Kendler addresses three basic and interrelated questions that face all psychologists: What is the subject matter of psychology? What are the criteria for understanding psychological events? What ethical principles underlie the use of psychological knowledge? "[The book's] structure.... only hints at the literate and responsible handling of these current issues.... [it] would be enjoyable to use in teaching." --Psychological Report.

The relationship between psychology and ethics is determined by whether psychology is conceptualized as a natural or a human science. If the former, then psychology is incapable of identifying universal moral imperatives because of the fact/value dichotomy that rejects the possibility of logically deriving moral principles or social policies from factual statements. In addition, the inevitability of moral pluralism raises the question as to how natural science methodology can select moral truths or social policies from a variety of presumed alternatives. (...) In contrast, human science psychology, which emphasizes phenomenological experience as a source of psychological truths, has attempted to bridge the fact/value gap. Upon close examination, this approach has failed to suggest a rule as to how the "correct" set of values can be identified. The conclusion is that facts cannot dictate moral principles or social policies but they can help illuminate their consequences. Policy decisions become the responsibility of a democratic society, not of psychology. (shrink)

A developmental study of free-classification behavior within the age range of 3-1/2 to 19 years indicates that categorical responses, which are characteristic of adult behavior, increase with age while overgeneralized responses, classifications including noncategorical instances, decrease with age. Overdiscriminated responses which are incomplete categorical classifications increase from 3-1/2 to 6 years and then decrease to 19 years of age. These results are discussed within a two-stage theory of conceptual development (Kendler, 1971).

This study considers the role of epistemic turning points in the historiography of sexuality. Disentangling the historical complexity of scientia sexualis, I argue that the late 19th century and the mid-20th century constitute two critical epistemic junctures in the genealogy of sexual liberation, as the notion of free love slowly gave way to the idea of sexual freedom in modern western society. I also explore the value of the Foucauldian approach for the study of the history of sexuality in non-western (...) contexts. Drawing on examples from Republican China (1912—49), I propose that the Foucauldian insight concerning the emergence of a ‘homosexual identity’ in the West can serve as a useful guide for thinking about similar issues in the history of sexuality and the historical epistemology of sexology in modern East Asia. (shrink)

In this dialogue, we discuss the contrast between inexorable physical laws and the semiotic freedom of life. We agree that material and symbolic structures require complementary descriptions, as do the many hierarchical levels of their organizations. We try to clarify our concepts of laws, constraints, rules, symbols, memory, interpreters, and semiotic control. We briefly describe our different personal backgrounds that led us to a biosemiotic approach, and we speculate on the future directions of biosemiotics.

A philosophical exploration of the origin and limits of the modern world.

Historians and philosophers of science have furnished a wide array of theoretical-historiographical terms to emphasize the discontinuities among different systems of knowledge. Some of the most famous include Thomas Kuhn’s “paradigm”, Michel Foucault’s “episteme”, and the notion of “styles of reasoning” more recently developed by Ian Hacking and Arnold Davidson. This paper takes up this theoretical-historiographical thread by assessing the values and limitations of the notion of “style” for the historical and philosophical study of science. Specifically, reflecting on various methodological (...) and theoretical concerns prompted by sexuality, translation, and East Asian studies, this paper argues that the heretofore ways in which historians and philosophers of science have used the notion of “style” are severely restricted in terms of its mere applicability to the intellectual history of Western science. The particular example of the translation of “homosexuality” into Chinese during the May Fourth era reveals that the notion of “style” has the potential of carrying a much more dynamic conceptual weight, as when used in “styles of argumentation”. The paper also engages briefly with the historiography of scientific “national styles” and ends with some concluding remarks on the limitations of “social histories from below” and the under appreciated importance of “epistemological histories of possibilities”. (shrink)

In this dialogue, we discuss the contrast between inexorable physical laws and the semiotic freedom of life. We agree that material and symbolic structures require complementary descriptions, as do the many hierarchical levels of their organizations. We try to clarify our concepts of laws, constraints, rules, symbols, memory, interpreters, and semiotic control. We briefly describe our different personal backgrounds that led us to a biosemiotic approach, and we speculate on the future directions of biosemiotics.

The contemplation of the end of life — life's ending — provokes the emotions of fear, alarm and despondency. Fears about the end of life are almost universal. The Stoic Zeno of Elea first analyzed the problem accurately when he pointed out what he thought the fundamental problems of human existence consisted of. He identified the fundamental anxieties as being fear of the gods and a fear of death. Both fears, he thought, could be therapeutically eliminated: fear of the gods (...) was pointless since they did not care about us, and fear of death could be rationalized away by reasonable philosophical argumentation. Without wishing to resurrect Zeno's arguments, one can safely say that he was spectacularly wrong in his view of the power of rational argument. The fears about life's ending are multifaceted. They consist of fears about the process of aging, the prospect of one's own dying and one's own death, and the fact that our lives and activities — as they are lived within the confines of our corporeal bodies — will come to an inevitable end.There are also problems and anxieties concerned with the fact that the passage of time and the visible effects it leaves on our physical selves make us conscious that, at some time or other, we are, like other material objects, subject to decay and wearing down. The process is a great equalizer and no one who lives long enough is spared the spectacle of witnessing and experiencing the gradual process of the decline of their physical powers and of their cognitive functions. No matter what sort of life has been led, the ending of that particular life is certain.In this paper I want to discuss some views about the nature of these fears about the later stages of life, aging, old age and death and their roots in the philosophical and metaphysical views we have come to endorse. (shrink)

Old age represents a serious contemporary social issue. In the West, we have had a long history of derogating the old and the very status of old age. This has been true, with very limited exceptions, for the ancients, for Renaissance thinkers, and in modern times. With the greater incidence of longevity in our society, the inevitable question arises: what meanings shall we attach to old age? How can this period of the life-cycle be lived successfully given the problem that (...) old-age represents in moral and social terms? And what does “successful old age” mean?Drawing on the work of William James, particularly on some of his ethical and moral ideas, and on the specific case of Matisse, , I argue that a successful old age is possible. I argue that the key to the problem of living a successful old age requires that one leads a life of significance, where a life of significance” is one lived broadly in line with the kind of proposal advanced by William James, to wit, – that it requires a life lived with a commitment to and guided by ideals.The Jamesian ideas are unpacked. It is shown how some of the difficulties that life in old age presents can be seen in the light of a failure to find, defend, and to maintain a commitment to ideals set by oneself, thus providing confirmation of the plausibility of this Jamesian insight. (shrink)