Despite numerous publications on the philosophy of technology, little attention has been paid to the relationship between being and value in technology, two aspects which are usually treated separately. This volume addresses this issue by drawing connections between the ontology of technology on the one hand and technology's ethical and aesthetic significance on the other. The book first considers what technology is and what kind of entities it produces. Then it examines the moral implications of technology. Finally, it explores the (...) connections between technology and the arts. Enrico Terrone is Associate Professor at the University of Genoa, Italy. He works on philosophical issues concerning aesthetics, ontology and technology. His main area of research is philosophy of film. His most recent previous book (co-authored with Luca Bandirali) is Concept TV: An Aesthetics of Television Series (2021). Vera Tripodi is Assistant Professor at the University of Milan, Italy. She specializes in feminist philosophy and ethics, bioethics, ethics of technology, and social ontology. She is a Founding Member and Vice President of the SWIP ITALIA (The Society for Women in Philosophy - Italy). (shrink)

In recent years, increasing attention has been devoted to the underrepresentation, exclusion or outright discrimination experienced by women and members of other visible minority groups in academic philosophy. Much of this debate has focused on the state of contemporary Anglophone philosophy, which is dominated by the tradition of analytic philosophy. Moreover, there is growing interest in academia and society more generally for issues revolving around linguistic justice and linguistic discrimination (sometimes called ‘linguicism’ or ‘languagism’) (see e.g. Van Parijs 2011). Globalization (...) and the increasing adoption of English as global linguistic vehicle or lingua franca push these issues at the forefront of much of the world’s attention. The convergence of these two trends suggests the appropriateness of an analysis of the condition of non-native speakers of English in analytic philosophy. (shrink)

This paper considers two issues raised by the claim that fictional characters are abstract artifacts. First, given that artifacts normally have functions, what is the function of a fictional character? Second, given that, in experiencing works of fictions, we usually treat fictional characters as concrete individuals, how can such a phenomenology fit with an ontology according to which fictional characters are abstract artifacts? I will indirectly address the second issue by directly addressing the first one. For this purpose, I will (...) rely on the notion of a mental file. I will argue that the function of fictional characters is the generation of mental files of a special kind. I will show that our experience of fictional characters as concrete individuals depends on the kind of mental files that are generated by fictional characters as abstract artifacts. I will conclude that an appreciator of a work of fiction can open two files about a certain fictional character; one about the character as an individual in the fictional world, and the other about the character as an abstract artifact in the actual world. In this sense, our relation to a fictional character is characterized by a duality of files or ‘twofileness’. (shrink)

Regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with Stacie Friend’s claim that fiction is a genre, her notion of genre can be fruitfully applied to a paradigmatic genre such as science fiction. This article deploys Friend’s notion of genre in order to improve the influential characterization of science fiction proposed by Darko Suvin and to defend it from a criticism recently raised by Simon Evnine. According to Suvin, a work of science fiction must concern “a fictional ‘novum’ validated by cognitive (...) logic.” While Suvin conceives of his characterization as a necessary and sufficient condition for membership in the genre, I propose to cast the notions of “fictional novum” and “cognitive validation” as standard features of the genre, which works of science fiction should have but might lack. I argue that this amended version of Suvin’s characterization can better account for two basic properties of science fiction as a genre, namely its historicity and its relevance to appreciation. Lastly, I show that the amended version can shed some light on the affinity between works of science fiction and philosophical thought experiments. (shrink)

This paper develops Richard Wollheim’s claim that the proper appreciation of a picture involves not only enjoying a seeing-in experience but also abiding by a standard of correctness. While scholars have so far focused on what fixes the standard, thereby discussing the alternative between intentions and causal mechanisms, the paper focuses on what the standard does, that is, establishing which kinds, individuals, features and standpoints are relevant to the understanding of pictures. It is argued that, while standards concerning kinds, individuals (...) and features can be relevant also to ordinary perception, standards concerning standpoints are specific to pictorial experience. Drawing on all this, the paper proposes an ontology of depiction according to which a picture is constituted by both its visual appearance and its standard of correctness. (shrink)

