Thomas Reid: Theory of Action Thomas Reid made important contributions to the fields of epistemology and philosophy of mind, and is often regarded as the founder of the common sense school of philosophy. However, he also offered key arguments and observations concerning human agency and morality. Reid carefully criticized the views of his contemporaries, and defended … Continue reading Reid: Theory of Action →.

Cet article défend la thèse selon laquelle l’amour personnel est une attitude a-rationnelle, qui ne répond à aucune raison normative. Je présente les deux courants de pensée principaux sur l’amour et les raisons, les théories rationnelles et a-rationnelles, ainsi que des problèmes engendrés par chaque position. Je défends ensuite une version de la position a-rationnelle, en répondant à l’objection selon laquelle l’amour a-rationnel serait inintelligible. L’amour personnel est a-rationnel, mais il peut néanmoins être rendu intelligible par des explications, par des (...) jugements de valeur indépendants de lui, ou par la valeur qui est visible grâce à lui. Si l’amour personnel possède une valeur, ce n’est donc pas en vertu de sa source, mais grâce à ce qu’il rend visible. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to show that animal motives play an important role in guiding human agents to virtue, according to Reid. Animal motives, for Reid, are constituted of desires and of their objects. These desires are intrinsic desires for objects other than moral or prudential worth. However, from a rational and moral point of view, animal motives are good and useful parts of the human constitution that lead to happiness, teach self-government, create the habit of acting virtuously, (...) and add force to rational motives. Understanding animal motives as guides to virtue provides Reid with the hybrid sentimentalist/rationalist account he seeks to offer. (shrink)

Libertarians, like Thomas Reid, hold that motives do not causally necessitate our choices. The problem that arises is to explain how the agent decides to act according to one motive and not the other. In light of some objections brought up by Leibniz and Edwards but also by contemporary compatibilists such as Haji and Goetz, I examine Thomas Reid's possible answer to this problem. I argue that to explain our choices Reid would appeal not only to motives and character traits (...) but also to the amount of effort needed to choose what is best. I also address Reid's criticism of the implicit presupposition of the Principle of Suffi cient Reason. My aim is therefore to explore, clarify and defend Reid's account of agency in choicemaking. (shrink)

Contrary to the widespread view that Reid and Hume agree that reason, alone, is inert, I argue that they disagree on this point. Both accept that reason plays a role in forming moral sentiments, and that affections are components of moral evaluations. However, I show that for Reid moral evaluations (comprised of moral judgments and moral affections) are different from moral motives (which are not comprised of affections). Moral motives for Reid are mind‐independent states of affairs that are grasped by (...) reason and do not require affections to influence human beings. Reid hence holds a non‐Humean theory in which reason, alone, is not inert. (shrink)

This paper is a response to Keith Lehrer's ‘Reid on Common Sense and Morals.’ I start by defending the general claim that it is appropriate to call Reid a moral realist. I continue by discussing three aspects of Reid's account of moral ideas. First, our first moral conceptions are non-propositional mental states that are essential ingredients of moral perception. Our first moral conceptions are not gross, indistinct and egocentric but are uninformed mental states that might be about others. Second, moral (...) perception functions like perception of aesthetic properties and of the mental states of other humans, and this kind of perception is both immediate and informed. Third, I discuss the role of moral feelings in moral motivation. (shrink)

Hume considered his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals to be one of his best works. In it he offers his most elegant and approachable account of the origins and scope of morality. With the hope of reaching a broad audience, he argues that morality is neither rigid nor austere, but is rather a product of sentiments that all human beings share, and which they are naturally inclined to recognize and act upon. In this Critical Guide, a team of distinguished (...) scholars discuss each section of the Enquiry, its place in Hume's philosophy as a whole, and its historical context; their topics include the nature of morals, talents and moral virtues, benevolence, sympathy, and the sources of moral disagreement. The volume will be valuable for scholars and advanced students working on Hume. (shrink)

