Researchers have wondered how the brain creates emotions since the early days of psychological science. With a surge of studies in affective neuroscience in recent decades, scientists are poised to answer this question. In this target article, we present a meta-analytic summary of the neuroimaging literature on human emotion. We compare the locationist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories consistently and specifically correspond to distinct brain regions) with the psychological constructionist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories (...) are constructed of more general brain networks not specific to those categories) to better understand the brain basis of emotion. We review both locationist and psychological constructionist hypotheses of brain–emotion correspondence and report meta-analytic findings bearing on these hypotheses. Overall, we found little evidence that discrete emotion categories can be consistently and specifically localized to distinct brain regions. Instead, we found evidence that is consistent with a psychological constructionist approach to the mind: A set of interacting brain regions commonly involved in basic psychological operations of both an emotional and non-emotional nature are active during emotion experience and perception across a range of discrete emotion categories. (shrink)

In our response, we clarify important theoretical differences between basic emotion and psychological construction approaches. We evaluate the empirical status of the basic emotion approach, addressing whether it requires brain localization, whether localization can be observed with better analytic tools, and whether evidence for basic emotions exists in other types of measures. We then revisit the issue of whether the key hypotheses of psychological construction are supported by our meta-analytic findings. We close by elaborating on commentator suggestions for future research.

We agree that conceptualisation is key in understanding the brain basis of emotion. We argue that by conflating facial emotion recognition with subjective emotion experience, Lindquist et al. understate the importance of biological predisposition in emotion. We use examples from the anxiety disorders to illustrate the distinction between these two phenomena, emphasising the importance of both emotional hardware and contextual learning.

Lindquist et al. convincingly argue that the brain implements psychological operations that are constitutive of emotion rather than modules subserving discrete emotions. However, the nature of such psychological operations is open to debate. I argue that considering appraisal theories may provide alternative interpretations of the neuroimaging data with respect to the psychological operations involved.

Compared to our understanding of positive prediction error signals occurring due to unexpected reward outcomes, less is known about the neural circuitry in humans that drives negative prediction errors during omission of expected rewards. While classical learning theories such as Rescorla–Wagner or temporal difference learning suggest that both types of prediction errors result from a simple subtraction, there has been recent evidence suggesting that different brain regions provide input to dopamine neurons which contributes to specific components of this prediction error (...) computation. Here, we focus on the brain regions responding to negative prediction error signals, which has been well-established in animal studies to involve a distinct pathway through the lateral habenula. We examine the activity of this pathway in humans, using a conditioned inhibition paradigm with high-resolution functional MRI. First, participants learned to associate a sensory stimulus with reward delivery. Then, reward delivery was omitted whenever this stimulus was presented simultaneously with a different sensory stimulus, the conditioned inhibitor. Both reward presentation and the reward-predictive cue activated midbrain dopamine regions, insula and orbitofrontal cortex. While we found significant activity at an uncorrected threshold for the CI in the habenula, consistent with our predictions, it did not survive correction for multiple comparisons and awaits further replication. Additionally, the pallidum and putamen regions of the basal ganglia showed modulations of activity for the inhibitor that did not survive the corrected threshold. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Der Islam Jahrgang: 93 Heft: 2 Seiten: 374-402.

The reign of the Abbasid caliph al-Muqtafī was one of great historical significance. Despite his having been chosen and elevated to the caliphate by the Seljuq sultans during the nadir of Abbasid power, after they had murdered one caliph and deposed another, it was al-Muqtafī who finally succeeded in reestablishing Abbasid political rule over Iraq. This article traces the course of al-Muqtafī’s relations with the Seljuq sultans, analyzes how and why he succeeded in reviving Abbasid political rule, and considers the (...) import of the events that transpired during his reign. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Der Islam Jahrgang: 93 Heft: 2 Seiten: 371-373.

Debates about the moral permissibility of mass electronic surveillance often turn on whether consequentialist considerations legitimately trump relevant deontological rights and principles. In order to establish such overriding consequences, many proponents of mass surveillance employ a modern analogue of Pascal’s wager: they contend that the consequences of no surveillance are so severe that any probability of such outcomes legitimates the abrogation of the relevant rights. In this paper, I briefly review Pascal’s original wager about whether to live a (...) pious life, including two classes of objections that were almost immediately leveled against his argument. I then show that analogues of those objections apply straightforwardly to the modern versions of Pascal’s wager. Mass electronic surveillance might be ethically permissible or even obligatory in some circumstances, but the details matter in ways that are systematically ignored or assumed away in a Pascal’s wager-type argument. Careful consideration of the complexities of our modern situation is required to decide whether consequentialist considerations override deontological principles in this domain. (shrink)

Is it possible truthfully to assert the non-existence of truth? It is a classical problem whose solution is still controversial. I present here an analysis of the sentence “there is no truth” (and its translations and paraphrases, such as “no proposition is true”, “every proposition is false”), with some remarks about its epistemological and ontological implications, and its consequences tor a general theory of reason.

Seventeenth-century “chance combinatorics” was a self-contained theory. It had an objective notion of chance derived from physical devices with chance properties, such as casts of dice, combinatorics to count chances and, to interpret their significance, a rule for converting these counts into fair wagers. It lacked a notion of chance as a measure of belief, a precise way to connect chance counts with frequencies and a way to compare chances across different games. These omissions were not needed for the theory’s (...) interpretation of chance counts: determining which are fair wagers. The theory provided a model for how indefinitenesses could be treated with mathematical precision in a special case and stimulated efforts to seek a broader theory. (shrink)

There are good grounds for seeing a deep opposition between reason and violence. Yet some forms of argument appear to link the two; and a prominent example is the argumentum ad baculum, where the premise contains a threat. Consideration of the connection between premise and conclusion in such an argument can, it seems, yield some cases where the status of the author of the threat renders the argument not only valid but also sound. Examples of such arguments cluster in the (...) areas near Pascal's Wager and Rawls' argument for justice. However even these arguments fail to effect a reconciliation between reason and violence. (shrink)

The reform of rape law remains a vexed enterprise. The wager of this article is that the plural traditions and technologies of criminal law can provide the resources for a radical rethinking of rape law. Parts 1 and 2 return to the historical and structural forms of rape law reform in Australia. These forms of reform illustrate a variety of criminal jurisdictions, and a transformation in the way in which rape law reform is conducted now. Against this transformation, Part (...) 3 takes up the technology of classification in rape law in order to generate a radical legal definition of rape—one which responds to the pain and suffering of the survivor of rape, at the same time as it holds the legal institution before the law. This has important implications, it is suggested, not only for domestic legal systems but also the jurisprudence of rape in international criminal law. (shrink)

As John Casti wrote, "Finally, a book that really does explain consciousness." This groundbreaking work by Denmark's leading science writer draws on psychology, evolutionary biology, information theory, and other disciplines to argue its revolutionary point: that consciousness represents only an infinitesimal fraction of our ability to process information. Although we are unaware of it, our brains sift through and discard billions of pieces of data in order to allow us to understand the world around us. In fact, most of what (...) we call thought is actually the unconscious discarding of information. What our consciousness rejects constitutes the most valuable part of ourselves, the "Me" that the "I" draws on for most of our actions--fluent speech, riding a bicycle, anything involving expertise. No wonder that, in this age of information, so many of us feel empty and dissatisfied. As engaging as it is insightful, this important book encourages us to rely more on what our instincts and our senses tell us so that we can better appreciate the richness of human life. (shrink)

The Russian Cards Problem has been extensively studied as an example of a problem of an unconditionally secure protocol where the sender and receiver are able to transmit secret information safely over a public non-secure channel without the secret being learned by a third party with access to the channel. Epistemic logic in general and public announcement logic in particular have been very useful in this study, as it involves careful analysis of subtle properties of nested knowledge. A long standing (...) open problem is whether or not there exist protocols of length strictly greater than two for the original problem. In this paper we finally settle this problem, answering the question in the affirmative, by presenting a new solution to the original Russian Cards Problem that involves more than two steps. It starts with an initial announcement with so-called crossing hands, after which it is not common knowledge that the protocol can terminate in one more step. (shrink)

Organization in a tangled world -- Process views of organization -- Alfred North Whitehead on process -- Bruno Latour on relativizing the social, and the becoming of networks -- Niklas Luhmann on autopoiesis and recursiveness in social systems -- James March on decision processes and organization : a logic of streams -- Karl Weick on organizing and sensemaking -- A scheme for process based organizational analysis -- Some implications for organizational analysis.

This fascinating and timely volume explores current thinking on vital topics in moral psychology, spanning the diverse disciplines that contribute to the field. Academics from cognitive science, evolutionary biology, anthropology, philosophy, and political science address ongoing and emerging questions aimed at understanding the thought processes and behaviors that underlie our moral codes-and our transgressions. Cross-cutting themes speak to individual, interpersonal, and collective morality in such areas as the development of ethical behavior, responses to violations of rules, moral judgments in the (...) larger discourse, and universal versus specific norms. This wide-angle perspective also highlights the implications of moral psychology research for policy and justice, with cogent viewpoints from: Philosophy: empiricism and normative questions, moral relativism. Evolutionary biology: theories of how altruism and moral behavior evolved. Anthropology: common moral values seen in ethnographies from different countries. Cognitive and neural sciences: computational models of moral systems and decision-making. Political science: politics, governance, and moral values in the public sphere. Advice on moral psychology research-and thoughts about its future-from prominent scholars. With the goal of providing a truly multidisciplinary forum for moral psychology, this volume is sure to spark conversations across disciplines and advance the field as a whole. Sampling the breadth and depth of an equally expansive and transformative field, Moral Psychology: A Multidisciplinary Guide will find an engaged audience among psychologists, philosophers, evolutionary biologists, anthropologists, political scientists, neuroscientists, lawyers, and policymakers, as well as a more general audience interested better understanding the complexity of moral psychology research. (shrink)

Semantic justifications of the classical rules of logical inference typically make use of a notion of bivalent truth, understood as a property guaranteed to attach to a sentence or its negation regardless of the prospects for speakers to determine it as so doing. For want of a convincing alternative account of classical logic, some philosophers suspicious of such recognition-transcending bivalence have seen no choice but to declare classical deduction unwarranted and settle for a weaker system; intuitionistic logic in particular, buttressed (...) by assertion-conditional semantics, is often considered to enjoy a degree of meaning-theoretical respectability unattainable by classical logic.The decision to forgo the classical inference rules is not always made lightly. Thus, Dummett: " In the resolution of the conflict between [the view that generally accepted classical modes of inference ought to be theoretically accommodated, and the demand that any such accommodation be achieved without recourse to bivalence] lies, as I see it, one of the most fundamental and intractable problems in the theory of meaning; indeed, in all philosophy. "The present article ventures to suggest that the conflict need not be irresoluble. Helping ourselves only to such conceptual resources as are standardly invoked by proponents of intuitionistic logic, we shall formulate a rudimentary meaning theory for a selection of logical constants, define a relation of valid inferability, and prove that the latter includes all of classical first-order logic. The result is essentially that reported in Sandqvist as Theorem 2.20.2. TheoryWe will be considering a standard-syntax first-order language with ⊃, ⊥ and ∀ as its only primitive logical constants. We assume countable supplies of individual constants, individual functors , and predicates , as well as a denumerably infinite set of individual variables. By a basic 1 formula we will mean one that …[Full Text of this Article]. (shrink)

Intuitionistic sentential logic is shown to be sound and complete with respect to a semantics centered around extensions of atomic bases (i.e. sets of inference rules for atomic sentences). The result is made possible through a non-standard interpretation of disjunction, whereby, roughly speaking, a disjunction is taken to hold just in case every atomic sentence that follows from each of the disjuncts separately holds; it is argued that this interpretation makes good sense provided that rules in atomic bases are conceived (...) of as being accepted hypothetically rather than categorically. (shrink)

Part 1. Some problems of organization theory and the potential of process organization theory -- Why assumptions in organization theory do not work for explaining organizing in a world on the move -- Assumptions for organizing in a world on the move -- Part 2. Toward a process theory of organization -- Temporality and process -- Organization, meaning structures, and time -- Articulatory models and agency -- Part 3. Process theory and selected aspects of organization management -- Process theory, organizational (...) continuity, and change -- Managing and leading in time -- Organizational culture, identity, and institutions -- Some thoughts on studying process -- A plea for mystery. (shrink)

Background Journal editors are responsible for what they publish and therefore have a duty to correct the record if published work is found to be unreliable. One method for such correction is retraction of an article. Anecdotal evidence suggested a lack of consistency in journal policies and practices regarding retraction. In order to develop guidelines, we reviewed retractions in Medline to discover how and why articles were retracted. Methods We retrieved all available Medline retractions from 2005 to 2008 and a (...) one-in-three random selection of those from 1988 to 2004. This yielded 312 retractions (from a total of 870). Details of the retraction including the reason for retraction were recorded by two investigators. Results Medline retractions have increased sharply since 1980 and currently represent 0.02% of included articles. Retractions were issued by authors (63%), editors (21%), journals (6%), publishers (2%) and institutions (1%). Reasons for retraction included honest error or non-replicable findings (40%), research misconduct (28%), redundant publication (17%) and unstated/unclear (5%). Some of the stated reasons might have been addressed by corrections. Conclusions Journals' retraction practices are not uniform. Some retractions fail to state the reason, and therefore fail to distinguish error from misconduct. We have used our findings to inform guidelines on retractions. (shrink)

Background: Breaches of publication ethics such as plagiarism, data fabrication and redundant publication are recognised as forms of research misconduct that can undermine the scientific literature. We surveyed journal editors to determine their views about a range of publication ethics issues. Methods: Questionnaire sent to 524 editors-in-chief of Wiley-Blackwell science journals asking about the severity and frequency of 16 ethical issues at their journals, their confidence in handling such issues, and their awareness and use of guidelines. Results: Responses were obtained (...) from 231 editors (44%), of whom 48% edited healthcare journals. The general level of concern about the 16 issues was low, with mean severity scores of <1 (on a scale of 0–3) for all but one. The issue of greatest concern (mean score 1.19) was redundant publication. Most editors felt confident in handling the issues, with <15% feeling “not at all confident” for all but one of the issues (gift authorship, 22% not confident). Most editors believed such problems occurred less than once a year and >20% of the editors stated that 12 of the 16 items never occurred at their journal. However, 13%–47% did not know the frequency of the problems. Awareness and use of guidelines was generally low. Most editors were unaware of all except other journals’ instructions. Conclusions: Most editors of science journals seem not very concerned about publication ethics and believe that misconduct occurs only rarely in their journals. Many editors are unfamiliar with available guidelines but would welcome more guidance or training. (shrink)

It seems plausible, even truistic, that when an agent is faced with the choice of giving up one belief or another, the decision should be based on the relative strengths of these beliefs along some dimension of doxastic merit. This said, however, two non-trivial questions arise: (1) Which dimension? (2) How should the contraction outcome be affected by the distribution of beliefs along this dimension?

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Clinical CommentaryTor Phern Chern, Associate ConsultantThe case scenario describes a difficult clinical and ethical challenge of a psychiatric patient refusing treatment in the context of a treatment-resistant condition that may be affecting her capacity to refuse treatment.The patient described in the case scenario displayed partial treatment refusal as evidenced by her refusal of ECT and adherence with medication and her voluntary hospital admission. Partial treatment refusal is generally more (...) common than absolute treatment refusal1 and can be sporadic, time-limited, periodic or continuous. It is important for the medical team to clarify which category of treatment refusal this patient’s refusal falls under. These broad categories include the doctor-patient relationship, religion, secondary gain, treatment- or illness-based refusals.2 The proper identification of category of treatment refusal will guide subsequent management.Refusal of treatments may be in response to reality-based transference issues like fear, distrust or pressure from the patient’s family. In this particular case, there is little data about her relationship with her treating psychiatrist, but the lack of a trusting doctor-patient relationship could be a factor for treatment refusal. The treating psychiatrist at the inpatient setting could be different from the patient’s routine outpatient psychiatrist and this could result in the lack of a trusting doctor-patient relationship. The remedy for this would be to develop a trusting relationship between her treating psychiatrist and the patient via understanding the patient’s needs and concerns. A useful adjunct would be to identify someone with whom the patient has a trusting relationship and recruit that person to help develop trust in the doctor-patient relationship. On this point, it is interesting to note that the patient’s family was noted to be highly supportive and influential in previous treatment decisions, agreed [End Page 235] with the treating psychiatrist’s treatment recommendation and yet both the treating psychiatrist and the patient’s family were unable to convince her to accept ECT. One possibility is that the patient may see her family’s support of the treating psychiatrist’s recommendation as one reason to refuse treatment. This possibility warrants deeper explorations of her premorbid underlying cultural and religious beliefs and attitudes towards her family and her perceived role in her community.Religion-based refusals of treatment (e.g. blood transfusions for Jehovah’s Witnesses) are less prominent in psychiatry than in general medicine but may manifest in treatment refusal due to advice from religious leaders on the need for spiritual solutions to the patient’s challenges. Religion-based refusals need to be distinguished from an illness-based refusal but if truly present will require the support of appropriate religious leaders to allow the patient more management options other than spiritual support for her psychiatric disorder. There is no specific information about the patient’s religion and religion-based refusals of ECT are not particularly common so this is unlikely to be a major reason for treatment refusal in this case.Treatment-based refusals of care are related to the specific treatment modality being offered and are often motivated by concerns about the side effects of treatment or past traumas that the treatment elicits. In this particular case, the patient has demonstrated some degree of treatment resistance as evidenced by the relapse of her bipolar disorder despite adherence to medication, and a change in management is certainly warranted. However, a change in medication management may be possible before proceeding to ECT in view of the patient’s acceptance of medication and no clear evidence of violent or disturbed behaviour in the ward. The occasional refusal of food and water is worrying, but if the patient can be coaxed to continue oral nutrition, there is no absolute indication to have ECT for rapid treatment response. Other options that may be acceptable to the patient are to optimise the dosage of current medications, switch medications or add augmenting pharmacological agents before proceeding to ECT. A change in pharmacotherapy must take into account her past treatment response and side effects to individual medications. Psychotherapy may also be considered to augment treatment response before ECT is considered.3Illness-based refusals are the most challenging category and... (shrink)

This collection of papers centres around a novel approach to the problem of phenomenal consciousness called cosmopsychism. A simple version of cosmopsychism says that the cosmos as a whole is conscious. In this collection, I focus on a comparison between arguably the most promising versions of cosmopsychism and panpsychism, called constitutive cosmopsychism and constitutive panpsychism, respectively. -/- The first paper, ‘A Blueprint for Cosmopsychism’ offers a blueprint for a cosmopsychist approach, comparing it to the panpsychist approach. It highlights how following (...) the blueprint allows one to sidestep the most serious of panpsychism’s problems, the combination problem, while also avoiding the problem of infinite decomposition. However, it notes that the approach must address a serious problem of its own in the derivation problem. -/- The second paper, ‘Beyond Panpsychism and Cosmopsychism? Focuses’ on two related views that reject subjects of experience at the fundamental level, thus avoiding the subject aspects of the combination and derivation problems. Albahari’s perennialism is touted as the natural successor to cosmopsychism; avoiding its subject derivation problem while maintaining a cosmic consciousness. Meanwhile, Coleman’s panqualityism is touted as a natural successor to panpsychism; avoiding its combination problem while maintaining that phenomenality is present at the level of microphysical ultimates. However, I show both views seem to face problems equal in measure to those they seek to avoid. -/- The third paper, ‘The Subject Problem for Panpsychism and Cosmopsychism’ targets the hardest problems for constitutive panpsychism and constitutive cosmopsychism; the subject combination problem and the subject derivation problem, respectively. I show that the two problems are almost identical, both hinging on the entailment of what I call synchronous perspectives scenarios. I formulate broad arguments from metaphysical impossibility and epistemic implausibility against both views, based on such scenarios. However, I provide a possible model of how to understand synchronous perspective scenarios unproblematically. I also provide several alternative responses. -/- The fourth, and final, paper in the collection provides an account of, and motivation for, a version of cosmopsychism I call CRP cosmopsychism. This version of cosmopsychism is created on the priority cosmopsychism blueprint and has three further key commitments: simple panpsychism, priority monism and Russellian monism. The paper motivates each of these commitments both in isolation and in partnership, before responding to each of the derivation problems; the subject derivation problem, the quality derivation problem and the structure derivation problem. Furthermore, I argue that cosmopsychism should be preferred over panpsychism owing to considerations concerning internal relations. (shrink)

This book demonstrates that we need not choose between seeing so-called Presocratic thinkers as rational philosophers or as religious sages. In particular, it rethinks fundamentally the emergence of systematic epistemology and reflection on speculative inquiry in Hesiod, Xenophanes and Parmenides. Shaul Tor argues that different forms of reasoning, and different models of divine disclosure, play equally integral, harmonious and mutually illuminating roles in early Greek epistemology. Throughout, the book relates these thinkers to their religious, literary and historical surroundings. It is (...) thus also, and inseparably, a study of poetic inspiration, divination, mystery initiation, metempsychosis and other early Greek attitudes to the relations and interactions between mortal and divine. The engagements of early philosophers with such religious attitudes present us with complex combinations of criticisms and creative appropriations. Indeed, the early milestones of philosophical epistemology studied here themselves reflect an essentially theological enterprise and, as such, one aspect of Greek religion. (shrink)

Well-being can be promoted in two ways. Firstly, by affecting the quantity, quality and allocation of bundles of consumption (the Resource Approach), and secondly, by influencing how people benefit from their goods (the Taste Approach). Whereas the former is considered an ingredient of economic analysis, the latter has conventionally not been included in that field. By identifying the gain the Taste Approach might yield, the article questions whether this asymmetry is justified. If successfully exercised, the Taste Approach might not only (...) enable people to raise their wellbeing, but also provide solutions to a number of issues such as sustainable development and global justice. The author argues that recently developed accounts such as Happiness Economics (HE) and Libertarian Paternalism (LP) both can be considered specifications of the Taste Approach. Furthermore a third specification is identified: Inexpensive Preference Formation (IPF). Whereas LP suggests that choice architecture should be exercised when rationality fails, IPF holds that governance in certain instances should improve choices also in absence of no such failure. (shrink)

This article argues that Empedocles’ trust in Strife (DK31 B115.14 = LM22 D10.14) is not, as the prevailing interpretation has it, only a past misjudgement and failure. Rather, trust in Strife still, and to his own lament, infects Empedocles’ mind and informs his life. This detail then offers a fresh perspective on Empedocles’ self-conception and on how, through the daimōn’s cosmic peregrinations, Empedocles raises and pursues questions of agency and responsibility. Furthermore, it sheds light on Empedocles’ understanding of his own (...) ethical standing: common assumptions to the contrary notwithstanding, he does not see himself as an unqualifiedly successful embodiment of his own ideals. (shrink)