It is a philosophy of patient care, and is therefore open to critique and evaluation.Using the Oxford Textbook of Palliative Medicine Third Edition as their ...

Palliative care is a recent branch of health care. The doctors, nurses, and other professionals involved in it took their inspiration from the medieval idea of the hospice, but have now extended their expertise to every area of health care: surgeries, nursing homes, acute wards, and the community. This has happened during a period when patients wish to take more control over their own lives and deaths, resources have become scarce, and technology has created controversial life-prolonging treatments. Palliative care is (...) therefore faced with more ethical problems that other areas of health care. This book, by a clinician, teacher, and writer on health care ethics, has been written to provide all those who care for the terminally ill--doctors, nurses, social workers, clergymen, physiotherapists--with the concepts and principles which will assist them with difficult decisions. It challenges many received doctrines of palliative care, but its well-illustrated central theme is that technical expertise must be controlled by humane, non-technical judgments. (shrink)

A book for nurses, doctors and all who provide end of life care, this essential volume guides readers through the ethical complexities of such care, including current policy initiatives, and encourages debate and discussion on their controversial aspects. dived into two parts, it introduces and explains clinical decision making-processes about which there is broad consensus, in line with guidance documents issued by WHO, BMA, GMC, and similar bodies. The changing political and social context where 'patient choice' has become a central (...) idea, and the broadened scope of potients' best interests, have added to the complexity of decision-making in end of life care. The authors discuss issues widely encountered by GPs, nurses, and hospital clinicians. These include patient choice, consent, life-prolonging treatment, and symptom relief including sedation. Part rwo explores the more controversial current end of life care initiatives, such as advance care planning preferred place of care and death, euthanais and assited suicide, extended ideas of 'best interests', and the view that there are therapeutic duties to the relatives of Throughout their discussion the authors draw attention to loose ends and contradictions in some of the proposals. Examining the current policy of comsumerist choice, they reject its place in the health service, proposing a a realistic, fair, humane and widely adoptable system of end of life care. As knowledge of ethical theories is required in training courses, and the vocabulary of ethical theory is widespread in current discussions a substantial appendix on ethical theories and terms is available online. Written by the same authors as The Philosophy of Palliative Care: Critique and Reconstruction, which won the Medical Journalists' Association Specialits Book Award 2007, this new book for non-specialists is essential reading for all health care professionals involved in providing end of life care. (shrink)

Care ethics is often criticized for being incapable of outlining what responsibilities we have to persons beyond our personal relations, especially toward distant others. This criticism centres on care theorists’ claim that the concerns of morality emerge between people, generated through our relations of interdependent care: it is difficult to see how moral duties can be applied to those with whom we do not forge a relationship. In this article, I respond to this criticism by outlining a care ethical justification (...) for an interest theory of human rights. This theory will argue that the demands of global justice include various positive actions that aim toward ensuring the conditions for good caring relations to flourish, which in turn protect and promote the vital interests of all persons. In doing so, I aim to concurrently advance the sparse work on human rights within the care literature, systematizing the ideas of care theorists such as Daniel Engster, Virginia Held, and Fiona Robinson. (shrink)

Introduction -- The ethics of care and global politics -- Rethinking human security -- 'Women's work' : the global care and sex economies -- Humanitarian intervention and global security governance -- Peacebuilding and paternalism : reading care through postcolonialism -- Health and human security : gender, care and HIV/AIDS -- Gender, care, and the ethics of environmental security -- Conclusion. Security through care.

Scientific and philosophical perspectives on hallucination: essays that draw on empirical evidence from psychology, neuroscience, and cutting-edge philosophical theory.

An overview of the philosophy and psychology of hallucination and its relevance to the philosophy of perception.

The papers in this collection on Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics by Charles, Rowe, McCabe, Whiting, and Buddensiek, offer new readings of Aristotle on the voluntary, friendship, and good fortune in the EE, by treating the EE on its own terms.

This volume presents ten new essays on the nature of perceptual imagination and perceptual memory, framed by an introductory overview of these topics. How do perceptual imagination and memory resemble and differ from each other and from other kinds of sensory experience? And what role does each play in perception and in the acquisition of knowledge? These are the two central questions that the contributors seek to address.

Looks at issues such as, the intellectual outlook of Medieval Christendom, the Renaissance, the order of nature in the 17th and 18th centuries, and thought and aspiration in the 19th and 20th centuries.

This volume will be an essential resource for anyone working in the central areas of philosophy, and the starting point for future research in this fascinating ...

This volume presents ten new essays on the nature of perceptual imagination and perceptual memory. The central questions are: How do perceptual imagination and memory resemble and differ from each other and from other kinds of sensory experience? And what role does each play in perception and in the acquisition of knowledge?

