In this paper, I consider emotional reactions in response to political facts, and I investigate how they may provide relevant knowledge about those facts. I assess the value of such knowledge, both from an epistemic and a political perspective. Concerning the epistemic part, I argue that, although emotions are not in themselves sufficient to ground evaluative knowledge about political facts, they can do so within a network of further coherent epistemic attitudes about those facts. With regards to the political part, (...) I argue that the contribution of emotions to evaluative knowledge about political facts, is indeed politically valuable. To develop my argument, I show first that an evaluative kind of knowledge is relevant for reaching a sophisticated level of political cognition, and second that emotions contribute distinctively to this kind of knowledge. I conclude that, when emotional experiences towards political events are coupled with an adequate factual knowledge about those events, they can ground a distinctive evaluative knowledge about those events, and such knowledge is relevant both from an epistemic and a political perspective. (shrink)

We are repeatedly told that AI will help us to solve some of the world's biggest challenges, from treating chronic diseases and reducing fatality rates in traffic accidents to fighting climate change and anticipating cybersecurity threats. However, the article contends that public discourse on AI systematically avoids considering AI’s environmental costs. Artificial Intelligence- Brevini argues- runs on technology, machines, and infrastructures that deplete scarce resources in their production, consumption, and disposal, thus increasing the amounts of energy in their use, and (...) exacerbate problems of waste and pollution. It also relies on data centers, that demands impressive amounts of energy to compute, analyse, categorize. If we want to stand a chance at tackling the Climate Emergency, then we have to stop avoiding addressing the environmental problems generated by AI. (shrink)

Geometrical intuitions spontaneously drive visuo-spatial reasoning in human adults, children and animals. Is their emergence intrinsically linked to visual experience, or does it reflect a core property of cognition shared across sensory modalities? To address this question, we tested the sensitivity of blind-from-birth adults to geometrical-invariants using a haptic deviant-figure detection task. Blind participants spontaneously used many geometric concepts such as parallelism, right angles and geometrical shapes to detect intruders in haptic displays, but experienced difficulties with symmetry and complex spatial (...) transformations. Across items, their performance was highly correlated with that of sighted adults performing the same task in touch (blindfolded) and in vision, as well as with the performances of uneducated preschoolers and Amazonian adults. Our results support the existence of an amodal core-system of geometry that arises independently of visual experience. However, performance at selecting geometric intruders was generally higher in the visual compared to the haptic modality, suggesting that sensory-specific spatial experience may play a role in refining the properties of this core-system of geometry. (shrink)

Jo-Anne McArthur est l’une des photojournalistes majeures de la condition animale dans le monde. Elle a documenté les conditions de vie et d’exploitation des animaux dans plus de soixante pays différents, et ses images sont utilisées par les mouvements animalistes dans le monde entier. Elle vit à Toronto et dirige l’agence multi-média We animals Media dont elle est la fondatrice. En vingt ans de travail, elle a accumulé une énorme documentation, et multiplié les projets de collaboration avec...

La pace non e un argomento ma un sogno evolutivo della coscienza umana. Un sogno timido che sopravvive al dramma della storia e alle sue smentite piu derisorie. Un sogno che e cruciale custodire, dunque, come gesto di resistenza a fronte del cinismo di ogni epoca e in particolar modo davanti alle derive piu subdole e inquietanti della contemporaneita. Un'esplorazione evocativa dei quattro modi in cui l'umanita, da sempre e non senza contraddizioni, prova a sognare la pace: attraverso la natura (...) (phusis), il pensiero (logos), la legge (nomos), l'amore (eros). Quattro dimensioni esistenziali che l'autrice sorvola in compagnia di alcune figure della filosofia, del mito, della letteratura, della poesia, della psicoanalisi e della storia che hanno rappresentato, nella sua esperienza autobiografica, una fonte generosa di fiducia e orientamento. Muovendo dall'intuizione comune a tante saggezze secondo cui la vera pace non elude la tragedia umana ma la denuncia e la interroga, il libro ci conduce in un viaggio meditativo che costeggia, senza negarlo, l'abisso della distruttivita, sia sul piano individuale sia su quello sociale e collettivo. L'abisso nel quale ripetutamente sprofonda il sogno di vivere insieme e amichevolmente su questa Terra. Ma proprio a partire da questa confidenza con la tragicita della vicenda umana si dipana quel filo sottile dell'etica che e risorsa elettiva della sensibilita femminile e che riconduce l'intelligenza all'intimita con la vita. E il sogno desto della pace, per desiderare ancora.". (shrink)

