Context: Niklas Luhmann is considered to be a major proponent of the constructivist movement who based his highly complex sociological theory on constructivist concepts such as Maturana’s autopoiesis and Spencer Brown’s distinction. Problem: Despite heavily borrowing from constructivism, there are doubts as to whether his epistemological standpoint was properly constructivist. Method: In six papers and 14 Open Peer Commentaries, Luhmann’s epistemological understanding, understanding of science, and use and development of constructivist concepts is examined. Results: The authors’ papers and commentaries cover (...) a broad range of topics including the concepts of the observer, meaning, environment, and structural coupling. (shrink)

Kyle Stanford has recently given substance to the problem of unconceived alternatives, which challenges the reliability of inference to the best explanation (IBE) in remote domains of nature. Conjoined with the view that IBE is the central inferential tool at our disposal in investigating these domains, the problem of unconceived alternatives leads to scientific anti-realism. We argue that, at least within the biological community, scientists are now and have long been aware of the dangers of IBE. We re-analyse the nineteenth-century (...) study of inheritance and development (Stanford’s case study) and extend it into the twentieth century, focusing in particular on both classical Mendelian genetics and the studies by Avery et al. on the chemical nature of the hereditary substance. Our extended case studies show the preference of the biological community for a different methodological standard: the vera causa ideal, which requires that purported causes be shown on non-explanatory grounds to exist and be competent to produce their effects. On this basis, we defend a prospective realism about the biological sciences. 1 Introduction2 Stanford on Unconceived Alternatives3 Pangenesis: A Re-analysis4 The Vera Causa Ideal I: Negative Aspect5 Rendering Heredity Accessible6 The Vera Causa Ideal II: Positive Aspect7 Implications for Scientific Realism8 Conclusion. (shrink)

Problem: Is Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social systems based on a constructivist or on a realist epistemology? Luhmann’s own elaborations seem to oscillate between both standpoints. Method: The argumentation provided in this article starts with a detailed reconstruction of Luhmann’s epistemology and of Luhmann’s criticism towards radical constructivism and then examines the consequences for a comparison of systems theory and (radical) constructivism. Results: Although Luhmann’s operative constructivism can be distinguished from radical constructivism, the differences are not considered fundamental. Luhmann’s epistemology (...) is clearly nearer to constructivism than to realism and it shares most of constructivism’s key concepts, such as self-referential logic, a strict relation between observer and observed, and the relativism of reality construction. Implications: Luhmann’s criticism of radical constructivism must be understood in the context of his sociological background. Most of his arguments against radical constructivism can be considered apprehensions of misleading interpretations of radical constructivism rather than of substantial criticism. They may help to clarify a radical constructivist epistemology. Constructivist content: The paper attempts to check whether Luhmann’s theory of social theory is based on (radical) constructivist epistemology. (shrink)

This chapter explores a way in which visual processing may involve innate constraints and attempts to show how such processing overcomes one enduring challenge to nativism. In particular, many challenges to nativist theories in other areas of cognitive psychology have focused on the later development of such abilities, and have argued that such development is in conflict with innate origins. Innateness, in these contexts, is seen as antidevelopmental, associated instead with static processes and principles. In contrast, certain perceptual models demonstrate (...) how the very same mental processes can both be innately specified and yet develop richly in response to experience with the environment. This process is entirely unmysterious, as shown in certain formal theories of visual perception, including those that appeal to spontaneous endogenous stimulation and those based on Bayesian inference. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the target article “From Objects to Processes: A Proposal to Rewrite Radical Constructivism” by Siegfried J. Schmidt > Upshot: Radical Constructivism should be strictly process-oriented to avoid hidden ontology. S. J. Schmidt provides such a strict process-orientation from a very philosophical viewpoint that, however, still lacks access to empirical research. The purpose of this commentary is to show a way to apply Schmidt’s philosophical framework to empirical research.

