54 found

Order:
  1. Consciousness and Realism.David Leech Anderson - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):1-17.
    There is a long and storied history of debates over 'realism' that has touched literally every academic discipline. Yet realism- antirealism debates play a relatively minor role in the contemporary study of consciousness. In this paper four basic varieties of realism and antirealism are explored and their potential impact on the study of consciousness is considered. Reasons are offered to explain why there is not more debate over these issues, including a discussion of the powerful influence of externalist versions of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  79
    The Relational Theory of Mind.Frederick Anderson - 1942 - Journal of Philosophy 39 (May):253-260.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Vagueness and the Metaphysics of Consciousness.Michael V. Antony - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (3):515-538.
    An argument is offered for this conditional: If our current concept conscious state is sharp rather than vague, and also correct , then common versions of familiar metaphysical theories of consciousness are false--?namely versions of the identity theory, functionalism, and dualism that appeal to complex physical or functional properties in identification, realization, or correlation. Reasons are also given for taking seriously the claim that our current concept conscious state is sharp. The paper ends by surveying the theoretical options left open (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  4. Introspectible Consciousness: What Philosophers Can Do About It.Hiranmoy Banerjee - 2003 - In Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. On the Simplicity of Mental Beings.David Barnett - manuscript
    No categories
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  62
    A Positivistic Metaphysics of Consciousness.Gustav Bergmann - 1945 - Mind 54 (July):193-226.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  7.  61
    Nominalism and Inner Experience.Peter Bieri - 1982 - The Monist 65 (January):68-87.
    Most analyses of our mental states in analytical philosophy rest on a particular conception of experience, which we can call the nominalist conception. Absent from this conception is what is traditionally called the inner experience of mental states. Any attempt to describe this inner experience inevitably comes into conflict with the nominalist conception of experience. I believe both that the nominalist conception is the right conception of experience, and that there is inner experience of mental states. Hence I see a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness.David Braddon-Mitchell - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  9.  38
    Consciousness: Creative and Self-Creating. Bukala - 1991 - Philosophy Today 35 (1):14-25.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10.  39
    The Social Construction of Consciousness, Part 2: Individual Selves, Self-Awareness, and Reflectivity.Tom R. Burns - 1998 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (2):166-184.
  11. Consciousness and its Place in Nature.David J. Chalmers - 2003 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 102--142.
    Consciousness fits uneasily into our conception of the natural world. On the most common conception of nature, the natural world is the physical world. But on the most common conception of consciousness, it is not easy to see how it could be part of the physical world. So it seems that to find a place for consciousness within the natural order, we must either revise our conception of consciousness, or revise our conception of nature. In twentieth-century philosophy, this dilemma is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   246 citations  
  12. Mind-Body Unity, Dual Aspect, and the Emergence of Consciousness. D. - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):393-403.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. The Gaze of Consciousness.Barry F. Dainton - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (2):31-48.
    According to one influential view, consciousness has an awareness– content structure: any experience consists of the awareness of some content. I focus on one version of this dualism, and argue that it should be rejected. My principal argument is directed at the status of the supposed contents of aware- ness; I argue that neither of the principal options is tenable, albeit for different reasons. Although the doctrine in question may seem to be supported by the find- ings of researchers in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  14.  24
    Conceiving the 'Inconceivable'? Fishing for Consciousness with a Net of Miracles.Christian de Quincey - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):67-81.
    Sometimes, after years of painstaking work, someone presents a startling argument that seems to suddenly snatch the ground right out from under your feet. And it's back to square one. Such a conceptual trapdoor caught me by surprise a few years ago. For decades, I had been convinced it is simply inconceivable that subjectivity -- the interior experience of how consciousness feels -- could possibly emerge from a previously wholly objective world, that mind could evolve from ‘dead’ matter. It seemed (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  15.  21
    The Irreducible Perspectives of Consciousness.Todd E. Feinberg - 1997 - Seminars in Neurology 17:85-93.
  16. The Problem of the Soul Two Visions of Mind and How to Reconcile Them.Owen Flanagan - 2002 - Basic Books.
    Traditional ideas about the basic nature of humanity are under attack as never before. The very attributes that make us human--free will, the permanence of personal identity, the existence of the soul--are being undermined and threatened by the current revolution in the science of the mind. If the mind is the brain, and therefore a physical object subject to deterministic laws, how can we have free will? If most of our thoughts and impulses are unconscious, how can we be morally (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  17.  41
    A Naturalistic Interpretation of Mind.A. Campbell Garnett - 1948 - Journal of Philosophy 45 (October):589-602.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18.  76
    Reflexive Monism Versus Complementarism: An Analysis and Criticism of the Conceptual Groundwork of Max Velmans’s Reflexive Model of Consciousness.Hans-Ulrich Hoche - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):389-409.
    From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  19.  19
    The New Mentalism and the Mind.Deryl J. Howard - 1986 - International Philosophical Quarterly 26 (4):353-357.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  20. Experiences as Complex Events.Michael Jacovides - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):141-159.
