Anti-materialist thought experiments as, e.g., zombie arguments, have posed some of the most vexing problems for materialist accounts of phenomenal consciousness. I doubt, however, that arguments of this kind can refute the core thesis of materialism. Although I do not question that there is something very special about an adequate explanation of phenomenal consciousness, and although I accept the epistemic irreducibility of phenomenal consciousness, I deny that modal arguments reach far enough to establish essentialism about consciousness. I will draw upon (...) a relativistic conception of modal space and suggest to strictly separate between varieties of metaphysical possibility - depending on which world is considered as actual, and depending on accessibility relations. It is shown that the modal argument cannot endanger the reductive explanation of the mind-brain relation if one distinguishes carefully between possibility according to primary intensions and possibility according to secondary intensions . Modal arguments are strong enough to make an epistemological point but not an ontological one. (shrink)

In Willensfreiheit Geert Keil seeks a better explanation of freedom of the will by investigating the connections between free will and determinism vs. indeterminism. Keil thinks that there is no freedom of the will without declaring determinism untrue. So, on the one hand freedom of the will seems to require indeterminism, but on the other hand, freely willed choices and decisions must be different from pure chance. The key, Keil thinks, is global indeterminism without local indeterminism — I doubt this.

The article is a reply to three reviews of my book Willensfreiheit (Berlin/New York 2007) which were published in a previous issue of this journal. In the book, I develop a libertarian account of free will that invokes neither uncaused events nor mind-body dualism nor agent causality. Against Bettina Walde’s criticism, I argue that a well-balanced libertarianism can evade the luck objection and that it should not be portrayed as positing tiny causal gaps in an otherwise deterministic world. (...) Against Marcus Willaschek’s Moorean compatibilism, I argue that our ordinary notion of agency commits us to genuine two-way abilities, i. e. to abilities to do otherwise given the same past and laws of nature. Against Christoph Jäger’s defence of van Inwagen’s consequence argument, I insist that this argument for incompati-bilism is seriously flawed and that libertarians are well-advised not to base their position upon it. (shrink)

The article is a reply to three reviews of my book Willensfreiheit which were published in a previous issue of this journal. In the book, I develop a libertarian account of free will that invokes neither uncaused events nor mind-body dualism nor agent causality. Against Bettina Walde′s criticism, I argue that a well-balanced libertarianism can evade the luck objection and that it should not be portrayed as positing tiny causal gaps in an otherwise deterministic world. Against Marcus Willaschek′s (...) Moorean compatibilism, I argue that our ordinary notion of agency commits us to genuine two-way abilities, i. e. to abilities to do otherwise given the same past and laws of nature. Against Christoph Jäger′s defence of van Inwagen′s consequence argument, I insist that this argument for incompatibilism is seriously flawed and that libertarians are well-advised not to base their position upon it. (shrink)

The problem of deviant causation has been a serious obstacle for causal theories of action. We suggest that attending to the problem of deviant causation reveals two related problems for causal theories. First, it threatens the reductive ambitions of causal theories of intentional action. Second, it suggests that such a theory fails to account for how the agent herself is guided by her reasons. Focusing on the second of these, we argue that the problem of guidance turns out to be (...) related to a number of other issues in the literature on action explanation, and that it is much more general: it threatens not only causal theories but any theory of action. Finally, we suggest that a certain version of the view that acting has a constitutive or formal aim can overcome this problem. (shrink)

Philosophe et penseur du politique, intellectuel marxiste et militant communiste, enseignant, directeur de collection... : à travers le rayonnement de son oeuvre et de sa personne, Louis Althusser a renouvelé la théorie politique et la philosophie de l'histoire, de Machiavel à Marx. Parmi ses contemporains, Michel Foucault exhorte : " Ouvrez les livres d'Althusser! ", Jacques Derrida évoque " la force rayonnante et provocante de sa pensée ", Gilles Deleuze salue l'" Althusser's Band ", et pour Roland Barthes, " le (...) seul modèle acceptable de la science est celui mis au jour par les études d'Althusser sur Marx ". Aliocha Wald Lasowski converse avec vingt écrivains et philosophes qui ont lu, rencontré, parfois travaillé avec Althusser, quand ils n'ont pas fait partie de ses proches. Où l'on mesure à quel point la pensée d'Althusser demeure d'une actualité brûlante. (shrink)

