One puzzle concerning highly idealized models is whether they explain. Some suggest they provide so-called ‘how-possibly explanations’. However, this raises an important question about the nature of how-possibly explanations, namely what distinguishes them from ‘normal’, or how-actually, explanations? I provide an account of how-possibly explanations that clarifies their nature in the context of solving the puzzle of model-based explanation. I argue that the modal notions of actuality and possibility provide the relevant dividing lines between how-possibly and how-actually explanations. Whereas how-possibly (...) explanations establish claims of possible explanations, how-actually explanations establish claims of actual ones. Models, in turn, simply provide evidence for these claims. (shrink)

How can we use models to understand real phenomena if models misrepresent the very phenomena we seek to understand? Some accounts suggest that models may afford understanding by providing causal knowledge about phenomena via how-possibly explanations. However, general equilibrium models, for example, pose a challenge to this solution since their contribution appears to be purely mathematical results. Despite this, practitioners widely acknowledge that it improves our understanding of the world. I argue that the Arrow–Debreu model provides a mathematical how-possibly explanation (...) which establishes claims of mathematical dependence. The account developed reveals how mathematical knowledge can inform claims about the world, allow ‘what-if-things-had-been-different’ inferences, and thus improve our understanding. (shrink)

Models typically have actual, existing targets. However, some models are viewed as having non-actual targets. I argue that this interpretation comes at various costs and propose an alternative that fares better along two dimensions: (1) agreement with practice and (2) ontological and epistemological parsimony. My proposal is that many of these models actually have actual targets.

One can find in the literature two sets of views concerning the relationship between understanding and explanation: that one understands only if 1) one has knowledge of causes and 2) that knowledge is provided by an explanation. Taken together, these tenets characterize what I call the narrow knowledge account of understanding. While the first tenet has recently come under severe attack, the second has been more resistant to change. I argue that we have good reasons to reject it on the (...) basis of theoretical models that provide how-possibly explanations. These models, while they do not explain in the strict sense, afford understanding. In response, I propose an alternative epistemology of understanding, broad KAU, that takes cases of theoretical modelling into account. (shrink)

Two recent contributions have discussed, and disagreed, over whether so-called toy models that attempt to represent dispositions have the power to explain. In this paper, I argue that neither of these positions is completely correct. Toy models may accurately represent, satisfy the veridicality condition, yet fail to provide how-actually explanations. This is because some dispositions remain unmanifested. Instead, the models provide how-possibly explanations; they _possibly_ explain.

Highly idealized models may serve various epistemic functions, notably explanation, in virtue of representing the world. Inferentialism provides a prima facie compelling characterization of what constitutes the representation relation. In this paper, I argue that what I call factive inferentialism does not provide a satisfactory solution to the puzzle of model-based—factive—explanation. In particular, I show that making explanatory counterfactual inferences is not a sufficient guide for accurate representation, factivity, or realism. I conclude by calling for a more explicit specification of (...) model-world mismatches and properties imputation. (shrink)

N. Emrah Aydinonat offre une caractérisation des explications par la main invisible. Celles-ci seraient des explications partielles potentielles et seraient en mesure de nous indiquer des capacités à l’œuvre dans le monde et élargiraient notre horizon intellectuel en conceptualisant des possibilités jusqu’alors inédites. Je montre que Nancy Cartwright offre un argument permettant de douter de cette première possibilité. La science économique n’ayant que peu de principes sûrs à sa disposition et reposant ainsi sur des hypothèses auxiliaires, il est impossible d’effectuer (...) des expériences galiléennes avec les modèles et de mettre au jour les capacités. La conception d’Uskali Mäki des modèles comme isolations et systèmes de représentation laisse penser que la deuxième possibilité est néanmoins fondée. (shrink)

Cet article reconstruit la théorie hayékienne de l’évolution culturelle tout en en montrant certaines limites et implications. Ce travail consiste ainsi en un effort de reconstruction et de synthèse. Pour ce faire, nous situerons en premier lieu la pensée hayékienne sur la toile de fond d’une réfexion sur les ordres spontanés et sur l’évolutionnisme. Nous effectuerons ensuite une distinction fondamentale entre règles de conduite et ordre d’actions du groupe. Nous analyserons fnalement les règles de conduite des individus en ayant recours (...) à deux aspects principaux, l’aspect psychologique, concernant la manière dont sont produites et transmises les règles de conduite des individus, et l’aspect épistémologique, traitant de la valeur que nous pouvons accorder à ces règles. (shrink)

