This article examines the proximity of the conceptions of Europe defended by Edmund Husserl and Paul Valéry during the interwar period, their common diagnosis of a European crisis and their attempt to give a non-geographical definition of Europe, based on the notion of spirit. It is shown that, behind the common use of the term and lexicon of spirit, the two authors actually put forward two different paradigms to account for Europe’s cultural specificity (a dynamic paradigm in Valéry and a (...) teleological paradigm in Husserl), and that this duality is reflected in the way they understand European modernity, the significance of science, and finally the idea of a Europeanization of the world. In so doing, the article enters into a critical discussion with those readings that have noted the proximity of the two authors only to see in them the same spiritualism, suspected of perpetuating the Eurocentric prejudice. (shrink)

Le présent article se propose d’interroger un aspect du devenir post-kantien de la notion d’âme à partir du problème de la fondation philosophique des « sciences de l’esprit » ( Geisteswissenschaften ) et du débat qu’il suscita en Allemagne entre la phénoménologie naissante, le néokantisme de l’école de Bade et la pensée herméneutique de Dilthey. Il s’agit d’abord de reconstruire le débat qui oppose la fondation formelle (néokantienne) et la fondation matérielle (diltheyenne) des sciences de l’esprit pour faire apparaître son (...) enjeu qui n’est autre que la difficile articulation des notions d’esprit et d’âme. Il est alors possible de se tourner vers la phénoménologie husserlienne pour montrer que l’originalité de la voie intermédiaire qu’elle trace entre fondation formelle et fondation matérielle tient largement à la façon dont elle réactive en contexte phénoménologique des déterminations essentielles du concept aristotélicien d’âme. (shrink)

Dans les Recherches logiques, Husserl rend compte de l’identité idéale de la signification en la considérant sur le modèle de l’idéalité de l’espèce (species) par rapport à ses singularisations. L’article se penche sur ce modèle ontologique lui-même et montre qu’il représente une réponse indirecte mais parfaitement consistante au problème des universaux, dont l’originalité est ressaisie de deux façons : d’abord, à partir de Husserl lui-même, qui la situe à la jonction de deux définitions de l’universel traditionnellement considérées comme incompatibles (ante (...) rem, in re). Puis, à la lumière des débats contemporains sur la question des universaux en métaphysique analytique, il apparaît que le cette conception husserlienne cherche à articuler, moyennant une théorie complexe des relations, un réalisme des universaux avec un particularisme qui préfigure l’actuelle théorie nominaliste des tropes. À chaque étape, c’est la question difficile du « platonisme » de Husserl qu’on cherche ainsi à éclaircir. (shrink)

This paper wants to clarify the concepts of “meaning” and “sense”, of which Husserlian phenomenology makes constant use even though it remains far from any hermeneutical perspective as from any linguistic philosophy. Whether in form of the “interpretative sense” and the “fulfilling sense” in the Logical Investigations or in form of the “noematic sense” which emerges in the Ideas, it appears that the notion of meaning is inseparable from the thesis of the object’s being-constituted, but forbids at the same time (...) any mentalist account of it. As a non-objectifiable medium in any relation to an object, this “meaning” cannot be identified with a Fregean Sinn but must be recognized as the fundamental operative concept of Husserlian phenomenology, from which its transcendental idealism is to be understood. (shrink)

Si ce qu?il est convenu d?appeler le « mouvement phénoménologique » est, selon une formule célèbre de Paul Ric?ur, « l?histoire des hérésies hus­serliennes » 1 , alors l?hérésie sartrienne mérite probablement une place à part dans cette histoire tant elle donne, du moins dans ces premières formulations, l?apparence de l?orthodoxie, en ce qui concerne des aspects aussi essentiels que la définition de la conscience par l?intentionnalité ou l?exigence d?intuitivité du « principe des principes ». Lorsque Sartre écrit ainsi, dans (...) La transcendance de l?ego : « Nous croyons volontiers pour notre part à l?existence d?une conscience constituante. Nous suivons Husserl dans cha­cune de ses admirables descriptions où il montre la conscience transcen­dan­tale constituant le monde en s?emprisonnant dans la conscience empi­rique ; nous sommes persuadés comme lui que notre moi psychique et psycho­physique est un objet transcendant qui doit tomber sous le coup de l? épochè » 2 , comment ne pas croire ici à une fidélité doctrinale pleine et entière ? Et pourtant, cette fidélité méthodologique est mise au service d?un projet bien distinct de celui de Husserl, comme le montre exemplairement le bref article intitulé « Une idée fondamentale de la phénoménologie de Hus­serl : l?intentionnalité » 3 . Au moment même où, à Fribourg dans ses manu­scrits de recherche, Husserl pousse jusqu?à ses. (shrink)

