The model of DNA-histones has the following elements: The hydrogen bonds between the complementary nucleotide bases function as informational gates. When the electrons π of one nucleotide base are excited, an exchange of protons is produced between the two complementary bases. The result is the displacement of the conjugated double bonds which facilitates the inter-molecular transmission of the electronic wave of excitation by electro-magnetic coupling. Each triplet of nucleotide bases of DNA fixes one definite amino acid . Between the nucleotide (...) bases and the amino acids there are constituted informational gates, which ensure the circulation of the electronic wave of excitation. An input signal molecule arrives at the receiver gene and unleashes the activity of the enzymes which introduce in the DNA-histones system the electronic wave of excitation. The electronic wave of excitation arises as a result of the break of the high-energy bonds of ATP. Then, the electronic excitation is transmitted to the productor gene where it represents the signal for starting the synthesis of the mRNA.Le modèle de système ADN-Histone a les éléments suivants: Les liaisons d'hydrogène entre les bases nucléotidiques complémentaires fonctionnent comme des portes informationnelles. Quand les électrons π d'une base nucléotidique sont excités, il se produit un échange de protons entre les bases complémentaires. Le résultat est un déplacement des doubles liaisons conjugées qui facilite la transmission de l'onde d'excitation électronique par un couplage électromagnétique. Chaque triplet de bases nucléotidiques de l'ADN fixe un certain amino-acide . Entre les bases nucléodiques et les amino-acides se constituent des portes informationnelles qui assurent la circulation de l'onde d'excitation dlectronique. Une molécule signal d'entrée arrive au gène récepteur et déclenche l'activité des enzymes qui introduisent dans le système ADN-histone l'excitation électronique. L'excitation électronique apparait comme résultat de la rupture des liaisons de haute énergie del' ATP. l'Onde d'excitation électronique est transmise au gène producteur, où elle rdprésente le signal pour faire commencer la synthèse de l'ARNm.Das Modell des DNS-Histonen Systems weist folgende Elemente auf: Die Wasserstoffbindungen zwischen den komplementäaren Nukleotidbasen funktionieren wie informationale Pforten. Wenn die π Elektronen einer Nukleotidbase erregt werden, ensteht ein Protonenwechsel zwischen den Komplementären Basen. Das Ergebnis ist eine Verschiebung der konjugierten Doppelbindungen, die die Weiterleitung der elektronischen Erregungswelle durch eine elektromagnetische Kupplung erleichtert. Jedes Nukleotidbasentriplett der DNS fixiert eine bestimmte Aminosäure . Zwischen den Nukelotidbasen und den Aminosäuren entstehen Informationspforten, welche den Umlauf der elektronischen Erregungswelle sichern. Ein Eintrittsignal Moleküul gelangt zur Rezeptorgen und löst die Aktivität von Enzymen aus, welche die elektronische Erregungswelle in das DNS-Histonen System einführen werden. Die elektronische Erregungswelle erscheint als Ergebnis der Spaltung der hochenergetischen Bindungen des ATP-s. Die elektronische Erregungswelle wird alsdann zur Produktorgen weitergeleitet, wo sie das Signal zum Beginn der Synthese der mRNS darstellt. (shrink)

According to the model presented in this paper, the beginning of life was marked by the coupling of two complementary nucleotide bases: adenine and thymine. The adenine-thymine system received photons from the sun and stored their energy in the form of a chemical high-energy bond between two phosphoric acid molecules, which were before-hand fixed by adenine from the aqueous environment. The energy of the high-energy bond was then delivered in the form of two waves of electronic excitation. These were utilized (...) to synthesize new molecules, starting from the carbonic acid and ammonia molecules, fixed from the aqueous environment by the polar groups of the nucleotide bases. In this way, a nucleotides-histone protosystem was self-synthesized, evolving step by step towards complexity, by means of some internal cybernetic and informational mechanisms. During its evolution, the NHPS synthesized a limiting membrane, produced the organizing elements of the cellular organelles and constructed microtubules and microfilaments. Subsequently, the NHPS evolved to the building of DNA-histone system and formed the cellular nucleus. (shrink)

