This paper considers the medium of videogames from a goodmanian standpoint. After some preliminary clarifications and definitions, I examine the ontological status of videogames. Against several existing accounts, I hold that what grounds their identity qua work types is code. The rest of the paper is dedicated to the epistemology of videogaming. Drawing on Nelson Goodman and Catherine Elgin's works, I suggest that the best model to defend videogame cognitivism appeals to the notion of understanding.

According to David Chalmers, the virtual entities found in Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR) environments instantiate virtual properties of a specific kind. It has recently been objected that such a view (i) can’t extend to all types of properties; (ii) leads to a proliferation of property-types; (iii) implausibly ascribes massive errors to VR and AR users; and (iv) faces an analogue of Jackson’s “many-property problem”. My first objective here is to show that advocates of virtual properties can deal (...) with each of these objections. The other goal of this paper is to examine the consequences of Chalmers’ theory in the particular case of AR. If we countenance virtual properties, AR highlights that non-virtual objects can possess both non-virtual and virtual properties. With AR, it also appears that a same non-virtual object can have different and even incompatible properties across augmented environments. Lastly, considering properties in light of AR highlights the risk of an “augmented solipsism”, and calls forth interesting questions about the persistence conditions of non-virtual objects in AR environments. (shrink)

David Chalmers a récemment soutenu que la réalité virtuelle est réelle, plutôt que fictionnelle. Dans cet article, j’examine les implications ontologiques de ce « réalisme virtuel ». Comme je le suggère, cette position s’associe naturellement à une ontologie algorithmique, qui identifie les objets virtuels à des structures de données comprises de manière fonctionnelle. Je présente ensuite plusieurs objections à cette ontologie algorithmique. Tant que celles-ci ne sont pas réglées, la question de l’identité des mondes et des objets virtuels reste encore (...) en suspens. (shrink)

It is a common experience to be surprised by an artwork. In this paper, I examine how and why this obvious fact matters for philosophical aesthetics. Following recent works in psychology and philosophers such as Davidson or Scheffler, we will see that surprise qualifies as an emotion of a special kind, essentially “cognitive” or “epistemic” in its nature and functioning. After some preliminary considerations, I wish to hold two general claims: the first one will be that surprise is somehow related (...) to aesthetic appreciation, because it is often the ground to judge of a work’s value. The second point will be that a functional analysis of surprise provides support for cognitivist accounts of aesthetics. If this picture is right, surprise would generally play an important part in aesthetic experience and should also be seen as a paradigm to study the cognitive powers of art. (shrink)

Résumé David Chalmers maintient que la réalité virtuelle est une véritable réalité. Une version de ce « réalisme virtuel » affirme que les entités virtuelles dépendent ontologiquement d'entités numériques réelles. Nous explorons ici cette suggestion, en proposant un nouveau modèle pour décrire la dépendance du virtuel à l’égard du numérique. En nous appuyant sur la théorie de la constitution de Lynne Rudder Baker, nous défendons que les objets virtuels sont constitués par des objets numériques, lorsque ceux-ci se trouvent dans certaines (...) circonstances favorables. Nous explorons les motivations et les implications de cette approche, que nous considérons comme une forme prometteuse de réalisme virtuel. (shrink)

This paper advocates a new reading of Nelson Goodman’s new riddle of induction. According to Ian Hacking, this famous problem conveys a “pure nominalism”, as it grounds Goodman’s denial regarding the existence of natural kinds. While this interpretation is somewhat convincing, it suffers the major flaw of not corresponding to what Goodman himself understood by “nominalism”. Nominalism, in a goodmanian sense, is indeed primarily a technical demand, which stems from the so-called “calculus of individuals”. I argue that this mereological definition (...) of nominalism allows to understand the new riddle of induction afresh. As a result, Goodman’s riddle is “hyper-nominalist”, i.e., nominalist in a distinct and stronger sense than what Hacking suggested. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Nelson Goodman’s pluriworldism, understood as the claim that there exists a plurality of actual worlds. This proposal has generally been quickly dismissed in the philosophical literature. I argue that we ought to take it more seriously. As I show, many of the prima facie objections to pluriworldism may receive straightforward answers. I also examine in detail Goodman’s argument for the conclusion that there are many worlds and attempt to show how it might be supported. Eventually, (...) I discuss some underexplored challenges to pluriworldism. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to examine and defend videogame cognitivism (VC). According to VC, videogames can be a source of cognitive successes (such as true beliefs, knowledge or understanding) for their players. While the possibility of videogame-based learning has been an extensive topic of discussion in the last decades, the epistemological underpinnings of these debates often remain unclear. I propose that VC is a domain- specific brand of aesthetic cognitivism, which should be carefully distinguished from other views that (...) also insist on the cognitive or educational potential of videogames. After these clarifications, I discuss and assess different broad strategies to motivate VC: propositionalism, experientialism, and neocognitivism. These map the different ways in which videogames can prove epistemically valuable, showing them to be, respectively, sources of propositional knowledge, experiential knowledge, and understanding. I eventually argue that neocognitivism is a particularly promising and yet underexplored way to defend VC. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Peter Schulte’s “Grounding Nominalism” (Schulte, 2018), understood as the claim that first-order properties and relations are grounded in the concrete particulars which instantiate them. While Schulte offered reasons to think that this view is consistent, along with answers to a number of objections, a more straightforward argument for GN is still needed. I take on this task here, by discussing and defending what I call the “argument from abstraction”. The latter, I suggest, offers more grounds (...) to Grounding Nominalism. (shrink)