Upshot: Poerksen’s discursive constructivism reconstructs radical constructivist foundations and applies them to several subjects of research in the field of journalism and media studies. The author combines epistemological arguments with practical advice for journalists, which makes the book not only valuable for interested followers of RC in general but also for communication scientists and media practitioners.

Upshot: Egner’s suggestion that a theory of observation should be developed towards a more abstract concept in order to apply it to any autopoietic system is plausible from the point of a general systems theory. However, this strategy of theorizing is not suited to solving epistemological problems in particular because such a broad concept fails to specify constructivism as a strictly observer-related philosophy. Nassehi’s search for a third way between constructivism and realism, in turn, presumes a too narrow and biased (...) concept of constructivism and is therefore not suited to solving the epistemological problem for which constructivism has been developed. (shrink)

Purpose: Explaining the relationship between theory and empirical research within the research process. The main motivation is to show that non-dualizing epistemology and constructivism have approximately the same ideas to explain this relationship. Problem: Josef Mitterer criticizes constructivism as a dualizing epistemology and "overlooks" that non-dualizing philosophy and constructivist perspectives are similar with regard to the relationship between theory and empirical research. Method: (1) Reconstruction of non-dualizing argumentation, (2) non-dualizing implications for the description of the relationship between theory and empirical (...) research, (3) comparison of non-dualizing implications for the relationship between theory and empirical research with constructivist implications for this relationship. Solution: Finding a position on the description of the relationship between theory and empirical research that fits both epistemologies i.e. non-dualizing philosophy and constructivism. If we discard the critical rationalist idea to falsify theory with the help of empirical research (which reflects reality), we better conceive the relationship between theory and empirical research as a permanent and mutual refinement, stabilization and irritation. Implications: With the help of non-dualizing argumentation, constructivists have to clarify their position towards the relationship between theory and empirical research, particularly towards the choice of methods and the interpretation of the results; and non-dualizing epistemology can profit from constructivist second-order argumentation. (shrink)

Purpose: Describing how radical constructivism was introduced to communication science and analyzing why it has not yet become a mainstream endeavour. Situation: Before radical constructivism entered the relevant debates in communication sciences, moderate constructivist positions had already been developed. Problem: Radical constructivists’ argumentation has often been provocative and exaggerating in style, and extreme in its position. This has provoked harsh reactions within the mainstream scientific community. Several argumentative strategies have been used to degrade radical constructivist arguments and their relevance. Solution: (...) Beyond such rhetorical devices, radical constructivism has become established within the field of communication science, although it has not become mainstream. One should probably not even wish to make radical constructivism a mainstream approach in case it loses its sceptical ability for second-order-observation. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Ontology, Reality and Construction in Niklas Luhmann’s Theory” by Krzysztof C. Matuszek. Upshot: Matuszek’s article criticizes Luhmann’s systems theory in particular and constructivism in general with respect to philosophical inconsistency caused by some ontological implications of constructivist epistemology. Providing a coherent interpretation of ontology and epistemology is worth the effort in order to solve philosophical problems. However, the question arises of whether philosophical reasoning actually is of any relevance for empirical research. I argue that (...) both Luhmann’s operative constructivism and constructivism in general already comply with Matuszek’s suggestions. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Constructivism as a Key Towards Further Understanding of Communication, Culture and Society” by Raivo Palmaru. Upshot: Palmaru addresses several problems with respect to radical constructivism, in particular the relationship between the micro-level and macro-level of social phenomena, i.e., communication, culture, and society. Related to this, I dispute three of Palmaru’s key claims: the relationship between micro-social and macro-social phenomena is a specific problem of radical constructivism; radical constructivism does not solve the problem of the (...) micro-macro-link; the author’s solution to the respective problem is necessary and sufficient. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Ethics: A Radical-constructivist Approach” by Andreas Quale. Upshot: The sharp distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive knowledge provided by Andreas Quale prevents the author from finding well-founded reasons for constructivist ethics.

