17th/18th Century Philosophy

I argue that Kant’s Categorical Imperative should be applied to individual maxim tokens rather than abstract maxim types. The article is divided into five sections. In the first, I explain my thesis. In the second, I show that my thesis disagrees with Rawls. In the third, I argue for my thesis on the basis of the wording of the Categorical Imperative and on the basis of considerations about autonomy. In the fourth, I argue for my thesis on the basis of (...) considerations about the ‘ought implies can’ principle. In the fifth, I provide a summary of the main argumentative moves and also explain some of the philosophical advantages of my thesis. (shrink)

This paper shows ways to develop, integrate, and transform Kant’s and Arendt’s theories on political evil into a unified Karendtian theory. Given the deep influence Kant had on Arendt’s thinking, the deep philosophical compatibility between their projects is not surprising. But the results of drawing on the resources left by both is exciting and groundbreaking with regard to both political evil in general and the challenges of modernity and totalitarianism in particular.

This essay considers the question of “atheism” as it arises in Hume’s _Dialogues_. It argues that the concept of “atheism” involves several signficiant ambiguities that are indicative of philosophical and interpretive disagreements of a more substantial nature. It defends the view that Philo’s general sceptical orientation accurately represents Hume’s own “irreligious” and “atheistic” commitments, both in the _Dialogues_ and in his other (“earlier”) writings. While Hume was plainly a “speculative atheist”, his “practical atheism” was targeted more narrowly against “superstition” - (...) as opposed to deism or religion of a more “philosophical” kind. (shrink)

The main interpretative claims in the chapter on Kant’s critique of the ontological argument in Ian Proops’s The Fiery Test of Critique are critically discussed.

Nos Sonhos de um Visionário explicados pela Metafísica (1766), Kant faz críticas à especulação em nome da experiência e critica o conhecimento científico em nome da moral. Ele afirma que a causa, o efeito e a substância são relações fundamentais que não se pode captar nem intuir. Não é dada à razão capacidade para conhecer tais relações fundamentais.

Locke refrained from engaging explicitly with Hobbes in any of his writings. Locke’s policy of non-engagement should be interpreted, we argue, neither as evidence of his lack of interest in (or ignorance of) Hobbes’s arguments, nor as an attempt to conceal from the uninitiated Locke’s covert Hobbesian commitments. Locke’s silence reveals rather than conceals. What it reveals is an absolute determination to “distinguish between the business of civil government and that of religion, and to mark the true bounds between them”. (...) Approached in this way, precisely because Locke’s account of the “business of civil government” says nothing about ecclesiastical government, the second of Two Treatises can be read, in its entirety, as a powerful critical response to Hobbes. To see why, it is necessary to grasp that Part iii of Leviathan (“Of a Christian Common-wealth”) is integral to Hobbes’s positive argumentative purposes in the work. (shrink)

(Early) Modern social contract theories reject the idea that legal and political institutions are grounded in an alleged natural ordering or hierarchy of human beings, and instead argue that only government by a public (and not private) authority can fulfil the idea of justice as freedom and equality for all. To be authoritative and not just powerful, governing institutions must be shared as ours in this irreducible sense. I first outline how Kant’s ideal account of rightful freedom brilliantly transforms this (...) tradition as found in the works of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, before proposing a way to see Kant’s two-layered non-ideal theory—his accounts of human nature (“moral anthropology”) and historical societies (“the principle of politics”)—as complementing his ideal theory of rightful freedom. This enables us to envision a conception not only of rightful external freedom but of rightful human freedom in particular societies—with their histories—on planet Earth. With these arguments at hand, we can also better appreciate the importance of realizing that the four possible political conditions for Kant—anarchy, barbarism, despotism, and republic—are ideas of reason, which means that they are never perfectly realized. Hence, historical societies we are not either in the state of nature or in civil society. In addition, in historical societies founded on principles of freedom, there are pockets of injustice or pockets that are devoid of justice that can only be captured by means of one of the three political ideas that are not constitutive of the republican legal-political framework. Kant’s four ideas therefore give us more tools with which to capture the nature of different political forces and challenges facing us in our historical societies. (shrink)

This introduction provides a brief overview of the issues and arguments arising in Hume's "Dialogues concerning Natural Religion". It also discusses some of the historical and contextual background relating to this work, as well as the relvance of Hume's earlier philosophical works for our understanding of the "Dialogues". The final section of this Introduction includes a brief set of summaries of the contributions contained in this collection.

