Epistemology

We argue that political propaganda is a negative phenomenon, against a recent strain of philosophical theorizing that argues that political propaganda can sometimes be neutral or even positive. After an exploration of the sense and connotation of the word ‘propaganda’ in ordinary use and in the scholarly literature, we discuss Ross’s (2002) account of propaganda as an epistemically defective form of political communication. We claim that, with some refinements, it is an explanatorily useful analysis. We then assess two prominent attempts (...) that aim at classifying legitimate cases of public communication as cases of propaganda, namely Ross’s (2013) revision of her previous model, and Stanley’s (2015) influential account. We show that some of the cases in contention are problematic and that the arguments the authors offer for classifying other non-problematic cases as propaganda are inconclusive. We also argue that the idea of considering legitimate public communication as propaganda is unmotivated. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers have largely neglected Richard Taylor’s design argument. Given that the initial responses to the argument were largely negative, one might be tempted to conclude that the argument is simply philosophically inadequate. This paper rejects that conclusion by showing how Taylor’s argument has been misunderstood by his critics. In defending Taylor, it is shown that the two types of objections levied against him fail to even blemish his design argument, let alone refute it. Consideration is also given to the (...) argument’s historical lineage, along with a proposal for future considerations of the connection between epistemological realism and design. (shrink)

Individuals deceive themselves about a wide variety of subjects. In fortunate circumstances, where those who manage to leave self-deception embrace reality, an interesting phenomenon occurs: the formerly self-deceived often confess to having ‘known [the truth] all along’. These post-self-deception judgments are not conceptually innocuous; if genuine, they call into question the core feature of prominent theories of self-deception, namely that self-deceived individuals do not believe the unwelcome truth. In this paper I argue that post-self-deception judgments do not track a belief, (...) but rather a suspicion of the unwelcome truth. I do this by showing that post-self-deception judgments are themselves instances of self-deception where the individual is self-deceived that they believed the unwelcome truth. I then suggest that the motivational cause of the self-deceit is hindsight bias, specifically the kind known as foreseeability, and that as a result, post-self-deception judgments are not reliable because they do not accurately track previous self-deceptive experiences. (shrink)

While many people today might turn to ancient Sanskrit philosophers for meditation or yoga, probably few would turn to them for help with difficult contemporary problems, such as what counts as "fake news" or navigating Internet debates. Philosopher Malcolm Keating argues that, in fact, a group of premodern Indian philosophers known as "Nyāya" have important things to say about how we can distinguish truth from falsity and reason well together, both of which are crucial to living a good life. -/- (...) In Reason in an Uncertain World, Keating teaches us what's distinctive in Nyāya approaches to knowledge and discussion, explaining these ideas in relationship to ordinary examples readers can understand. What are the limits of our reasoning? What counts as good evidence for our beliefs? How do we know if someone is a trustworthy source of information? What do we do when we are gripped by doubt? When is a debate with someone worth our time, and how can we discuss contentious topics? The answers to these questions are as relevant today as they were in ancient India. There, they were the focus of Nyāya philosophy, one of the most influential traditions of Indian philosophy, which few outside of scholarly communities have heard of. (shrink)

O presente trabalho em tela busca se debruçar nas relações e interconexões entre etnocentrismo, xenofobia e medo. Entretanto, o medo é medo de alguma coisa ou de alguém. Talvez do nada. Porém, quando nos deparamos com o medo, pensamentos e práticas etnocêntricas e xenofóbicas, a literatura demonstra que há processos ligados a mecanismos de pulsão, repressão e recalque, pois o medo está como pano de fundo, causando um desencadeamento de emoções e sentimentos de um sujeito frente ao outro. Então, quando (...) dois indivíduos se encontram, há um conflito interno por questões culturais e de objetificação entre ambos. Desse modo, o conflito não é apenas pessoal ou individual, mas fundado em estruturas e formação cultural. Portanto, quando dois indivíduos distintos se encontram, também são duas culturas se defrontando. Com isso, podem ocorrer pensamentos e práticas etnocêntricas e xenofóbicas oriundas do medo, de se estar diante do outro, do diferente, do desconhecido e que não sou eu. Assim, com o medo colocado, aparece o conflito, a angústia, o repúdio e a negação do outro. E daí já se evidencia o etnocentrismo e a xenofobia. Porém, o impulso é o recalque que se reprime por medo do outro, do diferente e do desconhecido. Logo, Etnocentrismo, Xenofobia e Medo: Pulsão, Repressão e Recalque como Medo oculto do outro, do desconhecido, do diferente e do diverso, talvez tal fato só apaziguemos com um olhar com análises relativizadoras, tanto das culturas como dos outros, pois talvez assim se possa encontrar a saída de tais neuroses. A pesquisa adentra pelas teorias da Antropologia e com suportes de campos da Psicologia, História, Psicanálises e Sociologia. Desse modo, a pesquisa não abarca apenas o caráter bibliográfico e de revisão da literatura, mas também adentra sutilmente pelos caminhos da “observação e descrição” do fato e fenômeno histórico-social, fazendo assim certo esforço de “explorá-lo e explicá-lo” pelas teorias de base, que suportam o construto. (shrink)