La problématique sous-jacente au débat concernant la tarifcation de la formation universitaire3, souvent pas suffsamment explicite, n’est pas de savoir quel est le coût de la formation universitaire, mais plutôt par qui et comment le coût doit être assumé. Cette communication se proposera de répondre à cette question en faisant appel à deux principes normatifs principaux, soit l’effcacité et l’équité. Nous donnerons une défnition de l’effcacité et verrons en quoi celle-ci commande une intervention publique. Nous présenterons ensuite deux critères d’équité (...) qui, en conjonction, devraient nous permettre d’évaluer les différents modèles institutionnels. Puis, nous essaierons de voir si l’un ou l’autre s’avère respecter davantage les principes élaborés. (shrink)

People are increasingly subject to algorithmic decisions, and it is generally agreed that end-users should be provided an explanation or rationale for these decisions. There are different purposes that explanations can have, such as increasing user trust in the system or allowing users to contest the decision. One specific purpose that is gaining more traction is algorithmic recourse. We first pro- pose that recourse should be viewed as a recommendation problem, not an explanation problem. Then, we argue that the capability (...) approach provides plausible and fruitful ethical standards for re- course. We illustrate by considering the case of diversity constraints on algorithmic recourse. Finally, we discuss the significance and implications of adopting the capability approach for algorithmic recourse research. (shrink)

Questionnement sur le rapport entre psychanalyse et religion. Sous l'angle historique, l'ouvrage étudie trois courants, Freud, Jung, Lacan, chacun à partir d'une origine familiale différente : juive, protestante, catholique. L'auteur en déduit que la religion n'existe pas, mais qu'il existe des religions particulières s'incarnant dans le psychisme humain.

The Surprise Exam Paradox is well-known: a teacher announces that there will be a surprise exam the following week; the students argue by an intuitively sound reasoning that this is impossible; and yet they can be surprised by the teacher. We suggest that a solution can be found scattered in the literature, in part anticipated by Wright and Sudbury, informally developed by Sorensen, and more recently discussed, and dismissed, by Williamson. In a nutshell, the solution consists in realising that the (...) teacher's announcement is a blindspot that can only be known if the week is at least 2 days long. Along the way, we criticise Williamson's own treatment of the paradox. In Williamson's view, the Surprise is similar to the Paradox of the Glimpse and, because of their similarities, both these paradoxes ought to receive a uniform treatment-one that involves locating an illicit application of the KK Principle. We argue that there's no deep analogy between the Surprise and the Glimpse and that, even if there were, the Surprise reasoning reaches a paradoxical conclusion before the KK Principle is used. Rather, in both the Surprise and the Glimpse, the blame should be put on other epistemic principles-respectively, a knowledge retention and a margin for error principle. (shrink)

Après la diffusion en intégralité, le samedi 28 septembre 2019, du discours d’Eric Zemmour à la « Convention de la droite », une large polémique est relayée, dans les médias et sur les réseaux sociaux, sur l’opportunité d’une telle diffusion. Le premier ministre Edouard Philippe a qualifié ces propos de « nauséabonds et profondément contraires à l’idée que nous nous faisons de la France et de la République ». Entre accusations et justifications, beaucoup reconnaissent que ce discours a posé (...) des problèmes. Les thèmes habituels du polémiste y sont abordés, avec de nombreux cas de propos pouvant relever de la discrimination, notamment envers les femmes. Pour mener cette étude, cet article présente une analyse textométrique de ce discours, dont les conclusions questionnent plus particulièrement les propos tenus vis-à-vis des femmes, notamment dans trois chapitres spécifiques de son ouvrage, Le suicide français. Au-delà, l’article interroge la légitimité d’Eric Zemmour, en mettant en valeur le « savoir » et l’« érudition » qu’il matérialise dans ses prises de parole, et la manière dont il parvient à auto-légitimer ses propos – ce qui lui confère une certaine "autorité" dans les médias. (shrink)

Les photos de ce portfolio ont été prises par Philippe Carta, Julien Goetz, Francis Guermann, Bernard Muscat et Michel Noirez. Projecteur et enrouleur 35 mm mobiles installés dans le vestibule de l’Opéra-Théâtre pour la projection de Moïse et Aaron – 24 mars 2011. Avant la projection de Moïse et Aaron, Jean-Marie Straub, debout face à l’écran de l’Opéra-Théâtre, vérifie la qualité de l’image et du son. François Narboni et Régine Palucci présentent Moïse et Aaron. A...