Un saggio in memoria di Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd , filosofo e teologo egiziano che ha contribuito in modo fondamentale alla diffusione dell’approccio letterario applicato al testo sacro dell’islam e al successivo sviluppo di un’ermeneutica di tipo umanistico in grado di affermare la portata rivoluzionaria e antidogmatica del concetto di Corano come insieme di discorsi. Nominato professore onorario all’Università di Leida, dove insegna a partire dal 2000, il professor Abu Zayd è costretto all’esilio nel 1995, dopo la condanna per apostasia (...) che gli viene mossa in ambito giudiziario proprio a causa del suo interesse per un terreno di studio così delicato.An essay written in memory of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd , Egyptian philosopher and theologian who substantially contributed to the spread of the literary approach to the sacred text of Islam and to the subsequent development of a humanistic hermeneutics being able to affirm the revolutionary and anti-dogmatic significance of the concept of the Qur’an asset of discourses. Appointed honorary professor at Leiden University, where he began teaching in 2000, the professor Abu Zayd is obliged to go into exile in 1995, after his judicial conviction for apostasy due to his interest in such a delicate field of study. (shrink)

Sulla base degli studi di Mircea Eliade, l’Autore evidenzia, nel lai antico francese Yonec e in due racconti popolari riconducibili al tipo AT 432, «The Prince as bird», tracce di scenari iniziatici femminili e del viaggio oltremondano sciamanico. Sur la base des études de Mircea Eliade, l’auteur met en évidence, dans le Lai de Yonec de Marie de France et dans deux contes de fées liés au conte-type AT 432 « L’Oiseau bleu », des traces des rites initiatiques féminins et (...) du voyage chamanique vers l’Autre Monde. On the ground of Mircea Eliade studies, the author analyses the Ancient French Lay of Yonec and two folk tales, connected to the type AT 432 “The Prince as bird”, focusing on the presence of hints of ancient initiatory female rites and shamanic female otherworld voyages. (shrink)

This review article puts two recent publications —Existence and Heritage: Hermeneutic Explorations in African and Continental Philosophies by Tsenay Serequeberhan and What Fanon Said. A Philosophical Introduction to His Life and Thought by Lewis R. Gordon—in conversation with Achille Mbembe’s renowned On the Postcolony, first published in French in 2000, in English in 2001, and here reviewed in the 2015 Wits University Press edition. The opportunity for such a literary dialogue to take place across fifteen years is occasioned both by (...) the latest South African edition of On the Postcolony, which in itself invites a fresh reading of Mbembe’s manifesto on postcolonial authoritarianism in Africa, as well as by the different potential outcome of the postcolonial condition that Gordon and Serequeberhan envision and propose with respect to Mbembe. I argue that while Mbembe’s pessimistic portrayal of the postcolonial present is one whereby it is difficult to envision transformation, both Serequeberhan and Gordon’s books offer a rich philosophical terrain from which to imagine possible futures, grounded in notions of dialogue and solidarity, that, however, vary significantly for each author. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 9, Page 1226-1246, November 2022. In this study, we claim that political liberalism, despite harsh criticism, is still the best option available for providing a just and stable society. However, we maintain that political liberalism needs to be revised so as to be justifiable from the perspective of not only the “reasonable” in a Rawlsian sense but also the ones whom Rawls labels as “unreasonable.” To support our claim, going beyond Rawls’s original account, (...) we unpack the concept of unreasonableness and identify three different subsets that we label as the “partially reasonable,” the “non-reasonable,” and the “unreasonable.” We argue that both the “fully” reasonable and the “partially reasonable” would be included into the constituency of public justification; more specifically, we claim that the latter would support liberal institutions out of their reasons: we define these reasons as mutually intelligible reasons and claim that they allow to acknowledge the importance of a convergence approach to public justification. As for the “non-reasonable” and “unreasonable,” we claim that they cannot be included in the constituency of public justification, but they nonetheless could be compliant with liberal institutions if political liberalism offers them some reasons to comply: here, we claim that political liberalism should include them through engagement and propose reasoning from conjecture as an effecting way of offering reasons for compliance. In particular, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, the “non-reasonable” could find conciliatory reasons to comply with liberal institutions on a stable base. With regard to the “unreasonable” in the strict sense, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, their unreasonableness could be contained and they could find reasons—even if just self-interested—for complying with liberal institutions rather than defying them. In our discussion, we consider the different subsets not as “frozen” but as dynamic and open to change, and we aim to propose a more complex and multilayered approach to inclusion that would be able to include a wider set of people. To strengthen our argument, we show that the need for a wider public justification and for broader inclusion in liberal societies is grounded in respect for persons both as equal persons and as particular individuals. In particular, we claim that individuals’ values, ends, commitments, and affiliations activate demands of respect and can strengthen the commitment to the liberal–democratic order. Through a reformulation of the role of respect in liberal societies, we also show a kind of social and communitarian dimension that, we claim, is fully compatible with political liberalism and opens it up to “civic friendship” and “social solidarity,” which are constitutive elements for the development of a sense of justice and for the realization of a just and stable society. (shrink)