    It is argued that experiences are complex events that befall their subjects. Each experience has a single subject and depends on the state or the event that it is of. The constituents of an experience are its subject, its grounding event or state, and everything that the subject is aware of during that time that's relevant to the telling of the story of how it was to participate in that event or be put in that state. The experience occurs where (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21.  83
    Consciousness as a Contextually Emergent Property of Self-Sustaining Systems.J. Scott Jordan & Marcello Ghin - 2006 - Mind and Matter 4 (1):45-68.
    The concept of contextual emergence has been introduced as a speci?c kind of emergence in which some, but not all of the conditions for a higher-level phenomenon exist at a lower level. Further conditions exist in contingent contexts that provide stability conditions at the lower level, which in turn accord the emergence of novelty at the higher level. The purpose of the present paper is to propose that consciousness is a contextually emergent property of self-sustaining systems. The core assumption is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  22.  57
    Brentano and the Relational View of Consciousness.Otis T. Kent - 1984 - Man and World 17 (1):19-52.
    What is consciousness? brentano suggests that consciousness is a simple binary relation between a self and an object. in this paper, i offer a textual clarification and a qualified philosophical defense of brentano's suggestion. in part i, i indicate the ordinary facts of subjective experience that any adequate theory of consciousness must account for. in part ii, i argue on textual grounds that brentano's theory has been misunderstood by chisholm. in part iii, i argue that brentano's theory meets the conditions (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  23.  23
    Reductionism and Ontological Aspects of Consciousness.Joseph Margolis - 1974 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 4 (April):3-16.
  24.  30
    Sentience.Wallace I. Matson - 1976 - University of California Press.
    1 Strange words to come from the father of materialism, a philosophy that might be self-evidently true if only there were no people. ..
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  25. Consciousness, Atomism, and the Ancient Greeks.Colin McGinn - 2004
    No categories
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26. Sperry on Consciousness as an Emergent Causal Agent.T. McMullen - 1997 - Australian Journal of Psychology 49:152-155.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27.  66
    One World, but a Big One.Mary Midgley - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):500-514.
    ‘Explanations’ are of various kinds. They vary with the needs that call for them. The current need to ‘explain consciousness’ expresses not only curiosity about its causes but a wider uncertainty about its place in the general scheme of things. For much of this century, naive dogmatic materialism suggested that consciousness is a trivial matter with effectively no place in the world. Yet the behaviourists’ attempt to ignore our experience altogether has not proved workable. Scientists are therefore now trying to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28.  15
    Consciousness and Relativity - a Reply to Professor Bode.William P. Montague - 1908 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 5 (8):209-212.
    No categories
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. The Relational Theory of Consciousness and its Realistic Implications.William P. Montague - 1905 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (12):309-316.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30.  37
    Dualism Through Reductionism.Hans Moravec - 2002
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31.  93
    Enjoyment and Awareness.Lloyd C. Morgan - 1917 - Mind 26:1.
  32.  18
    Consciousness, Brain and the Physical World: A Reply to Velmans.Robert Rentoul - 1992 - Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):163-166.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33.  43
    Sperry's Concept of Consciousness.Charles Ripley - 1984 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 27 (December):399-423.
    This paper explores R. W. Sperry's view that consciousness is ?causally? effective in directing voluntary human behaviour. This view, formulated in the course of his split brain research, presupposes an earlier theory that motor behaviour is the sole output of the brain and that mental phenomena were developed for regulation of overt response. His view of the ?causal? effectiveness of consciousness is shown to be based on a theory of emergent properties like that of Bunge. It is also shown that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  34. Consciousness as a Physical Property and its Implications for a Science of Mind.Gregg H. Rosenberg - 1989
    As the view that the mind has a physical cause becomes increasingly more difficult to refute, both philosophy and science must face the fact that having experiences, qualia, consciousness in short, is simply not deducible from within our physical theories. Indeed, all the power physics shows for qualitative explanation is adduced from outside the actual formality of its theories. Our physical theories describe vibrations and stochastic correlates of motion, and there is no principled way to explain awareness or the existence (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Consciousness: The Transcendalist Manifesto.Mark Rowlands - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):205-21.
    Phenomenal consciousness, what it is like to have or undergo an experience, is typically understood as an empirical item – an actual or possible object of consciousness. Accordingly, the problem posed by phenomenal consciousness for materialist accounts of the mind is usually understood as an empirical problem: a problem of showing how one sort of empirical item – a conscious state – is produced or constituted by another – a neural process. The development of this problem, therefore, has usually consisted (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  36. Contents of Consciousness and States of Affairs.K. J. Schuhmann - 1990 - In Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  37. The Emergence of Consciousness.William Seager - 2006 - Philosophic Exchange 36 (1):5-23.
    According to the mainstream view in philosophy today, the world is a purely physical system, in which consciousness emerged as a product of increasing biological complexity, from non-conscious precursors composed of non-conscious components. The mainstream view is a beautiful, grand vision of the universe. However, it leaves no real place for consciousness. This paper explains why.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38.  21
    Consciousness Naturalized: Supervenience Without Physical Determinism.Dennis M. Senchuk - 1991 - American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1):37-47.