Diante dos embates e dilemas que vive o Brasil após o ano de 2016, fundamentalmente no que diz respeito a educação pública brasileira, o presente trabalho procurou se debruçar, refletir e verificar a posição e situação do educando brasileiro no cenário social nacional, e sobretudo escolar. Levamos em conta como base de configuração do indivíduo-sujeito e estudante sua identidade enquanto ser biopsicossocial, isso na perspectiva Aristotélica e Marxista de homem, tanto como ser dotado de razão, emoção, vontade, social, político, teleológico (...) (Aristóteles) e essencialmente ser de trabalho e histórico (Marx). (shrink)

Issues of reliability are claiming center-stage in the epistemology of machine learning. This paper unifies different branches in the literature and points to promising research directions, whilst also providing an accessible introduction to key concepts in statistics and machine learning---as far as they are concerned with reliability.

This paper explores some surprising effects of psychological trauma on memory and develops the puzzle of observer memory for trauma. Memory for trauma tends to have a third-person perspective, or observer perspective. But it appears observer memory, by having a novel visual point of view, tends to misrepresent the past. And many find it plausible that if a memory type tends to misrepresent, it cannot yield knowledge of, or justification for believing, details of past events. But it is also plausible (...) that, with respect to details of past trauma, observer memory can yield knowledge or justification. I argue for a novel set of views that offers a way out of the puzzle: observer memory does tend to misrepresent, but it still has epistemic power regarding details of the past, although with special limits; but observer memory for trauma has other epistemic powers too, in that it allows for a kind of self-awareness. (shrink)

One desideratum for contemporary theories of emotion both in philosophy and affective science is an explanation of the relation between emotions and objects that illicit them. According to one research tradition in emotion theory, the Evaluative Tradition, the explanation is simple: emotions just are evaluative judgments about their objects. Growing research in affective science supports this claim suggesting that emotions constitute (or contribute to) evaluative judgments such as moral judgments about right and wrong. By contrast, recent scholarship in two historical (...) emotion theories, Augustinian and Thomistic, emphasize their sharp distinction between cognitive judgments and affectivity or between reason and emotion. For these historical models, reason, not emotion, is responsible for moral judgment. Are the evaluative and historical models at irreconcilable odds? Should we discard old models that fail to satisfy intuitions about the intricate role of emotions in moral judgment? This paper compares these research programs and suggests a roadmap for collaboration. (shrink)

This paper introduces and discusses three models of future: a determinist model, a stochastic model, and the model of True Prophetic Knowledge. All three models coexist in natural languages and are represented both in their grammatical systems and in the text-building discourse strategies speakers and authors apply to.

An objection to shifty epistemologies such as subject-sensitive invariantism is that it predicts that agents are susceptible to guaranteed losses. Bob Beddor (Analysis, 81, 193–198, 2021) argues that these guaranteed losses are not a symptom of irrationality, on the grounds that forgetful agents are susceptible to guaranteed losses without being irrational. I agree that forgetful agents are susceptible to guaranteed losses without being irrational– but when we investigate why, the analogy with shifty epistemology breaks down. I argue that agents with (...) shifty epistemologies are susceptible to guaranteed losses in a way which is a symptom of irrationality. Along the way I make a suggestion about what it takes for an agent to be coherent over time. I close by offering a taxonomy of shifty epistemologies. (shrink)