An introduction to the special issue on Hobbes and Locke: Meaning, Method, Modernity.

Jeffrey Collins’ new book aims to presents Locke’s views on religious toleration in the light of Thomas Hobbes’ political philosophy. At first blush, Hobbes seems an unusual choice as a point of co...

Locke’s short essay, “Venditio,” offers a series of thought-provoking examples of prices that might or might not be viewed as just. Locke writes as though these examples and his comments about them point to a coherent doctrine about which agreed-to prices are morally acceptable and which are morally unacceptable. However, despite the acuity of some of Locke’s observations, no such coherent doctrine emerges from Locke’s discussions of these examples. Indeed, many of the conclusions Locke reaches as he moves from example (...) to example are implausible in themselves or inconsistent with one another. Nevertheless, not all is lost. Locke’s observations can be viewed as thought experiments on his part which, in conjunction with insights from Locke’s other economic writings, indicate what features a doctrine of acceptable and unacceptable prices needs to possess. I show how a line of argument which appears almost as a sidebar within “Venditio” offers a doctrine that provides those needed features. That doctrine affirms both “the common law of traffic” and “the common law of charity” and a view about when the latter takes priority over the former. (shrink)

Both law and science went through revolutionary changes in England in the first half of the seventeenth century, a period of pandemic, conflict, and climate change. The circle of Samuel Hartlib (c. 1600–62) sought a way to regenerate society through reform and innovation. One member of the circle was Sir Cheney Culpeper (1601–66), a barrister and landowner, whose correspondence shows an attempt to synthesize law and natural philosophy into a coherent vision of regeneration. He wrestled as much with how change (...) could be achieved as with what changes would be beneficial. He sought a mutually beneficial relationship between humanity and nature. He urged self-restraint to avoid the abuse of power, political and technological. His most practical and influential work was in agriculture. Paradoxically, however, the efforts of Culpeper and his circle to address the crises of their times have arguably created the very crises of ours. We are, moreover, in what Culpeper describes as a ‘crisis of time’. This essay poses the question as to whether, given the urgency of our situation, we might learn from Culpeper’s generation that regeneration requires revolution as well as reform. (shrink)

Michael’s Hunter’s latest book serves as something of a capstone. In addition to his well-known work on the Royal Society, Robert Boyle, magic and the occult, Professor Hunter has been an important...

O presente artigo tem como objetivo analisar o conceito de propriedade na teoria de Arthur Schopenhauer, contida principalmente na obra Parerga und Paralipomena e a teoria de John Locke, expressa no Segundo tratado sobre o governo civil e estabelecer relações entre os conceitos, de modo a demonstrar as semelhanças enquanto direito natural e suas diferenças enquanto direito positivado na teoria dos dois filósofos.

Deleuze’ün Spinozacı yaşam tahayyülünde ‘ne yapmalıyız?’ sorusuna normatif, ahlaki ya da siyasi bir yanıt bulamıyoruz ama varoluşu düşünmenin içkin bir olanağını keşfediyoruz. Düşünmeye 'dışarıdan' yani dünyadan başlamak insani (kurgusal) bir dünyaya değil, içinde yaşadığımız gerçek dünyaya inanmak demektir. İçkinliğin politik anlamı düşünceyi dünyaya getirmektir.

A história humana possui seus processos e especificidades no e do tempo e espaço, com certas rupturas e continuidades de certos processos e elementos. Podemos citar como exemplo: Os tipos e modos de desigualdades, sistemas escravistas e sistemas coloniais etc. Mas, não sendo igual ou da mesma forma. Há especificidades e características ligadas ao tempo e ao espaço contextual. Porém, sem dúvidas, há acontecimentos e fatos históricos que ocorrem com certas semelhanças e características entre passado e presente, ainda que dentro (...) dos seus respectivos contextos. Logo, a cada época e contexto social, político, econômico, cultural, religioso e histórico, podemos observar certas semelhanças, entre ‘o ontem e o hoje. ’ A exemplo, o Sistema Feudal que ocorreu em muitos continentes e países, e em tempos específicos e com suas especificidades contextuais. Desse modo, como já mencionado, parecem que certos elementos ou resquícios de fatos históricos anteriores ou passados se evidenciam em outras épocas e contextos. Não que sejam os mesmos sistemas, nem tampouco a continuidade deles, mas apenas semelhanças e características que parecem ‘ir e vir. ’ Diante de tais fatos, seus problemas e consequências; debruçamo-nos em fontes sobre o Sistema Feudal Europeu dos séc. X ao XIV d. C. para compreendermos elementos, eventos e episódios que vêm ocorrendo na contemporaneidade brasileira, com algumas semelhanças com o Sistema Feudal. Fundamentalmente, no que diz respeito às terras, grandes latifundiários, religião, política, economia e rituais. Assim, identificamos que: a) Religião, Política e ‘poder’, tanto no feudalismo quanto nas relações políticas atuais no Brasil, continuam na perspectiva de defender a propriedade privada de grandes extensões de terras nas mãos de poucos; b) manter e reproduzir as ideias conservadoras e ‘moralistas’ dos grupos que detém o ‘poder político e econômico’; e c) naturalizar a pobreza e a miséria da população como destino ou normal-natural, bem como atribuir às conquistas econômicas e materiais dos grandes latifundiários a algo divino ou determinado. (shrink)