Problem: First-order scientific research is often not aware of the hidden assumptions provided by an epistemological perspective based upon realism. Beyond philosophical considerations about the epistemological foundations, some practical normative implications deriving from them are crucial: in the field of communication and media studies, some scholars criticize media coverage, e.g., on climate change, as biased and distorted from reality. Method: From a constructivist perspective, the article presents a detailed meta-analysis of the course of argumentation provided by two empirical communication studies (...) that follow an objectivist approach. Result: With the help of a second-order research strategy, it is possible to uncover their ontological assumptions and criticize their normative implications. Implications: Social scientists should be careful with normative suggestions for the system under study unless they are applied within these systems themselves. (shrink)

Upshot: The controversy between realism and constructivism often seems to be a matter of epistemology. However, empirical researchers are not primarily interested in solving philosophical questions but in practicing good research. It would be shortsighted to believe that there is a contradiction between epistemological and empirical questions.

While seeking novel food sources to feed the increasing population of the globe, several alternatives have been discussed, including algae, fungi or in vitro meat. The increasingly propagated usage of farmed insects for human nutrition raises issues regarding food safety, consumer information and animal protection. In line with law, insects like any other animals must not be reared or manipulated in a way that inflicts unnecessary pain, distress or harm on them. Currently, there is a great need for research in (...) the area of insect welfare, especially regarding species-specific needs, health, farming systems and humane methods of killing. Recent results from neurophysiological, neuroanatomical and behavioral sciences prompt caution when denying consciousness and therefore the likelihood of presence of pain and suffering or something closely related to it to insects. From an animal protection point of view, these issues should be satisfyingly solved before propagating and establishing intensive husbandry systems for insects as a new type of mini-livestock factory farming. (shrink)

The increasing application of network models to interpret biological systems raises a number of important methodological and epistemological questions. What novel insights can network analysis provide in biology? Are network approaches an extension of or in conflict with mechanistic research strategies? When and how can network and mechanistic approaches interact in productive ways? In this paper we address these questions by focusing on how biological networks are represented and analyzed in a diverse class of case studies. Our examples span from (...) the investigation of organizational properties of biological networks using tools from graph theory to the application of dynamical systems theory to understand the behavior of complex biological systems. We show how network approaches support and extend traditional mechanistic strategies but also offer novel strategies for dealing with biological complexity. (shrink)

We can perceive not only low-level features of events such as color and motion, but also seemingly higher-level properties such as causality. A prototypical example of causal perception is the ”launching effect’: one object moves toward a stationary second object until they are adjacent, at which point A stops and B starts moving in the same direction. Beyond these motions themselves --- and regardless of any higher-level beliefs --- this display induces a vivid visual impression of causality, wherein A is (...) seen to cause B’s motion. Do such percepts reflect a unitary category of visual processing, or might there be multiple distinct forms of causal perception? While launching is often simply equated with causal perception, researchers have sometimes described other phenomena such as ”triggering’ and ”entraining’. We used psychophysical methods to determine whether these labels really carve visual processing at its joints, and how putatively different forms of causal perception relate to each other. Previous research demonstrated retinotopically specific adaptation to causality: exposure to causal launching makes subsequent ambiguous events in that same location more likely to be seen as non-causal ”passing’. Here, after replicating this effect, we show that exposure to triggering also yields retinotopically specific adaptation for subsequent ambiguous launching displays, but that exposure to entraining does not. Collectively, these results reveal that visual processing distinguishes some types of causal interactions. (shrink)

Psychologists and philosophers have recently been exploring whether the mechanisms which underlie the acquisition of ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) are best charac- terized as cognitive modules or as developing theories. In this paper, we attempt to clarify what a modular account of ToM entails, and why it is an attractive type of explanation. Intuitions and arguments in this debate often turn on the role of develop- ment: traditional research on ToM focuses on various developmental sequences, whereas cognitive modules are thought (...) to be static and ‘anti-developmental’. We suggest that this mistaken view relies on an overly limited notion of modularity, and we explore how ToM might be grounded in a cognitive module and yet still afford development. Modules must ‘come on-line’, and even fully developed modules may still develop internally, based on their constrained input. We make these points con- crete by focusing on a recent proposal to capture the development of ToM in a module via parameterization. (shrink)