The system of realist philosophy developed by John Anderson — situational realism — has recently been dismissed as ‘positivist’ by a prominent critical realist. The reason for this dismissal appears not to be the usual list of ideas deemed positivist, but the conviction that situational realism mistakenly defends a form of actualism, i.e. that to conceive of causal laws as constant conjunctions reduces the domain of the real to the domain of the actual. This is, in part, a misreading of (...) Anderson’s philosophy because, contrary to Hume’s constant conjunction account, Anderson viewed causation as pluralistic and non-linear. However, the critical realist charge does point to two important ontological differences between these realist philosophies — a levels-of-reality thesis and the notion of causal powers. Situational realism has always maintained that the arguments for both lead to difficulties that are logically insurmountable. Unfortunately, this is not addressed in the critical realists’ dismissal of Anderson’s philosophy. Regardless of who makes the charge of positivism, it frequently involves inattention to the real character of its target. (shrink)

La réflexion sur la guerre de Montesquieu est amorcée dans l’ouvrage qu’il consacre à l’histoire de Rome : les Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence. C’est pour le baron de la Brède un moyen de prendre position contre les arguments machiavélistes qui soutiennent les entreprises de conquêtes de son époque. Il s’agit alors de retracer la généalogie de cette prise de position depuis les thèses de Machiavel, dont Montesquieu hérite, jusqu’aux usages politiques qu’il (...) dénonce. (shrink)

Which objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience, and how are we able to determine this? The papers in this collection address these questions together with other fundamental questions about the nature of perceptual content. The book draws together papers by leading international philosophers of mind, including Alex Byrne (MIT), Alva Noë (University of California, Berkeley), Tim Bayne (St Catherine’s College, Oxford), Michael Tye (University of Texas, Austin), Richard Price (All Souls College, Oxford) and Susanna Siegel (Harvard University) Essays (...) address the central questions surrounding the content of perceptual experience Investigates how are we able to determine the admissible contents of experience Published in association with the journal Philosophical Quarterly . (shrink)

This chapter explores the evidence for the existence of such new colour experiences and what their philosophical ramifications would be. I first define the notion of ‘novel colours’ and discuss why I think that this is the best name for such colours, rather than the numerous other names that they have sometimes been given in the literature. I then introduce the evidence and arguments for thinking that experiences as of novel colours exist, along with objections that people have had to (...) that evidence and to those arguments. To do so, I outline some facts about ordinary, non-novel colours before considering whether experiences as of novel colours, exist. Then I discuss the potentially significant ramifications the existence of novel colour experiences would have for theories of the metaphysics of colour, theories of the nature of colour experience, and for theories of the nature of perception more generally. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: What is Innateness? The Case for ElimiNativism Good Uses for Bad Concepts Against Premature Elimination References.

This powerfully iconoclastic book reconsiders the influential nativist position toward the mind. Nativists assert that some concepts, beliefs, or capacities are innate or inborn: "native" to the mind rather than acquired. Fiona Cowie argues that this view is mistaken, demonstrating that nativism is an unstable amalgam of two quite different--and probably inconsistent--theses about the mind. Unlike empiricists, who postulate domain-neutral learning strategies, nativists insist that some learning tasks require special kinds of skills, and that these skills are hard-wired into (...) our brains at birth. This "faculties hypothesis" finds its modern expression in the views of Noam Chomsky. Cowie, marshaling recent empirical evidence from developmental psychology, psycholinguistics, computer science, and linguistics, provides a crisp and timely critique of Chomsky's nativism and defends in its place a moderately nativist approach to language acquisition. Also in contrast to empiricists, who view the mind as simply another natural phenomenon susceptible of scientific explanation, nativists suspect that the mental is inelectably mysterious. Cowie addresses this second strand in nativist thought, taking on the view articulated by Jerry Fodor and other nativists that learning, particularly concept acquisition, is a fundamentally inexplicable process. Cowie challenges this explanatory pessimism, and argues convincingly that concept acquisition is psychologically explicable. What's Within? is a clear and provocative achievement in the study of the human mind. (shrink)

The Handbook of Philosophy of Education is a comprehensive guide to the most important questions about education that are being addressed by philosophers today. Authored by an international team of distinguished philosophers, its thirty-five chapters address fundamental, timely, and controversial questions about educational aims, justice, policy, and practices. Section I (Fundamental Questions) addresses the aims of education, authority to educate, the roles of values and evidence in guiding educational choices, and fundamental questions about human cognition, learning, well-being, and identity. Section (...) II (Virtues of Mind and Character) is concerned with the educational formation of personal attributes that are often seen as essential to flourishing individuals and societies. This section includes chapters on the cultivation of intellectual and character virtues, the nature and formation of expertise, Stoic virtues, and intellectual vices. Section III (Education and Justice) addresses fundamental and emerging issues of educational justice, from equal educational opportunity, racial domination, and linguistic justice in education, to educational problems of mass migration, global educational justice, the education of working children around the world, and the costs of higher education and upward mobility. Section IV (Educational Practices) addresses controversial aspects of contemporary education - pedagogical, curricular, and managerial practices - that deserve careful examination. These include controversies surrounding free speech and instruction in controversial issues; anti-racist, sustainability, and sex education; and the unfulfilled promises and demoralizing impact of high-stakes accountability schemes. The format and jargon-free writing in this volume ensure that topics are interesting and accessible, helping facilitate the work of advanced students and professionals in Education. (shrink)

