Human cerebral organoids are three-dimensional biological cultures grown in the laboratory to mimic as closely as possible the cellular composition, structure, and function of the corresponding organ, the brain. For now, cerebral organoids lack blood vessels and other characteristics of the human brain, but are also capable of having coordinated electrical activity. They have been usefully employed for the study of several diseases and the development of the nervous system in unprecedented ways. Research on human cerebral organoids is proceeding at (...) a very fast pace and their complexity is bound to improve. This raises the question of whether cerebral organoids will also be able to develop the unique feature of the human brain, consciousness. If this is the case, some ethical issues would arise. In this article, we discuss the necessary neural correlates and constraints for the emergence of consciousness according to some of the most debated neuroscientific theories. Based on this, we consider what the moral status of a potentially conscious brain organoid might be, in light of ethical and ontological arguments. We conclude by proposing a precautionary principle and some leads for further investigation. In particular, we consider the outcomes of some very recent experiments as entities of a potential new kind. (shrink)

Intuitively, we can conceive of the existence of a conscious state as a pure activity that does not necessarily require a body (or even a brain). This idea has found new support in certain recent theories that present the possibility of a totally disconnected and disembodied consciousness. Against this hypothesis, I argue that human experience is intrinsically embodied and embedded, though in a specific way. Using Sartre’s phenomenology of the body, I first analyze the concept of consciousness as intentionality and (...) a world-disclosing activity, thus explaining how conscious activity can only be expressed through a body that is spatiotemporally related to the world. Then, I argue that bodily consciousness does not necessarily imply the actual presence of an anatomical body but, rather, a process of spatialization and temporalization (hodological space and temporal synthesis) through the “spatiotemporal body”. Finally, I test my thesis by critiquing some cases of apparent disembodied/disconnected consciousness, i.e., dreams, out-of-body experiences, and the brain-in-a-vat scenario. (shrink)

: This paper uses Extended Mind Theory to explore Brain-Computer Interfaces, demonstrating how this conceptual framework provides a wide-ranging interpretation of the potential integration of user and computer. After a preliminary analysis of first- and second-wave EMT arguments and other pragmatic criteria, I present BCI technology, addressing the issues that arise. Can BCIs extend our mental processes and to what degree? What EMT criteria should be applied to this technology? What is the role of the body in the process of (...) integrating user and computer? What are current limits to complete cognitive and bodily extension by BCIs? In line with this discussion, I suggest a pluralist approach to BCIs, allowing for specific and appropriate application of the various models and paradigms. I also advocate greater focus on the integration of body and tool, primarily for clinical purposes, but also for applications that will meet daily needs in the future. Keywords : Extended Mind; Brain-Computer Interface; Embodiment; Parity Principle; Cognitive Artefacts. Mente estesa e brain-computer interface. Un approccio pluralista all’integrazione uomo-macchina Riassunto: Il presente articolo fa uso della Extended Mind Theory per indagare le Brain-Computer Interfaces, dimostrando che questo framework concettuale offre un’interpretazione ad ampio raggio della potenziale integrazione tra utente e computer. Dopo un’analisi preliminare degli argomenti della EMT di prima e seconda generazione e altri criteri pragmatici, presenterò la tecnologia delle BCIs, affrontando alcune questioni a essa collegate. Le BCIs possono estendere i nostri processi mentali e fino a che punto? Quali criteri della EMT dovrebbero essere applicati a questa tecnologia? Qual è il ruolo del corpo nel processo di integrazione utente-computer? Quali sono gli attuali limiti per completare l’estensione cognitiva e corporea da parte delle BCIs? In linea con questa discussione, suggerirò un approccio pluralistico alle BCIs che permetta un’applicazione specifica e appropriata dei vari modelli e paradigmi. Sosterrò inoltre la necessità di una maggiore attenzione all’integrazione tra corpo e strumento, principalmente per scopi clinici ma anche per applicazioni future che soddisfino le esigenze quotidiane. Parole chiave: Mente estesa; Brain-Computer Interface ; Incorporamento; Principio di Parità; Artefatti cognitivi. (shrink)