Mayr’s proximate–ultimate distinction has received renewed interest in recent years. Here we discuss its role in arguments about the relevance of developmental to evolutionary biology. We show that two recent critiques of the proximate–ultimate distinction fail to explain why developmental processes in particular should be of interest to evolutionary biologists. We trace these failures to a common problem: both critiques take the proximate–ultimate distinction to neglect specific causal interactions in nature. We argue that this is implausible, and that the distinction (...) should instead be understood in the context of explanatory abstractions in complete causal models of evolutionary change. Once the debate is reframed in this way, the proximate–ultimate distinction’s role in arguments against the theoretical significance of evo-devo is seen to rely on a generally implicit premise: that the variation produced by development is abundant, small and undirected. We show that a “lean version” of the proximate–ultimate distinction can be maintained even when this isotropy assumption does not hold. Finally, we connect these considerations to biological practice. We show that the investigation of developmental constraints in evolutionary transitions has long relied on a methodology which foregrounds the explanatory role of developmental processes. It is, however, entirely compatible with the lean version of the proximate–ultimate distinction. (shrink)

Upshot: New publications about Niklas Luhmann and his theory of social systems address the question of Luhmann’s epistemological standpoints. A publication on the “ontologies of the modern world” hastily describes social conventions and processes of stabilization as modern ontologies and a new handbook on Luhmann’s life, oeuvre and impact underestimates the major contribution of constructivism in Luhmann’s theory. Although the two books are comprehensive and informative, they do not make enough use of the constructivist potential to explain both Luhmann’s theory (...) as founded upon constructivist epistemology and the processes of modernization. (shrink)

Successful innovations are deemed to be necessary requisites for enterprise success. On the other hand, works council participation and employee participation are judged differently as either fostering employee and enterprise benefits or only the former or even none. Both forms of participation have found diverging theoretical and empirical argumentations regarding innovations. Here, we argue and show empirically that both forms of participation deliver positive contributions to innovation success, economically and employee-related, substantiated with qualitative reports from 36 process innovation cases and (...) quantitative data from 44 cases. Qualitative case analyses reveal different profiles of works council participation depending on the innovation type. Independent of the innovation types, more successful innovations are marked by more intensive participation. Quantitative examinations of a causal model with path analysis specify how this is achieved: works council and employee participation further the growth of appropriate knowledge and the former also raises the coordination capability; both are essential preconditions for innovation success. A direct impact of works councils on innovation success complements the indirect effects. The slightly modified path analysis explains 53% of the innovation success variance. (shrink)

Kyle Stanford has recently given substance to the problem of unconceived alternatives, which challenges the reliability of inference to the best explanation (IBE) in remote domains of nature. Conjoined with the view that IBE is the central inferential tool at our disposal in investigating these domains, the problem of unconceived alternatives leads to scientific anti-realism. We argue that, at least within the biological community, scientists are now and have long been aware of the dangers of IBE. We re-analyze the nineteenth-century (...) study of inheritance and development (Stanford’s case study) and extend it into the twentieth century, focusing in particular on both classical Mendelian genetics and the studies by Avery et al. on the chemical nature of the hereditary substance. Our extended case studies show the preference of the biological community for a different methodological standard: the vera causa ideal, which requires that purported causes be shown on non-explanatory grounds to exist and be competent to produce their effects. On this basis, we defend a prospective realism about the biological sciences. (shrink)

In three experiments, subjects attempted to track multiple items as they moved independently and unpredictably about a display. Performance was not impaired when the items were briefly (but completely) occluded at various times during their motion, suggesting that occlusion is taken into account when computing enduring perceptual objecthood. Unimpaired performance required the presence of accretion and deletion cues along fixed contours at the occluding boundaries. Performance was impaired when items were present on the visual field at the same times and (...) to the same degrees as in the occlusion conditions, but disappeared and reappeared in ways which did not implicate the presence of occluding surfaces (e.g. by imploding and exploding into and out of existence, instead of accreting and deleting along a fixed contour). Unimpaired performance did not require visible occluders (i.e. Michotte’s tunnel effect) or globally consistent occluder positions. We discuss implications of these results for theories of objecthood in visual attention. (shrink)