L’article propose une relecture des textes que Valéry a consacrés à la danse à la lumière des analyses dispersées dans les _Cahiers_, véritable laboratoire de la pensée valéryenne. Il en ressort que la danse est inséparable d’une réflexion approfondie sur la notion de rythme conçu non pas de façon étroite comme une forme dans le temps, mais comme principe d’organisation formelle fondé sur la périodicité, débouchant sur une conception physiologique de la danse. Après avoir établi que la danse consiste à (...) organiser rythmiquement la dissipation possible des mouvements corporels, on montre comment cet état rythmique induit une reconfiguration de l’espace, du temps et du corps dansant lui-même. (shrink)

On peut dire sans exagération que la vie est chez Husserl le concept à la fois le plus surdéterminé et le plus indéterminé. Il est bien connu, en effet, que la terminologie husserlienne fait place, au cours de son développement, à une prolifération des concepts impliquant une référence à la vie alors même que, pour sa part, « le concept de vie ne fait jamais l’objet d’une thématisation explicite ». C’est pourquoi, on pourrait être tenté de recourir à la distinction, (...) proposée par Eugen Fink et... (shrink)

Ce travail se propose de montrer que l’intérêt de la philosophie des valeurs de Rickert relativement au champ historique ne se limite pas, comme on le croit souvent, au développement d’une logique de la connaissance historique, mais qu’au-delà de cette dimension épistémologique, elle contribue à déterminer sur nouveaux frais l’idée d’une philosophie de l’histoire. Il s’agit dès lors d’élucider la thèse paradoxale selon laquelle c’est de l’édification d’un système des valeurs ineffectives que dépend pour Rickert la possibilité d’une philosophie de (...) cette effectivité asystématique qu’est la matière historique. Il apparaît ainsi que l’idée d’un système des valeurs permet de différencier plusieurs niveaux de cette philosophie de l’histoire, qui sont autant de moments d’une critique radicale de l’historicisme.This paper intends to show that Rickert’s philosophy of values provides not only a logic of historical knowledge but also a renewed philosophy of history itself. Rickert’s paradoxical claim is in fact that only a system of non effective values can allow the development of a critical philosophy of effective and non systematic history. This fundamental assertion is explained by showing how a system of values allows to divide the very idea of a philosophy of history into different levels, which are at the same time different steps on the way to a radical refutation of historicism. (shrink)

S’il faut bien reconnaître que la présence de Paul Valéry est loin d’être envahissante dans le champ contemporain de la recherche philosophique, il est toutefois des thèmes et des problèmes relativement auxquels la pertinence de la référence à son œuvre ne saurait faire le moindre doute, malgré le caractère assurément et volontairement marginal de cette œuvre par rapport à l’histoire et à la pratique « officielle » de la philosophie. Or c’est un fait que la surprise fait partie de ces (...) thèmes... (shrink)

Il ne prouve que lui-même, son unique preuve est lui-même, tous les adversaires le vainquent aussitôt mais ce n’est pas qu’ils le réfutent (il est irréfutable), c’est qu’ils se prouvent eux.Franz Kafka Si une meilleure connaissance de la pensée du jeune Heidegger a permis de faire apparaître Sein und Zeit au moins autant comme un point d’aboutissement que comme un point de départ, et de battre en brèche l’idée selon laquelle l’ouvrage devrait l’essentiel de sa substance à la pensée husserlien...

