The Problem of the Object of Consciousness in Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism’, forthcoming in Diametros. (shrink)

Is it true that there is an analogy between modes of creation and such of perception? Respective to the cultural anthropological research of Ernst Cassirer, Susanne K. Langer and John M. Krois and by the analysis of a tape of the Swiss video-artist Pipilotti Rist this initial thesis of Formal Aesthetics shall be supported. - I - -/- Lässt sich die Behauptung stützen, dass zwischen Gestaltungsweisen und Wahrnehmungsweisen eine Analogie besteht? Aufbauend auf den kulturanthropologischen Forschungen von Ernst Cassirer, Susanne K. (...) Langer und John M. Krois sowie der Analyse eines Tapes der Schweizer Videokünstlerin Pipilotti Rist gilt es diese ursprünglich von der formalen Ästhetik aufgeworfene These zu untermauern. (shrink)

Over the last two decades, Axel Honneth has written extensively on the notion of social pathology, presenting it as a distinctive critical resource of Frankfurt School Critical Theory, in which tradition he places himself, and as an alternative to the mainstream liberal approaches in political philosophy. In this paper, I review the developments of Honneth's writing on this notion and offer an immanent critique, with a particular focus on his recent major work "Freedom's Right". Tracing the use of, and problems (...) internal to, Honneth's concept of social pathology serves to demonstrate his increasing reformism. It also serves to catalogue some of the dead ends that Critical Theory should avoid in taking up the idea of social pathology. The implication is not that this idea should be dropped. Rather, the paper is undertaking the necessary step of clearing the ground for further progress to take place on the question of what role the idea of social pathology can and should play in Critical Theory. The paper is critical in nature (and relentlessly so), but ultimately serves a constructive purpose. (shrink)

When a slim, winsomely-written introductory volume manages accessibly to survey many of the most important signposts across Heidegger's path, does so in a way that both excavates new sources and puts them to constructive use, is historically-informed but futurally-minded and generous but critical -- that's an achievement. What's more, Judith Wolfe accomplishes these things while illuminating the rich but underemphasized hermeneutic significance for Heidegger's work of his lifelong struggle to reconcile himself to the Christian moorings of his life and thought.

A collaborative article by the Editorial Collective of Social Imaginaries. Investigations into social imaginaries have burgeoned in recent years. From ‘the capitalist imaginary’ to the ‘democratic imaginary’, from the ‘ecological imaginary’ to ‘the global imaginary’ – and beyond – the social imaginaries field has expanded across disciplines and beyond the academy. The recent debates on social imaginaries and potential new imaginaries reveal a recognisable field and paradigm-in-the-making. We argue that Castoriadis, Ricoeur, and Taylor have articulated the most important theoretical frameworks (...) for understanding social imaginaries, although the field as a whole remains heterogeneous. We further argue that the notion of social imaginaries draws on the modern understanding of the imagination as authentically creative. We contend that an elaboration of social imaginaries involves a significant, qualitative shift in the understanding of societies as collectively and politically-instituted formations that are irreducible to inter-subjectivity or systemic logics. After marking out the contours of the field and recounting a philosophical history of the imagination, the essay turns to debates on social imaginaries in more concrete contexts, specifically political-economic imaginaries, the ecological imaginary, multiple modernities and their inter-civilisational encounters. The social imaginaries field imparts powerful messages for the human sciences and wider publics. In particular, social imaginaries hold significant implications for ontological, phenomenological and philosophical anthropological questions; for the cultural, social, and political horizons of contemporary worlds; and for ecological and economic phenomena. The essay concludes with the argument that social imaginaries as a paradigm-in-the-making offers valuable means by which movements towards social change can be elucidated as well providing an open horizon for the critiques of existing social practices. (shrink)

Nothingness plays an essential role throughout the work of Meister Eckhart. The function of this concept, however, changed during the development of his thought. Despite this change nothingness remains always associated with the theory of analogy which lies at the core of Eckhart's attempt to explain the radical difference between God and creation and the complete dependency of all being on its unitary and transcendent ground.