Although lie detection procedures have been fundamentally criticized since their inception at the beginning of the 20th century, they are still in use around the world. In addition, they have created some remarkable appeal in the context of counterterrorism policies. Thereby, the links between science and fiction in this topic are quite tight and by no means arbitrary: In the progressive narrative of the lie detection devices, there is a promise of changing society for the better, which is entangled in (...) a fictional narrative provided by many cinematic and literary examples. By drawing on the concept of “diegetic technologies” formulated by David Kirby, we want to highlight the role of science fictional narratives in the historical development and current application of lie detection procedures. We therefore aim to use this conceptual frame to analyze the role of prevention-oriented mind reading procedures, which are developed for or already used in the “war on terror” with reference to their fictional predecessors. One virulent factor has to be highlighted in this context: The fictional engagement with possible new lie detection practices is in itself creating a legitimating ground for future security technologies. (shrink)

'All men, everywhere, have asked the same questions: Whence we come, what kind of thing we are, and at least some intimation of what may become of us...' So begins Nobel Prize-winning scientist George Wald's 1970 Massey Lectures, now in print for the first time ever. Where did we come from, who are we, and what is to become of us--these questions have never been more urgent. Then, as now, the world is facing major political and social upheaval, from overpopulation (...) to nuclear warfare to environmental degradation and the uses and abuses of technology. Using scientific fact as metaphor, Wald meditates on our place, and role, on Earth and in the universe. He urges us to therefore choose life - to invest in our capabilities as human beings, to heed the warnings of our own self-destruction, and above all to honour our humanity. (shrink)

Gibt es einen spezifisch "linken" Kitsch in Abgrenzung zu politisch "rechtem"? Dieser vernachlässigten, für das Verständnis "linken Denkens" seit der Französischen Revolution aber wichtigen Frage gehen die Beiträge dieses Bandes nach.0Gezeigt wird, dass "linkes" Denken aus ganz anderen Gründen kitschanfällig ist als sein "rechtes" Pendant, auch wenn die Pathosformeln sich mitunter frappierend ähneln. Denn während rechte Ideologien den Veränderungsdruck der Moderne kompensieren, streben linke eher danach, ihn nach dem Motto "Mehr desselben" zu überbieten. Dieses Phänomen »linker Kitsch± nimmt der Band (...) in historischer und theoretischer Hinsicht anhand von sprachlichen, bildlichen und filmischen Beispielen in den Blick, sodass es in seinem konstitutiv transmedialen Charakter zur Geltung kommt. (shrink)

Beauchamp and Childress’ definition of autonomous decision‐making includes the conditions of intentionality, understanding, and non‐control. In genetics, however, a relational conception of autonomy has been increasingly recognized. This article aims to empirically assess aspects of social influence in genetic testing decision‐making and to connect these with principlist and relational theories of autonomy. We interviewed 18 adult genetic counsellees without capacity issues considering predictive genetic testing for cancer predisposition for themselves and two counselling physicians in Switzerland. We conducted a qualitative analysis, (...) building on a grounded theory study about predictive genetic testing decision‐making. We found that some participants agreed to predictive genetic testing predominantly because relatives wanted them to do it, with some even acting contrary to their own convictions. Others, in contrast, based their decision on purely individualistic reasons but expressed difficulties in explaining their decision to their social environment. Healthcare professionals had a critical influence on decision‐making in many cases without being manipulative, as perceived by counsellees. Still, cases of coercion and social pressure occurred within social relationships. In conclusion, predictive genetic testing decision‐making includes relational and individualistic aspects, and both are compatible with autonomous decision‐making. While the principlist and relational notions of autonomy compete on a theoretical level, they are two sides of the same coin when used as analytical lenses for genetic testing decision‐making. Social acceptance of refusal of testing should be improved to mitigate social pressure. Individuals should be encouraged to decide for themselves how much their social environment influences their decision regarding predictive genetic testing. (shrink)

Recent commentaries on the relation between Deleuze and Foucault often operate with an implicit idea of compatibility or consistency that postulates systematic harmony as the decisive criterion for the affinity between them. Accordingly, the predominant question is whether Deleuze and Foucault are “true” friends philosophically and politically. Although the assessments differ, they share a likewise implicit notion of the friend as familiar that excludes any form of ambivalence in amicable relations and consequently cannot fully account for the dynamics and variability (...) of the relation between Deleuze and Foucault. This article tries to address this problem by suspending the notion of the friend-as-familiar, effectively posing the question of what concept of friendship we would have if the ambivalent relation between Deleuze and Foucault would be the model. For this, the reconstruction begins with the early encounters and follows their relationship until the supposed split in the context of the desire-pleasure-debate. What becomes apparent is the dialogical structure of the philosophical friendship between Deleuze and Foucault that entails convergences as well as divergences, which will eventually be related to their own and fundamentally different concepts of friendship. Deleuze and Foucault, as will be argued, are neither “vrais amis” nor “faux amis” but simply amis that practised a form of philosophical friendship, lasting for more than 15 years. (shrink)