This study explored the impact of implementing Philosophy, in the tradition of 'Philosophy for Children', on pedagogy. It employed an experimental design that included 59 primary teachers. The experimental group received an intervention of training in Philosophy and the comparison group received training in Thinking Tools (graphic organisers), a subset of the Philosophy training. Lessons were coded on variables of pedagogy, across the two groups, at three time-points. Teacher interviews were conducted to gather participants' perspectives. Between group analysis of variance (...) on several measures of pedagogy revealed that Philosophy significantly broadened teachers' pedagogical repertoire. (shrink)

What makes an object the same persisting individual over time? Philosophers and psychologists have both grappled with this question, but from different perspectives—philosophers conceptually analyzing the criteria for object persistence, and psychologists exploring the mental mechanisms that lead us to experience the world in terms of persisting objects. It is striking that the same themes populate explorations of persistence in these two very different fields—e.g. the roles of spatiotemporal continuity, persistence through property change, and cohesion violations. Such similarities may reflect (...) an underlying connection, in that psychological mechanisms of object persistence (especially relevant parts of mid-level visual object processing) may serve to underlie the intuitions about persistence that fuel metaphysical theories. This would be a way for cognitive science to join these two disparate fields, helping to explain the possible origins and reliability of some metaphysical intuitions, and perhaps leading to philosophical progress. (shrink)

According to the "confrontation model," integrated history and philosophy of science operates like an empirical science. It tests philosophical accounts of science against historical case studies much like other sciences test theory against data. However, the confrontation model's critics object that historical facts can neither support generalizations nor genuinely test philosophical theories. Here I argue that most of the model's defects trace to its usual framing in terms of two problematic accounts of empirical inference: the hypothetico-deductive method and enumerative induction. (...) This framing can be taken to suggest an unprofitable one-off confrontation between particular historical facts and general philosophical theories. I outline more recent accounts of empirical inquiry, which describe an iterative back-and-forth movement between concrete empirical exemplars to their abstract descriptions. Reframed along similar lines, the confrontation model continues to offer both conceptual insight and practical guidance for a naturalized philosophy of science. (shrink)

This volume collects reflections on the role of philosophy in case studies in the history of science. Case studies have played a prominent role in recent history and philosophy of science. They have been used to illustrate, question, explore, or explicate philosophical points of view. Even if not explicitly so, historical narratives are always guided by philosophical background assumptions. But what happens if different philosophies lead to different narratives of the same historical episodes? Can historical case studies decide between competing (...) philosophical viewpoints? What are the criteria that a case study has to fulfill in order to be philosophically relevant? Bringing together leading practitioners in the fields of history and philosophy of the physical and the life sciences, this volume addresses this methodological problem and proposes ways of rendering explicit philosophical assumptions of historical work. (shrink)

Semmelweis’s discovery of the cause of puerperal fever around the middle of the 19th century counts among the paradigm cases of scientific discovery. For several decades, philosophers of science have used the episode to illustrate, appraise and compare views of proper scientific methodology.Here I argue that the episode can be profitably reexamined in light of two cognate notions: causal reasoning and mechanisms. Semmelweis used several causal reasoning strategies both to support his own and to reject competing hypotheses. However, these strategies (...) have gone unappreciated in the existing literature. I show that a causal reasoning approach makes sense of the multitude of tables in Semmelweis’s main text, which in later editions were often abridged because they appeared redundant.Moreover, the existing literature tends to focus on Semmelweis’s clinical intervention and on the extent to which it alone confirms his theoretical conclusions. This neglects Semmelweis’s efforts to show by animal experiments that his clinical results are in agreement with a demonstrable mechanism of puerperal fever pathogenesis. I argue that the full evidential force of Semmelweis’s argument can only be appreciated if both his clinical and his laboratory investigations are taken into account. (shrink)

