This chapter presents some of Ayn Rand's express condemnations of non‐objective law and then indicates the underlying principles of government that explain these assessments. It also discusses the implications of Rand's view for the traditional Natural Law‐Positivism dispute over the authority of law and for the moral status of the Rule of Law. In particular, the chapter shows why the Rule of Law, on what she regards as a proper conception of objective law, is emphatically a moral ideal. The broad (...) scope of Rand's conception of objective law is explained not only by her view of the function of government, but also by her understanding of objectivity itself. In the sense in which the term applies to man‐made things, objectivity is normative. Rand's analysis suggests that the propriety of the Rule of Law rests, at bottom, in its objectivity. The Rule of Law banishes subjectivism. (shrink)

This essay contends that the debate between subjectivism and objectivism in ethics is better understood as a dispute among three alternatives: subjectivism, objectivism, and intrinsicism. Ayn Rand has identified intrinsicism – the belief that certain things are good “in, by, and of” themselves – as the doctrine that is actually operative in many defenses of moral objectivity. What intrinsicism fails to appreciate, however, is the significant role of the subject, the person to whom and for whom anything can be valuable. (...) Objective value, in Rand's view, is relational. Its existence depends on contributions of both external reality and human consciousness. Values are not reducible to psychological states, as in subjectivism, but nor are they independent of them, as in intrinsicism. Objectivity in ethics is attained neither through revelation of the intrinsic property of goodness nor through the subject's creation of goodness, but through a rational procedure of evaluation that is governed by the method of objectivity. This essay is in three parts, explaining Rand's view of exactly what intrinsicism is; elaborating on her view of the nature of moral objectivity; and highlighting certain features that make plain the differences between an intrinsicist and an objectivist account of value. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between tolerance, forgiveness, and justice. Contrary to prevailing wisdom, it argues that tolerance and forgiveness are not independent virtues vying with justice for our allegiance, but that they fall under justice’s imperative to judge other people objectively and treat them as they deserve. Misguided extensions of tolerance and forgiveness imperil the very values that ethics is designed to promote. Thus tolerance and forgiveness are neither virtues nor vices; they are appropriate only when authorised by justice. (...) The paper clarifies the common confusion of tolerance with respect for individuals’ rights, and argues that forgiveness is not a supererogatory act of generosity, but is sometimes morally required. (shrink)

In philosophical analyses of the value of sport, a relatively unheralded feature is the opportunity that sport offers for admiration. While we readily salute many of the things that people admire (...

Viable Values examines the most basic foundations of value and morality, demonstrating the shortcomings of major traditional views and proposing that morality is grounded in the objective requirements of human life. Smith argues that morality depends on a proper understanding of the concept of values, and that values depend on the alternative of life or death. She proposes that human beings need to be moral in order to live, explaining how life is the standard of morality, how flourishing is (...) the proper end and reward of living morally, and how an intelligent egoism is the path to flourishing. (shrink)

Since the recent work of Carol Gilligan, Nel Noddings, and others, it has become commonplace in moral philosophy to employ a dichotomy between an ethics of “Care” and an ethics of “Rights.” Gilligan claims that men and women view moral issues in fundamentally divergent ways. Responses to moral problems tend to divide along lines emphasizing respect for rights, in the case of men, and caring for others, in the case of women. Inspired by these findings, several authors have classified moral (...) theories in two basic camps, revolving around the injunction to care or the mandate to respect rights. While many concede that the Care and Rights perspectives are not mutually exclusive, it is increasingly common to view ethicists as forced to choose between these two types of theories. (shrink)

In contemporary discussions, so many moral and political controversies revolve around conflicting demands on resources that it is easy to assume that ethics simply is a means of divvying up a limited pool of coveted goods. Discussions of distributive justice, rights conflicts, environmental‐ism and international relations, for instance, are typically framed along these lines. Since Hobbes, we have been bred on the idea that moral prescriptions are a means of coping with disputes between people who have incompatible designs on finite (...) resources. Even those who have resisted Hobbes' portrait of life as war have done so by appealing to aspects of humanity that Hobbes underestimated (such as capacities for benevolence or empathy), rather than by challenging his premise that people's appetites exceed the resources available to satisfy them. (shrink)