Dans son étude intitulée « Aspects du vitalisme », Georges Cangui­lhem se plaît à rappeler les dangers de l?indistinction des frontières entre le savoir biologique et la spéculation philosophique, soit que la philosophie reprenne à son compte une partie du savoir biologique positif ou de la conceptualité biologique, soit que la biologie prétende s?élever, à partir de son savoir et de ses concepts, à des considérations d?ordre philosophique 1 . Canguilhem écrit ainsi, tout d?abord à propos du philosophe : Il (...) est bien difficile au philosophe de s?exercer à la philosophie biologique sans risquer de compromettre les biologistes qu?il utilise ou qu?il cite. Une biologie utilisée par un philosophe, n?est-ce pas déjà une biologie philoso­phique, donc fantaisiste ? Et, plus loin, à propos du biologiste : Le biologiste vitaliste devenu philosophe de la biologie croit apporter à la philosophie des capitaux et ne lui apporte en réalité que des rentes qui ne cessent de baisser à la bourse des valeurs scientifiques, du fait seul que se poursuit la recherche à laquelle il ne participe plus. [?] Il y a là une espèce d?abus de confiance sans préméditation 2 . Dans les deux cas, donc, celui des deux savoirs qui prétend s?annexer ou s?élever à quelque chose de l?autre compromet ce dernier et perd lui-même de sa solidité épistémique. En même temps qu?elles visent des personnalités scientifiques tout à fait précises. (shrink)

Pour les lecteurs désireux de comprendre ses Idées directrices a, Husserl a rendu la tâche extraordinairement difficile dans la mesure où des exemples adéquats, susceptibles d’éclaircir le type de connaissances qu’il a en vue, font tout bonnement défaut. On est obligé de les chercher soi-même selon les instructions de la théorie générale qui y est soutenue pour s’en représenter ainsi le sens...

Ce volume XXXIX de la collection des Husserliana, paru en 2008, est entièrement consacré à la problématique du monde de la vie (Lebenswelt). L’édition de cet ouvrage volumineux, fort de quelque 957 pages, a été confiée à R. Sowa. Ce volume complète le volume VI de la série, édité par W. Biemel, qui présentait le célèbre texte de 1936 Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie (La crise des sciences européennes et la phénoménologie transcendantale), ainsi...

In this paper, my goal is to use an epistemic injustice framework to extend an existing normative analysis of over-medicalization to psychiatry and thus draw attention to overlooked injustices. Kaczmarek has developed a promising bioethical and pragmatic approach to over-medicalization, which consists of four guiding questions covering issues related to the harms and benefits of medicalization. In a nutshell, if we answer “yes” to all proposed questions, then it is a case of over-medicalization. Building on an epistemic injustice framework, I (...) will argue that Kaczmarek’s proposal lacks guidance concerning the procedures through which we are to answer the four questions, and I will import the conceptual resources of epistemic injustice to guide our thinking on these issues. This will lead me to defend more inclusive decision-making procedures regarding medicalization in the DSM. Kaczmarek’s account complemented with an epistemic injustice framework can help us achieve better forms of medicalization. I will then use a contested case of medicalization, the creation of Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder in the DSM-5 to illustrate how the epistemic injustice framework can help to shed light on these issues and to show its relevance to distinguish good and bad forms of medicalization. (shrink)

"La Philosophie de M. Bergson" d'Albert Farges est un ouvrage qui explore la philosophie du célèbre philosophe français Henri Bergson. Albert Farges était un philosophe et un écrivain français du XIXe et du XXe siècle, et son livre offre une analyse et une interprétation de la pensée philosophique de Bergson. Henri Bergson était un philosophe majeur de la philosophie française au tournant du XIXe et du XXe siècle, et il est surtout connu pour ses travaux sur la philosophie (...) de la durée, de la créativité et de l'évolution. Son œuvre a eu une influence significative sur la philosophie, la littérature et la science de son époque. "La Philosophie de M. Bergson" de Farges peut examiner en détail les concepts philosophiques clés de Bergson, tels que l'élan vital, la durée, la mémoire, l'intuition, et d'autres. Il peut également explorer la manière dont les idées de Bergson ont été reçues et discutées dans le contexte intellectuel de son époque. Cet ouvrage d'Albert Farges peut servir de ressource précieuse pour ceux qui souhaitent comprendre la philosophie complexe et novatrice de Bergson et son impact sur la philosophie moderne. (shrink)