Enactivism maintains that the mind is not produced and localized inside the head but is distributed along and through brain-body-environment interactions. This idea of an intrinsic relationship between the agent and the world derives from the classical phenomenological investigations of the body (Merleau-Ponty in particular). This paper discusses similarities and differences between enactivism and Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenology, which is not usually considered as a paradigmatic example of the relationship between phenomenological investigations and enactivism (or 4E theories in general). After a (...) preliminary analysis of the three principal varieties of enactivism (sensorimotor, autopoietic and radical), I will present Sartre’s account of the body, addressing some key points that can be related to the current enactivist positions: perception-action unity, anti-representationalism, anti-internalism, organism-environment interaction, and sense-making cognition. Despite some basic similarities, enactivism and Sartre’s phenomenology move in different directions as to how these concepts are developed. Nevertheless, I will suggest that Sartre’s phenomenology is useful to the enactivist approaches to provide a broader and more complete analysis of consciousness and cognition, by developing a pluralist account of corporeality, enriching the investigation of the organism-environment coupling through an existentialist perspective, and reincluding the concept of subjectivity without the hypostatisation of an I-subject detached from body and world. (shrink)

Riassunto : Nonostante le difficoltà teoretiche ed epistemologiche nell’affrontare il fenomeno della coscienza, l’autore individua una metodologia pragmatica e sperimentalmente consistente, fondata sull’approccio neurocognitivo bidimensionale: per evitare di rimanere incagliati nel “problema complesso” della coscienza, è preferibile infatti concentrarsi sul “problema reale”, ovvero sui meccanismi empiricamente rilevabili, lasciando in secondo piano le caratteristiche epistemiche e fenomenologiche degli stati mentali coscienti. Dall’analisi della relazione gerarchica tra stato di veglia e contenuto di coscienza emerge un’interessante interpretazione che tenta di rendere ragione dell’unitarietà (...) della coscienza e, al contempo, della sua varietà fenomenica. Tuttavia, alcuni studi sul sonno, sulla fase REM e sugli incubi potrebbero mettere in discussione una certa versione forte di questa relazione gerarchica tra stati di coscienza. È inoltre importante chiedersi se una prospettiva bidimensionale sia sufficiente a definire esaustivamente le caratteristiche oggettive della coscienza o se sia auspicabile un diverso approccio tridimensionale. Keywords : Coscienza; Problema reale; Veglia; Consapevolezza; Fase REM A Pragmatic Approach to the “Real Problem” of Consciousness: Despite the theoretical and epistemological complexities involved in dealing with the phenomenon of consciousness, the author describes defines a pragmatic and experimental methodology, based on a two-dimensional neurocognitive approach. Indeed, in order to avoid the hard problem of consciousness, it would be better to focus on the real problem, i.e. on mechanisms that can be empirically observed, leaving out all of the epistemic and phenomenological features of conscious states. The idea of a hierarchical relationship between the level and the content of consciousness could give rise to an interpretation which justifies both the unity and, at the same time, the phenomenal variety of consciousness. However, studies on sleep, REM phase and nightmares might challenge at least the strong version of this hypothetical relationship between different features of consciousness. Furthermore, it is important to consider whether a two-dimensional perspective, rather than a three-dimensional one, would be sufficient to exhaustively define all the objective features of consciousness. Keywords : Consciousness; Real Problem; Wakefulness; Awareness; REM Phase. (shrink)

Human brain organoids (HCOs) are laboratory-grown biological entities that have been added to the catalog of living entities for just over a decade. How they are formed and may continue to develop for some time is not irrelevant, given their peculiarity, which is that they mimic the human brain with a high degree of similarity. Revolving around this key issue is the discussion on our target article (Zilio and Lavazza 2023), for which we are grateful to all the commentators.

In this paper I argue that Fricker’s influential account of testimonial injustice (hereafter ‘TI’) should be expanded to include cases of TI from mutually neutralising countervailing prejudices. In this kind of case, the hearer is given due credibility by the speaker. I describe a relevant case, defend it from objections, highlight how it differs from extant cases of due-credibility TI and describe its distinctive features. This case demonstrates how paying attention to the way multiple prejudices operate in concert leads to (...) expanding the repertoire of cases of TI and casts light on the harms of TI. (shrink)