Ayn Rand is well known for advocating egoism, but the substance of that instruction is rarely understood. Far from representing the rejection of morality, selfishness, in Rand's view, actually demands the practice of a systematic code of ethics. This book explains the fundamental virtues that Rand considers vital for a person to achieve his objective well-being: rationality, honesty, independence, justice, integrity, productiveness, and pride. Tracing Rand's account of the harmony of human beings' rational interests, Smith examines what each of (...) these virtues consists of, why it is a virtue, and what it demands of a person in practice. Along the way she addresses the status of several conventional virtues within Rand's theory, considering traits such as kindness, charity, generosity, temperance, courage, forgiveness, and humility. Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics thus offers an in-depth exploration of several specific virtues and an illuminating integration of these with the broader theory of egoism. (shrink)

Pride has been denounced as one of the seven deadly sins and praised as the crown of the virtues. Perhaps because of the difficulty of navigating between these appraisals, pride has not been paid very much attention by ethicists. Moreover, pride is so familiar as a feeling that the suggestion that it could be a virtue may seem misplaced.

The emphasis on evidence based medicine (EBM) has placed increased focus on finding timely answers to clinical questions in presence of patients. Using a combination of natural language processing for the generation of clinical excerpts and information theoretic distance based clustering, we evaluated multiple approaches for the efficient presentation of context-sensitive EBM excerpts.

ABSTRACTIn philosophical analyses of the value of sport, a relatively unheralded feature is the opportunity that sport offers for admiration. While we readily salute many of the things that people...

This paper examines a particular type of argument often employed to defend welfare rights. This argument contends that welfare rights are a necessary supplement to liberty rights because rights to freedom become hollow when their bearers are not able to take advantage of their freedom. Rights to be provided with certain goods are thus a natural outgrowth of a genuine concern to protect freedom.I argue that this reasoning suffers from two fatal flaws. First, it rests on an erroneous notion of (...) what it is to have a right, neglecting the fact that the exact source of a person's inability to exercise a right is crucial to determining whether that right is being respected. Second, the argument equivocates as to the freedom that rights are intended to protect, sometimes confusing freedom with ability, sometimes confusing not being free with not having other desired things, and sometimes confusing what a person is able to do with what a person is entitled to do. (shrink)

In recent decades, we have seen a remarkable proliferation of the kinds of moral rights that people are thought to have. While many of these new rights have gained sizable support, the theoretical underpinnings of all rights have remained uncertain. The danger in the growth of rights claims is that we may weaken rights. As more and more desirable goods are demanded as people's "rights," the actual protection which rights afford is diminished. Abundant rights will bump up against one another, (...) preventing many rights from being fully satisfied. The long-term effect of this rights inflation will be the erosion of the value of rights, rather than the intended aim of enhanced security for people. ;The dissertation examines in two stages what the status of rights should be. First, it explores the history of the notion of rights, the exact meaning of what it is to have a right, and the obligations which rights place on other persons. It also presents an argument defending the view that all people have certain moral rights "naturally," independently of social creation or recognition. ;The second stage of the discussion focusses more directly on certain aspects of the recent expansion of rights claims. It delineates the logical and practical implications of rights "conflicts" which the boom in rights precipitates. Finally, it considers one particular type of rights which has been enjoying increasing acceptance: rights to be provided with concrete goods . ;The major conclusions reached are first, that the notion of "natural" moral rights is a credible and valuable component within an adequate moral theory; second, that individuals do have extensive rights to freedom of action; third, that "natural" moral rights cannot directly conflict with one another; and fourth, that welfare rights are spurious. ;As a whole, this work is intended largely as a caution to tame the recent enthusiasm for rights. Restraint is needed in order to preserve rights, and to allow rights to exert their protective powers to individuals more effectively. (shrink)

In the debate over proper judicial interpretation of the law, the doctrine of Originalism has been subjected to numerous, seemingly fatal criticisms. Despite the exposure of flaws that would normally bury a theory, however, Originalism continues to attract tremendous support, seeming to many to be the most sensible theory on offer. This paper examines its resilient appeal (with a particular focus on Scalia's Textualism).By surveying and identifying the fundamental weaknesses of three of the leading alternatives to Originalism (Popular Will theory, (...) Dworkin's value theory, and Minimalism), the paper demonstrates that the heart of Originalism's appeal rests in its promise of objectivity. The paper also establishes, however, that Originalism suffers from a misguided conception of what objectivity is. All camps in this debate, in fact, suffer from serious misunderstandings of the nature of objectivity. (shrink)