Conceiving of fictional characters as types allows us to reconcile intuitions of sameness and difference about characters such as Batman that appear in different fictional worlds. Sameness occurs at the type level while difference occurs at the token level. Yet, the claim that fictional characters are types raises three main issues. Firstly, types seem to be eternal forms whereas fictional characters seem to be the outcome of a process of creation. Secondly, the tokens of a type are concrete particulars in (...) the actual world whereas the alleged tokens of a fictional character are concrete particulars in a fictional world. Thirdly, many fictional characters, unlike Batman, only appear in one work of fiction, and therefore one can wonder whether it does make sense to treat them as types. The main aim of this paper is to address these issues in order to defend a creationist account of fictional characters as types. (shrink)

The main accounts of the documentary in contemporary analytic aesthetics have difficulties in dealing with the distinction between documentaries and docudramas. On the one hand, the assertion-based accounts proposed by Carroll, Ponech and Plantinga cannot properly differentiate documentaries from docudramas. On the other hand, Currie’s account can do so by relying on the notion of trace but this involves an undesirable side-effect, namely, the exclusion, from the documentary, of those documentaries that do not include traces of their subjects, as for (...) instance documentaries that resort to reenactments. Is there a way to exclude docudramas from the documentary without also excluding other films that we usually treat as documentaries? The paper affirmatively answers to this question by relying on the notion perceptual belief, that is, a belief that one can form by endorsing one's perception. Documentaries are defined as films that mandate us to form perceptual beliefs. Even if a docudrama mandates us to form beliefs, it does not mandate us to form perceptual beliefs, and thus does not count as a documentary. By contrast, a documentary that resorts to reenactments still mandates us to form perceptual beliefs and thus properly satisfies the definition proposed. (shrink)

The main accounts of the documentary in contemporary analytic aesthetics have difficulties in dealing with the distinction between documentaries and docudramas. On the one hand, the assertion‐based accounts proposed by Noël Carroll, Trevor Ponech, and Carl Plantinga cannot properly differentiate documentaries from docudramas. On the other hand, Gregory Currie's account can do so by relying on the notion of trace, but this involves an undesirable side effect, namely, the exclusion, from the documentary, of those documentaries that do not include traces (...) of their subjects, as, for instance, documentaries that resort to reenactment. Is there a way to exclude docudramas from the documentary without also excluding other films that we usually treat as documentaries? This article affirmatively answers by relying on the notion of perceptual belief, that is, a belief that one can form by endorsing the demonstrative content of one's perception. While documentaries primarily involve the formation of perceptual beliefs, docudramas invite us to form nonperceptual beliefs by primarily involving the formation of perceptual imaginings. That is why docudramas are not documentaries. By contrast, a documentary that resorts to reenactment primarily involves the formation of perceptual beliefs, namely, perceptual beliefs about the reenactment itself. (shrink)

This paper considers two different kinds of philosophical interpretations of the movie Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind. On the one hand, Eternal Sunshine as a thought experiment that can function as an argument against utilitarianism. On the other hand, Eternal Sunshine as an instance of the genre of the remarriage comedy. I will argue that these two kinds of interpretations are in conflict. More specifically, Eternal Sunshine, understood as a comedy of remarriage, cannot function as an argument against utilitarianism, (...) at least in the sense specified by Grau and Wartenberg. Finally, I will suggest a different way in which Eternal Sunshine, understood as a comedy of remarriage, might function as an argument against utilitarianism. (shrink)

This paper presents and discusses Simon Evnine’s hylomorphic account of fictional characters and proposes some amendments to it with the aim of explaining the functioning of fictional characters. The paper does so by relying on a case study, viz. Edgar Allan Poe’s short story Berenice. The amended hylomorphic account of fictional characters will also be capable of explaining the malfunctioning of fictional characters.