Ever since Kant and Hegel, the notion of autonomy—the idea that we are beholden to no law except one we impose upon ourselves—has been considered the truest philosophical expression of human freedom. But could our commitment to autonomy, as Theodor Adorno asked, be related to the extreme evils that we have witnessed in modernity? In Autonomy after Auschwitz, Martin Shuster explores this difficult question with astonishing theoretical acumen, examining the precise ways autonomy can lead us down a path of evil (...) and how it might be prevented from doing so. Shuster uncovers dangers in the notion of autonomy as it was originally conceived by Kant. Putting Adorno into dialogue with a range of European philosophers, notably Kant, Hegel, Horkheimer, and Habermas—as well as with a variety of contemporary Anglo-American thinkers such as Richard Rorty, Stanley Cavell, John McDowell, and Robert Pippin—he illuminates Adorno’s important revisions to this fraught concept and how his different understanding of autonomous agency, fully articulated, might open up new and positive social and political possibilities. Altogether, Autonomy after Auschwitz is a meditation on modern evil and human agency, one that demonstrates the tremendous ethical stakes at the heart of philosophy. (shrink)

In two of the most significant and influential contemporary exponents of German philosophical anthropology, anthropogenetic accounts play a large role. Hans Blumenberg and Peter Sloterdijk have presented their mode of philosophical anthropology as a philosophical anthropogenealogy. To this end both of them have ventured into an alliance with paleoanthropology, incidentally drawing on the same paleoanthropolgist, the forgotten pioneer of philosophical anthropology: Paul Alsberg. Taking this observation as its cue, the article addresses two questions. What are the motives for philosophical anthropology (...) to turn into philosophical anthropogenealogy? What is the methodological status of anthropogenetic accounts in philosophical anthropology? By reflecting on these questions the article aspires to convey a synthesis of themes in contemporary German philosophical anthropology and introduce them especially to an English-speaking audience. (shrink)

Revisiting the work of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century philosophers, when the split between analytical and continental philosophy began, Thomas-Fogiel finds both traditions followed the same path—the road of reference—which ...

The unity of God and man in the intellect is the fundamental teaching of Meister Eckhart on which he bases the system of his thoughts. Since there is a metaphysical and a psychological aspect to this teaching the book naturally falls into two parts: The first part is devoted to the analysis of divine nature, the second examines the human soul. God and man are essentially the same in their highest point: God's innermost essence is unity, which Eckhart identifies with (...) intellect. But intellect is also the highest peak in the human soul, the famous spark. By studying both Eckhart's German and Latin works, from the early Parisian Questions to the German sermons, this study also shows the unity of Eckhart's thought in all genres of writing. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that philosophical anthropology is central to ethics and politics. The denial of this has facilitated the triumph of debased notions of humans developed by Hobbes which has facilitated the enslavement of people to the logic of the global market, a logic which is now destroying the ecological conditions for civilization and most life on Earth. Reviving the classical understanding of the central place of philosophical anthropology to ethics and politics, the early work of Hegel (...) and Marx is explicated, defended and further developed by interpreting this through developments in post-mechanistic science. Overcoming the opposition between the sciences and the humanities, it is suggested that the conception of humans developed in this way can orient people in their struggle for the liberty to avert a global ecological catastrophe. (shrink)

Standard accounts of nineteenth-century German philosophy often begin with Kant and assess philosophers after him in light of their responses to Kantian idealism. In _Continental Idealism_, Paul Redding argues that the story of German idealism begins with Leibniz. Redding begins by examining Leibniz's dispute with Newton over the nature of space, time and God, and stresses the way in which Leibniz incorporated Platonic and Aristotelian elements in his distinctive brand of idealism. Redding shows how Kant's interpretation of Leibniz's views of (...) space and time consequently shaped his own 'transcendental' version of idealism. Far from ending here, however, Redding argues that post-Kantian idealists such as Fichte, Schelling and Hegel on the one hand and metaphysical sceptics such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche on the other continued to wrestle with a form of idealism ultimately derived from Leibniz. _Continental Idealism_ offers not only a new picture of one of the most important philosophical movements in the history of philosophy, but also a valuable and clear introduction to the origins of Continental and European philosophy. (shrink)

_A philosophical exploration of the power that poetry, music, and the erotic have on us._.