Dans cet article, je propose d’examiner un aspect relativement méconnu de la philosophie de l’art de Nelson Goodman, à savoir sa théorie de la variation, succinctement exposée dans Reconceptions en philosophie (Goodman & Elgin, 1988). Si la variation est un procédé courant dans les arts, son fonctionnement reste difficile à cerner. Goodman défend qu’il s’agit d’une opération sémiotique et référentielle complexe : la variation implique l’exemplification de caractéristiques partagées et constrastées, ainsi qu’une référence de la variation au thème via ces (...) caractéristiques exemplifiées. Comme je le défends ici, cette théorie de la variation peut s’appliquer de manière fructueuse au jeu vidéo. La variation y est non seulement plus fréquente et saillante que dans d’autres formes artistiques, mais fournit même une clé de compréhension du medium vidéoludique. Elle préside à la création des jeux vidéo, à leur fonctionnement, à l’activité ludique, et finalement à la valeur épistémique et hédonique du jeu. Le jeu vidéo peut donc être foncièrement compris comme un art de la variation, où il s’agit essentiellement d’explorer et d’épuiser des variations autour d’un même thème. (shrink)

L’interactivité est communément perçue comme la marque caractéristique des technologies digitales et, par extension, de différentes formes de fictions, de médias ou d’œuvres numériques – de la littérature hypertextuelle et des jeux vidéo au net art. On peut toutefois s’interroger sur le sens précis qu’il convient de donner à cette notion, ainsi que sur les promesses auxquelles elle est souvent associée. À défaut de pouvoir cerner un concept unique et maxi-englobant d’interactivité, nous suggérons qu’il est plus profitable de tenter d’identifier (...) des types et des degrés d’interactivité. Nous tentons de montrer pourquoi cette théorie pluraliste et gradualiste est plus attrayante que d’autres approches développées dans la littérature récente. Nous mettons enfin cette conception à l’épreuve du jeu vidéo, en montrant qu’elle permet de réévaluer le rôle que joue l’interactivité dans ce médium, mais qu’elle met aussi au jour les limitations inhérentes des fictions interactives que l’on y trouve. (shrink)

Mereological Nominalism, as traditionally understood, states that properties are mereological wholes and that instantiation is mereological. Thus defined, this view faces a number of well-known issues, which make it virtually untenable. Recently, Effingham :160–185, 2020) has offered an alternative account of Mereological Nominalism, which intends to avoid these problems by accepting while rejecting. In this paper, we argue that this theory is not viable for two main reasons. First, it faces a threat of circularity. Second, the various non-mereological accounts of (...) instantiation envisioned by Effingham in order to replace seem inconsistent with. (shrink)

1 La ressemblance comme problème philosophique transversal Personne ne nierait que les chats se ressemblent sous un grand nombre de rapports, ni ne douterait du fait qu’ils ressemblent plus aux chiens qu’aux bactéries ou aux matchs de tennis. En réalité, il semble légitime de croire que c’est en vertu de cette similarité d’ensemble que nous pouvons dire que certains individus appartiennent à une même espèce, qu’ils sont tous des chats. Ces intuitions partagées suggèrent que la notion de resse...