A leading critic of the disruptive force of technology in education, Bernard Stiegler saw the counter-effects of artificial intelligence in undermining human agency, autonomy and individuality, rendering the role of education ever more critical. Stiegler believes that our goal is not to abandon technology but to focus our attention on its power and direction in a hypercapitalist economy. While he did not foresee the emergence of generative artificial intelligence (GAI), its rapid acceleration raises important issues for his notion of digital (...) writing as a pharmakon. In this essay, we examine Stiegler’s view on intelligence, digital writing, technological memory, and neuropower, focusing specifically on his Shanghai lecture and Nanjing Lectures. We compare Stiegler with Catherine Malabou, who examines the nature of intelligence primarily through the lens of neuroscience. We argue that Malabou’s view of neuroplasticity in human and artificial brains, and her critique of techno-narcissism in the control over technology, add an important dimension to Stiegler’s political critique of education. Finally, we examine how best to construe AI as part of a hyper-materialist epistemology that Stiegler espouses in the conclusion of his Nanjing Lectures, to bring about neganthropic knowledge through a therapeutics of care. (shrink)

According to the fitting attitude (FA) analysis of value concepts, to conceive of an object as having a given value is to conceive of it as being such that a certain evaluative attitude taken towards it would be fitting. Among the challenges that this analysis has to face, two are especially pressing. The first is a psychological challenge: the FA analysis must call upon attitudes that shed light on our value concepts while not presupposing the mastery of these concepts. The (...) second challenge is normative: the FA analysis must account for the fittingness of the relevant attitudes in terms of a kind of normativity intimately related to these attitudes, but again without presupposing the mastery of the relevant value concepts. In this paper, we show that real progress is possible if we pay close attention to the nature of the attitudes recruited by the analysis. More specifically, we claim that an FA analysis that appeals to emotions conceived as evaluative attitudes — as opposed to, for instance, evaluative judgements or evaluative perceptions — has the best prospects of meeting the two challenges and of putting the FA analysis on a strong footing. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage interroge les articulations problématiques entre art, flux et contemporain, à partir de pratiques artistiques actuelles où interviennent le quotidien, le sociologique et le collectif. Traversé par des flux de toute sorte, le monde contemporain soulève la question de sa représentabilité, alors que les artistes ont, depuis toujours, éprouvé le besoin de se mettre en adéquation avec lui. Comment en effet montrer ce qui sans cesse se meut? Pourquoi suivre les mouvances du monde? Et finalement, que peut l'art d'aujourd'hui? (...) Il s'agit pour les artistes d'adopter une position de contemporanéité car toute observation du monde, fût-elle opérée sur un mode contemplatif, ne peut être l'objet de l'inactif et de l'inopérant. C'est pourquoi "devenir contemporain" est une nécessité, une injonction politique et éthique aussi bien qu'esthétique. Il nous faut dès lors entreprendre une "esthétique du contemporain", elle qui nous portera vers un "contemporain de l'esthétique" guidé par les flux et les devenirs. (shrink)

In this article, I side with those who argue that the debate about the definition of “disease” should be reoriented from the question “what is disease” to the question of what it should be. However, I ground my argument on the rejection of the naturalist approach to define disease and the adoption of a normativist approach, according to which the concept of disease is normative and value-laden. Based on this normativist approach, I defend two main theses: (1) that conceptual analysis (...) is not the right method to define disease and that conceptual engineering should be the preferred method and (2) that the method of conceptual engineering should be implemented following the principles of Alexandrova’s account of social objectivity in the context of the definition of disease. (shrink)

There is a traditional conception of knowledge but it is not the Justified True Belief analysis Gettier attacked. On the traditional view, knowledge consists in having a belief that bears a discernible mark of truth. A mark of truth is a truth-entailing property: a property that only true beliefs can have. It is discernible if one can always tell that a belief has it, that is, a sufficiently attentive subject believes that a belief has it if and only if it (...) has it. Requiring a mark of truth makes the view infallibilist. Requiring it to be discernible makes the view internalist. I call the view Classical Infallibilism. (shrink)

