In eighteenth-century French natural history, the notion of preformation was not only a model for a small preexisting embryo that gradually extended its shape through the influx of particles, but also for an order that coordinated the dynamic relation between organic parts. Preformation depended therefore also on a hidden order behind the continuity of visible forms. Louis Bourguet, Charles Bonnet, and Georges Cuvier distinguished three organizational levels: First, the synchronic or functional order of organic systems; second, the diachronic order of (...) the initiation of mechanical processes; and third, the hierarchical order that regulates the interaction of organic parts. In this essay, I reconstruct and compare the three organizational levels in the writings of Bourguet, Bonnet and Cuvier, relate their models of organic unity to the principle of perfection, and contrast these models with Georges Buffon's critique of system theories. (shrink)

This essay focuses on the structure of agency in Georg Ernst Stahl's model of organic order and the role that it plays for the difference between living and non-living beings in the discourses of medicine and natural history around 1700. Stahl calls the order of organic beings an "organism". He characterizes the "organism" through the notions of tonic movement, energy and ratio. The tonic movement is a mechanism of contraction and relaxation of organic units to direct fluids to certain parts (...) of the body; the energy represents a certain, limited potential of the living body to act spontaneously and to react if it is irritated; and the ratio expresses the logic of a processual, directed order imposed on corporeal dispositions. This ratio inheres in natural agents. However, to establish his theory of agency, Stahl first analyzes the irregular blood movements that characterize diseases. The capacity of the organic body to change these movements and to heal itself in redirecting them, leads him to the assumption that such bodies can regulate their own order and that self-regulation requires an autonomous agent. (shrink)

In a long-term transformation, that begins in Antiquity but takes a crucial turn in the Renaissance anatomies, the “fibre” becomes from around 1750 the operative building block and at the same time the first unifying principle of function-structure-complexes of organic bodies. It occupies the role that the cell takes up in the cell œconomies of the second third of the nineteenth century. In this paper, I will first discuss some key notions, technical analogies, and images that are related to “fibre”-concepts (...) from Andreas Vesalius to Albrecht von Haller and then focus on Charles Bonnet's and Denis Diderot's fibre œconomies. In Bonnet's and Diderot's fibre œconomies, the self-active, regulating properties of fibre-agents and their material structures, that reach from fibre bundles, tissues and membranes to apparati of organs, are united within the concrete whole of individual organized “systems” or “networks.”. (shrink)

For Uexküll, biology is the science of the organization of living beings. In the context of Entwicklungsmechanik, he refers to Driesch’s and Spemann’s experiments on the development of embryonic germ cells to prove that self-differentiating processes constitute organisms as natural objects. Uexküll focuses on the theory of such self-differentiating processes or organizations. The notion of organization implies for him a “technique of nature” that is capable of structuring organic and inorganic material according to plans and rules. These plans and rules (...) are part of the overall order of the world. As preformed sign systems or codes, they determine and regulate the development and existence of individual animal subjects in their specific Umwelten. (shrink)

In diesem Artikel geht es um die historische und konzeptuelle Entwicklung von Charles Bonnets (1720-1793) allgemeiner Systemtheorie organismischer Ordnung. Hierfür wird der Kontext von Bonnets Ansatz in Naturgeschichte und Philosophie rekonstruiert. Leitfaden zur Analyse von Bonnets Systemtheorie bildet das Problem der doppelten Verortung des Organischen: Zum einen unterscheiden sich organisierte Körper durch ihre Ordnungsform von allen nicht organisierten Körpern, und zum anderen reihen sie sich zusammen mit den nicht-organisierten Körpern in eine Stufenleiter der Wesen ein, die von den Elementen bis (...) zum Menschen reicht und Mineralien, Pflanzen und Tiere umfasst. Anhand dieser Problemstellung wird eine Interpretationsebene entwickelt, die es erlaubt, Bonnets Ansatz einer bestimmten Transformation zwischen klassischer Metaphysik und Naturgeschichte zuzuordnen. The article focuses on the historical and conceptual development of Charles Bonnet's (1720-1793) general system theory of organismic order. The context of Bonnet's work will be reconstructed in natural history and philosophy. The problem of the double position of organic bodies is central for the understanding of Bonnet's theory: On the one hand, organized bodies are different from all non-organized bodies, and on the other hand, organized and non-organized beings form a single scale of beings that reaches from the elements to minerals, plants, animals and humans. This problematic setting will be characterized as a specific transformation between classical metaphysics and natural history. (shrink)