One of the twentieth century’s most brilliant and unconventional thinkers, Alexandre Kojève was a Russian émigré to France whose lectures on Hegel in the 1930s galvanized a generation of French intellectuals. Although Kojève wrote a great deal, he published very little in his lifetime, and so the ongoing rediscovery of his work continues to present new challenges to philosophy and political theory. Written in 1931 but left unfinished, Atheism is an erudite and open-ended exploration of profound questions of estrangement, (...) death, suicide, and the infinite that demonstrates the range and the provocative power of Kojève’s thought. Ranging across Heidegger, Buddhism, Christianity, German idealism, Russian literature, and mathematics, Kojève advances a novel argument about freedom and authority. He investigates the possibility that there is not any vantage point or source of authority—including philosophy, science, or God—that is outside or beyond politics and the world as we experience it. The question becomes whether atheism—or theism—is even a meaningful position since both affirmation and denial of God’s existence imply a knowledge that seems clearly outside our capacities. Masterfully translated by Jeff Love, this book offers a striking new perspective on Kojève’s work and its implications for theism, atheism, politics, and freedom. (shrink)

Depersonalization consists in a deep modification of the way things appear to a subject, leading him to feel estranged from his body, his actions, his thoughts, and his mind, and even from himself. Even though, when it was discovered at the end of the 19th century, this psychiatric condition was widely used to probe certain aspects of bodily awareness, and more specifically the sense of bodily ownership (SBO), it has been strangely neglected in contemporary debates. In this chapter, I argue (...) that because of three specific features, depersonalization raises some important challenges for current theories of the SBO. The first feature — call it “generality” — is that depersonalization does not only affect the sense of bodily ownership but also, typically, the sense of ``mental ownership’’ (SMO), the sense of agency or ``action ownership’’ (SOA), and the subject’s core sense of herself (CSS), that is, her awareness of herself as an I. The second feature is that except for the symptoms of depersonalization, depersonalized patients are hard to distinguish, psychologically, from normal subjects. This makes it hard to find psychological features that might explain their condition. The last feature, call it “fundamentality” is that the psychological features that do seem abnormal among depersonalized patients seem more likely to be explained by depersonalization than to explain it. These three features raise three challenges — the centrality challenge, the dissociation challenge, and the grounding challenge. Taken together, I will argue, these challenges suggest that the SBO depends on a form of phenomenal “mineness” that would mark my mental states as mine and that cannot be accounted for in sensorimotor, cognitive, or even affective terms. A phenomenal mineness that indeed seems to be psychologically primitive, and only accountable in neurophysiological terms. (shrink)

(2013). Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 291-314. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.625117.

This paper offers an overview of the prospects and ethics of using AI to achieve human enhancement, and more broadly what we call intellectual augmentation (IA). After explaining the central notions of human enhancement, IA, and AI, we discuss the state of the art in terms of the main technologies for IA, with or without brain-computer interfaces. Given this picture, we discuss potential ethical problems, namely inadequate performance, safety, coercion and manipulation, privacy, cognitive liberty, authenticity, and fairness in more detail. (...) We conclude that while there are very significant technical hurdles to real human enhancement through AI, and significant ethical problems, there are also significant benefits that may realistically be achieved in ways that are consonant with a rights-based ethics as well. We also highlight the specific concerns that apply particularly to applications of AI for "sheer" IA (more realistic in the near term), and to enhancement applications, respectively. (shrink)

This is a commentary on Andrea Lavazza and Murilo Vilaça's article "Human Extinction and AI: What We Can Learn from the Ultimate Threat" (Lavazza & Vilaça, 2024). I discuss the potential concern that their proposal to create artificial successors to "insure" against the tragedy of human extinction might mean being too quick to accept that catastrophic prospect as inevitable, rather than single-mindedly focusing on avoiding it. I also consider the question of the value that we might reasonably assign to such (...) a future of artificial successors under the assumption that they do not enjoy phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)

According to what we will call subjectivity theories of consciousness, there is a constitutive connection between phenomenal consciousness and subjectivity: there is something it is like for a subject to have mental state M only if M is characterized by a certain mine-ness or for-me-ness. Such theories appear to face certain psychopathological counterexamples: patients appear to report conscious experiences that lack this subjective element. A subsidiary goal of this chapter is to articulate with greater precision both subjectivity theories and the (...) psychopathological challenge they face. The chapter’s central goal is to present two new approaches to defending subjectivity theories in the face of this challenge. What distinguishes these two approaches is that they go to great lengths to interpret patients’ reports at face value – greater length, at any rate, than more widespread approaches in the extant literature. (shrink)

Too many somersaults -- The strange creature that I am -- Giving meaning to reality -- The sincerity of true kindness -- Embracing our condition -- Drawing strength from our weakness -- Pity anesthetizes -- The other's gaze -- The joy of being alive -- They talked and analyzed -- Culture shock -- Conditional happiness -- A man of God -- A craving for learning -- Genuine friends -- Marginal.

Recueil des commentaires de Michel Alexandre sur la "Critique de la raison pure" d'après des notes de cours, comme la première édition de 1961. Cependant, on y a ajouté un quatrième chapitre, intitulé "L'ordre", avec des notes sur les deux dernières critiques, "Critique de la raison pratique" et "Critique du jugement". L'ensemble couvre les vingt dernières années d'enseignement de M. Alexandre (1932-1952), dont le commentaire relève du genre "Auslegung" (qu'on pourrait traduire par "exposition") comme celui que firent de (...) Kant un Hegel ou un Heidegger, et qui se caractérise par une certaine manière de questionner les textes. Ce volume est donc aussi un hommage rendu à un maître d'u. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage de philosophie et de sagesse est inséparable de la personnalité de l’auteur. Alexandre Jollien, gravement handicapé à sa naissance, a passé les dix-sept premières années de sa vie dans une institution spécialisée. Grâce à la détermination d’un de ses éducateurs, et après avoir été initié à l’informatique, il a pu entreprendre des études approfondies, notamment en philosophie. Dans un ouvrage publié au Seuil en 2002, il exprimait le point de vue qu’il s’est forgé sur la vie, la (...) souffrance, l’amitié, le rapport au corps que peut entretenir un handicapé. Ce petit livre, Le métier d’homme, a été un best-seller tandis que son auteur, invité par tous les médias, devenait une figure emblématique du handicap assumé et vaincu. Aujourd’hui, Alexandre Jollien aspire très légitimement à être perçu comme philosophe à part entière. Même s’il se réfère encore à l’incroyable et magnifique combat qu’a été sa vie jusqu’à la victoire sur le handicap, il refuse d’être « le philosophe du handicap » ou « le handicapé devenu philosophe ». Il s’oppose donc à ce qu’on fasse mention de son handicap dans les textes promotionnels quels qu’ils soient. Il a raison. Son nouveau livre justifie – et mérite – cette perception et ce respect. Dans ce texte, approfondi et médité, Alexandre Jollien, tout en revenant sur son aventure personnelle, s’exprime en philosophe. Il témoigne, pour l’avoir expérimenté, de l’importance salvatrice de la philosophie. (shrink)

The advent of the Web is one of the defining technological events of the twentieth century, yet its impact on the fundamental questions of philosophy has not yet been explored, much less systematized. The Web, as today implemented on the foundations of the Internet, is broadly construed as the space of all items of interest identified by URIs. Originally a space of linked hypertext documents, today the Web is rapidly evolving as a universal platform for data and computation. Even swifter (...) is the Web‐driven transformation of many previously unquestioned philosophical concepts of privacy, belief, intelligence, cognition, and even embodiment in surprising ways. The ensuing essays in this collection hope to explore the philosophical foundation of the World Wide Web and open the debate on whether or not the changes caused by the Web to technology and society warrant the creation of a philosophy of the Web. (shrink)

Cette préface présente le contexte politique et culturel du fameux discours de Helmholtz prononcé à Heidelberg le 22 novembre 1862, où il défend une certaine idée de l’université et des relations entre les différentes disciplines qu’elle enseigne. L’idée de pluridisciplinarité, tant invoquée aujourd’hui, est au cœur de son propos, ainsi que celle d’une conciliation possible entre philosophie et sciences de la nature, mais en partant du point de vue de ces dernières.