According to the fitting attitude (FA) analysis of value concepts, to conceive of an object as having a given value is to conceive of it as being such that a certain evaluative attitude taken towards it would be fitting. Among the challenges that this analysis has to face, two are especially pressing. The first is a psychological challenge: the FA analysis must call upon attitudes that shed light on our value concepts while not presupposing the mastery of these concepts. The (...) second challenge is normative: the FA analysis must account for the fittingness of the relevant attitudes in terms of a kind of normativity intimately related to these attitudes, but again without presupposing the mastery of the relevant value concepts. In this paper, we show that real progress is possible if we pay close attention to the nature of the attitudes recruited by the analysis. More specifically, we claim that an FA analysis that appeals to emotions conceived as evaluative attitudes — as opposed to, for instance, evaluative judgements or evaluative perceptions — has the best prospects of meeting the two challenges and of putting the FA analysis on a strong footing. (shrink)

One puzzle concerning highly idealized models is whether they explain. Some suggest they provide so-called ‘how-possibly explanations’. However, this raises an important question about the nature of how-possibly explanations, namely what distinguishes them from ‘normal’, or how-actually, explanations? I provide an account of how-possibly explanations that clarifies their nature in the context of solving the puzzle of model-based explanation. I argue that the modal notions of actuality and possibility provide the relevant dividing lines between how-possibly and how-actually explanations. Whereas how-possibly (...) explanations establish claims of possible explanations, how-actually explanations establish claims of actual ones. Models, in turn, simply provide evidence for these claims. (shrink)

It is undeniable that Thomas Aquinas showed great metaphysical originality among his contemporaries. However, his advances concerning the meaning of the uniqueness of the substantial form cannot be adequately grasped independently of an equally original understanding of matter, conceived in particular as pure power. This study attempts to grasp the implications of the Thomasian conception of matter in the various fields of his thought, from physics to metaphysics, passing through the foundations, in the very constitution of substance, theories of knowledge, (...) of moral action and apprehension of the beautiful. We discover a conception of the substance-subject in the strong sense which nevertheless shows itself, at the very heart of its constitutive principles, radically open to the originality of Otherness in its various forms. (shrink)

When spelled out properly infallibilism is a viable and even attractive view. Because it has long been summary dismissed, however, we need a guide on how to properly spell it out. The guide has to fulfil four tasks. The first two concern the nature of knowledge: to argue that infallible belief is necessary, and that it is sufficient, for knowledge. The other two concern the norm of belief: to argue that knowledge is necessary, and that it is sufficient, for justified (...) certainty. With such a guide in hand infallibilism can be evaluated on its own merits. The most controversial parts are the first and fourth. The idea that knowledge requires infallible belief is thought to be excessively sceptical. The idea that knowledge warrants certainty is thought to be excessively dogmatic. The present paper addresses the first. It argues that knowledge requires infallible belief. (shrink)

The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of their significance. The philosophical problems stirred up by the existence of the emotions, over which many great philosophers of the past have laboured, revolve around attempts to understand what this significance amounts to. Are emotions feelings, thoughts, or experiences? If they are experiences, what are they experiences of? Are emotions rational? In what sense do emotions give meaning to what surrounds us? (...) -/- The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction introduces and explores these questions in a clear and accessible way. The authors discuss the following key topics: -/- the diversity and unity of the emotions the relations between emotion, belief and desire the nature of values the relations between emotions and perceptions emotions viewed as evaluative attitudes the link between emotions and evaluative knowledge the nature of moods, sentiments, and character traits. -/- Including chapter summaries and guides to further reading, The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction is an ideal starting point for any philosopher or student studying the emotions. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as psychology and the social sciences. (shrink)

The revisionary approach to semantic paradox is commonly thought to have a somewhat uncomfortable corollary, viz. that, on pain of triviality, we cannot affirm that all valid arguments preserve truth (Beall2007, Beall2009, Field2008, Field2009). We show that the standard arguments for this conclusion all break down once (i) the structural rule of contraction is restricted and (ii) how the premises can be aggregated---so that they can be said to jointly entail a given conclusion---is appropriately understood. In addition, we briefly rehearse (...) some reasons for restricting structural contraction. (shrink)

Through Aristotle's theory of catharsis and his concept of complex tragedy, Ben La Farge provides an original examination of genre. Moving effortlessly from Greek to Shakespearean tragedies, to nineteenth and twentieth-century British, American and Russian drama, and fiction and contemporary television, this study sheds new light on the art of comedy.

Through Aristotle's theory of catharsis and his concept of complex tragedy, Ben La Farge provides an original examination of genre. Moving effortlessly from Greek to Shakespearean tragedies, to nineteenth and twentieth-century British, American and Russian drama, and fiction and contemporary television, this study sheds new light on the art of comedy.