Plato's political thought gave rise to a number of concepts and issues - such as the idea of a normative theory, the philosophical foundation of politics, the philosopher-kings, the standard of utopian theory - which have played a significant role on Western political and philosophical thought. -/- This volume aspires to bring out Plato's concept of efficacy in a normative theory. -/- By efficacy, the author means the way in which the theory conceives of its practical realization. If in the (...) Republic this issue is particularly problematic, in the Laws, instead, the claim of realizability becomes the main concern. -/- By defining the concept of efficacy and going through the main works of Plato, this conceptual and textual analysis aims to shed a new light on Plato's political thought, which is neither a utopia, nor a short term political program, but the first normative theory encompassing a theory of efficacy. (shrink)

O julgamento da ADPF 54 pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal teve como efeito a regulamentação do início da proteção constitucional à vida, silenciada na Constituição Federal de 1988 e na legislação ordinária. Todavia, a tramitação perante o Legislativo de Projeto de Lei prevendo a criminalização da interrupção da gravidez por diagnóstico de anencefalia fetal reacende as tensões acerca dos limites da atuação dos poderes Judiciário e Legislativo na concretização dos direitos fundamentais, as quais serão analisadas no presente trabalho à luz do (...) direito comparado, a fim de compreender como a regulamentação do direito à vida se estabeleceu em outros Estados Democráticos. (shrink)

The concept of feasibility has received a significant amount of scrutiny in recent years. Despite the diversity of accounts, all agree on the assumption that feasibility considerations have a practical function in guiding action. However, the two most important accounts (by Gilabert and Lawford-Smith, and by Wiens) seem to scarcely speak to this practical function because they provide a third-personal reconstruction of feasibility constraints. In this paper, I argue that, to understand feasibility constraints in a way that matters for guiding (...) action, we should switch from a third-personal to an agent-centered perspective. I show that relevant constraints can be Barriers, Limitations, Boundaries, and Rubber Walls to the extent that they concern nomic impossibilities (Barriers), resources (Limitations), agents’ abilities (Boundaries) or other people’s unwillingness (Rubber Walls). Understanding constraints through the lens of their qualitatively different natures opens the way for addressing the problem of how to respond to them. (shrink)

While some form of loss of control is often assumed to be a common feature of the diverse manifestations of addiction, it is far from clear how loss of control should be understood. In this paper, I put forward a concept of decrease in control in addiction that aims to fill this gap and thus provide a general framework for thinking about addictive behavior. The development of this account involves two main steps. First, I present a view of degrees of (...) control as the degree to which an agent would be responsive to potential or counterfactual sufficient reasons to do otherwise. Second, I sketch an account of the relevant control-undermining factors in addiction that is consonant with my proposed view of degrees of control. Being a high-level functional property, reasons-responsiveness is particularly well suited to frame an account of control-undermining factors that is doubly pluralistic: it encompasses the contribution of factors both internal and external to the agent, and it is consistent with various proposals as to the precise nature of the anomaly taking place in the psychology of addiction. (shrink)

In previous works, an ontology of properties for quantum mechanics has been proposed, according to which quantum systems are bundles of properties with no principle of individuality. The aim of the present article is to show that, since quasi-set theory is particularly suited for dealing with aggregates of items that do not belong to the traditional category of individual, it supplies an adequate meta-language to speak of the proposed ontology of properties and its structure.

The paper offers an interpretation of the thesis developed by Fichte in the Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre following “the philosophy one chooses depends on the man one is” as a deepening of symbolic practices and dispositions that philosophy shares with ordinary consciousness. To support this interpretation, the paper describes how Fichte defines individual character formation and how it relates to a historical determinate is presented through a quick excursion in the Nicolaischrift of 1801 (§2). Through a critical and synthetic (...) view of the process of initiation into philosophy, the paper shows how the choice of philosophy is a choice for philosophy (§ 3) and invests a certain “skill” that is produced in the pre-philosophical dimension (§ 4). Through discussion of the Fichtian concepts of “instinct of reason” and “new sensory,” how the choice for philosophy, interpretable as the production of a new habitus, the fichtean doctrine of Science realizes itself fully as ‘critique’ (§ 5). (shrink)

We propose a new interpretation of the equation E=mc² in special relativity by generalizing ideas of ontological emergence to fundamental physics. This allows us to propose that mass, as a property, can be considered to emerge from energy, using a well-known definition of weak ontological emergence. Einstein’s famous equation gains in this way a clearer philosophical interpretation, one that avoids the problems of previous attempts, and is fully consistent with the kinematic properties of special relativity, while yielding fresh insights concerning (...) the nature of mass. (shrink)