This paper explores some phenomenological consequences of the ontological affinity between films and pop songs. Given the central place of the recording technology in both films and pop songs, one can wonder whether pop songs can elicit from their listeners the same kind of experience that films elicit from their spectators. In other words, one can wonder whether pop songs encourage us to play a ‘game of make-believe’ analogous to that we play when we engage with films. The main part (...) of the paper is meant to provide a positive answer to this question. The remaining sections illustrate and test the proposed account by contrasting paradigmatic pop songs with borderline cases. (shrink)

Both perception and imagination seem to play a crucial role in our engagement with fiction films but whether they really do so, and which role they possibly play, is controversial. On the one hand, a fiction film, as film, is a depiction that invites us to perceive the events portrayed. On the other hand, as fiction, it invites us to imagine the story told. Thus, after watching the film Alien, one might say that one saw Ripley fighting the monster but (...) one might also say that one imagined Ripley fighting the monster. Are these two reports compatible? If they are, how can we combine them so to make sense of them? If, instead, they are not, which of them should we give up? (shrink)

Nelson Goodman notoriously distinguished between autographic works, whose instances should be identified by taking history of production into account, and allographic works, whose instances can be identified independently of history of production. Scholars such as Jerrold Levinson, Flint Schier, and Gregory Currie have criticized Goodman’s autographic/allographic distinction arguing that all works are such that their instances should be identified by taking history of production into account. I will address this objection by exploiting David Davies’ distinction between e-instances and p-instances of (...) a work, thereby restating the autographic/allographic distinction. Then, I will show that this way of restating this distinction leads us to effective accounts of relevant related phenomena such as forgery, plagiarism, and digital technologies. Finally, I will show the theoretical advantages of my account of the autographic/allographic distinction in comparison with an alternative account recently proposed by Jason D’Cruz and P.D. Magnus. (shrink)

The philosophy of film usually presupposes two main assumptions or dogmas. First, films are autonomous audiovisual structures that can be instantiated by particular screenings. Second, the cinematic experience is a surrogate of the audiovisual perception. Experimental cinema can defy these assumptions by making films that either lack an autonomous structure or do not provide spectators with an audiovisual experience that emulates ordinary perception. The paper analyzes Ugo Nespolo’s experimental films precisely as peculiar attempts to defy the two dogmas of the (...) philosophy of film. (shrink)

Ontologia dell’arte L’ontologia dell’arte è la disciplina filosofica che si occupa di stabilire a quali categorie ontologiche appartengono determinate famiglie di opere d’arte. Si consideri innanzitutto la distinzione fra individui e tipi, che ricalca la distinzione aristotelica fra particolari e universali. Un individuo è qualcosa che ha una sua precisa localizzazione nello spazio e nel tempo, qualcosa che potremmo indicare con un gesto o con un dimostrativo come “questo” o “quello”: questa...

L’articolo si focalizza sulle relazioni fra la nozione di Ferraris di documentalità e le nozioni tradizionali di causalità, intenzionalità, e normatività. Mostrerò che la nozione di documentalità, al cui centro troviamo la nozione di traccia, si basa su una spiegazione della causalità stando alla quale i documenti sono costituiti da catene causali. Stando così le cose, occorre formulare un criterio per differenziare le catene documentali da altri tipi di catene causali. Argomenterò che, riconducendo l’intenzionalità alla documentalità, Ferraris si preclude la (...) possibilità di usare l’intenzionalità come criterio. Senza un tale criterio, però, la teoria della documentalità rischia di ritornare alla tesi di Derrida stando alla quale nulla esiste al di fuori del testo. La parte finale dell’articolo considera due strategie grazie alle quali la teoria può evitare tale rischio. (shrink)