  39. A Mentalist View of Consciousness.Roger W. Sperry - 1993 - Social Neuroscience Bulletin 6 (2):15-19.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  40.  99
    Turnabout on Consciousness: A Mentalist View.Roger W. Sperry - 1992 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (3):259-80.
    Conceptual foundations for the changeover from behaviorism to mentalism are reviewed in an effort to better clarify frequently contested and misinterpreted features. The new mentalist tenets which I continue to support have been differently conceived to be a form of dualism, mind-brain identity theory, functionalism, nonreductive physical monism, dualist interactionism, emergent interactionism, and various other things. This diversity and contradiction are attributed to the fact that the new mentalist paradigm is a distinctly new position that fails to fit traditional philosophic (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  41. Mind-Brain Interaction: Mentalism Yes, Dualism No.Roger W. Sperry - 1980 - Neuroscience 5 (2):195-206.
  42.  62
    An Objective Approach to Subjective Experience: Further Explanation of a Hypothesis.Roger W. Sperry - 1970 - Psychological Review 77 (6):585-590.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  43.  72
    A Modified Concept of Consciousness.Roger W. Sperry - 1969 - Psychological Review 76 (6):532-36.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   120 citations  
  44. On Primitive Consciousness.Hiram M. Stanley - 1892 - Philosophical Review 1 (4):433-442.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. An Adverbial Theory of Consciousness.Alan Thomas - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):161-85.
    This paper develops an adverbial theory of consciousness. Adverbialism is described and endorsed and defended from its near rival, an identity thesis in which conscious mental states are those that the mental subject self-knows immediately that he or she is "in". The paper develops an account of globally supported self-ascription to embed this neo-Brentanian view of experiencing consciously within a more general account of the relation between consciousness and self-knowledge. Following O'Shaughnessy, person level consciousness is explained as a feature of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  46.  84
    Is Consciousness Vague or Arbitrary?Michael Tye - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):679-685.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  47. Blindness of Modern Science.Undo Uus - 1994 - Estonia: Apt.
    No categories
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  48.  87
    Psychophysical Nature.Max Velmans - 2009 - In Harald Atmanspacher & Hans Primas (eds.), Recasting Reality: Wolfgang Pauli's Philosophical Ideas and Contemporary Science. Springer. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. pp. 115-134..
    There are two quite distinct ways in which events that we normally think of as “physical” relate in an intimate way to events that we normally think of as “psychological”. One intimate relation occurs in exteroception at the point where events in the world become events as-perceived. The other intimate relationship occurs at the interface of conscious experience with its neural correlates in the brain. The chapter examines each of these relationships and positions them within a dual-aspect, reflexive model of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  49.  30
    Dualism, Reductionism, and Reflexive Monism.Max Velmans - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Blackwell. pp. 346-358.
    (added for 2013 upload): This chapter compares classical dualist and reductionist views of phenomenal consciousness with an alternative, reflexive way of viewing the relations amongst consciousness, brain and the external physical world. It argues that dualism splits the universe in two fundamental ways: in viewing phenomenal consciousness as having neither location nor extension it splits consciousness from the material world, and subject from object. Materialist reductionism views consciousness as a brain state or function (located and extended in the brain) which (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  50. How Experienced Phenomena Relate to Things Themselves: Kant, Husserl, Hoche, and Reflexive Monism.Max Velmans - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):411-423.
    What we normally think of as the “physical world” is also the world as experienced, that is, a world of appearances. Given this, what is the reality behind the appearances, and what might its relation be to consciousness and to constructive processes in the mind? According to Kant, the thing itself that brings about and supports these appearances is unknowable and we can never gain any understanding of how it brings such appearances about. Reflexive monism argues the opposite: the thing (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  51.  10
    Reply to Gillett's Consciousness, Intentionality and Internalism.Max Velmans - 1992 - Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):181-182.
    This reply to Grant Gillett appeared in the first symposium on Velmans' Reflexive Model of Perception (the departure point for Reflexive Monism) initially presented in "Consciousness, Brain and the Physical World" (1990) in Philosophical Psychology. The symposium begins with Velmans' summary of the main arguments in that paper, followed by critiques from two psychologists--Robert Rentoul and Norman Wetherick. Velmans replies to the critiques and the entire treatment is further critiqued by the philosopher Grant Gillett, followed by Velmans' final reply. At (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  52. Consciousness, Brain, and the Physical World.Max Velmans - 1990 - Philosophical Psychology 3 (1):77-99.
    Dualist and Reductionist theories of mind disagree about whether or not consciousness can be reduced to a state of or function of the brain. They assume, however, that the contents of consciousness are separate from the external physical world as-perceived. According to the present paper this assumption has no foundation either in everyday experience or in science. Drawing on evidence for perceptual projection in both interoceptive and exteroceptive sense modalities, the case is made that the physical world as-perceived is a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   108 citations  
  53.  51
    Truth, Error, and the Location of the Datum.Donald C. Williams - 1934 - Journal of Philosophy 31 (16):428-438.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  54.  23
    Consciousness, the Sense Organs, and the Nervous System.Frederick J. E. Woodbridge - 1909 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (17):449-455.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations