This thought-provoking book discusses the concept of progress in economics and investigates whether any advance has been made in its different spheres of research. The authors look back at the history, successes and failures of their respective fields and thoroughly examine the notion of progress from an epistemological and methodological perspective. The idea of progress is particularly significant as the authors regard it as an essentially contested concept which can be defined in many ways – theoretically or empirically; locally or (...) globally; or as encouraging or impeding the existence of other research traditions. The authors discuss the idea that for progress to make any sense there must be an accumulation of knowledge built up over time rather than the replacement of ideas by each successive generation. Accordingly, they are not concerned with estimating the price of progress, reminiscing in the past, or assessing what has been lost. Instead they apply the complex mechanisms and machinery of the discipline to sub-fields such as normative economics, monetary economics, trade and location theory, Austrian economics and classical economics to critically assess whether progress has been made in these areas of research. -/- Bringing together authoritative and wide-ranging contributions by leading scholars, this book will challenge and engage those interested in philosophy, economic methodology and the history of economic thought. It will also appeal to economists in general who are interested in the advancement of their profession. (shrink)

Hume establishes a link between our capacity to conceive or form “clear and distinct ideas” and metaphysical possibility. Hume’s so-called Conceivability Principle is usually assumed to be epistemic: conceivability is supposed to inform us of independent metaphysical facts. In this chapter, however, I argue that Hume is not engaged in modal epistemology. For Hume, there is no epistemic relation between conceivability and an independent metaphysical world of possibilities. On my reading, conceivability is more like the “mètre étalon” in Paris—the standard (...) unit of measurement of length—than a window or telescope into some metaphysical world. Conceivability is the standard of metaphysical possibility. And just as the meter is defined as a certain distance of light traveled, for Hume, conceivability is defined in terms of the liberty of the imagination. I discuss how Hume deploys conceivability along with knowledge—the standard of metaphysical necessity—as tools for measuring or assessing the alleged metaphysical necessity of a cause to every beginning of existence and the alleged rational foundation of causal inferences. (shrink)

Au sortir de cet entretien avec Gauz, Laëtitia Ajanohun nous propose une légende inspirée de ces légendes orales pleinement réécrites qui essaiment dans tout le roman de Gauz, Camarade Papa, qui minent le discours colonial et donnent voix aux oubliés de l’Histoire.

It is generally stated that diaeresis after the first metron, obligatory in recitative dimeters, is not the rule in catalectic dimeters, or paroemiacs. An examination of the material, however, yields the following results. The paroemiacs of Tyrtaeus' consistendy observe metron-diaeresis. Out of a total of 348 recitative paroemiacs in the Attic dramatists, only 34 disregard metron-diaeresis altogether. A further 75 overlap metron-diaeresis by one short syllable . Apparently, the practice with regard to metron-diaeresis is fundamentally the same in paroemiacs as (...) in full dimeters, only the licences are a little more frequent. The poets occasionally take advantage of the interruption in the movement produced by the catalectic colon in order to break away still farther from regular anapaestic rhythm. Aristophanes, in particular, rather likes to round off an anapaestic period with a rattling, and often abusive, polysyllable: Vesp. 326. (shrink)

Darwin's inner voice -- Living the virtuous life -- Of altruism and free riders -- Knowing our immediate predecessors -- Resurrecting some venerable ancestors -- A natural Garden of Eden -- The positive side of social selection -- Learning morals across the generations -- Work of the moral majority -- Pleistocene ups, downs, and crashes -- Testing the selection-by-reputation hypothesis -- The evolution of morals -- Epilogue: humanity's moral future.

This paper aims to queer evidence‐based practice by troubling the concepts of evidence, knowledge and mental illness. The evidence‐based narrative that emerged within biomedicine has dominated health care. The biomedical notion of ‘evidence’ has been critiqued extensively and is seen as exclusive and limiting, and even though the social constructionist paradigm attempts to challenge the authority of biomedicine to legitimate what constitutes acceptable evidence or knowledge for those experiencing mental illness, biomedical notions of evidence appear to remain relatively intact. Queer (...) theory offers theoretical tools to disrupt biomedical norms and challenges biomedical normativity to indicate how marginalisation occurs when normative truths about mental health classify those who differ from the norm as ‘ill’ or ‘disordered’. Queer theory's emphasis on normativity serves the political aim to subvert marginalisation and bring about radical social and material change. Reference will be made to mental health subjects within each discourse by indicating how the body acts as a vehicle for knowing. Deleuzian notions of the rhizome are used as metaphor to suggest a relational approach to knowledge that does away with either/or positions in either biomedical, or queer knowledge to arrive at a both/and position where the biomedical, constructionist and queer are interrelated and entangled in needing the other for their own evolution. However, queer does not ask for assimilation but celebrates difference by remaining outside to disrupt that which is easily overlooked, assumed to be natural or represented as the norm. The task of queer knowledge is to do justice to the lives lived in the name of evidence‐based practice and demands that we consider the relations of power where knowledge is produced. This pursuit creates different knowledge spaces where we identify new intersections that allow for socially just understandings of knowing or evidence to emerge. (shrink)

Fox-Genovese, Kaminer, and Riley all write the history of feminism as a history of conflict between feminists who desire to deny difference in favor of equality and those who desire to celebrate difference. And they all ask what this contradiction lying at the heart of feminist theory implies for the practice of feminist politics. These works reveal the need for feminists who engage this debate to be self’-Conscious in their formulations.

Dans le chamanisme occidental, riche de multiples cosmologies syncrétiques, hybrides et multiculturelles, l’apprenti construit sa propre cosmologie par une succession d’interprétations de ses expériences cognitives et perceptuelles qui le constituent en tant que « chamane ». Les stages, initiations et diverses expériences tendent à la fabrication de ce corps chamanique capable de se mettre en contact et d’interagir, dans une relation volontaire et maîtrisée avec les autres mondes, qu’ils soient vécus comme extérieurs ou intérieurs à soi, mondes autres, parallèles ou (...) faisant partie d’une intériorité élargie. Cet article propose une anthropologie des ressentis et des images intérieures associée à une analyse des techniques du corps dans le champ des études sur le chamanisme. (shrink)

L’article décrit l’attente des familles exilées hébergées dans des hôtels. De quoi est fait le quotidien en attendant les papiers pour chacun des membres de la famille, un CDI, un logement? Nous proposons de porter notre attention sur les relations entre le temps vécu et la vie matérielle, autrement dit l’espace, les objets, l’argent, les papiers administratifs, les petits boulots, les échanges concrets, lesquels sont trop souvent évacués des recherches sociologiques sur l’exil.Parce que l’espace d’hébergement donne un relief particulier à (...) l’attente, nous proposons de saisir ces temporalités sociales comme configurations particulières des relations entre l’espace et le temps. L’enquête ethnographique menée dans quatre hôtels situés dans l’Oise et en Île-de-France souligne combien l’attente revêt une réalité toute matérielle. Les familles vivent entre l’impossibilité de s’installer en France – au sens du droit commun de « prendre domicile » – et le temps qui creuse leur présence, accumule les relations et les expériences. Une forme de paradoxe entre précarité du statut et épaisseur du temps vécu. (shrink)

L ’habitat de Krisa, fouillé en 1935‑36, a livré d’importants vestiges de l’âge du Bronze. Le réexamen du site et du mobilier a pour but de revoir l’accessibilité de l’éperon rocheux, de redater les dépôts céramiques découverts dans les bâtiments et les tombes au sein de l’habitat, ainsi que de mettre à jour nos connaissances sur le corpus céramique. On démontre, entre autres, que la porte ouverte dans le mur de fortification se trouve plus à l’Est que l’emplacement indiqué jusqu’alors. (...) De plus, la phase HR I de l’habitat était plus importante que ce qui avait été supposé, alors que la phase HR II A demeure difficile à identifier. Par ailleurs, on souligne la présence récurrente de vases à boire et vaisselle de table dans le corpus céramique mycénienne. Enfin, on soutient que la majeure partie des céramiques à peinture mate et mycénienne examinées a certainement été produite régionalement. (shrink)

La particularité du sentiment est que, alors qu'il est une impression d'ordre affectif, constituée de perceptions de plaisir et de douleur, il est amené à représenter autre chose que l'état purement subjectif de l'âme. Tout le problème est de déterminer à quel point le sentiment constitue un mode de connaissance irréductible.

Prenant acte de la disqualification du sentiment religieux à la fin du xvii e siècle, sous l’impulsion à la fois, de la querelle du pur amour et de la critique philosophique des sentiments, cet article remonte en deçà de cette époque pour examiner le corpus de la littérature spirituelle du xvi e siècle et du début du xvii e siècle. Cette littérature mystique interroge le rôle et la valeur des affects au sein d’un itinéraire spirituel et permet de réévaluer la (...) question d’une spécificité des émotions religieuses par rapport aux émotions naturelles. Nous montrerons que l’affectivité religieuse n’est pas tant caractérisée par un apport de sentiments nouveaux que par une conversion de valeur des sentiments naturellement éprouvés. (shrink)

This paper is a fragment of the book “Kaja od Radosława, czyli historia Hubalowego Krzyża”, which was published by Warszawskie Wydawnictwo Literackie Muza in 2006. It will be published by the American publisher The Military History Press under the title “Kaia Savior of the Hubal Cross”. Covering a century of Polish history, it is full of tragic and compelling events. Such historic events as Polish life in Siberia, Warsaw before the war, the German occupation, the Warsaw Uprising, life in Ostaszków, (...) and the rebuilding of Warsaw are included.The hero Kaia is a woman, christened Cesaria, whose father was expelled to Siberia in 1905 for conspiring against the tsar. Kaia spent her early childhood there, and the family lived near the mountain Altaj. A chapter shows how the Polish community lived there, organized their daily lives, etc. In 1922, the family returned to free Poland, the train trip back taking almost a year. This ordeal is highlighted as a series of stops sometimes lasting for weeks because of heavy snow accumulation, the men shoveling a pathway for the train to pass through, many deaths occurring from the frigid cold with the “caboose” used as a mortuary for Poles to be returned to their homeland for burial. Kaia entered the school system, was eventually educated as an architect, and then World War II started. She lived under the German occupation for the first few years, and later became a conspirator by helping the underground movement. She joined the Armia Krajowa in 1942. At considerable risk, her apartment became a meeting place for the conspirators.After Hubal’s death, one of his couriers gave Kaia the Hubal Cross Virtuti Militari. The cross was with her for the ensuing 50 years. During the Warsaw Uprising, in which she was a courier, she carried the cross around her neck. Many times, she had to travel via the Warsaw underground sewer system. Twice, she was wounded. After the Warsaw Uprising collapsed, she went to the east territory to look for her mother. She was captured by the Russian NKVD in Białystok and sent to Ostaszków. An interesting scene describes one of many interrogations: the Russian interrogator asks if she knows about the cross. Her reply causes a puzzled look on his face. The cross was never discovered (she had hidden it in a specially made shoe). Protection of the Virtuti Militari Cross, which at first had been a challenge to Kaia to survive the Uprising and Russian imprisonment, later became a symbol of courage and determination of the Polish people. In 1946, Kaia returned to Poland very ill and weighing only 38 kg (83.6 pounds). Eventually recovering her health, she worked as an architect involved in the rebuilding of Warsaw totally decimated by the Germans.In the Warsaw Uprising chapter, Kaia’s diary is included, and the book relates the scenes and events that she described. One such experience is most moving. It was a quiet moment, i.e. the shooting had subsided. On a warm beautiful August night, she was sitting, enjoying the quiet alone when, a young man sat down next to her. He was a colleague from architectural school. Together, a few months earlier, they had attended a university ball, and Kaia remembered him as always being funny and amusing. Then, she noticed he was missing one eye and part of his chin. He returned her gaze and jokingly said, “I still have one eye left”. And then, he quietly sang a popular song that they had danced the waltz to… “Not to be in love on such a beautiful night is a sin”… Kaia had to be in the same mood as he was and smiled. A few days later, half of his body was covered in ruins…he could not be helped. His death lasted several days, and he is buried in Powązki Cemetery, like many soldiers of the Uprising. (shrink)

Theoretical and practical trends of corporate citizenship indicate a deepening partnership between business and community. Following these developments, the article develops a model for the participation of businesses in decision-making processes as part of policy making and social-economic planning in the community. The article focuses on three levels: It examines the benefits and risks of such participation; identifies the typical dimensions of the participation processes; and finally, provides guidelines on how to develop a participation strategy based on the unique conditions (...) of each business and community. (shrink)

Hume appeals to a mysterious mental process to explain how to world appears to possess features that are not present in sense perceptions, namely causal, moral, and aesthetic properties. He famously writes that the mind spreads itself onto the external world, and that we stain or gild natural objects with our sentiments. Projectivism is founded on these texts but it assumes a reading of Hume’s language as merely metaphorical. This assumption, however, conflicts sharply with the important explanatory role that “spreading” (...) and “staining” are supposed to play, which, ironically, is the very appeal of Hume’s texts to projectivists. In this paper, I first consider the difficulties readers of Hume have encountered in their attempts to ascertain nature of the key psychological process. I then identify in Hume’s texts novel theoretical resources that allow Hume to produce a satisfying answer to the question of process, that is, an account of the precise nature of the key process. I offer this explanation assuming what I take to be Hume’s austere conception of the elements involved in the process: sense impressions and “internal impressions” lacking intrinsic intentionality. On my reading, the spreading process explains the gap between the meager input and the rich, novel output: causal, moral and aesthetic judgments. (shrink)

Many proteins responsible for genome maintenance interact with one another via short sequence motifs. The best known of these are PIP motifs, which mediate interactions with the replication protein PCNA. Others include RIR motifs, which bind the translesion synthesis protein Rev1, and MIP motifs, which bind the mismatch repair protein Mlh1. Although these motifs have similar consensus sequences, they have traditionally been viewed as separate motifs, each with their own target protein. In this article, we review several recent studies that (...) challenge this view. Taken together, they imply that these different motifs are not distinct entities. Instead, there is a single, broader class of motifs, which we call “PIP‐like” motifs, which have overlapping specificities and are capable of binding multiple target proteins. Given this, we must reassess the role of these motifs in forming the network of interacting proteins responsible for genome maintenance. (shrink)

In the Introduction to the Treatise Hume very enthusiastically announces his project to provide a secure and solid foundation for the sciences by grounding them on his science of man. And Hume indicates in the Abstract that he carries out this project in the Treatise. But most interpreters do not believe that Hume's project comes to fruition. In this paper, I offer a general reading of what I call Hume's ‘foundational project’ in the Treatise, but I focus especially on Book (...) 1. I argue that in Book 1 much of Hume's logic is put in the service of the other sciences, in particular, mathematics and natural philosophy. I concentrate on Hume's negative thesis that many of the ideas central to the sciences are ideas that we cannot form. For Hume, this negative thesis has implications for the sciences, as many of the texts I discuss make evident. I consider and criticize different proposals for understanding these implications: the Criterion of Meaning and the ‘Inconceivability Principle’. I introduce what I call Hume's ‘No Reason to Believe’ Principle, which I argue captures more adequately the link Hume envisions between his logic, in particular his examination of ideas, and the other sciences. (shrink)

Looks at the lives of three young Palestinian fighters caught up in the second Palestinian Intifada and examines the recent history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the cross-generational differences and divisions in religious, ...

What do Albert Einstein and Pablo Picasso have in common? Can we learn about science by studying art? There are many connections just waiting to be discovered between the natural world and artistic techniques that have been used for centuries. Author and retired science educator Mary Kirsch Boehm systematically guides readers through a look at science with an artistic eye, introducing an integrated and often overlooked view of the two disciplines. By exploring the materials and techniques of art and (...) the science behind them, Boehm reveals just how interconnected our world really is. (shrink)

En prenant appui sur l’histoire de la plus importante organisation mondiale d’écrivains, PEN International, et sur plusieurs trajectoires et mobilisations d’écrivains ou collectifs indiens contemporains (le Indian Cultural Forum, Karthika Naïr, Perumal Murugan), cet article s’interroge sur certaines modalités de l’activisme en littérature, entendu à la fois comme activisme à travers la littérature, et comme activisme au service de celle-ci. En Inde, particulièrement, l’écrivain(e) partage une communauté de vulnérabilité avec toutes les autres voix et minorités menacées ou liquidées. L’activisme, c’est (...) s’assurer que ce qui est mineur, minoré ou oublié continue d’être vu, entendu, reconnu ; c’est continuer à raconter d’ autres histoires, à creuser leur multiplicité et leur équivocité ; c’est enregistrer les mots, les noms et les réalités apparemment superflues des mondes vulnérables qui nous entourent. (shrink)

Repetition priming of object identification refers to the phenomenon whereby experience with an object induces systematic changes in subsequent processing of that same object. This data-driven form of priming is distinct from conceptually-driven priming. To date, considerable controversy exists about whether data-driven priming reflects facilitation in perceptual processing or mediation by preexisting object representations. The present study concerned priming of recognizing familiar and unfamiliar faces and how this priming is influenced by face inversion, which interferes with perceptual face processing. Perceptual (...) and representation-based loci conjointly contributed to priming; the perceptual locus was operative similarly for familiar and unfamiliar faces, whereas the representation-based locus was only invoked for familiar faces and resulted in a response-time reduction triple the magnitude of that from the perceptual locus. The results constrain theoretical accounts of data-driven priming by indicating that improved identification can result from the combination of perceptual and representation-based facilitation. (shrink)

Proponents of the standard evolutionary biology paradigm explain human “altruism” in terms of either nepotism or strict reciprocity. On that basis our underlying nature is reduced to a function of inclusive fitness: human nature has to be totally selfish or nepotistic. Proposed here are three possible paths to giving costly aid to nonrelatives, paths that are controversial because they involve assumed pleiotropic effects or group selection. One path is pleiotropic subsidies that help to extend nepotistic helping behavior from close family (...) to nonrelatives. Another is “warfare”—if and only if warfare recurred in the Paleolithic. The third and most plausible hypothesis is based on the morally based egalitarian syndrome of prehistoric hunter-gatherers, which reduced phenotypic variation at the within-group level, increased it at the between-group level, and drastically curtailed the advantages of free riders. In an analysis consistent with the fundamental tenets of evolutionary biology, these three paths are evaluated as explanations for the evolutionary development of a rather complicated human social nature. (shrink)

The last few decades have witnessed intense debates in Hume scholarship concerning Hume’s account of causation. At the core of the “old–new Hume” debate is the question of whether causation for Hume is more than mere regularity, in particular, whether Hume countenances necessary connections in mind-independent nature. This chapter assesses this debate against the background of Hume’s “foundational project” in the Treatise. The question of the role and import of Hume’s account of the idea of cause is examined and compared (...) with Hume’s treatment of other ideas. (shrink)

Hunter-gatherer punishment involves costs and benefits to individuals and groups, but the costs do not necessarily fit with the assumptions made in models that consider punishment to be altruistic – which brings in the free-rider problem and the problem of second-order free-riders. In this commentary, I present foragers' capital punishment patterns ethnographically, in the interest of establishing whether such punishment is likely to be costly; and I suggest that in many cases abstentions from punishment that might be taken as defections (...) by free-riders are actually caused by social-structural considerations rather than being an effect of free-rider genes. This presentation of data supplements the ethnographic analysis provided by Guala. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers frequently assume that Kant never seriously engaged with Spinoza or Spinozism --certainly not before the break of Der Pantheismusstreit, or within the Critique of Pure Reason. Offering an alternative reading of key pre-critical texts and to some of the Critique's most central chapters, Omri Boehm challenges this common assumption. He argues that Kant not only is committed to Spinozism in early essays such as "The One Possible Basis" and "New Elucidation," but also takes up Spinozist metaphysics as (...) Transcendental Realism's most consistent form in the Critique of Pure Reason. (shrink)

La « figure vitruvienne », héritée du traité De architectura de Vitruve, et les variations auxquelles elle donne lieu dans les arts à la Renaissance révèlent une grande diversité de formes et un remaniement du canon antique. En s’appuyant sur une méthode historique et conceptuelle, l’article entend mettre à jour les enjeux esthétiques suscités par la représentation du corps humain dans les arts, en tenant compte de la diversité des voies empruntées par les artistes de la Renaissance, influencés qui plus (...) est par la tentation de la mathématisation, la physiognomonie et la recherche de l’expressivité. (shrink)

Nach wissenschaftlichen Schätzungen gibt es auf diesem Planeten Menschen seit etwa einer halben Million Jahre. Gleichwohl drohen die überall um sich greifenden, scheinbar aus den verschiedensten Quellen sich nährenden Vorstellungen universaler Entwicklung der Behauptung, daß solche Wesen—Menschen—wirklich existieren, den Boden zu entziehen. Denn diese Behauptung muß bedeuten, daß mit dem Auftreten von Menschen—als Wesen eigener Art—ein ihnen spezifisch eigenes, zuvor ungekanntes Wirkungsvermögen in die Welt eingetreten ist und, soweit es reicht und sich auswirkt, die Wirklichkeit dieser Welt verändert hat. Solche (...) Veränderungen der Welt im Wirkungsbereich des Menschen und in Folge seiner insbesondere auf seine Wissenschaft sich stützenden Wirksamkeit scheinen ja auch sichtbar genug. Doch gerade im Namen dieser ihrer Wissenschaft wollen moderne Menschen diese Veränderungen eher nur der Entwicklung zuschreiben als einem geheimnisvollen Wirkungsvermögen ganz eigenartiger Wesen, die da mitten unter uns unter dem Namen von “Menschen” existierten, ja denen man gar uns selber zurechnen wollte. (shrink)

This paper brings to light an unexplored aspect of Hobbes’s argument that political authority rests upon subjects’ consent. Consent enacts a transfer of subjects’ right of nature to the sovereign, yet she already possesses a natural right to everything. What moral difference, then, does this make to her possession of power, and how? In my reading, the difference lies in the rise of new obligations befalling the sovereign by means of an indirect mechanism: That many individuals, hoping for safety, transfer (...) their right of nature to the sovereign triggers an obligation for her to accept the role of a ruler and perform the duties attached to it, for the sake of the peace enjoined by the laws of nature. This reading should also confirm the possibility of a consensual foundation for the Hobbesian right to punish and shed new light on Hobbes’s notion of tacit consent. (shrink)

What is the source of normativity in Hume’s account of causal reasoning? In virtue of what are causal beliefs justified for Hume? To answer these questions, the literature appeals, almost invariably, to custom or some feature thereof. I argue, in contrast, that causal beliefs are justified for Hume because they issue from experience. Although he denies experience the title of justifying reason, for Hume experience has normative authority. I offer an interpretation of the source and nature of the normativity of (...) experience in causal reasoning. I argue that the senses and memory have a special, positive status within the mind in virtue of their force and vivacity, which, on my reading, Hume identifies with a sense of presentness and a strong effect on the mind. Hume dignifies the system of memory and the senses with the title of reality because of these features. Causal beliefs are dignified as “realities” because they issue from reality. However, because the imagination can sometimes enhance the force and vivacity of ideas without the help of experience, Hume appeals to coherence and general rules as well. (shrink)

Hegels Philosophie ist die wissenschaftliche Weltanschauung unserer Zeit, so lautet die These, d.h. Ausdruck einer selbst zur Ideologie entarteten Idee von Wissen, in die unser Zeitalter, als das „Zeitalter der Wissenschaft”, alle Hoffnung der Menschheit setzt. Es ist die der klassischen griechischen Philosophie entstammende Idee, daß wahres Wissen, und mithin grundlegend auch für jede erfolgversprechende Praxis, allein rein theoretisches Wissen sei. Dieses Wissen fordert Objektivität, weil es für das einzig Wirkliche das in sich und an sich Bestimmte hält und Wahrheit (...) nur in der Anpassung an das an sich so Seiende erblickt. Die Neuzeit ist das Zeitalter, in dem Philosophie und Wissenschaft diese überkommene Idee einerseits praktisch, andererseits auch selbst erst theoretisch zu verwirklichen unternehmen. Die bald rasch sich aufhäufenden praktischen Erfolge der modernen Wisenschaft sind bekannt. Die Versuche zu einer streng wissenschaftlichen Begründung rein theoretischen Wissens im Sinne der Idee dieses Wissens selbst, welche die Geschichte der Philosophie der Neuzeit von Descartes bis Fichte ausfüllen, führen indessen zu einer unwiderstehlich zunehmenden Einsicht in die Wirklichkeitsfremdheit der Idee rein theoretischen Wissens. Fichte zuerst sah zwischen Wissenim Sinne dieser Idee - und Realität eine unüberwindliche Kluft sich auftun. Angesichts dessen hat sich Hegel, um diese Idee zu retten, auf die verzweifelte Auskunft verlegt, dieses Wissen absolut zu setzen. Damit konnte er jederlei Bedenken, welches sich vom absoluten Standpunkt des Wissens entfernte und auf die Realität verweisen wollte, den Weg verlegen. Die Aufhebung aller Realität im absolut gesetzten Wissen aber, behauptete Hegel, bewahre in Wahrheit das Ganze, welches an ihr allein das Wahre sei. Dies nachzuweisen, diente ihm das Mittel der „Dialektik”, welche auf einer systematischen Verwechslung von notwendigen Möglichkeitsbedingungen und zureichenden Gründen beruht. Indem jedoch Hegel die Idee rein theoretischen Wissens absolut setzte und somit der Forderung entzog, sie ihren eigenen theoretischen Ansprüchen gemäß streng wissenschaftlich zu begründen und zu verwirklichen, machte er das Wissen selbst zum bloßen Glaubensgegenstande einer Weltanschauung. Husserl andererseits teilte zwar diesen Glauben, doch erneuerte er unter der Losung „Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft” jene Forderung, damit aber jenen seit den Cartesianischen Meditationen eingeleiteten kritischen Prozeß, der nunmehr scheint, das Urteil aufzunötigen: Rein theoretisches Wissen ist selbst nur praktisch zu verwirklichen auf den Boden einer Weltanschauung, welche als solche im Widerspruch steht zu den Forderungen des Wissens selber. Der Versuch einer selbst streng wissenschaftlichen Verwirklichung der Idee rein theoretischen Wissens hingegen, den zuletzt Husserl unternahm, zwang die phänomenologische Philosophie zu einer Umwertung der Idee des Wissens. In Wirklichkeit ist theoretisches Wissen nicht Wissen, sojern und weil es rein theoretisches ist, sondern sofern es das nicht und wiewohl es nur theoretisches ist. (shrink)