“Probably Peirce’s best-known works are the first two articles in a series of six that originally were collectively entitled Illustrations of the Logic of Science and published in Popular Science Monthly from November 1877 through August 1878. The first is entitled ‘The Fixation of Belief’ and the second is entitled ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear.’ In the first of these papers Peirce defended, in a manner consistent with not accepting naive realism, the superiority of the scientific method over other (...) methods of overcoming doubt and ‘fixing belief.’” — Robert Burch, “Charles Sanders Peirce,” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2021 revision) -/- “Pragmatist epistemologies often explore how we can carry out inquiries in a self-controlled and fruitful way. (Where much analytic epistemology centres around the concept of knowledge, considered as an idealised end-point of human thought, pragmatist epistemology centres around the concept of inquiry, considered as the process of knowledge-seeking and how we can improve it.) So pragmatists often provide rich accounts of the capacities or virtues that we must possess in order to inquire well, and the rules or guiding principles that we should adopt. A canonical account is Peirce’s classic early paper ‘The Fixation of Belief‘. Here Peirce states that inquiry is a struggle to replace doubt with “settled belief“, and that the only method of inquiry that can make sense of the fact that at least some of us are disturbed by inconsistent beliefs, and will subsequently reflect upon which methods of fixing belief are correct is the Method of Science, which draws on the Pragmatic Maxim described above. This contrasts with three other methods of fixing belief: i) refusing to consider evidence contrary to one’s favored beliefs (the Method of Tenacity), ii) accepting an institution’s dictates (the Method of Authority), iii) developing the most rationally coherent or elegant-seeming belief-set (the A Priori Method).“ — Catherine Legg, “Pragmatism,” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2021 revision). (shrink)

"Philosophy of Education" is designed to engage readers with a broad range of contemporary perspectives on significant educational issues, including, pluralism and democracy in education, the problem of indoctrination, the nature and value of critical teaching, controversy in the classroom, and educational standards. In this third edition, it remains the intention of the editors to offer a collection of essays in the philosophy of education which will provide students in teacher education programs with a lively and accessible introduction to some (...) of the central debates and issues in the field. In addition, teachers, administrators and graduate students should find this collection a valuable resource. As with the first and second editions, and given the intended readership, the editors have selected discussions which establish a connection between philosophical reflection and pedagogical practice, in the belief that philosophical understanding is a vital aspect of professional development. (shrink)

According to most accounts of trust, you can only trust other people (or groups of people). To trust is to think that another has goodwill, or something to that effect. I sketch a different form of trust: the unquestioning attitude. What it is to trust, in this sense, is to settle one’s mind about something, to stop questioning it. To trust is to rely on a resource while suspending deliberation over its reliability. Trust lowers the barrier of monitoring, challenging, checking, (...) and questioning. Trust sets up open pipelines between yourself and parts of the external world. Trust permits external resources to have a similar relationship to one as one’s internal cognitive faculties. This creates efficiency, but at the price of exquisite vulnerability. We must trust in this way because we are cognitively limited beings in a cognitively overwhelming world. Crucially, we can hold the unquestioning attitude towards objects and technologies. When I trust my climbing rope, I stop worrying about its reliability. When I trust my online calendaring system, I simply go to the events indicated, without question. But, one might worry, how could one ever hold such a normatively loaded attitude as trust towards mere objects? How could it ever make sense to feel betrayed by an object? Trust is our engine for expanding and outsourcing our agency — for binding external processes into our practical selves. Thus, we can be betrayed by our smartphones in the same way that we can be betrayed by our memory. When we trust, we try to make something a part of our agency, and we are betrayed when our part lets us down. To unquestioningly trust something is to let it in—to attempt to bring it inside one’s practical functioning. This suggests a new form of gullibility: agential gullibility, which occurs when agents too hastily and carelessly integrate external resources into their own agency. (shrink)