Se dovessi scegliere un unico libro di Maurizio Ferraris da portarmi sulla proverbiale isola deserta sceglierei Una ikea di università. Lo farei per tre ragioni differenti. La prima è autobiografica: è il libro per merito – o per colpa – del quale ho finito per occuparmi di filosofia. La seconda è estetica: c’è in questo libro una felicità di scrittura che è raro trovare non solo in filosofia ma anche in letteratura; forse mi lascio condizionare da fattori idiosincratici, ma per (...) me Una ikea è uno dei testi italiani più belli degli ultimi vent’anni. Infine c’è una terza ragione che è propriamente filosofica. Per come vedo io le cose, è in Una ikea che si compie la svolta decisiva nel percorso filosofico di Ferraris; è in questo libro – a partire dalla riflessione su natura e funzione di un peculiare oggetto sociale, l’università – che si gettano le basi delle dottrine a venire: la documentalità e il nuovo realismo. Nel mio saggio mi propongo dunque di rileggere Una ikea con il senno di poi, mostrando che i principi fondamentali della documentalità e del nuovo realismo erano già all’opera, in forma di vivide intuizioni, ben prima che queste teorie ricevessero un nome proprio e una trattazione sistematica. In particolare, è in Una ikea che Ferraris mette a punto il principio critico-metodico che da lì in poi guiderà l’intera sua ricerca: «Uno potrebbe opporre che qui si ha a che fare con una classica confusione tra ontologia e qualcosa che non è ontologia (e può essere tante altre cose: ermeneutica, filosofia della storia, psicologia delle visioni del mondo, storia delle mentalità, teoria della scienza, o al limite animismo, come ai tempi dei druidi). Come a dire che si confonde il fatto – del tutto indipendente dall’iniziativa umana – per cui c’è qualcosa, con il fatto che si possa descrivere quel qualcosa in tanti modi, e che in questa descrizione siamo relativamente liberi» (Una ikea di università: 42). (shrink)

I term ‘institutional monism’ the ontological thesis according to which the distinction between institutions and practices is only a matter of degree and not of kind. This paper criticizes institutional monism and puts forward a dualist theory, which takes institutions and practices as two distinct ontological kinds. For that, I introduce a distinction between the attitude and the content of a mental state. I show there can be normativity at the level of the attitude as well as at the level (...) of the content. In the former case we have a norm, in the latter a rule. This allows me to draw an ontological distinction between practices, understood as systems of norms, and institutions, understood as systems of rules. (shrink)

Moving from a cinematic reinterpretation of Borges’s Library of Babel, I attempt to provide a new answer to the old ontological question: “What kind of being is a film?”. This answer, which takes into account the coming of digital era, is developed through a comparison with Carroll’s philosophy of motion pictures. While discussing, criticizing and trying to complete his theory, I will examine the concept of a film under four different aspects: as a material object, as an ideal object, as (...) a mental object, and as a social object. Finally, our ontology of film will be applied to clarify some traditional theoretical dualisms: i.e. film vs. reality, film vs. narration, film vs. discourse, film vs. art. (shrink)

Se il mondo ti confonde, non lo capisci più, se nulla ti soddisfa, ti annoi sempre più, scienziati ed ingegneri hanno inventato già una generazione di bambole robot.Alberto Camerini, Rock’n’ roll robot La teoria della fidanzata automatica (Ferraris 2007b) ha due importanti ricadute: da una parte rivela l’opera d’arte come oggetto sociale, di contro alle derive idealistiche della filosofia dell’arte; dall’altra ne preserva la peculiarità estetica, di contro al convenzionalismo pragmatista per...

If live-action fictions are photographic representations of theatrical representations, “collapsed seeing”, according to Robert Hopkins, is the experience of directly seeing in the films the narrated events, while overriding the theatrical representation. Collapsed seeing opens the door to a paradox: on the one hand, we would experience live-action films as photographic records of narrated events, on the other hand, we know that it is impossible to access directly fictional events. The paradox can be solved if we consider these events as (...) happening in an artefactual – and not simply a possible – world, with points of view as elements of its ontological structure. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to characterize Maurizio Ferraris’ New Realism as a metaphilosophical account that develops Peter Strawson’s project of a descriptive metaphysics. The paper consists of two sections. The former outlines Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics by highlighting its realist commitments. The latter characterizes New Realism as a way of turning Strawson’s metaphysics into a metaphilosophy. New Realism moves from Strawson’s metaphysical description of the world we share through our experience to the metaphilosophical claim that philosophy should primarily (...) consist in this kind of description. (shrink)