A set of replies to critics of my 2021 book 'The Fiery Test of Critique: A Reading of Kant's Dialectic' (OUP). -/- The criticisms are based on talks given at an Author-meets-critics symposium at Princeton University on April 22nd, 2023. The critics are: Beatrice Longuenesse, Patricia Kitcher, Allen Wood, Des Hogan, and Anja Jauernig.

Early in his Essays on Intellectual Powers, Reid draws a distinction between mental power, mental operation, and mental capacity (EIP 21). To the untrained eye, these terms could probably be used interchangeably, and Reid believes this is correct, up to a point. He argues that, if we are interested in understanding exactly how the human mind works, we must use these terms with more precise meanings. This is part of his more general strategy of trying to always use the words (...) with their common meanings, as much as possible, but also pointing out that certain philosophical distinctions are needed to carry out the project of laying out the foundations of the science of the mind. This paper explains what the distinction between power, operation, and capacity is, according to Reid, with the goal of understanding why it is important to draw such a distinction, not only for the Reidian project, but for action theory, more generally. (shrink)

Kant’s critical philosophy cannot realize its stated purpose to make metaphysics systematic unless it makes all metaphysical uses of reason, including the practical use of reason, systematic. Yet Kant’s account of the systematicity of the practical use of reason is not entirely clear. In particular, none of the variations of his account of the systematicity of the practical use of reason explicitly discusses the role of the discipline of pure reason in making the practical use of reason systematic. The apparent (...) absence of the discipline from Kant’s account is contrary to indications in his writings indirectly suggesting that the discipline plays an indispensable role in the systematicity of the practical use of reason. This discrepancy remains unaddressed in the scholarship. Most interpreters reconstruct Kant’s account of the systematicity of the practical use of reason without attributing any role to the discipline. This article aims to make explicit the role of the discipline in Kant’s account of the systematicity of the practical use of reason. Specifically, it suggests that the discipline of pure reason is the first necessary condition for the systematicity of the practical use of reason: it prepares the ground for a justifiable conception of the ideal of the highest good and for legitimate postulates regarding the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. (shrink)

In this paper I raise concerns that I have with what I perceive to be as a complete lack of warrant for Hume’s assertion that there are only two types of reasoning – demonstrative and probable. (Hume’s fork) What I leave for others to decide is whether this lack of warrant therefore successfully undercuts Hume’s argument for the Problem of Induction.

I focus on two main points in Ian Proops’s reading of Kant’s Paralogisms of Pure Reason: the structure of the paralogisms in the A edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, and the changes in Kant’s exposition of the paralogisms from A to B. I agree with Proops that there are defects in the A exposition and that Kant attempted to correct those defects in B. But I argue that Proops fails to give its due to what remains fundamental in (...) both editions: Kant’s criticism of the rational psychologist’s confusion between the subjective (albeit universally subjective) standpoint thinkers have on themselves just in virtue of thinking, and the objective, metaphysical standpoint on a thinking thing. In short, Proops fails to give sufficient attention to Kant’s opening statement in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason: ‘“I think” is the sole text of rational psychology’. (shrink)

The eighth and final chapter of Aron Gurwitsch’s major book, Leibniz. Philosophy of Panlogism, a translation of which is presented here, lays the foundations for Gurwitsch’s phenomenological reading of Leibnizian thought as a whole, understood and interpreted as a transcendental philosophy : as an objective correlate of the divine thought that sustains its systematic unity and original coherence, the world is itself thoroughly understood as the realization and “incorporation” of logic, in a broader sense. Examining the ontological status of relations, (...) and Leibniz’s conception of divine understanding as the transcendental subject of “possible worlds”, this final chapter brings together the guidelines that support and sustain his entire interpretation. (shrink)