For Uexküll, biology is the science of the organization of living beings. In the context of Entwicklungsmechanik, he refers to Driesch’s and Spemann’s experiments on the development of embryonic germ cells to prove that self-differentiating processes constitute organisms as natural objects. Uexküll focuses on the theory of such self-differentiating processes or organizations. The notion of organization implies for him a “technique of nature” that is capable of structuring organic and inorganic material according to plans and rules. These plans and rules (...) are part of the overall order of the world. As preformed sign systems or codes, they determine and regulate the development and existence of individual animal subjects in their specific Umwelten. (shrink)

ArgumentIn this essay, I sketch a problem-based framework within which I locate the concept of “organism” in the system theories of Georg Ernst Stahl, Théophile Bordeu, and Paul-Joseph Barthez. Around 1700, Stahl coins the word “organism” for a certain concept of order. For him, the concept explains the form of order of living bodies that is categorically different from the order of other bodies or composites. At the end of the century, the “organism” as a specific form of order becomes (...) a major topos in many discourses. I will not so much focus on experiments and objects as on basic problems that contribute to the general framework of the concept of organism as a key concept of the vitalist movement between 1700 and 1800. For this purpose, I will investigate the combination of three explanatory tools. These tools refer to regulating agents, functional interactions, and stimulus-reactions-schemes within individual organic systems of forces. They are related to various themes – especially to energy, sensibility, and sympathy. I will retrace some aspects of these relations. (shrink)

Drawing on natural history, theology and philosophy, this book retraces the shifting foundations of the order of things that characterizes the period between Descartes and Kant with respect to three questions: What is an animal?

In Expériences sur le principe de la vie (Chez D’Hautel, Paris, 1812), Jean César Legallois, a French physician and physiologist, explored the basic regulatory framework of vital processes of warm-blooded animals. He decapitated rabbits and cut off their limbs in order to search for a seat of life that is located in the spinal cord. Through ligatures and artificial pulmonary insufflations, he kept the trunks of rabbits alive for some minutes. Legallois thus criticized models of organic order in which the (...) spinal cord only mediates, like a gross nerve, between the brain and the body. He identified a certain section of the spinal cord that influences respiratory acts, and he also established a connection between the spinal cord and the movement of the heart. Further on, Legallois envisioned experiments that would extend the life-time of headless trunks through the infusion of arterial blood. (shrink)

Scholarship in experimental jurisprudence has reported surprising findings about various concepts of legal significance: _acting intentionally_, _causation_, _consent_, _knowledge, recklessness_, _reasonableness,_ and _law_ itself. Often, these studies examine laypeople’s ordinary concepts and draw broader conclusions about legal experts’ concepts. This Article questions such inferences, from empirical findings about ordinary concepts to conclusions about the concepts of those with legal expertise. It presents a case study concerning what it means to act _intentionally._ An experiment examines intentionality judgments across four populations (N (...) = 774): laypeople, law students, non-law students, and United States judges. Legal training affected judgments in three ways that are consistent with the acquisition of a distinctive legal concept. This case study supports the Article’s broader claim: Laypeople’s ordinary concepts are not equivalent to experts’ legal concepts. The acquisition of legal concepts is an important form of legal expertise. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article suggests that Asian American rhetorics of sound destabilize representational politics by complicating the racialization of sonic difference. The author investigates the relationship between notions of Asian American citizenship and not-Blackness in vocal performance. By attending to sonic rhetorics through Awkwafina’s blaccent controversy, the article explores the condition of epistemic violence that position Asian American voices as “unhearable.”.