This commentary further explores some of the ethical issues raised by Prof. Peter Singer in his Lanson Lecture “Pandemic Ethics: Five Lessons”. In the first part, I distinguish a prioritarian approach to the allocation of scarce medical resources, from the utilitarian one advocated by Singer. I suggest that the prioritarian view better matches common intuitions about fair distribution, even though it likely needs to be balanced with other principles if it is to have plausibility in contexts like vaccine allocation. In (...) the second part of the commentary, I take a global perspective (as Singer himself does regarding the ethics of lockdowns), and highlight the controversial implications of adopting a fully cosmopolitan ethical outlook when deciding how to distribute Covid-19 vaccines. I also raise justice-related concerns about Singer’s proposal to use well-being as a single metric for evaluating public health policies. (shrink)

Ilan Gur-Ze'ev and Education: Pedagogies of Transformation and Peace critically analyses and introduces the main ideas of Ilan Gur-Ze'ev, reflecting on their continuing theoretical and practical relevance for the field of education. This book offers an accessible, higher-level critical discussion on the thought of Ilan Gur-Ze'ev with an impressive breadth and contemporary focus. The book focuses on Gur-Ze'ev's 'counter-pedagogy' project, which brought him much attention and attempts to establish an alternative and non-dogmatic form of education. Gur Ze'ev's views go against (...) 'critical pedagogy' and 'neoliberalism', because while the former advocates achieving an utopia in which there is no oppression, the later defends the idea that 'wants and desires' need to be satisfied through a process of 'marketisation'. This book brings into notice Gur-Ze'ev's concepts of 'counter-education' and 'diasporic education' which seeks to pursue the truth in everyday life, rather than achieving a utopian goal, or the Promised Land. This unique and up-to-date monograph will be of great interest for researchers, academics and postgraduate students in the fields of philosophy of education, theory of education, peace education, Jewish education, neoliberalism, and sociology of education. (shrink)

Computational reproducibility possesses its own dynamics and narratives of crisis. Alongside the difficulties of computing as an ubiquitous yet complex scientific activity, computational reproducibility suffers from a naive expectancy of total reproducibility and a moral imperative to embrace the principles of free software as a non-negotiable epistemic virtue. We argue that the epistemic issues at stake in actual practices of computational reproducibility are best unveiled by focusing on software as a pivotal concept, one that is surprisingly often overlooked in accounts (...) of reproducibility issues. Software is not only about designing and coding but also about maintaining, supporting, distributing, licensing, and governance; it is not only about developers but also about users. We focus on openness debates among computational chemists involved in molecular modeling software packages as empirical grounding for our argument. We then identify and analyse four epistemic characteristics as key to the role of software in computational reproducibility. (shrink)

John Rawls was what we might call a “frenemy” to Stanley Cavell. Time and again, Cavell states his admiration for Rawls's political philosophy but criticizes it for two reasons. First, he believes that Rawls too hastily dismisses a perfectionist tradition that is essential for a flourishing liberal democracy. Second, he attacks certain aspects of Rawls's theory of justice as moralistic and legalistic. The first half of this article examines Cavell's critique of Rawls and argues that the two authors are more (...) closely aligned than suspected. It begins by reconstructing Cavell's critique of Rawls, and using archival materials from Harvard University, presents for the first time Rawls's interpretation of this critique. The second half of the article highlights perfectionist themes in Rawls's A Theory of Justice. The contribution of this article is to reevaluate the relationship between two of the most important moral philosophers of the twentieth century and also to provide a more expansive theory of liberalism that incorporates the psychological depth, moral subtlety and political hopefulness of moral perfectionism. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: A Tale of Two Philosophies: URIs between Proper Names and REST; From References to Referentialization; and Toward Ontological Politics.

Using emotional film clips is one of the most popular and effective methods of emotion elicitation. The main goal of the present study was to develop and test the effectiveness of a new and comprehensive set of emotional film excerpts. Fifty film experts were asked to remember specific film scenes that elicited fear, anger, sadness, disgust, amusement, tenderness, as well as emotionally neutral scenes. For each emotion, the 10 most frequently mentioned scenes were selected and cut into film clips. Next, (...) 364 participants viewed the film clips in individual laboratory sessions and rated each film on multiple dimensions. Results showed that the film clips were effective with regard to several criteria such as emotional discreteness, arousal, positive and negative affect. Finally, ranking scores were computed for 24 classification criteria: Subjective arousal, positive and negative affect (derived from the PANAS; Watson & Tellegen, 1988), a positive and a negative affect scores derived from the Differential Emotions Scale (DES; Izard et al., 1974), six emotional discreteness scores (for anger, disgust, sadness, fear, amusement and tenderness), and 15 “mixed feelings” scores assessing the effectiveness of each film excerpt to produce blends of specific emotions. In addition, a number of emotionally neutral film clips were also validated. The database and editing instructions to construct the film clips have been made freely available in a website. (shrink)