For Hannah Arendt, authority is the shape educational responsibility assumes. In our time, authority in Arendt’s sense is under pressure. The figure of Greta Thunberg shows the failure of adult generations, taken collectively, to take responsibility for the world and present and future generations of newcomers. However, in reflecting on Arendt’s use of authority, we argue that her account of authority also requires amendments. Arendt’s situating of educational authority in-between past and future adequately captures its temporal dimension. We make explicit (...) another, spatial, dimension: authority in-between world and earth. Arendt’s neglect of the material earth also has implications for the relational dimension of authority. Arendt’s authority depends on a dichotomy between the private and the public sphere. This is problematic. First, we agree with Arendt’s feminist critics that the personal can be made into the site of the political. Second, we point once more to Thunberg, the child, taking the public stage, thereby contesting the division between public and private. In response, we situate the relational dimension of authority in-between private and public. The three dimensions of educational authority taken together imply that it is situated in-between domains that cannot be reduced to each other or taken as absolutes: past and future, world and earth, and the private and public sphere. This brings us to our concept of ambiguous authority, which expresses the Arendtian nature of our reflections and the ways in which we seek to renew her original insights on educational authority. (shrink)

Widespread preservation of fossilized biomolecules in many fossil animals has recently been reported in six studies, based on Raman microspectroscopy. Here, we show that the putative Raman signatures of organic compounds in these fossils are actually instrumental artefacts resulting from intense background luminescence. Raman spectroscopy is based on the detection of photons scattered inelastically by matter upon its interaction with a laser beam. For many natural materials, this interaction also generates a luminescence signal that is often orders of magnitude more (...) intense than the light produced by Raman scattering. Such luminescence, coupled with the transmission properties of the spectrometer, induced quasi‐periodic ripples in the measured spectra that have been incorrectly interpreted as Raman signatures of organic molecules. Although several analytical strategies have been developed to overcome this common issue, Raman microspectroscopy as used in the studies questioned here cannot be used to identify fossil biomolecules. (shrink)

The phenomenon of species extinction raises more and more concern among ecologists facing the actual crisis of biodiversity. Scientific investigations of the causes and effects of extinction must be completed by a philosophical analysis of the concept of extinction that aims to clarify the meanings of the term ‘extinction’ and to analyse modalities, criteria and degrees of extinction. We will focus our attention on the apparent paradox of the possible ‘resurrection’ of species in the near future with the help of (...) genetic biotechnology and cloning techniques. The ontological background of the extinction concept is analysed in relation to the idea of species as classes. We will also show that there is no simple analogy between death and species extinction, and develop a conceptualist and dualistic system of supra-individual entities , supported by an instrumentalist approach to genetic manipulations which transform species into interactive kinds, which can go extinct and be recreated. (shrink)

One evening years ago I was watching a performance of the Chinese Magic Circus of Taiwan when it suddenly came to me that the fundamental characteristics of comedy were being acted out before my eyes. The discovery seems ironic in retrospect, as I did not find the performance very amusing, but the crude simplicity of the act illuminated the underlying dynamics of the genre. Two Taiwanese clowns came on stage dressed in the traditional white coverall and floppy hat that signify (...) a chef. One of them announced that he and his companion were Puerto Rican chefs, and they proceeded to set up a row of nine springy bamboo poles, each about seven feet high, each one stuck vertically into a firm base and separated from the. (shrink)

While it is generally believed that justification is a fallible guide to the truth, there might be interesting exceptions to this general rule. In recent work on bridge-principles, an increasing number of authors have argued that truths about what a subject ought to do are truths we stand in some privileged epistemic relation to and that our justified normative beliefs are beliefs that will not lead us astray. If these bridge-principles hold, it suggests that justification might play an interesting role (...) in our normative theories. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, a value that's notoriously difficult to understand if we think of justification as but a fallible means to a desired end. We will argue that these bridge-principles will be incredibly difficult to defend. While we do not think that normative facts necessarily stand in any interesting relationship to our justified beliefs about them, there might well be a way of defending the idea that our justified beliefs about what to do won't lead us astray. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, but this way of thinking about justification and its value comes with costs few would be willing to pay. (shrink)