Some argue that robots could never be sentient, and thus could never have intrinsic moral status. Others disagree, believing that robots indeed will be sentient and thus will have moral status. But a third group thinks that, even if robots could never have moral status, we still have a strong moral reason to treat some robots as if they do. Drawing on a Kantian argument for indirect animal rights, a number of technology ethicists contend that our treatment of anthropomorphic or (...) even animal-like robots could condition our treatment of humans: treat these robots well, as we would treat humans, or else risk eroding good moral behavior toward humans. But then, this argument also seems to justify giving rights to robots, even if robots lack intrinsic moral status. In recent years, however, this indirect argument in support of robot rights has drawn a number of objections. In this paper I have three goals. First, I will formulate and explicate the Kant-inspired indirect argument meant to support robot rights, making clearer than before its empirical commitments and philosophical presuppositions. Second, I will defend the argument against a number of objections. The result is the fullest explication and defense to date of this well-known and influential but often criticized argument. Third, however, I myself will raise a new concern about the argument’s use as a justification for robot rights. This concern is answerable to some extent, but it cannot be dismissed fully. It shows that, surprisingly, the argument’s advocates have reason to resist, at least somewhat, producing the sorts of robots that, on their view, ought to receive rights. (shrink)

This article offers the first systematic investigation of the linguistic forms in which Kant expresses his transcendental idealism since Gerold Prauss’ seminal book Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich. It is argued that Prauss’ own argument for the claim that ‘in itself’ is an adverbial expression that standardly modifies verbs of philosophical reflection is flawed and that there is hence very poor exegetical evidence for so-called ‘methodological two-aspect’ interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism. A comprehensive investigation of Kant’s adverbial (...) uses of ‘in itself’ rather reveals that there are various groups of verbs that ‘in itself’ modifies, which can more or less all be reduced to a standard use in which ‘in itself’ modifies verbs of predicative being such as the copula. It is also discussed how these findings can be accommodated by the two main alternative kinds of interpretations, that is, two-object and ontological two-aspect interpretations. (shrink)

Unser Alltag ist von technisch erzeugter Virtualität nicht nur geprägt - er wird in vielen Bereichen durch sie bestimmt. Die Informationsgesellschaft pflegt einen selbstverständlichen Umgang mit sich immer weiter entwickelnden technischen Geräten. Als Schein oder Unwirklichkeit konnotiert, bleiben die neuen Phänomene der Virtualität dabei jedoch weitgehend unreflektiert. Tobias Holischkas phänomenologische Analyse zeigt, dass insbesondere der virtuelle Ort als versammelndes Prinzip eine Realität schafft, die - ganz im Gegensatz zum abstrakten Konzept des Cyberspace - eine ontologische Verbindung zur menschlichen Alltagswelt (...) herstellt und sie auf diese Weise erweitert. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Ausarbeitung setzt sich mit der Beziehung auseinander, die Subjekt (Erkenntnisvermögen) und Objekt (Erkenntnisgegenstand) im Denken Theodor W. Adornos zueinander einnehmen. Sie fragt, genauer gefasst, wie das Subjekt den darin angestrebten philosophischen Zugang zu seinem Objekt herstellen kann, der sich aus dezidierter Distanz und enger Nähe zugleich speisen soll. Dazu möchte sie dem dialektischen Gefüge von Subjekt und Objekt, wie es in Adornos Schriften zur Geltung kommt, weiter nachgehen: Sie möchte dessen zentrale Aspekte herausstellen, ihren Zusammenhang kenntlich machen und (...) das bei Adorno Ungesagte weiter ausdeuten. Der Autor Tobias Litterst studierte Philosophie und Musikwissenschaft. Er war Doktorand am Lehrstuhl von Prof. Dr. Ulrich Schlösser an der Universität Tübingen. Dort setzte er sich mit der Epistemologie Theodor W. Adornos auseinander. (shrink)

This essay first discusses the three major arguments in favor of euthanasia and physician-assisted-suicide in contemporary Western society, viz ., the arguments of mercy, preventing indignity, and individual autonomy. It then articulates both Confucian consonance and dissonance to them. The first two arguments make use of Confucian discussions on suicide whereas the last argument appeals to Confucian social-political thought. It concludes that from the Confucian moral perspectives, none of the three arguments is fully convincing.

Theoretische Philosophie aus phänomenologischer Perspektive Das Verhältnis von Phänomenologie und Metaphysik ist ambivalent. Einerseits richtet sich phänomenologische Deskription gegen leere Spekulation. Andererseits betonen Husserl und seine Nachfolger die Möglichkeit einer kritischen Erneuerung der Metaphysik. Die zwanzig Beiträge dieses Kompendiums untersuchen das Problem einer phänomenologischen Metaphysik von Husserl bis in die Gegenwart und bieten so Antworten auf die Frage, was phänomenologische Metaphysik sein kann und sein sollte.