It seems to be more and more evident that the onto-theological notion of the Trinity is at the center of Hegel's thought. Already strongly present in the Jugendschriften, sparingly though most forcefully treated in the Phenomenology, it comes really to the fore in the Encyclopedia and in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Though none of the major commentators have avoided the issue, until recent years there had been only the short study of J. Hessen devoted to the problem. (...) Splett promises to treat extensively the questions Hessen has only touched upon, and does so by a combination of a historical and a systematic analysis of Hegel's thought. The first chapter shows his progression from the texts of Frankfurt via the fascinating Jenafragment on the Divine Triangle to the Phenomenology. The second chapter is devoted to the Propaedeutics, the Logic, and the Encyclopedia where the idea is represented in its naked, speculative articulation. Thereafter comes a collection of relevant texts taken from different lectures on the philosophy of the spirit--and, finally, a clear and succinct exposé of the mature doctrine of the Philosophy of Religion. In the conclusion the author tries to formulate a number of issues where Hegelian speculation and Christian dogmatics might converge. To sum up: this is a good, clear, well-written monograph.--M. J. V. (shrink)

A quebra no que se refere às certezas da fé, a ênfase da própria experiência e os horrores do século XX levaram ao surgimento de uma vaga de (anti-)teodiceias. Aos ataques por parte do ateísmo correspondem do lado dos teólogos ou um certo resentimento em relação a Deus ou a sua desculpa mediante um pôr-em-questão da sua omnipotência. Surgiram desta forma propostas de carácter ora dualistico ora monístico que fizeram com que a resposta clássica ao problema tivesse progressivamente ficado quase (...) reduzida ao âmbito do ininteligível (veja-se o caso da incompreensão das teses ontológicas referentes ao carácter deficitário do mal). Foi sobretudo em confronto com a tonalidade afectiva desta discussão que surgiu a "free-will-defense" da racionalidade, muito embora a questão seja aqui a de saber até que ponto não têve ela por isso de pagar um preço demasiado alto. Em referência à dupla questão de Boécio na obra "Consolação da Filosofia", o autor do presente artigo defende, por um lado, a não solubilidade do problema da teodiceia: "Si Deus est, unde mala?" - Néscio! Por outro lado, no entanto, o autor constata também que a reflexão sobre a experiência de si não só justifica, como até exige, uma abertura à esperança da fé: "Si vero Deus non est, unde bona?" Seio quod nonl Facto é que desta forma, diz o autor, nos confrontamos com a realidade do bem seja isso a propósito da exigência moral que experimentamos ou do protesto que levantamos contra a realidade do mal. Ora é esta auto-revelação do poder da realidade do santo e do bem que não só nos permite, mas também de nós exige a Esperança da sua manifestação final. /// Breakdown in what concerns faith certainties, emphasis on experience of the self, and the horrors of the XX century led to a wave of (anti)-theodicies. To the attacks on the atheist's side correspond, according to the theologian's side, either some resentement related to God or their excuse by means of calling in question God's omnipotence. Thus, some proposals of either dualistic or monistic character came up and made the classical answer to the problem progressively reduced to unintelligible bounds (take a look at the incomprehension of the ontological theses concerning evil's deficient character). It was mostly in confrontation with the affective tonality of this discussion that the "free-will-defense" of rationality appeared, though the question here is knowing up to what point it didn't have to pay a too high price. Referring to Boethius double question in "The Consolation of Philosophy", the author of the present article defends, on the one hand, the non-solubility of the problem of theodicy: "Si Deus est, wide mala?" — Nescio! On the other hand, however, the author also notices that the reflexion on self-experience does not only justify, as it also demands an opening to faith's hope: "Si vero Deus non est, uncle bona? "Scio quod non! In fact in this way, says the author, we confront ourselves with the reality of good whether it is in reference to the moral demand that we experiment or to the protest we raise against evil's reality. Now, it's this self-revelation of the power of reality of the saint and good that not only allow us, but also demands from ourselves the Hope of its final manifestation. /// Verlust an Glaubensgewißheit, Betonung eigener Erfahrung und die Schrecken des 20. Jh. haben eine ganze Flut von (Anti-)Theodizeen ausgelöst. Atheistischen Angriffen entsprechen bei Theologen Groll auf Gott oder seine Entschuldigung durch Bestreitung seiner Allmacht. Dualistische wie monistische Antwortversuche leben auf; die klassische Antwort wird kaum noch verstanden (siehe besonders das Mißverständnis der ontologischen These vom Mangel-Charakter des Übels). Einer um sich greifenden Emotionalisierung gegenüber tritt die "free-will-defense" für Rationalität ein; aber zahlt sie für ihren Lösungsvorschlag nicht einen zu hohen Preis? - Im Rückgriff auf die Doppelfrage in Boethius' "Trost der Philosophie" wird hier vertreten: Einerseits ist das Theodizeeproblem unlösbar - "Si Deus esty unde mala?" Nescio! Anderseits berechtigt aber, ja ruft gewissenhafte Selbsterfahrung zur Glaubenshoffnung - "Si vero Deus non est, unde bona? "Scio, quod non! Nun aber begegnet uns Gutes, zunächst im sittlichen Anspruch an uns wie im Recht unseres Protestes gegen das Böse. Diese Selbstoffenbarung der Macht des Heilig-Guten erlaubt, ja fordert die Erwartung seines endgültigen Selbsterweises. (shrink)

Para a determinação do humano (em contraposição quer ao não-humano quer ao in-humano) não basta nem o entendimento saudável do homem (gesunder Menschenverstand) nem a ciência que porventura o complemente. Ms não vai também a Filosofia precisamente em nome da razão para lá do indivíduo e das suas necessidades ? Trata-se, portanto, de em contraposição à "sabedoria do mundo" afirmar a escuta crente em relação a Palavra de Deus? Esta Palavra, por são vez, não informa sobre tudo, e onde quer (...) que ela performe a acção de informar ela deve ser traduzida a partir da sua localização histórica para o nosso Aqui e Agora. Neste sentido, o cristão deve, portanto, filosofar. Ele não afirma a sua fé como fundamentação (como "premissa"), o que acontece, isso sim, na Teologia; mas ela está ao seu serviço no contexto da descoberta: ela olha para lá do indivíduo para a realidade em si mesma. Ora isto pode-Ihe muito bem abrir novas dimensões, as quais permanecem cerradas para um pensamento a-cristão ou até mesmo anti-cristão. Em última análise o crente é levado a reconhecer que a questão central da Filosofia pertence não ao homem, mas a Deus. /// DeusTo determine the human (in contraposition to both the non-human and the inhumane), neither the "healthy" understanding of man, nor science is sufficient. But does philosophy, in name of reason, proceeding beyond the individual and his needs, operate in contraposition to the "wisdom of the world" and the affirmation of the believer in relation to the Word of God? This Word does not inform us of everything and wherever it performs its action of informing, it must be translated in regard to its historical localization. Thus, the Christian must philosophise, not affirming his faith in foundational terms, as does indeed a theologian. But such an affirmation is at the service of a contextual discovery that proceeds beyond the individual and in the direction of reality itself This can open new dimensions that are effectively closed to non-Christian, or even anti-Christian, thought. Ultimately, the believer recognizes that the central question of philosophy does not belong to man but rather to God. (shrink)

We derive the first analytical formula for the density of "Dark Matter" (DM) at all length scales, thus also for the rotation curves of stars in galaxies, for the baryonic Tully–Fisher relation and for planetary systems, from Einstein's equations (EE) and classical approximations, in agreement with observations. DM is defined in Part I as the energy of the coherent gravitational field of the universe, represented by the additional equivalent ordinary matter (OM), needed at all length scales, to explain classically, with (...) inclusion of the OM, the _observed coherent_ gravitational field. Our derivation uses both EE and the Newtonian approximation of EE in Part I, to describe semi-classically in Part II the advection of DM, created at the level of the universe, into galaxies and clusters thereof. This advection happens proportional with their own classically generated gravitational field g, due to self-interaction of the gravitational field. It is based on the universal formula ρ D = λgg′ 2 for the density ρ D of DM advected into medium and lower scale structures of the observable universe, where λ is a universal constant fixed by the Tully–Fisher relations. Here g′ is the gravitational field of the universe; g′ is in main part its own source, as implied in Part I from EE. We start from a simple electromagnetic analogy that helps to make the paper generally accessible. This paper allows for the first time the exact calculation of DM in galactic halos and at all levels in the universe, based on EE and Newtonian approximations, in agreement with observations. (shrink)

Consequence is at the heart of logic, and an account of consequence offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. This text presents what the authors term as 'logical pluralism' arguing that the notion of logical consequence doesn't pin down one deductive consequence relation; it allows for many of them.

Providing an original and systematic treatment of foundational issues in philosophy of religion, J. L. Schellenberg's new book addresses the structure of..