This article aims at showing the need for a sound ethical and anthropological foundation of economics and business, and argues the importance of a correct understanding of human values and human nature for the sake of economics and of businesses themselves. It is suggested that the ethical-anthropological side of economics and business can be grasped by taking Aristotle’s virtue ethics and Amartya Sen’s capability approach (CA) as major reference points. We hold that an “Aristotelian economics of virtues”, connected with the (...) CA’s notion of human richness, can promote the shift to the concept of personhood, and can lead to a more “humanized” business, by fostering human flourishing, the enhancement of human capabilities, and the pursuit of a more humane development for each and every person. (shrink)

The increasing implementation of and reliance on machine-learning (ML) algorithms to perform tasks, deliver services and make decisions in health and healthcare have made the need for fairness in ML, and more specifically in healthcare ML algorithms (HMLA), a very important and urgent task. However, while the debate on fairness in the ethics of artificial intelligence (AI) and in HMLA has grown significantly over the last decade, the very concept of fairness as an ethical value has not yet been sufficiently (...) explored. Our paper aims to fill this gap and address the AI ethics principle of fairness from a conceptual standpoint, drawing insights from accounts of fairness elaborated in moral philosophy and using them to conceptualise fairness as an ethical value and to redefine fairness in HMLA accordingly. To achieve our goal, following a first section aimed at clarifying the background, methodology and structure of the paper, in the second section, we provide an overview of the discussion of the AI ethics principle of fairness in HMLA and show that the concept of fairness underlying this debate is framed in purely distributive terms and overlaps with non-discrimination, which is defined in turn as the absence of biases. After showing that this framing is inadequate, in the third section, we pursue an ethical inquiry into the concept of fairness and argue that fairness ought to be conceived of as an ethical value. Following a clarification of the relationship between fairness and non-discrimination, we show that the two do not overlap and that fairness requires much more than just non-discrimination. Moreover, we highlight that fairness not only has a distributive but also a socio-relational dimension. Finally, we pinpoint the constitutive components of fairness. In doing so, we base our arguments on a renewed reflection on the concept of respect, which goes beyond the idea of equal respect to include respect for individual persons. In the fourth section, we analyse the implications of our conceptual redefinition of fairness as an ethical value in the discussion of fairness in HMLA. Here, we claim that fairness requires more than non-discrimination and the absence of biases as well as more than just distribution; it needs to ensure that HMLA respects persons both as persons and as particular individuals. Finally, in the fifth section, we sketch some broader implications and show how our inquiry can contribute to making HMLA and, more generally, AI promote the social good and a fairer society. (shrink)