How should courts interpret the law? While all agree that courts must be objective, people differ sharply over what this demands in practice: fidelity to the text? To the will of the people? To certain moral ideals? In Judicial Review in an Objective Legal System, Tara Smith breaks through the false dichotomies inherent in dominant theories - various forms of originalism, living constitutionalism, and minimalism - to present a new approach to judicial review. She contends that we cannot (...) assess judicial review in isolation from the larger enterprise of which it is a part. By providing careful clarification of both the function of the legal system as well as of objectivity itself, she produces a compelling, firmly grounded account of genuinely objective judicial review. Smith's innovative approach marks a welcome advance for anyone interested in legal objectivity and individual rights. (shrink)

Ayn Rand is well known for advocating egoism, but the substance of that instruction is rarely understood. Far from representing the rejection of morality, selfishness, in Rand's view, actually demands the practice of a systematic code of ethics. This book explains the fundamental virtues that Rand considers vital for a person to achieve their objective well-being: rationality, honesty, independence, justice, integrity, productiveness, and pride. Tracing Rand's account of the value and harmony of human beings' rational interests, Smith examines what (...) each of these virtues consists of, why it is a virtue, and what it demands of people in practice. Along the way she addresses the status of several conventional virtues within Rand's theory, considering traits such as kindness, charity, generosity, temperance, courage, forgiveness, and humility. Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics thus offers an in-depth exploration of several specific virtues and an illuminating integration of these with the broader theory of egoism. (shrink)

This series is intended to provide students and general readers with brief and accessible insight into the ideas of major philosophers. Allan Gotthelf, a distinguished Aristotle scholar, has been intimately familiar with Rands philosophy for nearly forty years, having participated in workshops that Rand gave in the 1960s and 1970s. Gotthelf joins scholarly rigor with firsthand knowledge of Rands thought to provide a systematic introduction to Rands philosophy, objectivism. The result is absorbing.

ABSTRACTThis study aimed to investigate the association of locus of control with reading and mathematics achievement of high school students with disabilities using data from the Special Educ...

This is the first scholarly study of Atlas Shrugged, covering in detail the historical, literary, and philosophical aspects of Ayn Rand's magnum opus. Topics explored in depth include the history behind the novel's creation, publication, and reception; its nature as a romantic novel; and its presentation of a radical new philosophy.

Ayn Rand's first novel, We the Living, offers an early form of the author's nascent philosophy—the philosophy Rand later called Objectivism. Robert Mayhew's collection of entirely new essays brings together pre-eminent scholars of Rand's writing. In part a history of We the Living, from its earliest drafts to the Italian film later based upon it, Mayhew's collection goes on to explore the enduring significance of Rand's first novel as a work both of philosophy and of literature.

Tara Smith's book on Rand's ethics is reviewed by Stephen Hicks for *Philosophy in Review.*.

Responsibility and professionalism are increasingly issues of concern for professional associations, employers and educators alike. When bad things happen, professionals are often held personally accountable for complex situations. Professional Responsibility and Professionalism advances our approaches to professional responsibility from individual-centred, virtue-based prescriptions towards understanding and responding effectively to the multifaceted challenges encountered today by professionals working in dynamic complexity. The author applies a sociomaterial examination to specific examples drawn from different professional contexts of practice. She examines important implications for what (...) professional responsibility and accountability might mean individually and collectively, and what it might be becoming when demands increasingly conflict, and when we accept that capacities for action are performed into existence in emergent and precarious webs of both human and non-human forces. The chapters explore some of the most prominent questions in professional responsibility, including: What does professional responsibility, and accountability, mean in the escalating complexities and conflicts confronting today's professionals? How does professional responsibility become developed and enacted, and through what social and material entanglements? How should responsibility be determined in multi-agency and interprofessional practice? What happens when professional decisions are delegated to software algorithms and diagnostic instruments? How are new governing regimes of professional work, such as innovation imperatives, excessive audit and logics of blame and scapegoating, reconfiguring responsibility? How can professionals respond simultaneously to individuals in need, the obligations of their profession, the demands of their employer and an anxious society? A major concern addressed by each chapter, and the book as a whole, is educating professionals in and for responsibility. Specific dilemmas and strategies are offered for educators in universities, workplaces and professional development contexts who seek new approaches to helping professionals learn to critically understand and practise responsibility today. This book will appeal to a wide audience of education researchers and post-graduate students studying professional practice, professionalism and education across a wide range of disciplines. Health professionals, professionals working in private practices, such as law, architecture and engineering, newer professions such as social work and policing, and educational professionals at all levels will find stories and strategies reflecting key issues of their practice in this detailed exploration of professional responsibility and accountability. (shrink)