Value capture occurs when an agent’s values are rich and subtle; they enter a social environment that presents simplified — typically quantified — versions of those values; and those simplified articulations come to dominate their practical reasoning. Examples include becoming motivated by FitBit’s step counts, Twitter Likes and Re-tweets, citation rates, ranked lists of best schools, and Grade Point Averages. We are vulnerable to value capture because of the competitive advantage that such crisp and clear expressions of value have in (...) our private reasoning and our public justification. There is, however, a price. In value capture, we take a central component of our autonomy — our ongoing deliberation over the exact articulation of our values — and we outsource it. And the metrics to which we outsource usually engineered for the interests of some external force, like a large-scale institution’s interest in cross-contextual comprehensibility and quick aggregability. That outsourcing cuts off one of the key benefits to personal deliberation. In value capture, we no longer adjust our values and their articulations in light of own rich experience of the world. Our values should often be carefully tailored to our particular selves or our small-scale communities, but in value capture, we buy our values off the rack. In some cases – like decreasing CO2 emissions – the costs of non-tailored values are outweighed by the benefit of precise collective coordination. In other cases, like in our aesthetic lives, they are not. This suggests that we should want different values suited to different scales. We should want value federalism. Some values are perhaps best pursued at the largest-scale level, others at smaller scales. The problem occurs when we exhibit an excess preference for the largest-scale values – when we consistently let the universal metrics swamp our quieter interests. (shrink)

Alessandro Portelli tiene una larga historia de amistad con la Universidad Nacional de La Plata y con la Maestría en Historia y Memoria en particular. Ha dictado dos seminarios de posgrado en el marco de la maestría en 2013 y 2018, así como también la revista Aletheia ha publicado una traducción de un texto de su autoría (Aletheia n°7) y una entrevista en el marco de sus visitas al país (Aletheia n°9). En 2013 fue distinguido con el título Miembro (...) Honorífico y en 2017 le fue otorgado el Doctorado Honoris Causa por la UNLP. Hoy volvemos a publicar un texto suyo, que transcribe la conferencia que nos ofreció en la Universidad Nacional de La Plata, el 16 y 17 de septiembre de 2019, durante una nueva visita, invitado por el Doctorado en Historia y la Maestría en Historia y Memoria de la FaHCE, para participar del Coloquio sobre Memorias Populares y realizando un encuentro con investigadores e investigadoras de nuestra casa de estudios. En la conferencia “Archivos Sonoros y cultura popular", el investigador italiano disertó sobre “Bob Dylan, migraciones y globalización” trazando un recorrido histórico y geográfico de la lírica popular de transmisión oral. En este viaje se registran las mutaciones de la canción y las transformaciones de los sujetos que la entonan a través del espacio y el tiempo, mientras permanecen las opresiones que dan lugar al canto. En la canción de Bob Dylan se concentran las versiones de sus precursores: desde el teatro del renacimiento italiano hasta el cercamiento de los campos en Escocia, desde el romanticismo europeo al folclore del Sur de Estados Unidos. Las postales musicales que reúne Portelli nos hablan también de una canción sin tiempo, una canción que se actualiza en el presente, en un mundo global que re-traza las fronteras y dictamina nuevas-viejas restricciones a la circulación de personas entre el Norte y el Sur. El canto popular del presente es entonces el de los migrantes, de las diásporas que dispersan familias y sociedades, y las “sísporas” que reúnen diferentes generaciones y culturas tan diversas en un mismo punto de llegada. En esa conjunción de lo universal y lo particular, el folklore nos trae una y mil veces los grandes temas de la humanidad: la pérdida de la inocencia, el temor de lo nuevo, la tragedia humana de la injusticia y la desigualdad. Si allá por los años ‘60 la canción de Bob Dylan nos alertaba sobre el peligro inminente de la modernidad, hoy el sentido premonitorio de esas imágenes futuristas se revierte. El paisaje sonoro que nos muestra Portelli trae la canción de los migrantes eritreos, libios, somalíes, nigerianos y senegaleses que trabajan como braseros en Italia, trae el grito de los refugiados en Veintimiglia que desafían el futuro proclamando “We're not going back”. Como explica Portelli, la música es inmaterial, tiene pies, y viaja. La música no conoce fronteras, por eso la canción de los migrantes del Sur global sigue escribiendo la historia de las resistencias y resiliencias, la historia de las luchas de los pueblos por conquistar nuevas libertades. (shrink)