Most theories of justice rest on the idea that emotions need to be contained or set aside and that rationality serves as the best, if not exclusive, criterion for identifying the principles of a fair distribution. In recent years, however, two important claims have been made. One is that rationality and emotions are not in conflict with one another, but should be conceived of as strictly interconnected; the other is that social justice is not just about distribution, but also – (...) or especially – about social relations. This paper aims to bridge these claims and argues that (a) the role of emotions should be recognised by theories of justice, as it is compatible with the importance such theories attribute to rationality, and (b) an inquiry into emotions is particularly important to investigate the socio-relational dimension of justice. Moreover, the paper claims that (c) in order to adequately investigate the role of emotions in social justice, it is important to acknowledge that emotions are structurally mediated and shaped by powerful transformative forces, among which technologies – especially so-called socially disruptive technologies (SDTs) – prove to be particularly relevant. The paper argues that SDTs have a fundamental role in shaping social relations, shared commitments, and the emotions that follow from them or enable them. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 9, Page 1226-1246, November 2022. In this study, we claim that political liberalism, despite harsh criticism, is still the best option available for providing a just and stable society. However, we maintain that political liberalism needs to be revised so as to be justifiable from the perspective of not only the “reasonable” in a Rawlsian sense but also the ones whom Rawls labels as “unreasonable.” To support our claim, going beyond Rawls’s original account, (...) we unpack the concept of unreasonableness and identify three different subsets that we label as the “partially reasonable,” the “non-reasonable,” and the “unreasonable.” We argue that both the “fully” reasonable and the “partially reasonable” would be included into the constituency of public justification; more specifically, we claim that the latter would support liberal institutions out of their reasons: we define these reasons as mutually intelligible reasons and claim that they allow to acknowledge the importance of a convergence approach to public justification. As for the “non-reasonable” and “unreasonable,” we claim that they cannot be included in the constituency of public justification, but they nonetheless could be compliant with liberal institutions if political liberalism offers them some reasons to comply: here, we claim that political liberalism should include them through engagement and propose reasoning from conjecture as an effecting way of offering reasons for compliance. In particular, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, the “non-reasonable” could find conciliatory reasons to comply with liberal institutions on a stable base. With regard to the “unreasonable” in the strict sense, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, their unreasonableness could be contained and they could find reasons—even if just self-interested—for complying with liberal institutions rather than defying them. In our discussion, we consider the different subsets not as “frozen” but as dynamic and open to change, and we aim to propose a more complex and multilayered approach to inclusion that would be able to include a wider set of people. To strengthen our argument, we show that the need for a wider public justification and for broader inclusion in liberal societies is grounded in respect for persons both as equal persons and as particular individuals. In particular, we claim that individuals’ values, ends, commitments, and affiliations activate demands of respect and can strengthen the commitment to the liberal–democratic order. Through a reformulation of the role of respect in liberal societies, we also show a kind of social and communitarian dimension that, we claim, is fully compatible with political liberalism and opens it up to “civic friendship” and “social solidarity,” which are constitutive elements for the development of a sense of justice and for the realization of a just and stable society. (shrink)

Une lettre de Fénelon au duc de Bourgogne, écrite en 1708, représente le sommet du sobre échange épistolaire entre l’archevêque et le prince. Nous utiliserons ici cette lettre comme un point de départ pour sonder la richesse linguistique et rhétorique du discours de l’épreuve chez Fénelon directeur de conscience. Miroir de concentration des thèmes féneloniens, elle peut être l’objet d’une lecture rapprochée, mais il convient aussi d’élargir le cadre et d’évoquer le vaste intertexte où elle s’insère : les exigences radicales (...) du pur amour transparaissent alors – tout comme, ailleurs, sous le voile de la fable – à travers le conseil politique, les maximes de la sagesse humaniste ou le nuances du portrait spirituel. (shrink)

On connaît de Charles Larmore (1950), philosophe moral américain contemporain, ses célèbres objections à John Rawls, mais peu de travaux se concentrent sur sa philosophie : son réalisme moral, sa réhabilitation partielle de l'idéal d'authenticité, sa version du libéralisme politique ou encore à sa théorie normativiste du moi. Ce sont ces différents aspects de sa pensée que les études contenues dans ce volume, premier ouvrage entièrement consacré à l'oeuvre de Charles Larmore, interrogent et mettent en perspective. Un essai inédit du (...) philosophe américain ainsi qu'un débat entre Charles Larmore et Alain Renaut autour de la controverse réalisme-idéalisme y figurent également, en guise de conclusion. (shrink)