A restrictive view of self-control identifies exercises of self-control with synchronic intrapsychic processes, and pictures diachronic and externally-scaffolded strategies not as proper instances of self-control, but as clever ways of avoiding the need to exercise that ability. In turn, defenders of an inclusive view of self-control typically argue that we should construe self-control as more than effortful inhibition, and that, on grounds of functional equivalence, all these diverse strategies might be properly described as instances of self-control. In this paper, I (...) take a fresh look at this debate by focusing on cases of addiction. I argue that addicted agents face a paradigmatic sort of self-control challenge, which makes addiction an important test case for theories of self-control. And I discuss evidence that highlights both the unreliability of synchronic intrapsychic strategies and the crucial role that is played by diachronic and externally-scaffolded strategies in successful attempts at achieving abstinence by addicted individuals. Abstaining addicts are a paradigmatic case of agents who successfully exercise self-control, and they mostly do so by relying on diachronic and externally-scaffolded strategies. This, I argue, lends further support to an inclusive view of self-control. (shrink)

We discuss the mathematical structures that underlie quantum probabilities. More specifically, we explore possible connections between logic, geometry and probability theory. We propose an interpretation that generalizes the method developed by R. T. Cox to the quantum logical approach to physical theories. We stress the relevance of developing a geometrical interpretation of quantum mechanics.

The first National Health Service (NHS) was introduced in the United Kingdom providing free universal health care (UHC) at the point of use. Within decades, increasing European countries adopted the same intervention to improve the health of citizens on the entire life span. Today, several reasons put at risk (1) empirically, the sustainability and fairness of these systems, (2) theoretically, the same consistency of solidarity, as vulnerable patients struggle most to receive essential care. Preserving solidarity from the pressure of modern (...) medicine and society needs to identify a fair and sustainable type of coverage at the same time. This paper aims (1) to describe the short circuit of solidarity in European NHSs; (2) to discuss alternative versions of UHC and support redistributive neo-universalism; (3) to promote the role of medical humanities in implementing this solution. (shrink)

Science is the most powerful tool of the twentieth century, but is its influence properly harnessed? This book examines the often-difficult relationship between scientists and those who govern them. A distinguished group of specialists looks at the history of this relationship, where it stands today, and what needs to be done to ensure that science is used in the future for the greatest good of the greatest number.

John S. Bell is known, among other things, for the introduction of the notion of beable. The development of this notion inspired the so-called primitive ontology (PO) approach to the foundations of quantum mechanics, proposed for the first time by Detlef Dürr, Sheldon Goldstein and Nino Zanghì in 1992. It is not very well known, however, that the Bell theory of beables had an early formulation, in which Bell curiously adopts some Bohr-reminiscent insights to attack exactly the standard Copenhagen version (...) of quantum mechanics. Here I reconstruct the two stages of the Bell theory of beables, showing that the first stage is in fact unable to adequately confront the foundational problem it was designed to address. Only the second stage of the Bell theory could represent a motivation for the PO approach: in this respect, it may be of some interest to compare the two-stage reconstruction of the Bell theory with recent analyses of the PO approach in terms of beables. I dedicate this paper to the dear memory of Detlef Dürr, a leading figure of the international community of the foundations of physics and a lovely man. He will be long remembered for his inspiring contributions: it was a privilege to enjoy his company and his doctrine. (shrink)

Il presente lavoro si propone di colmare una lacuna negli studi hegeliani analizzando in dettaglio il concetto e la teoria della sensazione di Hegel. Esso si prefigge, da un lato, di restituire il contesto sistematico entro cui Hegel discute tale concetto, fornendo un’interpretazione dei paragrafi dell’Enciclopedia ad esso dedicati; dall’altro, esso mira a fornire una ricostruzione razionale della teoria hegeliana della sensazione a partire dalla questione teorica dell’accesso epistemico del pensiero al mondo. Tale ricostruzione ruota attorno al tentativo hegeliano di (...) conciliare e rendere compatibili all’interno del proprio sistema l’istanza di un riferimento passivo a un mondo esterno e una concezione autoreferenziale del pensiero. (shrink)