The concept Curriculum is a complex notion. Various meanings have been attached to it. A careful analysis of Curriculum shows that the notions "plan", "content", "objectives" and "method" are intimately connected to Curriculum which should not be completely identified with any one of these concepts. In this short paper I propose to discuss two questions: Is the teaching method distinct from the Curriculum? and, Can we decide prior to experience which methods ought to be applied in the educational process? Answers (...) to these questions are meant to help clarify the relationship between the Curriculum and teaching method. (shrink)

The English word 'curriculum' is derived from the Latin word curriculum meaning 'a course', 'a race' or 'a running'. This suggests a process, the idea of going through something which has a beginning, a development and an end. The secondary meaning of curriculum was 'career'. Both the primary and the secondary meanings of curriculum referred to temporal space and to non-temporal endeavours or intellectual pursuits. The expression 'curriculum vitae', then referred to both intellectual and non-intellectual pursuits. Today curriculum in the (...) educational context refers primarily, if not solely, to intellectual pursuits. Actually curriculum is related to learning in a broad sense, incorporating more than the "cognitive" aspect. This suggests that the concept curriculum is a complex notion. Various meanings have been attached to it. A careful analysis of curriculum shows that the notions of "plan", "content or subject matter", "objectives" and "method" are intimately connected to curriculum which should not be completely identified with any one of these concepts. In this short paper I propose to discuss the following question: Is the notion of subject matter inherent in that of curriculum, or, does the notion curriculum make sense without that of subject matter? Answers to this question are meant to help clarify the relationship between the curriculum and subject matter. (shrink)

Curriculum theorists are, among other things, engaged in attempts at producing models of curriculum design and/or curriculum development. Such attempts, according to Robin Barrow, aim at establishing "a set of ideal steps that will both lead to coherent proposals for curriculum change and, when incorporated in the curriculum proposal, enable it to be successfully adopted." Establishing such "a set of ideal steps" involves a consideration of needs, practical constraints, curriculum content and curriculum planning. Such projects also include a formulation of (...) curriculum objectives, ways of implementing objectives and methods of evaluating the success or failure of achieving these objectives. In this paper I propose to reflect on the nature of objectives by focusing on the following questions: 1. Are objectives part of the curriculum? 2. What constitutes a meaningful objective? (shrink)

In 1963 James A. Jordan Jr. claimed that "It is not difficult nowadays to run into a claim that such and such teaching method follows the principle implicit in the method of Socrates." Jordan's claim refers particularly to supporters of programmed instruction or the use of teaching machines. He argued that the use or application of such materials cannot lead to genuine immitation of Socrates. Today, although the use and application of computers in schools has increased, the claim of following (...) the Socratic Method is usually made by teachers who allow or encourage "classroom discussions." Some might even claim that this is the only appropriate or suitable method of learning. (shrink)

Recent conversation has blurred two very different social epistemic phenomena: echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Members of epistemic bubbles merely lack exposure to relevant information and arguments. Members of echo chambers, on the other hand, have been brought to systematically distrust all outside sources. In epistemic bubbles, other voices are not heard; in echo chambers, other voices are actively undermined. It is crucial to keep these phenomena distinct. First, echo chambers can explain the post-truth phenomena in a way that epistemic (...) bubbles cannot. Second, each type of structure requires a distinct intervention. Mere exposure to evidence can shatter an epistemic bubble, but may actually reinforce an echo chamber. Finally, echo chambers are much harder to escape. Once in their grip, an agent may act with epistemic virtue, but social context will pervert those actions. Escape from an echo chamber may require a radical rebooting of one's belief system. (shrink)