This article is a response to the new book by Bruce Janz, African Philosophy and Enactivist Cognition: The Space of Thought, published in 2023 in the Bloomsbury Studies in World Philosophies series. Enactivist Cognition opens up a new space of conversation in the field of African philosophy—and world philosophies more broadly—through an innovative approach that applies insights from the cognitive sciences to the humanities in order to highlight the relationship between thought and context, between theorization and experience. Through the interpretive (...) lens of enactivism, Janz ventures into new readings of well-known themes and personalities in African philosophy and also introduces interesting new themes and personalities to the African philosophical conversation. Janz also intentionally bridges African and Africana thought. While this article contests the application of enactivism to all the philosophers treated in Enactivist Cognition, it applauds Janz’s search for new, creative, and productive spaces for and of philosophy. (shrink)

This article argues that if world philosophies are to remain relevant for social emancipation in the present time, they must incorporate critical reflections about the methods and sources of philosophy that were at the center of the African philosophy debates in the 1970s and 1980s. The debates that surrounded the emergence of African philosophy as an academic discipline entailed thorough and innovative methodological reflections on the role of ethnography, language, and genre in philosophical expression. These reflections critically recast the relationship (...) between indigenous traditions and academic texts and between popular and professional philosophical expression, enabling their practitioners to re-think the important questions of what it means to philosophize and who philosophizes. My argument is that these methodological reflections from African philosophy reveal the profound and essential link between methods and content of philosophy and that they must be incorporated as key methodologies for world philosophies to tackle questions of social and political relevance in the present time. (shrink)

The law commonly conceived as a norm : deficiency of this conception -- On some general hints of this deficiency, and in particular those evinced by the likely origin of the current definitions of law -- The need to distinguish the distinct legal norms from the legal order considered as a whole. The logical impossibility of defining the legal order as a set of norms -- How the unity of a legal order has been sometimes intuited -- How a legal (...) order is not only a set of norms, as it also encompasses other elements -- How such ements are implicitly postulated by the common inquiry into the distinguishing characteristics of law -- Assessment, from this point of view, of the so-called objectivity of law -- The element of sanction -- The expression "the legal order" -- The essential elements of the concept of law. The law as an institution and the law as a precept -- The preceding doctrine on the concept of institution -- My concept of institution and its fundamental characteristics : 1. The objective existence of the institution; 2. Institution and social body; 3. The institution's selfness; 4. The unity of the institution -- Equivalence of the concept of institution and the concept of a legal order -- Evidence for this equivalence based on the doctrine that the law is only "form" -- Mention of some problems that need solving in the light of this equivalence -- Cases in which the original establishment of a law does not depend on norms, but on the emergence of an institution, and the impossibility of reducing the institution to the norms -- The concept of institution and the international legal order -- The institution and the legal relationship: relationships between more persons -- Relationships between persons and things : examples of some of these relationships that, considered more broadly, cab be portrayed as institutions -- The institution and the legal person -- My conception of the law with respect to certain problems relating to : 1. The legal character of state power; 2. The extension of the state personality; 3. The legal relevance of its territory and citizenry -- Critical assessment of some opinions that attach importance to the legal order only insofar as it reflect relationships between persons. Applications to: 1. The legal sanction; 2. The state territory and citizenship; 3. The state bodies; 4. The limits of the legislative function -- Some consequences of my conception with regard to the subjective aspect of the law: the legal relationship; the status of persons; rights in rem; the correlation between rights and obligations; the equal position of subjects -- Recapitulatory remarks -- The plurality of legal orders and the doctrine that reduces all law to state law -- The untenability of this doctrine from a historical and theoretical point of view -- Its untenability with respect to the existing law -- Non-state legal orders; international law -- Ecclesiastical law -- The order of entities that are considered unlawful or are ignored by the state -- Entities that are regulated by the state, but also have an order of their own which is not recognized by the state (private disciplinary orders; the internal organisation of workplaces; so-called unrecognized associations or institutions, etc.) -- Doctrines that confine the concept of a legal order to the order of communities in general and specifically to necessary communities -- The relations between different legal orders. Principles that have to be taken into account with respect to : 1. Original or derivative institutions; 2. The particular or general ends of institutions; 3. Their diverse basis; 4. Simple or complex institutions; 5. Perfect or imperfect; 6. With or without personality; 7. Independent, coordinated or subordinated -- The concept of relevance of one order to another -- The title for this relevance: a. The relation of superiority and correlative dependence between two orders; b. The relation whereby an order presupposes another; c. The relation whereby reciprocally independent orders depend a further one; d. The relevance unilaterally attributed by an order to another on which it depends; e. The relation of succession between orders -- Diverse aspects (existence, content, effectiveness) expressing the relevance an order to another one. Cases in which the existence of an order depends on another: a. Complete subordination of the former to the latter which directly establishes the former or assigns limited autonomy to it. Independence, as far as its existence is concerned, of an order in case of a less expansive subordination (some spheres of the order of the states of a federal state vis-à-vis the latter; the order of states vis-à-vis international law) and general principles; b. In the hypothesis of an order that represents the presupposition of another (state law vis-à-vis international law) -- The relevance of an order to another with respect to its content. Various cases: a. The superior order as the mediated or unmediated source of an inferior order; the superior order (international law, ecclesiastical concordats) which is not the source, and yet affects the content of inferior orders; b. the Superior order about effects the content of more orders subjected to, which however are independent from each other; c. the order of that itself that determines its own content by considering a subjected or independent order : private international law; ecclesiastical law as it refers to civil laws; the law of the state that refers to ecclesiastical law; d. an order that incorporates another -- The relevance of an order to one another with respect to its effects: external and internal effectiveness of an order. Various cases of external effectiveness: a. The relationships between orders where the one partially or totally depends on the other; b. Relationships between more orders that are independent from each other because of a unilateral disposition of one or each of them. Private international law; civil effectiveness of ecclesiastical law; c. Relationships meeting more orders in which one is of the presupposition of the other; d. Relationships between orders that succeed each other -- Diverse extension of the relevance of an order to another. Applications with regard to the problem of so-called natural obligations -- The irrelevance of an order to another; total or partial, reciprocal or unilateral -- A legal order that as such is irrelevant to another, but it is relevant in other respects (orders that are considered unlawful by the state; corporations, de facto institutions) -- Total developments of an order to another: possibility of such an irrelevance also with respect to the order of the state -- Critical assessment of the opposite doctrine. The limitations of the state order; various figures and consequences; examples of matters that are legally indifferent to the state (private disciplinary orders; particular religious orders; the orders of some non-patrimonial associations; etc.) -- The internal orders of the institutions, especially state ones, vis-à-vis the order of other institutions in which they are included. (shrink)