In this paper, my goal is to use an epistemic injustice framework to extend an existing normative analysis of over-medicalization to psychiatry and thus draw attention to overlooked injustices. Kaczmarek has developed a promising bioethical and pragmatic approach to over-medicalization, which consists of four guiding questions covering issues related to the harms and benefits of medicalization. In a nutshell, if we answer “yes” to all proposed questions, then it is a case of over-medicalization. Building on an epistemic injustice framework, I (...) will argue that Kaczmarek’s proposal lacks guidance concerning the procedures through which we are to answer the four questions, and I will import the conceptual resources of epistemic injustice to guide our thinking on these issues. This will lead me to defend more inclusive decision-making procedures regarding medicalization in the DSM. Kaczmarek’s account complemented with an epistemic injustice framework can help us achieve better forms of medicalization. I will then use a contested case of medicalization, the creation of Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder in the DSM-5 to illustrate how the epistemic injustice framework can help to shed light on these issues and to show its relevance to distinguish good and bad forms of medicalization. (shrink)

C'est sur la nécessité de l'absence d'une telle définition que Julien Busse invite à se pencher pour en analyser aussi bien les causes que les effets.

A leading critic of the disruptive force of technology in education, Bernard Stiegler saw the counter-effects of artificial intelligence in undermining human agency, autonomy and individuality, rendering the role of education ever more critical. Stiegler believes that our goal is not to abandon technology but to focus our attention on its power and direction in a hypercapitalist economy. While he did not foresee the emergence of generative artificial intelligence (GAI), its rapid acceleration raises important issues for his notion of digital (...) writing as a pharmakon. In this essay, we examine Stiegler’s view on intelligence, digital writing, technological memory, and neuropower, focusing specifically on his Shanghai lecture and Nanjing Lectures. We compare Stiegler with Catherine Malabou, who examines the nature of intelligence primarily through the lens of neuroscience. We argue that Malabou’s view of neuroplasticity in human and artificial brains, and her critique of techno-narcissism in the control over technology, add an important dimension to Stiegler’s political critique of education. Finally, we examine how best to construe AI as part of a hyper-materialist epistemology that Stiegler espouses in the conclusion of his Nanjing Lectures, to bring about neganthropic knowledge through a therapeutics of care. (shrink)

According to the fitting attitude (FA) analysis of value concepts, to conceive of an object as having a given value is to conceive of it as being such that a certain evaluative attitude taken towards it would be fitting. Among the challenges that this analysis has to face, two are especially pressing. The first is a psychological challenge: the FA analysis must call upon attitudes that shed light on our value concepts while not presupposing the mastery of these concepts. The (...) second challenge is normative: the FA analysis must account for the fittingness of the relevant attitudes in terms of a kind of normativity intimately related to these attitudes, but again without presupposing the mastery of the relevant value concepts. In this paper, we show that real progress is possible if we pay close attention to the nature of the attitudes recruited by the analysis. More specifically, we claim that an FA analysis that appeals to emotions conceived as evaluative attitudes — as opposed to, for instance, evaluative judgements or evaluative perceptions — has the best prospects of meeting the two challenges and of putting the FA analysis on a strong footing. (shrink)

"À son décès, Julien Freund laissait parmi ses papiers un recueil de textes inédits, sous forme épistolaire, adressés à ses amis et collègues : les Lettres de la vallée. Dans ces méditations, rédigées en sa retraite vosgienne - qui n'est pas sans évoquer la Hütte de Heidegger, de l'autre côté du Rhin - et loin des servitudes propres aux écrits universitaires, l'auteur de L'Essence du politique s'exprime en toute liberté, à bâtons rompus, sur ses sujets de prédilection (le politique, (...) l'idéologie, la guerre, les totalitarismes, l'utopie, la décadence), mais également l'enseignement, le journalisme, la connaissance, le droit, la morale, la métaphysique, les limites... Ce livre forme la clef de voûte où se rejoignent les grands thèmes de sa pensée."--Page 4 de la couverture. (shrink)

In this article, I side with those who argue that the debate about the definition of “disease” should be reoriented from the question “what is disease” to the question of what it should be. However, I ground my argument on the rejection of the naturalist approach to define disease and the adoption of a normativist approach, according to which the concept of disease is normative and value-laden. Based on this normativist approach, I defend two main theses: (1) that conceptual analysis (...) is not the right method to define disease and that conceptual engineering should be the preferred method and (2) that the method of conceptual engineering should be implemented following the principles of Alexandrova’s account of social objectivity in the context of the definition of disease. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage interroge les articulations problématiques entre art, flux et contemporain, à partir de pratiques artistiques actuelles où interviennent le quotidien, le sociologique et le collectif. Traversé par des flux de toute sorte, le monde contemporain soulève la question de sa représentabilité, alors que les artistes ont, depuis toujours, éprouvé le besoin de se mettre en adéquation avec lui. Comment en effet montrer ce qui sans cesse se meut? Pourquoi suivre les mouvances du monde? Et finalement, que peut l'art d'aujourd'hui? (...) Il s'agit pour les artistes d'adopter une position de contemporanéité car toute observation du monde, fût-elle opérée sur un mode contemplatif, ne peut être l'objet de l'inactif et de l'inopérant. C'est pourquoi "devenir contemporain" est une nécessité, une injonction politique et éthique aussi bien qu'esthétique. Il nous faut dès lors entreprendre une "esthétique du contemporain", elle qui nous portera vers un "contemporain de l'esthétique" guidé par les flux et les devenirs. (shrink)

