" Recourir à la métaphysique est comme lancer une allumette dans une poudrière. Cela fait exploser la scène entière. C'est exactement ce que font les philosophes de la science quand ils sont conduits dans une impasse et convaincus d'incohérence. Aussitôt ils font entrer de force l'esprit et parlent d'entités qui sont selon le cas dans l'esprit ou hors de l'esprit. Pour la philosophie naturelle, toute chose perçue est dans la nature. Nous ne pouvons pas faire le difficile. Pour nous, la (...) lueur rouge du crépuscule est autant une partie de la nature que les molécules ou les ondes électriques par lesquelles les hommes de science expliqueraient le phénomène. Il appartient à la philosophie naturelle d'analyser comment les éléments variés de la nature sont liés ". Whitehead. (shrink)

The critical problems of the Third Decade of Livy have long been familiar to students. In Books XXI.–XXV. we have only the mutilated Codex Puteanus of the fifth century and later manuscripts derived from it, directly or indirectly, at one or more points in its history. R, C, and most probably M, are copies of P, after it was corrected by P2 and probably P3. Here the problem in the parts in which P is preserved is to correct its numerous (...) corruptions by conjecture as far as possible; and, where it is now defective, by comparing the later MSS. to arrive at their inter-relation and at P's original text, and then subject this text to the same process of criticism. Also a study of the corrections in the earlier of these MSS. may reveal the previous existence of other traditions and of other MSS. now lost—such corrections, e.g., as are made by P4, R2, and M2. (shrink)

Whitehead's remarks on man, social problems, education, religion, and history have been extracted from his technical works and placed side by side to form an account in familiar terminology of Whitehead's theory of civilization. In context, occurring almost as afterthoughts illustrating abstract metaphysical principles, these remarks constitute brilliant flashes of humanistic insight; abstracted from context, they become platitudinous. Only when, in the final chapter, Johnson adumbrates their metaphysical setting, does one feel any of the excitement of seeing the (...) values of Western democracy emerge from a speculative account of the nature of things. --D. W. S. (shrink)

That process philosophy can be the foundation of the theory and practice of educating human beings is the main argument of this book. The process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) is the particular thinking on which this book is based. Readers are shown that Whitehead's process philosophy provides a frame, a conceptual matrix, that addresses their concerns about education and offers direction for their educative acts. Whitehead theorized that all living entities are connected in some way. (...) Relatedness, connectedness, and holism are recurring themes in this exploration of Whitehead's implied philosophy of education. Whitehead never wrote a philosophy of education, but his writings over a period of nearly thirty years reveal a persistent interest and concern with education. His work, ranging from Introduction to Mathematics (1911) to Adventures of Ideas (1938), is drawn on here to construct, not Whitehead's philosophy of education, but, a Whiteheadian philosophy of education. Whitehead and Philosophy of Education brings to scholars and students of education an understanding of Whitehead as an important figure in philosophy, particularly philosophy of education; an acquaintance with process philosophy; a brief treatment of Whitehead's life and an account of events and experiences that influenced his philosophizing; and an exploration of the educationally salient concepts found in Whitehead's formal and informal philosophy with special attention to Whitehead's ideas about creativity, process, rhythm, wisdom, and knowledge. Whitehead writes of phases of the rhythm of education - romance, precision, and generalization. The book is organized with attention to these three phases. Part One-Romance introduces readers to Whitehead the person, and the change of context for educating from a mechanistic world-view to an organismic one. Part Two-Precision examines Whitehead's writings, as they relate to process philosophy and to educating. Part Three-Generalization is an application of the explorations of Parts One and Two, yielding a construction of a Whiteheadian philosophy of education and suggestions for educational practice. (shrink)

Leclerc's systematic introduction is predicated upon the thesis that "Whitehead's basic problems belong to the great tradition of philosophical inquiry first opened up by the Greeks." A lucid discussion of the traditional problems surrounding "being" leads simply and logically to a consideration of the categories in terms of which Whitehead reformulates the traditional approach to "that which is." The great merit of this progression is that it dispels the illusion, so overwhelming on an initial glance at Whitehead (...) himself, that his terminology is arbitrary and completely disassociated from traditional usage.--D. W. S. (shrink)

This volume follows by eighteen years Mays's earlier study, which was titled simply The Philosophy of Whitehead. The strongly stated, controversial working hypothesis behind that work was that even though Whitehead introduces a fiercely complicated vocabulary in his later books, especially in Process and Reality, "the ideas contained in his later work are much simpler than is usually assumed, since he is working out some of his earlier ideas on a larger philosophical canvas". In short, the 1959 book (...) by Mays was based upon a sharp denial that Process and Reality involves "a radical departure from [Whitehead's] early writings". (shrink)

The use of the symbol ∨for disjunction in formal logic is ubiquitous. Where did it come from? The paper details the evolution of the symbol ∨ in its historical and logical context. Some sources say that disjunction in its use as connecting propositions or formulas was introduced by Peano; others suggest that it originated as an abbreviation of the Latin word for “or,” vel. We show that the origin of the symbol ∨ for disjunction can be traced to Whitehead (...) and Russell’s pre-Principia work in formal logic. Because of Principia’s influence, its notation was widely adopted by philosophers working in logic (the logical empiricists in the 1920s and 1930s, especially Carnap and early Quine). Hilbert’s adoption of ∨ in his Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik guaranteed its widespread use by mathematical logicians. The origins of other logical symbols are also discussed. (shrink)

This new book proposes a way out of the crisis by letting go of the idea that psychology needs ‘new’ foundations or a new identity, whether biological, discursive, or cognitive. The psychological is not narrowly confined to any one aspect of human experience; it is quite literally ‘everywhere’. Drawing on a range of influential thinkers including Michel Serres, Michel Foucault, AN Whitehead, and Gilles Deleuze, the book proposes a strong process-oriented approach to the psychological, which studies ‘events’ or ‘occasions.’.

This is a book with a highly unorthodox, idiosyncratic thesis, but because of the author's deep familiarity with the Whiteheadian materials, because of the power given to her analysis by its all-encompassing scope, because of the genuinely important issues which cluster around her theme, and also, undoubtedly, because of the unabashed bravado with which this Don Quixote of the process set breaks lances with virtually all of the established authors in the field, this book will probably be widely read.

Whitehead's response to the epistemological challenges of Hume and Kant, written in a style devoid of the metaphysical intricacies of his later works, Symbolism makes accessible his theory of perception and his more general insights into the function of symbols in culture and society.

This is the second edition of a somewhat unusual account of the philosophy of Jaspers. The "Introduction" contains an historical survey of Existentialism which is rather out of date. It associates Heidegger and Sartre together, and as philosophers of the absurd--a mistake for which by now there is no excuse. It sees a "way out of this barren desert" of the philosophy of absurdity in Jaspers--which is a misleadingly religious way to introduce Jaspers. The body of the work contains chapters (...) on the foundations of Jaspers' thought in Kant, on the concept of philosophical faith, a comparison of Jaspers with some contemporaries, such as Whitehead, and a final comparison of Jaspers' "ciphers" with Maimonides' negative theology. The 79-page long text is heavily punctuated with citations and so does not make for smooth reading. This is followed by nearly half that many pages of notes, some of which are rather interesting and which provide the whole with extensive documentation.--J. D. C. (shrink)

This book offers a comprehensive critical survey of issues of historical interpretation and evaluation in Bertrand Russell's 1918 logical atomism lectures and logical atomism itself. These lectures record the culmination of Russell's thought in response to discussions with Wittgenstein on the nature of judgement and philosophy of logic and with Moore and other philosophical realists about epistemology and ontological atomism, and to Whitehead and Russell’s novel extension of revolutionary nineteenth-century work in mathematics and logic. Russell's logical atomism lectures have (...) had a lasting impact on analytic philosophy and on Russell's contemporaries including Carnap, Ramsey, Stebbing, and Wittgenstein. Comprised of 14 original essays, this book will demonstrate how the direct and indirect influence of these lectures thus runs deep and wide. (shrink)

The articulation of critical dialects of psychology has typically involved a questioning of the foundational assumptions of the so-called mainstream. This has included critiques in the name of more adequate scientific foundations, but more recently these have been accompanied by critiques in the name of an absence of foundations altogether, and critiques that suggest a rethinking of the concept of foundation. These latter versions are usually influenced by the great 20 th Century non-foundational philosophies of figures such as Bergson, (...) class='Hi'>Whitehead, Wittgenstein and Heidegger, or by related thinkers such as Deleuze, Serres, Luhmann, Butler and Stengers. In foregrounding themes of process and multiplicity such thinkers provide potent tools for critically rethinking psychological questions. Less positive has been a tendency amongst critical psychologists to polarise natural and social scientific issues and to associate the former with negative images (all that is static, mechanistic, essentialist and conservative). This can lead to a formulaic criticality in which arguments for nature are bad, and those for culture are good. Deconstruction comes to appear simply as an assertion of ‘the discursive construction of’ whatever phenomenon is under scrutiny. To counteract this trend, the proposed paper will discuss a process approach to ontology that welcomes contributions from the natural sciences as well as the humanities and social sciences. (shrink)

John Hick’s revolutionary, “Copernican” approach to religious diversity received a great deal of criticism in his lifetime from more conservative theologians and philosophers of religion, many of whom were seeking to preserve a unique place of pre-eminence for Christianity amongst the world’s faiths. Critical responses to Hick’s Pluralistic Hypothesis have also emerged, however, from amongst his fellow religious pluralists, who have sought either to build upon or to go beyond his pivotal and groundbreaking work. In the same spirit as the (...) responses given by this latter group, this chapter will seek to look beyond Hick’s important work, certainly not in an unfriendly fashion, but with the understanding that Hick is the proverbial “giant” upon whose shoulders subsequent generations of pluralists are standing as we seek to advance pluralism even further than he did in his work. Specifically, this chapter will draw on the Jain concepts of anekāntavāda, nayavāda, and syādvāda, as well as the thought of Alfred North Whitehead and his successors in the movement of process philosophy, to reconceptualize the Real, not on a Kantian foundation, as is done in the Pluralistic Hypothesis, but on the basis of a robust metaphysical realism. The aim of this approach to pluralism is to capture more fully the sense of mystics from diverse religious traditions that they have actually perceived the Real as such, and not merely one of its phenomenal appearances. (shrink)

This paper aims at the construction of a structural coupling between object-oriented philosophy and Whitehead’s philosophy of organism by making a case for the primacy of the ontological principle through the proposal of a social object hypothesis. The social object here differs from traditional renderings of sociology, which are centered on humans’ activity and personalities, by way of recuperating Tarde’s social theory of associations. This theory provides us with a non-anthropocentric reading of sociality. This hypothesis will be furthered by (...) the introduction of the systemic category of internal/external, or system/environment, as a self-enclosure feature of social objects. Equipped with these two notions, we will discuss Graham Harman’s paper “Whitehead and Schools X, Y, and Z,” while rerouting his assessments to our own social object hypothesis. The final idea is to propose an alliance through the conception of a macro-ontological approach to philosophy of organism. We intend to show that this is not only coherently feasible regarding Whitehead’s own categoreal scheme, but also meets the requirements of being a real object in object-oriented ontology’s directives. (shrink)