... Le figure del terzo legislatore e del terzo giudice costituiscono la garanzia che la tutela dei deboli non renda debole né il dovere né il diritto, ma ne fortifichi la consapevolezza responsabile in ognuno di noi, mostrando il significato giuridico del ‘dono di senso’, nucleo, nella mia interpretazione dell’intenso magistero di Bruno Romano. (Dalla Presentazione di L. Avitabile).

L'Odyssée, le plus ancien poème de la culture occidentale, met en scène la métamorphose qui change Ulysse en lui-même sous les yeux dessillés de ceux qui échouaient jusque-là à le reconnaître. Ulysse constitue ainsi la première d'une longue série de figures donnant corps à cette opération mystérieuse : le passage de l'existence en régime d'obscurité à l'existence "en personne", dans une forme de vérité. Que signifie un tel passage? Comment s'opère cette transition? Quelles formes cette idée d'existence en personne a-t-elle (...) pu revêtir dans la pensée occidentale? Claude Romano interroge les sources, y compris lointaines, de cette idée d' "existence en vérité" telle qu'elle sous-tend notamment l'idéal moderne d'authenticité personnelle, en retraçant la généalogie de cet idéal et en exhumant certaines de ses formes plus anciennes. Chemin faisant, le lecteur découvre différents types et régimes de discours, philosophique, mais aussi théologique, spirituel, rhétorique, littéraire, esthétique. Romano esquisse ainsi une histoire de la philosophie occidentale aux contours bien différents de ceux qu'on lui prête généralement : à l'écart des grandes métaphysiques du moi et de la subjectivité, il emprunte les chemins de traverse d'une enquête sur les formes de vie et les modes d'existence. (shrink)