Silence is a multifaceted concept which is not merely as an absence of sound but a presence with significant ontological, existential, and phenomenological implications. Through a thematic analysis, this paper deconstructs silence into various dimensions—its ontology, linguistic universality, and its function as cessation of speech, a form of listening, an act of kenosis, a form of ascesis, and a way of life. The study employs philosophical discourse and mathematical notation to delve into these aspects, demonstrating that while each perspective sheds (...) light on certain facets of silence, none can comprehensively encapsulate its essence. The research underscores the paradoxical nature of silence. It is both a universal phenomenon recognised across cultures and an intimate, personal experience that resists definitive categorisation. The paper concludes that the true nature of silence, particularly when considering the state of "being silent," remains indefinable and elusive, inviting deeper contemplation on its role in human experience. (shrink)

The Monad’s components are as follows: 1: Monism as the state of eternal undifferentiation 2: Dualism as the state of infinite differentiations -/- MONAD = ET = INF ET Ψ INF.

The book deals with conceptualization of time in different languages and in different kinds of discourse (folklore, poetry, fiction). Special attention is paid to some culture-specific models of time as well as to linguistic means related to temporal semantics: nouns, adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, prefixes, particles, and other temporal modifiers. The concept of time is also considered in its logical, axiological and historical aspects.

The liar paradox is still an open philosophical problem. Most contemporary answers to the paradox target the logical principles underlying the reasoning from the liar sentence to the paradoxical conclusion that the liar sentence is both true and false. In contrast to these answers, Buddhist epistemology offers resources to devise a distinctively epistemological approach to the liar paradox. In this paper, I mobilise these resources and argue that the liar sentence is what Buddhist epistemologists call a contradiction with one’s own (...) words. I situate my argument in the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and show how Buddhist epistemology answers the paradox. (shrink)

In mainstream analytic epistemology, Reformed theology has made its presence prominently felt in Reformed epistemology, the view of religious belief according to which religious beliefs can be properly basic and warranted when formed by the proper functioning of the sensus divinitatis, an inborn capacity or faculty for belief in God that can be prompted to generate certain religious beliefs when presented with things (e.g., certain majestic aspects of creation). A major competitor to Reformed epistemology is Wittgensteinian quasi-fideism, a position drawn (...) from the epistemology of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, according to which some foundational religious commitments are not properly basic beliefs but some kind of apodictic, unshakeable certainties that form part of the structure of one’s rationality and worldview. I argue that the Reformed tradition has contained elements of quasi-fideism at least as far back as Calvin’s account of faith from the Institutes of the Christian Religion, book 3, chapter 2. (shrink)

Epistemic oppression is the systematic exclusion of oppressed groups from knowledge-making practices. One of the goals of feminist epistemology is to understand the nature of the barriers preventing oppressed individuals from realising their epistemic agency and contributing to knowledge production. Feminist epistemologists have taken monumental strides in theorising the different forms of exclusions that constitute epistemic oppression (e.g., Fricker 2007; Dotson 2014; Bailey 2014). But more needs to be done by way of understanding what makes an oppressive epistemic landscape resilient (...) and resistant to change. In this paper, I develop a pragmatist account of the affective mechanisms in place that protect the epistemic landscape from critical reflection and produce what I refer to as affective exclusion. I argue that, since the mechanism that protects the epistemic landscape from critical reflection is affective by nature, we cannot reason ourselves out of affective exclusion. Instead, I propose that, although they often prevent us from realising our epistemic agency, our co-occurring emotions and feelings, such as grief, anxiety, and other epistemic feelings, can be catalysts for reflection about the skewed nature of the epistemic landscape. I conclude with a discussion of the role that narrative fiction might play in helping us resist affective exclusion and ending epistemic oppression. (shrink)

This article shows how Schmitt’s work is animated by a fundamental conflict between two concepts of conflict: the one is Schmitt’s own, war, polemos, and the other one is discussion, dialogue, conversation or polemics, which may be said, accordingly, to be Schmitt’s foe. Schmitt’s project is thus described as a conflict between war and discussion: polemos vs polemics, an inner war within the notion of war. The article contemplates this basic configuration and points at some of its major significations for (...) Schmitt’s political theology and theory of state and international law. (shrink)