Perhaps the most striking phenomenon of visual awareness is inattentional blindness (IB), in which a surprisingly salient event right in front of you may go completely unseen when unattended. Does IB reflect a failure of perception, or only of subsequent memory? Previous work has been unable to answer this question, due to a seemingly intractable dilemma: ruling out memory requires immediate perceptual reports, but soliciting such reports fuels an expectation that eliminates IB. Here we introduce a way of evoking repeated (...) IB in the same subjects and the same session: we show that observers fail to report seeing salient events’ not only when they have no expectation, but also when they have the wrong expectations about the events nature. This occurs when observers must immediately report seeing anything unexpected, even mid-event. Repeated IB thus demonstrates that IB is aptly named: it reflects a genuine deficit in moment-by-moment conscious perception, rather than a form of inattentional amnesia. (shrink)

Object files (OFs) are hypothesized mid-level representations which mediate our conscious perception of persisting objects—e.g. telling us ‘which went where’. Despite the appeal of the OF framework, not previous research has directly explored whether OFs do indeed correspond to conscious percepts. Here we present at least one case wherein conscious percepts of ‘which went where’ in dynamic ambiguous displays diverge from the analogous correspondence computed by the OF system. Observers viewed a ‘bouncing/streaming’ display in which two identical objects moved such (...) that they could have either bounced off or streamed past each other. We measured two dependent variables: (1) an explicit report of perceived bouncing or streaming; and (2) an implicit ‘object-specific preview benefit’ (OSPB), wherein a ‘preview’ of information on a specific object speeds the recognition of that information at a later point when it appears again on the same object (compared to when it reappears on a different object), beyond display-wide priming. When the displays were manipulated such that observers had a strong bias to perceive streaming (on over 95% of the trials), there was nevertheless a strong OSPB in the opposite direction—such that the object files appeared to have ‘bounced’ even though the percept ‘streamed’. Given that OSPBs have been taken as a hallmark of the operation of object files, the five experiments reported here suggest that in at least some specialized (and perhaps ecologically invalid) cases, conscious percepts of ‘which went where’ in dynamic ambiguous displays can diverge from the mapping computed by the object-file system. (shrink)

The Lotka–Volterra predator-prey-model is a widely known example of model-based science. Here we reexamine Vito Volterra’s and Umberto D’Ancona’s original publications on the model, and in particular their methodological reflections. On this basis we develop several ideas pertaining to the philosophical debate on the scientific practice of modeling. First, we show that Volterra and D’Ancona chose modeling because the problem in hand could not be approached by more direct methods such as causal inference. This suggests a philosophically insightful motivation for (...) choosing the strategy of modeling. Second, we show that the development of the model follows a trajectory from a “how possibly” to a “how actually” model. We discuss how and to what extent Volterra and D’Ancona were able to advance their model along that trajectory. It turns out they were unable to establish that their model was fully applicable to any system. Third, we consider another instance of model-based science: Darwin’s model of the origin and distribution of coral atolls in the Pacific Ocean. Darwin argued more successfully that his model faithfully represents the causal structure of the target system, and hence that it is a “how actually” model. (shrink)

Even simple geometric shapes are seen as animate and goal-directed when they move in certain ways. Previous research has revealed a great deal about the cues that elicit such percepts, but much less about the consequences for other aspects of perception and cognition. Here we explored whether simple shapes that are perceived as animate and goal-directed are prioritized in memory. We investigated this by asking whether subjects better remember the locations of displays that are seen as animate vs. inanimate, con- (...) trolling for lower-level factors. We exploited the ‘Wolfpack effect’: moving darts (or discs with ‘eyes’) that stay oriented toward a particular target are seen to be actively pursuing that target, even when they actually move randomly. (In contrast, shapes that stay oriented perpendicular to a target are correctly perceived to be drifting randomly.) Subjects played a ‘matching game’ – clicking on pairs of panels to reveal animations with moving shapes. Across four experiments, the locations of Wolfpack animations (compared to control animations equated on lower-level visual factors) were better remembered, in terms of more efficient matching. Thus perceiving animacy influences subsequent visual memory, perhaps due to the adaptive significance of such stimuli. (shrink)