The aim of this book is to understand and critically appraise science-based transgression dynamics in their whole complexity. It includes contributions from experts with different disciplinary backgrounds, such as philosophy, history and sociology. Thus, it is in itself an example of boundary transgression. Scientific disciplines and their objects have tended to be seen as permanent and distinct. However, science is better conceived as an activity that constantly surpasses, erases and rebuilds all kinds of boundaries, either disciplinary, socio-ethical or ecological. This (...) transgressive capacity, a characteristic trait of science and its applications, defines us as "knowledge societies." However, scientific and technological developments are also sources of serious environmental and social concerns. Contents Disciplinary Transgression of Boundaries - Extra-Disciplinary Transgression of Boundaries - Radical Transgression of Boundaries Target Groups Scientists and students of philosophy, sociology, history of science, and interdisciplinary fields such as technology assessment, sustainable development, science and technology studies - Practitioners in research management Editors Bettina-Johanna Krings (MA in sociology, political science and anthropology; PhD in sociology) is head of the research department "Knowledge Society and Knowledge Policy" at the Institute for Technology Assessment and Systems Analysis (ITAS) at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT). Hannot Rodríguez (PhD in philosophy) is Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy of the University of the Basque Country UPV/EHU. Anna Schleisiek (Dipl.-Soz.) is doing research on the role of economic principles in the scientific practice of research teams for her PhD project in sociology. <. (shrink)

Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral - Leipzig) under the title: Seinsvergessenheit im Narrativismus. Zur Bedeutung sprachlicher Tiefenstrukturen im Geschichtsdenken von...

Pourquoi les philosophes pleurent-ils à l'écoute de la musique?

​Für die Wahrnehmung von Politik und die Beteiligung am politischen Leben einer Gesellschaft ist politisches Wissen notwendig. Der Band bündelt aktuelle Studien zur Bedeutung, zur Messung sowie zu den Bestimmungsfaktoren und Konsequenzen des politischen Wissens. Die Beiträge geben erste Antworten auf drängende Fragen und weisen auf Lücken in der Forschung zum politischen Wissen in Deutschland hin.

Is Plato’s philosophy still relevant for current issues in politics and political science? In order to answer this question, the contributions to this volume endeavour to re-read the Platonic dialogues and to interpret them in terms of textual hermeneutics on the one hand. On the other hand, they refer to Plato from a systematic point of view and apply his philosophy, in particular the method of Socratic dialogue, to discussions on contemporary political issues. The volume is dedicated to Barbara Zehnpfennig, (...) whose works aim at making Socratic–Platonic philosophy fruitful for the present on the basis of a new interpretation of Plato’s philosophy. With contributions by Anke Adamik, Sarah Al-Taher, Viktoria Bachmann, Philip Breuer, Johanna Falk-Seifert, Bettina Fröhlich, Benjamin A. Hahn, Hendrik Hansen, Thomas Haslböck, Raul Heimann, Johannes Frank Hoerlin, Vanessa Jansche, Peter Kainz, Christina Kast, Eva-Maria Kaufmann, Ulrich Kühn, Laura Martena, Julian Obenauer, Victor Peneff und Thomas Wimmer. (shrink)

Was ist Wurde? Konnen auch nichtmenschliche Tiere Wurde haben? Bettina Huber geht diesen Fragen nach, indem sie sich mit verschiedenen Auffassungen von Wurde befasst und davon ausgehend genauer auf das Verstandnis von Wurde als einer Haltung eingeht: Uber Wurde als Haltung zu verfugen bedeutet, mit dem eigenen Selbstbild in Ubereinstimmung zu leben. Die Autorin zeigt, inwiefern bestimmte nichtmenschliche Tiere die notwendigen Fahigkeiten besitzen, um ein Selbstbild zu entwickeln und damit ubereinzustimmen. Anschliessend beschaftigt sie sich mit den Bedingungen, die fur (...) ein Leben in Wurde erfullt sein mussen. Am Ende geht es um ein konkretes Beispiel, namlich warum Grossaquarien Delfinen ein Leben in Wurde nicht ermoglichen konnen - und in bestimmten Fallen eine Wurdeverletzung oder gar eine Demutigung vorliegt. (shrink)

Goal-setting theory states that challenging, specific, and concrete goals (i.e., subordinate goals) are powerful motivators and boost performance in goal pursuit more than vague or abstract goals (i.e., superordinate goals). Goal-setting theory predominantly focuses on single, short-term goals and less on broad, long-term challenges. This review article extends goal-setting theory and argues that superordinate goals also fulfill a crucial role in motivating behavior, particularly when addressing broad, long-term challenges. The purpose of this article is to show theoretically that people pursue (...) long-term goals more successfully when they focus on subordinate and superordinate goals simultaneously than when they focus on either subordinate or superordinate goals alone. (shrink)