In his celebrated masterpiece, Symposium, Plato imagines a high-society dinner-party in Athens in 416 BC at which the guests - including the comic poet Aristophanes and, of course, Plato's mentor Socrates - each deliver a short speech in praise of love. The sequence of dazzling speeches culminates in Socrates' famous account of the views of Diotima, a prophetess who taught him that love is our means of trying to attain goodness. And then into the party bursts the drunken Alcibiades, the (...) most popular and notorious Athenian of the time, who insists on praising Socrates himself rather than love, and gives us a brilliant sketch of this enigmatic character. The power, humour, and pathos of Plato's creation engages the reader on every page. This new translation is complemented by full explanatory notes and an illuminating introduction. (shrink)

"This edition, which replaces the original Loeb edition..., offers text, translation, and annotation that are fully current with modern scholarship"--Front flap of dust jacket, volume 1.

Why do moral people so often fail to act morally? Standard scientific answers point to poor moral judgment (based on deficient character development, reason, or intuition) or to situational pressure. I consider a third possibility: a relative lack of truly moral motivation and emotion. What has been taken for moral motivation is often instead a subtle form of egoism. Recent research provides considerable evidence for moral hypocrisy—motivation to appear moral while, if possible, avoid the cost of actually being moral—but very (...) little evidence for moral integrity—motivation to actually be moral. The lack of truly moral motivation may, in turn, be linked to a lack of truly moral emotion, at least in response to violation of certain moral standards. (shrink)

forthcoming in R. Cameron, B. Hale and A. Hoffmann (ed.s), The Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics of Modality, Oxford University Press. Presents a concept-grounding account of modal knowledge.

Анотація. У статті проаналізовані досягнення Соціального Вчительства Католицької Церкви, репрезентовані працями Лева ХІІІ, Пія ХІ, Пія ХІІ, Івана Павла ІІ, що розкривають змістовні характеристики поняття «принцип субсидіарності», його роль і значення в системі християнських цінностей. Принцип субсидіарності робить можливими такі взаємовідносини в соціальному житті, коли спільнота вищого порядку не втручається у внутрішнє життя спільноти нижчого порядку, перебираючи на себе належні тій функції; заради спільного добра, спільного блага вона надає їй у разі потреби підтримку й допомогу, узгоджуючи у такий спосіб її (...) взаємодію з іншими соціальними структурами. Принцип субсидіарності скеровує соціальну практику на утвердження спільного блага в людському співтоваристві. Поширення і застосування принципу субсидіарності протистоїть небезпеці «одержавлення» суспільства та найзагрозливіших проявів колективізму, обмежує абсолютизацію влади, бюрократизацію державних і соціокультурних структур, стає одним із гарантів дотримання прав і свобод громадян своєї країни. (shrink)

Philosophers of biology typically pose questions about individuation by asking “what is an individual?” For example, we ask, “what is an individual species”, “what is an individual organism”, and “what is an individual gene?” In the first part of this chapter, I present my account of the gene concept and how it is used in investigative practices in order to motivate a more pragmatic approach. Instead of asking “what is a gene?”, I ask: “how do biologists individuate genes?”, “for what (...) purposes?”, and “do their practices of individuating genes serve these purposes?" In the second part of this chapter, I propose that we use this approach when analyzing concepts of organisms and biological individuals. Following philosophical pragmatism, I argue that we should abstain from attempts to situate individuation of Darwinian individuals or of holobionts in a philosophy of nature. Instead, we should analyze practices of individuating organisms in terms of three-place relations between the world, ideas, and human purposes and actions. I conclude with three lessons: an ontological, an epistemological, and a meta-philosophical lesson, which I suggest, apply to philosophy of science generally and to philosophy and metaphysics at large. (shrink)

In this critique, Martha Nussbaum argues that our dominant theories of development have given us policies that ignore our most basic human needs for dignity and self-respect.

This edition of Martin Ostwald's revised version of J. B. Skemp's 1952 translation of _Statesman_ includes a new selected bibliography, as well as Ostwald's interpretive introduction, which traces the evolution in Plato's political philosophy from _Republic_ to _Statesman to Laws_--from philosopher-king to royal statesman.