"A genuinely innovative contribution to philosophical accounts of subjectivity and temporality. Romano develops what he calls an 'evential hermeneutics' that takes as its starting point the life-changing events that upend our world. He studies the structure of these events in terms of the genuine change and novelty that they open up, distinguishing them from mere occurrences, which can be explained as a subject realizing pre-existing possibilities. Because such events introduce radically new possibilities by transforming me and my world, (...) class='Hi'>Romano argues that they must be understood as establishing a world rather than as happening in the world."--Shane Mackinlay, Catholic Theological College, University of Divinity, Melbourne. (shrink)

Fairness is one of the most prominent values in the Ethics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) debate and, specifically, in the discussion on algorithmic decision-making (ADM). However, while the need for fairness in ADM is widely acknowledged, the very concept of fairness has not been sufficiently explored so far. Our paper aims to fill this gap and claims that an ethically informed re-definition of fairness is needed to adequately investigate fairness in ADM. To achieve our goal, after an introductory section aimed (...) at clarifying the aim and structure of the paper, in section “Fairness in algorithmic decision-making” we provide an overview of the state of the art of the discussion on fairness in ADM and show its shortcomings; in section “Fairness as an ethical value”, we pursue an ethical inquiry into the concept of fairness, drawing insights from accounts of fairness developed in moral philosophy, and define fairness as an ethical value. In particular, we argue that fairness is articulated in a distributive and socio-relational dimension; it comprises three main components: fair equality of opportunity, equal right to justification, and fair equality of relationship; these components are grounded in the need to respect persons both as persons and as particular individuals. In section “Fairness in algorithmic decision-making revised”, we analyze the implications of our redefinition of fairness as an ethical value on the discussion of fairness in ADM and show that each component of fairness has profound effects on the criteria that ADM ought to meet. Finally, in section “Concluding remarks”, we sketch some broader implications and conclude. (shrink)

Claude Romano repense à nouveaux frais la méthode phénoménologique en la mettant en dialogue avec d'autres courants de la philosophie contemporaine, et notamment la philosophie analytique. Sa réflexion s'ordonne autour de trois axes. Tout d'abord, la question des rapports entre langage et expérience, dans le sillage des recherches empiriques en linguistique : le langage n'exige-t-il pas, pour pouvoir être compris, que l'on interroge ses liens avec des significations pré-linguistiques qui fondent notre expérience même du monde? Ensuite, la question du (...) réalisme : la phénoménologie entretient-elle une affinité nécessaire avec l'idéalisme, comme l'ont cru un certain nombre de disciples de Husserl, ou ne nous met-elle pas plutôt sur la voie d'un réalisme qui demanderait à être reformulé? Enfin, comment une phénoménologie réaliste et soucieuse d'une articulation plus fine entre expérience et langage permet-elle d'approcher de manière renouvelée des phénomènes " classiques " comme le corps, les émotions ou l'habitude? (shrink)

BackgroundAssessing consciousness in other subjects, particularly in non-verbal and behaviourally disabled subjects (e.g., patients with disorders of consciousness), is notoriously challenging but increasingly urgent. The high rate of misdiagnosis among disorders of consciousness raises the need for new perspectives in order to inspire new technical and clinical approaches. Main bodyWe take as a starting point a recently introduced list of operational indicators of consciousness that facilitates its recognition in challenging cases like non-human animals and Artificial Intelligence to explore their relevance (...) to disorders of consciousness and their potential ethical impact on the diagnosis and healthcare of relevant patients. Indicators of consciousness mean particular capacities that can be deduced from observing the behaviour or cognitive performance of the subject in question (or from neural correlates of such performance) and that do not define a hard threshold in deciding about the presence of consciousness, but can be used to infer a graded measure based on the consistency amongst the different indicators. The indicators of consciousness under consideration offer a potential useful strategy for identifying and assessing residual consciousness in patients with disorders of consciousness, setting the theoretical stage for an operationalization and quantification of relevant brain activity.ConclusionsOur heuristic analysis supports the conclusion that the application of the identified indicators of consciousness to its disorders will likely inspire new strategies for assessing three very urgent issues: the misdiagnosis of disorders of consciousness; the need for a gold standard in detecting consciousness and diagnosing its disorders; and the need for a refined taxonomy of disorders of consciousness. (shrink)