There is a traditional conception of knowledge but it is not the Justified True Belief analysis Gettier attacked. On the traditional view, knowledge consists in having a belief that bears a discernible mark of truth. A mark of truth is a truth-entailing property: a property that only true beliefs can have. It is discernible if one can always tell that a belief has it, that is, a sufficiently attentive subject believes that a belief has it if and only if it (...) has it. Requiring a mark of truth makes the view infallibilist. Requiring it to be discernible makes the view internalist. I call the view Classical Infallibilism. (shrink)

According to the fitting attitude (FA) analysis of value concepts, to conceive of an object as having a given value is to conceive of it as being such that a certain evaluative attitude taken towards it would be fitting. Among the challenges that this analysis has to face, two are especially pressing. The first is a psychological challenge: the FA analysis must call upon attitudes that shed light on our value concepts while not presupposing the mastery of these concepts. The (...) second challenge is normative: the FA analysis must account for the fittingness of the relevant attitudes in terms of a kind of normativity intimately related to these attitudes, but again without presupposing the mastery of the relevant value concepts. In this paper, we show that real progress is possible if we pay close attention to the nature of the attitudes recruited by the analysis. More specifically, we claim that an FA analysis that appeals to emotions conceived as evaluative attitudes — as opposed to, for instance, evaluative judgements or evaluative perceptions — has the best prospects of meeting the two challenges and of putting the FA analysis on a strong footing. (shrink)

It is undeniable that Thomas Aquinas showed great metaphysical originality among his contemporaries. However, his advances concerning the meaning of the uniqueness of the substantial form cannot be adequately grasped independently of an equally original understanding of matter, conceived in particular as pure power. This study attempts to grasp the implications of the Thomasian conception of matter in the various fields of his thought, from physics to metaphysics, passing through the foundations, in the very constitution of substance, theories of knowledge, (...) of moral action and apprehension of the beautiful. We discover a conception of the substance-subject in the strong sense which nevertheless shows itself, at the very heart of its constitutive principles, radically open to the originality of Otherness in its various forms. (shrink)

When spelled out properly infallibilism is a viable and even attractive view. Because it has long been summary dismissed, however, we need a guide on how to properly spell it out. The guide has to fulfil four tasks. The first two concern the nature of knowledge: to argue that infallible belief is necessary, and that it is sufficient, for knowledge. The other two concern the norm of belief: to argue that knowledge is necessary, and that it is sufficient, for justified (...) certainty. With such a guide in hand infallibilism can be evaluated on its own merits. The most controversial parts are the first and fourth. The idea that knowledge requires infallible belief is thought to be excessively sceptical. The idea that knowledge warrants certainty is thought to be excessively dogmatic. The present paper addresses the first. It argues that knowledge requires infallible belief. (shrink)

The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of their significance. The philosophical problems stirred up by the existence of the emotions, over which many great philosophers of the past have laboured, revolve around attempts to understand what this significance amounts to. Are emotions feelings, thoughts, or experiences? If they are experiences, what are they experiences of? Are emotions rational? In what sense do emotions give meaning to what surrounds us? (...) -/- The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction introduces and explores these questions in a clear and accessible way. The authors discuss the following key topics: -/- the diversity and unity of the emotions the relations between emotion, belief and desire the nature of values the relations between emotions and perceptions emotions viewed as evaluative attitudes the link between emotions and evaluative knowledge the nature of moods, sentiments, and character traits. -/- Including chapter summaries and guides to further reading, The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction is an ideal starting point for any philosopher or student studying the emotions. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as psychology and the social sciences. (shrink)

The revisionary approach to semantic paradox is commonly thought to have a somewhat uncomfortable corollary, viz. that, on pain of triviality, we cannot affirm that all valid arguments preserve truth (Beall2007, Beall2009, Field2008, Field2009). We show that the standard arguments for this conclusion all break down once (i) the structural rule of contraction is restricted and (ii) how the premises can be aggregated---so that they can be said to jointly entail a given conclusion---is appropriately understood. In addition, we briefly rehearse (...) some reasons for restricting structural contraction. (shrink)

Volume 1. Égypte antique, Grèce antique, Empire romain, judaïsme, islam, Perse mazdéenne, hindouisme -- volume 2. Des débuts du christianisme à aujourd'hui.