Francesco Guala has developed some novel and radical ideas on the problem of external validity, a topic that has not received much attention in the experimental economics literature. In this paper I argue that his views on external validity are not justified and the conclusions which he draws from these views, if widely adopted, could substantially undermine the experimental economics enterprise. In rejecting the justification of these views, the paper reaffirms the importance of experiments in economics.
Most methodological discussion in experimental economics has been pursued by justifying the use of experiments as theory?testing vehicles. More recently, it has also been argued that the external validity of experiments requires the use of non?experimental field studies. Therefore, it has been proposed, experiments are intermediaries between theories and field evidence. In this paper it is argued that this picture of experiments is mistaken in the general case and that experiments can be justifiably undertaken as autonomous vehicles of discovery, independently (...) of theory?testing or field studies. (shrink)
Understanding is an issue of crucial importance in economic experiments. Different ideas of how to achieve full understanding have resulted in disparate and contradictory recommendations on the correct methods for economic experiments. It is argued that a more systematic approach is necessary based on the linguistic theories of pragmatics put forward by Grice. This provides resources for assessing understanding in practical experiments. JEL classification: B41.
One has the distinct feeling that Deleuze and World Cinemas was already in the works when David Martin-Jones published Deleuze: Cinema and National Identity in 2006. In that earlier study, he married Deleuze with Homi K. Bhabha to produce constructive readings of both canonical and popular films. He considers these texts to be hybrid films that display qualities of both the movement-image and time-image, two Deleuzian concepts he deploys in showing how narrative time fashions national identity in distinctive (...) ways. The final chapter of this earlier work departed abruptly from discussion of Hollywood and Western European cinema to engage with films from East Asia, a move that charted a specific future course. In... (shrink)
Can we understand brain lateralization in humans by analysis in terms of an evolutionarily stable strategy? The attempt to demonstrate a link between lateralization in humans and that in, for example, fish appears to hinge critically on whether the isomorphism is viewed as a matter of homology or homoplasy. Consideration of human handedness presents a number of challenges to the proposed framework.
Two perspectives from which memories can be retrieved have been distinguished: field resembles the view from the first-person vantage point of original experience, whereas observer resembles the view from the third-person vantage point of a spectator. There is evidence that the incidences of the two types of perspective differ between at least two different cultural groups. It is hypothesised here that this is a special case of a more general relation between memory perspective and cultural individualism, such that field and (...) observer perspectives are more prevalent among people from, respectively, relatively individualist and relatively collectivist societies. Memory perspectives adopted by participants from a range of different countries were recorded, and were found to vary in the predicted manner. Regression analysis showed that the potential effects of three other cultural variables – uncertainty avoidance, masculinity and, to a lesser extent, power distance – were eclipsed by the influence of individualism, and the implications are discussed. (shrink)
We provide and interpret a new measure independent characterization of the Gödel speed-up phenomenon. In particular, we prove a theorem that demonstrates the indifference of the concept of a measure independent Gödel speed-up to an apparent weakening of its definition that is obtained by requiring only those measures appearing in some fixed Blum complexity measure to participate in the speed-up, and by deleting the “for all r” condition from the definition so as to relax the required amount of speed-up. We (...) interpret our results as correlating the relative difficulty of mechanically recognizing theories with the relative power and the relative abstractness of the theories. We conclude by providing two open problems concerning possible similarities and relationships between the Blum speedability and Gödel speed-up phenomena. MSC: 03D15, 03F20. (shrink)
We study the measure independent character of Godel speed-up theorems. In particular, we strengthen Arbib's necessary condition for the occurrence of a Godel speed-up [2, p. 13] to an equivalence result and generalize Di Paola's speed-up theorem . We also characterize undecidable theories as precisely those theories which possess consistent measure independent Godel speed-ups and show that a theory τ 2 is a measure independent Godel speed-up of a theory τ 1 if and only if the set of undecidable sentences (...) of τ 1 which are provable in τ 2 is not recursively enumerable. (shrink)
Call a bit of scientific discourse a description of a missing system when (i) it has the surface appearance of an accurate description of an actual, concrete system (or kind of system) from the domain of inquiry, but (ii) there are no actual, concrete systems in the world around us fitting the description it contains, and (iii) that fact is recognised from the outset by competent practitioners of the scientific discipline in question. Scientific textbooks, classroom lectures, and journal articles abound (...) with such passages; and there is a widespread practice of talking and thinking as though there are systems which fit the descriptions they contain perfectly, despite the recognition that no actual, concrete systems do so—call this the face value practice . There are, furthermore, many instances in which philosophers engage in the face value practice whilst offering answers to epistemological and methodological questions about the sciences. Three questions, then: (1) How should we interpret descriptions of missing systems? (2) How should we make sense of the face value practice? (3) Is there a set of plausible answers to (1) and (2) which legitimates reliance on the face value practice in our philosophical work, and can support the weight of the accounts which are entangled with that practice? In this paper I address these questions by considering three answers to the first: that descriptions of missing systems are straightforward descriptions of abstract objects, that they are indirect descriptions of “property-containing” abstracta, and that they are (in a different way) indirect descriptions of mathematical structures. All three proposals are present in the literature, but I find them wanting. The result is to highlight the importance of developing a satisfactory understanding of descriptions of missing systems and the face value practice, to put pressure on philosophical accounts which rely on the practice, and to help us assess the viability of certain approaches to thinking about models, theory structure, and scientific representation. (shrink)
In this paper we interpret a characterization of the Gödel speed-up phenomenon as providing support for the ‘Nagel-Newman thesis’ that human theorem recognizers differ from mechanical theorem recognizers in that the former do not seem to be limited by Gödel's incompleteness theorems whereas the latter do seem to be thus limited. However, we also maintain that (currently non-existent) programs which are open systems in that they continuously interact with, and are thus inseparable from, their environment, are not covered by the (...) above (or probably any other recursion-theoretic) argument. (shrink)
This paper evaluates the argument for the contradictoriness of unity, that be- gins Priest’s recent book One. The argument is seen to fail because it does not adequately differentiate between different forms of unity. This diagnosis of the argument’s failure is used as a basis for two consistent accounts of unity. The paper concludes by arguing that reality contains two absolutely fundamental and unanalysable forms of unity, which are in principle presupposed by any theory of anything. These fundamental forms of (...) unity are closely related to the unity of propositions and facts. (shrink)
Inquiries into the nature of scientific modeling have tended to focus their attention on mathematical models and, relatedly, to think of nonconcrete models as mathematical structures. The arguments of this article are arguments for rethinking both tendencies. Nonmathematical models play an important role in the sciences, and our account of scientific modeling must accommodate that fact. One key to making such accommodations, moreover, is to recognize that one kind of thing we use the term ‘model’ to refer to is a (...) collection of propositions. (shrink)
One of the most intriguing claims in Sven Rosenkranz’s Justification as Ignorance is that Timothy Williamson’s celebrated anti-luminosity argument can be resisted when it comes to the condition ~K~KP—the condition that one is in no position to know that one is in no position to know P. In this paper, I critically assess this claim.