Dentro de las tesis que definen la metafísica de Leibniz, destaca aquella según la cual las esencias encierran una pretensión a la existencia. Esta tesis ha despertado un singular interés entre los comentaristas de Leibniz, dando origen a un debate que enfrenta a aquellos que defienden una interpretación metafórica con aquellos que profesan una interpretación literal: si el primer grupo sostiene que tal pretensión ha de entenderse como una atribución metafórica en virtud de la cual las esencias, desprovistas de tal (...) característica, son susceptibles de alcanzar la existencia al ser actualizadas por Dios, para el segundo grupo, las esencias son portadoras en sí de tal característica, la que debe entenderse entonces como una cualidad real e inherente presente en ellas. A partir de un examen de diversos manuscritos de Leibniz, nuestro propósito es reivindicar una interpretación literal de la tesis de la pretensión de las esencias a la existencia, explicando por qué la interpretación metafórica, además de carecer de fundamento, entraña contradicciones. (shrink)

This work in metaphysics adheres to the critical demands of Immanuel Kant for what Kant would call a science of metaphysics, in that it consits strictly of a priori principles that, while from pure reason, can help make sense of our phenomenal world (Kant's criterion for objective validity). The work has an Appendix quoting Kant's most relevant remarks with regard to a science, and offers parallel quotes from David Hume's "Treatise of Human Nature". The work advances the explanation of a (...) causal process that accounts for the origination of the universals: space, time, mass (or substance), and mind (or consciousness), and it necessitates the existence of God as Absolute Being and Absolute Mind. Hegel's 'Science of Logic' is quoted wherein Hegel makes an analogous claim. The causal process is defined with both a definite beginning and a definite end and agreement can be found with the statement found in the book of Revelation, final chapter: "I am the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end." The statement suggests a movement that is not in conflict with the science, and seems to reflect Hegel's own thoughts. The science does not conflict with, but it further finds agreement with the science of big bang cosmology, but it goes further in necessitating a 'singularity' at the beginning of time. The causal process defined has a Formative Phase and a Creative Phase, with the former preceding the big bang and the latter following after the big bang. (shrink)

L’article vise à montrer les difficultés théoriques que soulève l’interprétation de Leibniz proposée par Jon Elster. L’analogie entre l’entrepreneur capitaliste et le Dieu leibnizien, pour séduisante qu’elle soit, apparaît fragile sinon superficielle. La conclusion évoque la nécessité de réintroduire le point de vue du « consommateur » pour définir l’ optimum à atteindre, en esquissant un parallèle entre la théorie de l’équilibre général et la théodicée.

Kann Gott tun, was er will oder will Gott, was seinem Wesen entspricht? Ist Gott an notwendige Prinzipien gebunden oder ist notwendig, was Gott dekretiert? Derartige Fragen nach dem Verhältnis von Modalitäten und Gotteskonzepten sind Bestandteil unzähliger Debatten und reichen weit in die Philosophie- und Theologiegeschichte zurück. Die vorliegende Studie untersucht zunächst die Modalmetaphysiken G.W. Leibniz', D. Lewis' und A. Plantingas samt ihren sehr unterschiedlichen ontologischen Voraussetzungen. Im Anschluss werden die in der gegenwärtigen analytisch-religionsphilosophischen Debatte dominanten Formen des Theismus analysiert: (...) der klassische und personale Theismus und der Panentheismus. Das Kernstück dieser Studie bildet die Analyse von Konsistenzen und Inkonsistenzen, die zutage treten, will man aus metaphysisch-ontologischen Gründen diese unterschiedlichen Formen des Theismus mit den Modaltheorien Lewis', Leibniz' oder Plantingas verbinden. (shrink)

This paper examines the relationship between beauty and aesthetic properties to argue that aesthetic properties are connected to a work’s content, to what a work conveys or expresses. I turn to Kant’s Critique of Judgement to make the case. My argument highlights two parts of Kant’s approach. Kant argues that pure aesthetic judgements of beauty are grounded in a harmonious yet free play of the imagination and understanding. Such free play is pleasurable and intimates that the power or capacity of (...) imagination is suitable for and can be brought within the conditions of the capacity for conceptual understanding. Within this broader frame, Kant’s account of artistic beauty specifies the relationship of aesthetic properties to the beauty of a work: aesthetic attributes help convey the aesthetic ideas that beautiful works express. I examine how Kant’s view helps us appreciate that aesthetic properties of artworks are integral to conveying the content of a work, and that the pleasure we feel has the potential to make us aware of the experience, its nature and value. (shrink)