John Dewey and George Santayana engaged in a philosophic controversy that lasted more than forty years, beginning with Dewey's two reviews of The Life of Reason and concluding with a posthumously published essay by Santayana . The most well-known part of this controversy began with Santayana's review of Experience and Nature in which he said that Dewey's naturalism is "half-hearted and short-winded." To this Dewey replied that if his naturalism is half-hearted, then Santayana's is "broken-backed." In Metaphysics as Morals I (...) survey the principle writings of this controversy to show that despite Dewey's surprise at Santayana's criticism of Experience and Nature , many of the issues that emerge there also show up in their earlier writings about each other; the debate, even when ostensibly about such as issues as the role of nature in experience, has more to do with their deeply felt convictions about how life should be lived and the role of reason, philosophy, and art in human existence---in short, it is a moral controversy metaphysical guise; and the debate continued in their subsequent writings, where the moral controversy appears in disputes about politics, literature, art, and religion. ;Both Santayana and Dewey agreed that things and events in the natural world exist independently of human observation, that there is no supernatural realm apart from physical existence, and that consciousness does not occur except in living animal organisms. Santayana regarded conscious life as fundamentally different from physical existence, even though consciousness is produced by physical interactions. Consciousness entails perspectives and purposes, neither of which exist in nature. Dewey focused on the development of consciousness in natural and social environments, and, therefore, emphasized how human knowledge, interests, and activities are part of an ongoing interaction with the world. Dewey's philosophical predilections reflect his concerns for social improvement, intelligent practical activity, and educational reform. Santayana's philosophy is an expression of his discomfort with the practical world and his belief that human life is most vital in moments of contemplation. (shrink)

Introduction: A Logic for the Reasons of the Heart? Creating an aphorism that would prove irresistible to many later investigators into affective life, ...

Das Thema dieser Überlegungen ist die deutsche Philosophie und sind deutsche Philoso­phen im Nationalsozialismus. (Für unsere politisch korrekten Ohrenspitzer(innen): es war keine Frau dabei.)1 Vorweg sei gesagt, verbrecherische Schurken finden wir unter ihnen nicht, anders als bei z. B. Juristen und Medizinern. ,,Auschwitz" wurde nicht von Philoso­phen betrieben. Die Praxisferne der Philosophie hat manchmal eben auch Vorteile. Teil I beschäftigt sich mit Philosophie und Philosophen im „Dritten Reich" im allgemei­nen. Teil II stellt eine Fallstudie (Oskar Becker) vor, während der dritte (...) Teil ansatzweise eine noch skizzenhafte und vielleicht kontroverse Antwort auf die Frage versucht, welche philosophischen Umstände es begünstigt haben, daß Philosophen zu Naziphilosophen wurden, und welche dies vielleicht eher verhindert haben. (shrink)

It is a truism that the attitude of deference to the text plays a lesser role in Anglo-Saxon philosophy than in other philosophical traditions. Works of philosophy written in English have, it is true, spawned a massive secondary literature dealing with the ideas, problems or arguments they contain. But they have almost never given rise to works of commentary in the strict sense, a genre which is however a dominant literary form not only in the Confucian, Vedantic, Islamic, Jewish and (...) Scholastic traditions of the past, but also in relation to more recent German-language philosophy (thus for example in work on Hegel, Heidegger or Wittgenstein). Moreover Anglo-Saxon philosophers have themselves embraced the commentary form when dealing with Greek or Latin philosophers outside their own tradition. The paper seeks to establish the reasons for this imbalance by examining those factors which might be conducive to the growth of a commentary literature in a given culture. (shrink)

The remarks which follow are intended to address a certain apparent asymmetry as between German and Anglo-Saxon philosophy. Put most simply, it is clear to every philosopher moving backwards and forwards between the two languages that the translation of an Anglo-Saxophone philosophical text into German is in general a much easier task than is the translation of a German philosophical text into English. The hypothesis suggests itself immediately that this is so because English philosophical writings are in the main clear (...) and intelligible, and therefore easy to translate. The texts of German philosophy, on the other hand, both classical and contemporary, seem in many cases to be marked by stylistic obscurities or idiosyncracies of a sort which make them not translatable in the strict sense at all. (shrink)

The desire for the inner feeling of existence was central to Heidegger’s later philosophy. During the 1930s in works like the Contributions to Philosophy, he began to search for the direct experience, rather than the mere knowledge, of existential power. I characterize such feelings as post-Lutheran. Luther taught his followers to feel the presence of an existentially creative God within themselves. Such feelings, as evidence of one’s salvation, became endemic. After the Enlightenment and despite the rise of secularism, the desire (...) for the inner feeling of existence remained within portions of German culture. Heidegger rejected the idea of God as the foundation of existence, which he called an ontotheology, but he retained the desire to experience the coming-to-be of existence as an inner activity. In the Contributions, Heidegger repeatedly describes Being or “Seyn” as the “trembling” or “oscillation” between existence and nothingness. He tells us that nothingness always remains central to Being, which is what distinguishes Being from mere beings. The latter belong only to what has come-to-be; what Heidegger wanted to experience, not intellectually but as an inner feeling, was the power of coming-to-be. In short, Heidegger sought the inner experience of coming into being from nothingness. (shrink)