In the debate on our engagement with and appreciation of fiction films, the thesis that the viewer of a fiction film imagines observing fictional events, and the thesis that these events are imagined to be presented by a narrator, are usually taken as two components of one theoretical package, which philosophers such as George Wilson and Jerrold Levison defend, while philosophers such as Gregory Currie and Berys Gaut reject. This paper argues that the two theses can be disentangled and investigates (...) their logical connection. The investigation shows that the second thesis entails the first but there is no entailment the other way around. Endorsing the first thesis is thus compatible with two options, namely endorsing the second thesis or abandoning it. However, the paper argues that if we endorse the first thesis, endorsing the second provides us with a more compelling explanation of our engagement with and appreciation of fiction films. (shrink)

According to the standard view of pictorial reference, a picture produces singular thought in virtue of both its appearance and its history. Zeimbekis (2010) challenges this view, arguing that the perception of the picture's appearance does not contribute to the production of singular thought. The paper defends the standard view from Zeimbekis' challenge, specifying the roles of appearance and history in pictorial reference. While knowledge about the picture's history allows one to identify the standpoint from which to see the scene (...) depicted, the perception of the picture's appearance exploits that standpoint to single out individuals in that scene. (shrink)

This paper casts the television series BoJack Horseman as a challenge to the genre that Stanley Cavell calls “the comedy of remarriage.” First, it is argued that the last season of the series explicitly suggests but finally contradicts the narrative pattern of the comedy of remarriage. Then, the impossibility of remarriage in BoJack Horseman is traced back to some structural features of the medium of television and its relationship to time. Finally, the impossibility of remarriage in BoJack Horseman is related (...) to the capacity of the medium of television to enable self-defeating fictions which challenge fiction as a cultural institution. (shrink)

Social individuals are social entities having a distinctive individuality, often signaled by the use of a proper name to designate them. This article proposes an account of social individuals based on the notion of a mental file, understood as a repository of information about a single individual. First, I consider a variant of the puzzle of the ship of Theseus in which the object having problematic identity conditions is a social individual, namely, a rock band. Then, I argue that we (...) can figure out such identity conditions by considering the mental files concerning this band. In conclusion, I outline a version of social constructionism according to which the existence of social individuals like bands depends on mental files about them. (shrink)

This article addresses the definition of cinema by focusing on the related ontological question of which basic category circumscribes cinematic works. According to Noël Carroll, the definition of cinema consists both of ontological conditions that treat the moving image as a type and of other conditions that treat it as a display. But following Carroll’s ontological conditions, the digital encoding of a moving image enigmatically ends up being both a type and a token. Solving such a puzzle by clarifying the (...) relation between the cinematic type and the digital type leads us to define the moving image in general as a type that specifies a spatiotemporal distribution of pixels. (shrink)

I rely on Frascolla's interpretation of the Tractatus ontology to develop an account of depiction in which a picture is conceived of as a visual structure constituted by pixels that are conceived of, in their turn, as elementary propositions. Then I argue that such an account is complementary to the considerations about «noticing aspects» in the Philosophical Investigations, to the extent that the visual structure constituted by pixels provides a design allowing the picture’s viewer to notice aspects. Finally I argue (...) that a joint reading of the considerations about pictures in the Tractatus and in the Philosophical Investigations allows us to address some important issues in the contemporary philosophical debate about depiction. (shrink)

A series of recent experimental studies have cast doubt on the existence of a traditional tension that aestheticians have noted in our aesthetic judgments and practices, viz. the problem of taste. The existence of the problem has been acknowledged since Hume and Kant, though not enough has been done to analyse it in depth. In this paper, we remedy this by proposing six possible conceptualizations of it. Drawing on our analysis of the problem of taste, we argue that the experimental (...) results in question are not a real challenge to its existence. By contrast, they provide empirical evidence in its support. (shrink)

What aesthetic interest do we have in watching films? In a much debated paper, Roger Scruton argued that this interest typically comes down to the interest in the dramatic representations recorded by such films. Berys Gaut and Catharine Abell criticized Scruton’s argument by claiming that films can elicit an aesthetic interest also by virtue of their pictorial representation. In this article, we develop a different criticism of Scruton’s argument. In our view, a film can elicit an aesthetic interest that does (...) not come down to an interest in the dramatic representation or in the pictorial representation. We will argue that this is a distinctively cinematic interest. In section I we outline Scruton’s argument. In section II we point out an interest in how the cinematic medium presents the portrayed subject as detached from the spectator’s environment. In section III, by referring to Wittgenstein’s account of the contemplation from outside, we contend that the interest in films introduced in section II can count as an aesthetic interest. In section IV we argue that both documentaries and fiction films can elicit this kind of interest. In section V we compare the three different kinds of aesthetic interest that, in our view, a film can elicit. In section VI we describe the corresponding kinds of cinematic achievements. (shrink)

Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time, raises an interesting philosophical issue, namely, how can one be in touch with past things if they no longer exist? It provides us with a way to address this issue by outlining an ontological view according to which past things still exist within a four-dimensional world. Although one cannot be in touch with past things by means of ordinary perception, one can do so by combining perception and memory. In this sense, In Search (...) of Lost Time helps us to reconcile a four-dimensionalist ontology according to which things have both spatial and temporal parts with a realist phenomenology according to which experience gives us access to things as they are. In so doing, Proust’s masterpiece allows us to shed some light on what it means for a subject of experience to exist in a four-dimensional world. (shrink)

This book uses the conceptual tools of philosophy to shed light on digital media and on the way in which they bear upon our existence. At the turn of the century, the rise of digital media significantly changed our world. The digitizing of traditional media has extraordinarily increased the circulation of texts, sound, and images. Digital media have also widened our horizons and altered our relationship with others and with ourselves. Information production and communication are still undoubtedly significant aspects of (...) digital media and life. Recently, however, recording, registration and keeping track have taken the upper hand in both online practices and the imaginaries related to them. The essays in this book therefore focus primarily on the idea that digital media involve a significant overlapping between communication and recording. (shrink)

Television series seem to be made of images and sounds just like films, but Luca Bandirali and Enrico Terrone suggest an alternate framework for understanding television series: as concepts whereby narratives made of images and sounds can be constructed.

This introduction accounts for three main elements characterizing digital media and the recent history of their interpretation and understanding. The authors label these three elements: “interaction”; “recording”; and “autonomy.” First, digital media somehow subvert the traditional notion of mass media. In digital media, the masses do not passively receive information; rather, they contribute to its creation and diffusion. Second, digital media involve a complete overlapping between communication, on the one hand, and recording, registration and keeping track, on the other. For (...) sure, information production and communication remain important aspects of digital media. And yet, for a few years now, recording, registration and keeping track have taken the upper hand. The third element characterizing digital media is that a crucial role is assigned to software, which is not only able to transmit and store information, but also to manipulate it. Digital media do not limit themselves to help our minds or to interconnect us with other human subjects. In digital media, recording often involves the autonomous manipulation, combination, and recombination of what is recorded. (shrink)

The Audience Effect. On the Collective Cinema Experience HANICHJULIAN edinburgh university press. 2017. pp. 256. £19.99.

The story of the Ship of Theseus is one of the most venerable conundrums in philosophy. Some philosophers consider it a genuine puzzle. Others deny that it is so. It is, therefore, an open question whether there is or there is not a puzzle in the Ship of Theseus story. So, arguably, it makes sense to test empirically whether people perceive the case as a puzzle. Recently, David Rose, Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich and forty-two other researchers from different countries have (...) undertaken that task. We argue that their tests do not provide any evidence that bears on the question as to whether the Ship of Theseus case is a genuine puzzle. In our discussion we address also what should be taken into account if one wishes to test the puzzling, or not puzzling, status of the Ship of Theseus story. (shrink)

In ‘Listening to Other Minds’, Enrico Terrone provides an account of the mental activity in which we ought to engage to appreciate pop music. He argues that we should ‘play a game of make-believe’ in which we imagine that we can ‘hear … the mind’ of a fictional character. We should use this ability to grasp the thoughts and feelings that the mind contains, and thus undertake ‘exploration’ of the character’s ‘inner life’. This article argues, first, that only (...) a simplified version of the account is plausible; second, that its plausibility as a general account of pop music depends on a dubious conception of the ‘paradigm cases’ ; third, that its desirability as an account of a narrower range of cases is questionable; and, fourth, that it is motivated by unsuitable assumptions about representation in pop. (shrink)