This article proposes an approach to understanding life that overcomes reductionist and dualist approaches. Kant’s analysis of the conditions of knowing an organism shows that attempts to explain its teleology and autopoiesis from the interactions of its components is problematic. Based on an analysis by Van de Vijver and colleagues, a co-constitutive relationship between the cognitive activities of the observer and the living features of the organism is described. Using the example of a developmental series, it is shown that within (...) this active relational process, both autopoiesis and teleology of the organism manifest themselves on the mental level of the observer. The Kantian mode of objectification, which refers to the sensually perceptible appearance of an organism, can be supplemented by an active mode of relational objectification that encompasses the life of the organism. The analysis introduces a phenomenological first-person perspective on the study of life "from within", which enables an empirical investigation of the vital properties of an organism. (shrink)

This paper analyses the abstractionist account of quantity championed by Leibniz, especially in the 1680s. Leibniz introduced the notion of quantity in an indirect way, via an abstraction principle. In the first part of the paper, I identify the context in which this approach arose in light of Leibniz's criticism of his earlier dream of an ‘alphabet of human thought’. Recognising the impossibility of such a project led him to realise that, when dealing with terms referring to abstract objects, we (...) should always consider them within the true sentences in which they occur. In the second part, I describe this approach in detail. This allows us to look at some key concepts of Leibniz's theory of quantity. In particular, I raise the problem of the relationship between the two sides of the abstraction principle: how should we think of the relation between the claim that a and b are equal, and the claim that the quantity of a is identical to the quantity of b? I argue that we can find a positive answer to this problem in Leibniz. (shrink)

“내용없는 사고들은 공허하고, 개념들이 없는 직관은 맹목적이다.”(KrV A51=B75)라는 테제로 잘 알려진 것처럼, 대상을 인식하려면 직관과 개념이 모두 필요하다는 것이 칸트의 인식론적 견해라고 여겨진다. 그러나 몇몇 연구자들은 칸트의 인식론에서도 “개념없는 직관(Anschauung ohne Begriffe)” 즉 지성의 활동과 개념을 수반하지 않는 직관이 가능하다고 여긴다. 이러한 배경에서 본 논문은 경험적 직관에서 개념의 역할, 특히 감성적 종합에서 범주의 역할을 명료히 함으로써 칸트에서 개념 없는 직관이 가능한지 밝히는 것을 목적으로 한다. 이를 위해 경험적 직관을 시공간 상에서 배경과 구별되는 개별자에 대한 표상으로 규정하고, B판 연역을 중심으로 경험적 (...) 직관에서 개념이 어떤 역할을 하는지 살핀다. 원전을 검토하는 과정에서 개별자를 지각하는 것에는 시공간이라는 감성의 형식만으로도 충분하다는 한나(Robert Hanna)와 앨레이스(Lucy Allais)의 해석의 문제점을 밝혀, 칸트의 인식론에 따르면 범주라는 대상 일반의 개념이 동반되어야만 통일된 시공간 표상과 개별자 표상이 가능하다는 것을 해명한다. 그 결과 칸트의 인식론에서는 개념없는 직관의 가능성이 뒷받침될 수 없다. (shrink)

On more than one occasion, John Wesley found himself engaged in debate with Calvinists in the Methodist revival. In this article, I philosophically re-examine John Wesley’s concerns with the Calvinism of some members of his evangelical cohort. I argue that Wesley’s concerns fall into two types: theoretical concerns about the conceptual coherency of a view that makes God the author of sin and practical concerns about the moral implications of a view that suggests some individuals are elect and others are (...) reprobate. I then attempt a principled reconstruction of these objections. I argue that while there is a rational Arminian case to be made here, what is arguably most valuable in this case is the distinctive method of weaving together thought and action in the Christian life the connections between Wesley’s theoretical and practical concerns reveal. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Hume’s account of an important class of causal belief which he calls “general rules”. I argue that he understands general rules, like all causal beliefs, as lively ideas which are habitually associated with our impressions or memories. However, I argue, he believes that they are unlike any reflectively produced causal beliefs in that they are produced quickly and automatically, such that they occur independently of any other processes of reasoning. Given this, I argue, Hume appears (...) to understand general rules as relatively simple beliefs, expressible only via generic sentences, like “birds lay eggs”. (shrink)