In one of his key publications on the harmful dysfunction analysis of mental disorder (HDA), Jerome Wakefield acknowledged that he has “explored the value element in disorder less thoroughly than the factual element. This is in part because the factual component poses more of a problem for inferences about disorder and in part because the nature of values is such that it requires separate consideration” (Wakefield 1992, 384). More than twenty years have passed since this remark, and yet a thorough (...) consideration of the value component in Wakefield’s HDA is still lacking. Quite a few contributions to this volume promise to change that situation, and ours is one of these. In this contribution, we will analyze the harm or value component and argue that Wakefield’s dealing with it is so problematic that it undermines, at least indirectly, the viability of the HDA. In the first section, we explore Wakefield’s emphasis on the subjective nature of harm and his exclusive focus on social values. The second section is devoted to an analysis of Wakefield’s examples of conditions that are dysfunctional but harmless (fused toes, albinism, reversal of the heart, dyslexia in illiterate societies, etc.). We argue that these examples are quite problematic because they do not exemplify what they are supposed to exemplify. In the third section, we show how these two problems are connected: Wakefield uses the harmfulness of a condition as an implicit criterion to distinguish normal variation from dysfunction. In doing so, he blurs the distinction between the harm component and the dysfunction component, even though this distinction is central to his HDA. (shrink)

In his seminal Inference to the Best Explanation, Peter Lipton adopted a causal view of explanation and a broadly Millian view of how causal knowledge is obtained. This made his account vulnerable to critics who charged that Inference to the Best Explanation is merely a dressed-up version of Mill’s methods, which in the critics’ view do the real inductive work. Lipton advanced two arguments to protect Inference to the Best Explanation against this line of criticism: the problem of multiple differences (...) and the problem of inferred differences. Lipton claimed that these two problems show Mill’s method of difference to be largely unworkable unless it is embedded in an explanationist framework. Here I consider both arguments as well as the best Millian defense against them. Since the existing Millian defense is only partially successful, I will develop a new and improved account. As an integral part of the argument, I show that my solutions to the problems of multiple and inferred differences offer new insight into Lipton’s main case study: Ignaz Semmelweis’s discovery of the cause of childbed fever. I conclude that the method of difference can overcome Lipton’s challenges outside an explanationist framework. (shrink)

Philosophical inquiry has the capacity to push boundaries in teaching and learning interactions with students and improve teacher’s pedagogical experiences. This paper focuses on the potential for Philosophy to foster pedagogical transformation. Two groups of primary school teachers, 59 in total, have been involved in a comparison of pedagogical transformation between teachers who implemented Philosophy and teachers who used thinking tools for conceptual exploration. A mixed methods approach, including, questionnaires and semi-structured interviews, was employed to inquire into the effect of (...) teaching Philosophy on teachers’ perceptions of their pedagogy. This paper describes how the engagement in communities of philosophical inquiry results in a significant improvement in perceptions of pedagogy, teacher thinking and student engagement. (shrink)

This study explored the impact of facilitating collaborative philosophical inquiry, in the tradition of “Philosophy for Children,” on connectedness pedagogies. The study employed an experimental design that included 59 primary teachers in 2 groups. The experimental group received an intervention that comprised training in CPI and the comparison group received training in Thinking Tools, a subset of the CPI training. Lessons were coded on four variables of connectedness pedagogies, across the two groups, at three time-points. Teacher interviews were conducted to (...) gather participants’ perspectives. Between-groups analysis of variance on particular measures of pedagogy revealed that CPI significantly broadened teachers’ pedagogical repertoires, in ways that included drawing on students’ background knowledge and preparing a problem-based curriculum which connects students to the world beyond the classroom. (shrink)