The Unifying Moment provides a fine comparative study of Whitehead and James. Eisendrath expresses the presupposition of his effort in noting "a fruitful complementarity" between his subjects: "Whitehead is highly abstract and needs the exemplification which reference to James can provide. Conversely, Whitehead can be used to show the full sweep of general application implicit in James’s ideas." The core of Eisendrath’s analysis lies in creativity and in the ‘aesthetic’ bias shared by Whitehead and James; experience (...) is feeling, appetition and advance into novelty. There are indeed problems in the analogy between personality and atomic concrescence, since from a Whiteheadian perspective personality is a complex ’society', not a simple concrescence. Yet the analogy works, because Eisendrath is aware of the disparity, and because it serves to illuminate the anthropomorphic tendency in Whitehead. The book is at its strongest in dealing directly with issues of epistemology and psychology, where Eisendrath also displays a firm grasp of the early history of psychology. Less satisfying are some of the approaches to larger issues, such as the discussions of God and civilization. Throughout, there is the stylistic flaw, perhaps inevitable in a comparative study, of lengthy textual citation and explication; while thus documenting his position, Eisendrath at times lets the documentation obscure his argument. The notes and index are both extensive and helpful.—D. F. D. (shrink)

This volume in the "World Perspectives" series brings together four chapters from The Concept of Nature and one each from The Principle of Relativity, The Principles of Natural Knowledge, Modes of Thought, and Essays in Science and Philosophy.--K. R. D.

Hall seeks to develop "a theory of culture through the analogical extension of certain of Whitehead’s concepts and theories." His concern in this essay is not simply to systematize Whitehead’s remarks about cultural history, but rather to elaborate a comprehensive philosophy of culture in the light of his metaphysical structures. Hall accordingly presents a brief and adequate summary of Whitehead’s metaphysical scheme in terms of its "primary analogate" in the aesthetic event, and then proceeds to explicate the (...) cultural theme throughout Whitehead’s writings. By means of careful, detailed analyses, Hall establishes the coordination between metaphysical and cultural issues, such as that between an "actual occasion’s" subjective aim towards satisfaction and a civilization’s quest to achieve its characteristic "cultural aims" or values. He further argues for a nonreductive relation among the various "cultural interests" in terms of their divergent modes of abstraction from the concrete matrix of experience. (shrink)

In this "essay in systematic philosophy," Neville takes on an ambitious project: the integration of the personal and social dimensions of freedom in terms of an "axiological cosmology." The introductory chapters which sketch this cosmology and value theory owe much to a careful and critical reading of Whitehead and Plato. The succeeding discussion of personal freedom culminates in the pivotal notion of creativity: "Personal freedom is creative activity in the environment of the given world." Consequently, freedom can be limited (...) neither to external liberty, nor to intentional action, nor to free choice; rather, these modes of freedom find their actual unity in creative activity and its achievement of value. (shrink)

Fifty or sixty years ago anyone fluttering the pages of one of the many magazines which then catered for the cultivated and intelligent English reader would have been fairly certain to come upon an article bearing somewhat the same title as that of the present paper. The author would probably be an eminent scientist, such as Huxley or Clifford; a distinguished scholar, such as Frederic Harrison or Edmund Gurney; or a politician of cabinet rank, such as Gladstone or Morley. Whichever (...) side he might take, he would write with the moral fervour of which Englishmen at that time had an inexhaustible supply. Nowadays the so-called “conflict between Religion and Science,” which was then appetizingly hot from the oven, has acquired something of the repulsiveness of half-cold mutton in halfcongealed gravy. There seems to be a widespread opinion that Sir Arthur Eddington and Sir James Jeans, with some highly technical and not readily intelligible assistance from Professor Whitehead, have enabled the lion to lie down with the lamb. Well, I have no wish to pipe a discordant note in this scene of Messianic harmony. But I cannot help reflecting that psychology, anthropology, and psychical research have made considerable advances as well as mathematical physics; and that they seem prima facie much more likely to be relevant to religion. Even the ordinary common sense of the lawyer and the historian may still have something useful to say on such topics. (shrink)