In the history of Western thought, Christian theology was once considered to be 'the Queen of Sciences'. Today it has been marginalised by a prevailing scepticism. Randal Rauser confronts the problem of developing a public voice for the theologian as engaged in true theological science while not compromising the commitment to the Christian community of faith. This book posits a viable account of theological rationality, justification, and knowledge that avoids the twin pitfalls of modern rationalism and postmodern irrationalism. Theology is (...) freshly understood as a rigorous and rational truth-seeking discipline that seeks theoretical understanding of divine reality. Throughout the modern era the predominant epistemological position has been classical foundationalism, a position now widely rejected by philosophers and theologians alike. Philosophers recognize that it fails to achieve a plausible account of rationality, justification or knowledge, while theologians recognize the extent to which classical foundationalist strictures have distorted Christian doctrine. In its place many philosophers and theologians alike have adopted a nonfoundationalist epistemology, which is in turn often associated with a problematic alethic and metaphysical antirealism. Engaging with the ideas of key thinkers from Descartes, Locke, and Kant, to Bruce Marshall and Alvin Plantinga, Rauser provides an accessible and provocative survey of the theological terrain of the modern - and postmodern - era, arguing in favour of a return to a moderate foundationalism. (shrink)

The aim here is to implement intelligence in an engineered processing substrate – a machine mind, as it were. This solution is clearly related to work in artificial intelligence (AI) and shares many of its analytical requirements and synthesis goals, but the objective is unambiguously to make individual human minds independent of a single substrate. Brain–machine interfaces require adaptations for communication to be possible, emphasizing either the machine or the brain. Brain emulation on general‐purpose computers is convenient, because model functions (...) can be modified easily. Ultimately, a mature emulation demands a suitable computing substrate. Theoretical debates occasionally focus on the question of determinism and computation in the Von Neumann sense. ARPANET (the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network) useful for university projects and for the military, but it was not immediately obvious what sort of civilian applications would thrive on such a computer network. (shrink)

A collection of lectures on the relevance of the history of philosophy to modern philosophers that argues that without knowledge of its history and the utilization of its rich resources, philosophy will be 'thin and ultimately empty.'.

This paper provides a categorization of cross-modal experiences. There are myriad forms. Doing so allows us to think clearly about the nature of different cross-modal experiences and allows us to clearly formulate competing hypotheses about the kind of experiences involved in different cross-modal phenomena.

What happens when science hits the headlines - for all the wrong reasons? Do you remember the 'Climategate' email leak? Or the 'Frankenscience'-style headlines about the perils of GM foods? What about the time the government sacked its own science advisor for challenging drug laws? The truth behind the attention-grabbing headlines was complex, nuanced - sometimes even mundane. Yet that's not how it was reported or remembered. We rely on the media to help us make sense of complicated scientific developments (...) that could transform our world. Yet all too often, science coverage in the British press has been less fact than fiction. And equally scientists have too often either avoided engaging with the press or have been actively prevented from doing so. The result? Media hype, political spin, and misinformation from those with vested interests. In Beyond the Hype, Fiona Fox - founding director of the Science Media Centre, set up by scientists to encourage openness and accuracy in science communication - takes us behind the scenes of some of the most contentious stories in science over the past two decades. From animal research and genetically modified foods to hybrid embryos and climate change, she reveals the highs and lows of each controversy and shows us how transparency can radically transform the way science is reported, and what a difference that makes to public understanding. (shrink)

Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one's cognitive system, for example, one's thoughts or beliefs? If one thinks that this can happen then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case of cognitive penetration that cannot be explained away by the standard strategies one can typically use to explain away alleged cases. The case (...) is one in which it seems subjects' beliefs about the typical colour of objects affects their colour experience. I propose a two-step mechanism of indirect cognitive penetration that explains how cognitive penetration may occur. I show that there is independent evidence that each step in this process can occur. I suspect that people who are opposed to the idea that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable will be less opposed to the idea when they come to consider this indirect mechanism and that those who are generally sympathetic to the idea of cognitive penetrability will welcome the elucidation of this plausible mechanism. (shrink)

Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of an experience is either identical with, or supervenes on, the content of that experience. Many representationalists hold that the relevant content of experience is nonconceptual. I propose a counterexample to this form of representationalism that arises from the phenomenon of Gestalt switching, which occurs when viewing ambiguous figures. First, I argue that one does not need to appeal to the conceptual content of experience or to judgements to account for Gestalt switching. (...) I then argue that experiences of certain ambiguous figures are problematic because they have different phenomenal characters but that no difference in the nonconceptual content of these experiences can be identified. I consider three solutions to this problem that have been proposed by both philosophers and psychologists and conclude that none can account for all the ambiguous figures that pose the problem. I conclude that the onus is on representationalists to specify the relevant difference in content or to abandon their position. (shrink)

Aquinas talks about a topic with which fans of Sons of Anarchy are all too familiar: homicide and murder. For Aquinas, murder is the private, intentional homicide of an innocent human being and always wrong. This is called the Murder Principle. Murder is the killing of an innocent. This seems to leave the Sons—a private organization rather than an arm of the state—without the legitimate authority to take a life. Watching Sons of Anarchy makes us increasingly suspicious of the moral (...) authority of the state and its agents, who hardly seem like the competent “doctors” of Aquinas's amputation analogy. Contemporary philosophers have articulated the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), the gist of which states that it is sometimes morally permissible to bring about as a foreseen but unintended side‐effect what one would not be permitted to bring about intentionally. Aquinas's Murder Principle condemns much of what the Sons do. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Should We Stay or Should We Go Now? Frak the Numbers! Saving Starbuck? The Mark of Cain “Evil Men in the Gardens of Paradise?” Sacrifice Notes.

This book challenges readers to rethink rural health ethics. Traditional approaches to health ethics are often urban-centric, making implicit assumptions about how values and norms apply in health care practice, and as such may fail to take into account the complexity, depth, richness, and diversity of the rural context. There are ethically relevant differences between rural health practice and rural health services delivery and urban practice and delivery that go beyond the stereotypes associated with rural life and rural health services. (...) This book examines key values in the rural context that have not been fully explored or taken into account when we examine health ethics issues, including the values of community and place, and a need to “revalue” relationships. It also advocates for a greater attention to meso and macro level analysis in rural health ethics as being critical to ethical analysis of rural health care. This book is essential reading for those involved in health ethics, rural health policy and governance, and for rural health providers. (shrink)

In the early days, before Superman's full array of superpowers “developed,” Clark Kent's reporter persona was necessary for gathering information. Although he was pretty tough and fast, Superman didn't yet have the flight, the super‐hearing, the super‐vision, or the super‐intelligence that he would later have. The strategies that explain why a mere mortal or even a Golden Age Superman might not be up to meeting the demands of the S‐principle full time won’t apply to today's Superman. We may face a (...) choice: either we say goodbye to Clark or we abandon the S‐Principle. Clark Kent and Superman: We've had glimpses of worlds in which one exists without the other. But they're both normally there, and occasionally at odds. Jor‐El wants Superman to embrace his destiny as Earth's savior, Martha wants Clark to find a life for himself, and Lex wants Superman to leave and let humanity find its own path. (shrink)

Continues the account of major philosophical currents in the west from Book 1. Shows the way philosophers reacted to the science of Galileo and Newton.

Although the focus of "Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights" is practical, Gould does not shy away from hard theoretical questions, such as the relentless debate over cultural relativism, and the relationship between terrorism and democracy.

The main aim of Lupyan’s paper is to claim that perception is cognitively penetrated and that this is consistent with the idea of perception as predictive coding. In these remarks I will focus on what Lupyan says about whether perception is cognitively penetrated, and set aside his remarks about epistemology. I have argued (2012) that perception can be cognitively penetrated and so I am sympathetic to Lupyan’s overall aim of showing that perception is cognitively penetrable. However, I will be critical (...) of some of Lupyan’s reasoning in arguing for this position. I will also call for clarification of that reasoning. First, I will discuss what is meant by cognitive penetration and, in light of this, the sort of evidence that can be used to establish its existence. Second, I will question whether Lupyan establishes that all cases of cross-modal effects are cases of cognitive penetration. In doing so, I will suggest a form of cognitive penetration that has heretofore not been posited, and give an example of how one might test for its existence. Third, I will question whether Lupyan puts forward convincing evidence that categorical knowledge and language affect perception in a way that conclusively shows that cognitive penetration occurs. Fourth, I will closely examine Lupyan’s reply to the argument against cognitive penetration from illusion. I show that his reply is not adequate and that he misses a more straightforward reply that one could give. Fifth, I briefly concur with the remarks that Lupyan makes about the role of attention with respect to cognitive penetration. And finally, sixth, I spell out exactly what I think the relationship is between the thesis that predictive coding is the correct model of perception and the thesis that there is cognitive penetration. (shrink)