Filial Duties

The institution of the family and its importance have recently received considerable attention from political theorists. Leading views maintain that the institution’s justification is grounded, at least in part, in the non-instrumental value of the parent-child relationship itself. Such views face the challenge of identifying a specific good in the parent-child relationship that can account for how adults acquire parental rights over a particular child—as opposed to general parental rights, which need not warrant a claim to parent one’s biological progeny. (...) I develop a view that meets this challenge. This Project View identifies the pursuit of a parental project as a distinctive non-instrumentally valuable good that provides a justification for the family and whose pursuit is necessary and sufficient for the acquisition of parental rights. This view grounds moral parenthood in a normative relation as opposed to a biological one, supports polyadic forms of parenting, and provides plausible guidance in cases of assisted reproduction. (shrink)

Confucianism’s emphasis on filial piety is both a hallmark of its approach to ethics and a source of concern. Critics charge that filial piety’s extreme partialism corrupts Chinese society and should therefore be expunged from the tradition. Are the critics correct? In this article, we outline the criticism and note its persistence over the last century. We then evaluate data from the empirical study of corruption to see whether they support the claim that partialism corrupts. Finally, we report some recent (...) experimental work done with colleagues testing the claim that filial piety is associated with tolerance of corruption in Chinese societies. The results suggest that the critics are on to something. However, partialism (or kin affection) is not a cause of concern. Instead, authoritarianism (another aspect of filial piety) is associated with tolerance of corruption. We conclude that critics should reformulate their criticisms if they seek to combat corruption effectively. (shrink)

When and why are coercion, indoctrination, manipulation, deception, and bullshit morally wrongful modes of influence in the context of educating children? Answering this question requires identifying what valid claims different parties have against one another regarding how children are influenced. Most prominently among these, it requires discerning what claims children have regarding whether and how they and their peers are influenced, and against whom they have these claims. The claims they have are grounded in the weighty interests they each equally (...) have in their wellbeing, prospective autonomy and being regarded with equal concern and respect. Plausibly children have valid claims regarding the content and means of influence they themselves are subjected to. For instance, considerations of concern and respect for children confer duties on others enable them to know important information and develop important skills. Children also plausibly have valid claims to be free from certain means of influence including indoctrination. This is because indoctrinatory practices threaten to diminish both their capacity to reason soundly, thereby constituting a wrongful harm, and their opportunities to form judgements and choices in response to relevant evidence and reasons, thereby constituting a wrong of disrespect. (shrink)

Siblings ought to treat one another specially – in other words, siblings qua siblings ought to treat one another in ways that they need not treat others. This paper offers a theory of why this is the case. The paper begins with some intuitive judgments about how siblings ought to treat one another and some other normative features of siblinghood. I then review three potential theories of why siblings ought to treat one another specially, adapted from the literature on filial (...) piety: the gratitude theory, the friendship theory, and the special goods theory. In each case, these theories fail to explain some of the intuitive judgments about how siblings ought to treat one another. The paper then proposes a familial belonging theory. The institution of the family has certain goals, which impose normative demands on family members. I suggest that one such family goal is that every member feel familial belonging towards every other member, a goal which grounds the ways in which siblings ought to treat one another specially. (shrink)

We think about personal relationships in two distinct ways. The first focuses on relationships between blood relatives: parents and their children, siblings, and perhaps first cousins. The second focuses on intimacy: relationships where each individual is honest to and trusting of the other; each cares for the other and seeks the other’s company. In this article I ask how these two conceptions are, can be, or should be linked. Should we strive to make all relationships with kin intimate? Even if (...) the answer is a qualified “No,” does that mean relationships with kin are not valuable? I offer some tentative answers to these questions. Despite its limitations, I hope this provides a framework from which future exploration of these issues might profitably begin. (shrink)

Todo lo que compete al ámbito familiar es fundamental para una correcta vertebración social. Debido a ello, es preciso abordar integral e integradoramente los diferentes aspectos de la política familiar; así, desde los fundamentos de la protección familiar y su importancia dentro del conjunto de instrumentos de políticas de articulación social hasta las claves demográficas que explican y condicionan el futuro de España en el campo de la educación, del empleo, de la seguridad social y del diálogo social, merecen un (...) tratamiento adecuado y especializado. La protección social de la familia es, en la actualidad, no sólo oportuna sino también necesaria. Y ello por varias razones: en primer lugar, por su relevancia social e instrumental -la familia es fuente de solidaridad frente a las crisis económicas y crisis de valores-; en segundo lugar, por la alta valoración de ella que revelan todas las encuestas –lo que se interpreta como satisfacción por su concreto funcionamiento interno y como célula que fundamenta nuestro sistema social-; en tercer lugar, por la necesidad del reconocimiento social de la maternidad como garantía de futuro –pues de la maternidad no debieran derivarse efectos negativos para la vida personal de la mujer (ni en calidad, ni en oportunidades), lo que lleva a la necesidad de compatibilizar la esfera laboral y familiar-. Y, por último, por la necesidad de compensación pública de las cargas familiares. Además, no debe obviarse el hecho de que todo ello va asociado a los fuertes cambios que afectan a la familia como la aparición de nuevos problemas que van erosionando la institución familiar. Tales son, entre otros, la feminización de la pobreza, la aparición de familias reconstituidas, el rápido crecimiento del número de hogares de personas solas, el fuerte incremento cuantitativo de familias monoparentales, el aumento de divorcios, la caída de la natalidad y el envejecimiento de la población. Todo ello justifica el empeño investigador y preservador de la familia. En esta línea heurística y axiológica, el objetivo de este libro es ofrecer un panorama completo de los principales aspectos que hoy son considerados más relevantes en el ámbito de la protección de la familia teniendo como meta el que los análisis sectoriales confluyan de forma integradora hacia la consideración de la familia como unidad integral con entidad propia. (shrink)

This is a review of Laurence Houlgate's "Family and State: the Philosophy of Family Law. It takes a look at the moral theory from which Houlgate begins and raises questions about is correctness and appropriateness, but it finds more to agree with with respect to his middle-level principles. It considers his definition of "family" in the context of contemporary political controversy over such definitions. It looks at his consequentialist justification for the family, agrees with it, and suggests additional supplementary arguments, (...) primarily from Brigitte and Peter Berger, to give additional support for Houlgate's argument. It looks at his justification for family law and agrees with his principle of optimum communal benefit. It seeks to place Houlgate's views within the context of contemporary political debate about being "pro-family" or "anti-family". It then goes on to look briefly at some of the specific issues of family law that Houlgate considers, taking time to raise a few questions about some of them, and concludes by dealing in a more extensive way with the question of what the extent and limits of state interference in the family should be, agreeing with Houlgate's basic position, but considering further its application to specific issues. (shrink)