I examine, in this paper, the contents of one of the most famous religious texts of the early modern period, The Whole Duty of Man, and I show that Hume's Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Man is an attempt to reappropriate and replace the Anglican devotional with his own moral philosophy. Hume would reject the devotional's general methodology, its claims about the foundation of morality, and its list of duties. However, a careful reading of The Whole Duty of Man reveals (...) that Hume shares its author's evaluation of pride and humility, and its insistence on utility and pleasure. Hume, I argue, would not think of this book as mortifying or monkish. Given the popularity of The Whole Duty of Man and Hume's desire to push religion back into the closet together with his passion for literary fame, we have good reasons to conclude that Hume was more envious than critical, and that the EPM was his own remastered version of what could be called ‘The Whole Merit of Man’. (shrink)

Why is religion such a widespread human experience? In enlightenment Scotland, philosophers had already attempted to answer this question turning to natural histories of mankind, and to a careful analysis of the human mind and of those cognitive capacities responsible for religious-type beliefs and attitudes. This early approach is also echoed today, as scholars from the cognitive sciences seek to show how religious-type beliefs and practices are produced either directly or as a by-product of natural cognitive processes. Others continue to (...) study the dependence of religious beliefs on cultural traditions, symbolic meanings and ritualistic practices. The authors of this special issue continue this discussion, focusing on specific topics and challenges posed by current studies on religion as a natural phenomenon. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to present Reid's answer to Hume's claim that religion is contrary to natural human moral passions. Religion, according to Hume, weakens natural human inclinations toward virtue and invents new species of merit. Reid would respond, first, that morality is indeed tied to human nature, and that Hume fails to recognize that a sense of justice is natural as well. Since justice does not arise within human social conventions, Reid would conclude that justice is not (...) a virtue that is limited to the human domain. Second, Reid would argue that the concordance between natural moral human motives and natural non-moral motives is a sign of design. And third, Reid would argue that uncorrupted religion is one that is faithful to morality and human nature, and that does not distort natural motives. Overall, Reid holds that the moral faculty is a natural human faculty that gives rise to natural inclinations and beliefs, but that these are concordant with religious beliefs and practices prescribed b.. (shrink)

For anyone interested in Reid's moral psychology and ethics, the new edition of his Essays on the Active Powers of Man is a welcome addition to the Edinburgh Collection. This book, first announced as the sixth, finally arrives as the seventh of a ten volume collection, The Edinburgh Edition of Thomas Reid, edited by Knud Haakonssen, which contains Reid's published and unpublished writings. During his lifetime, Reid published three volumes: An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common (...) Sense (1764), Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785), and Essays on the Active Powers of Man (1788). With the most recent addition of Harris and Haakonssen's edition of the Active Powers, all three of these .. (shrink)

This book brings together new essays that explore the connection between love and reasons. The observation that considerations of love carry significant weight in the deliberative process opens up new perspectives in the classic discussion about practical reasons, and gives rise to many interesting questions about the nature of love’s reasons, about their source and legitimacy, about their relation to moral and epistemic reasons, and about the extent to which love is sensitive to reasons. The contributors to this volume orient (...) questions related to love within the broader context of the contemporary discussion on practical reasons, and move forward the conversation about the normative dimensions of love. _Love, Reason and Morality _will be of interest to philosophers working on issues of normativity, meta-ethics and moral psychology, and especially those interested in the source of practical reasons and the role of attachments in practical deliberation. (shrink)

This chapter surveys essentialist and anti-essentialist theories of sex and gender. It does so by engaging three approaches to sex and gender: externalism, internalism, and contextualism. The chapter also draws attention to two key debates about sex and gender in the feminist literature: the debate about the sex/gender distinction (the distinction debate) and the debate about whether sex and gender have essences (the essentialism/anti-essentialism debate). In addition, it describes three problems that theories of sex and gender tend to face: the (...) Inclusion Problem, the Definition Problem, and the Exclusion Problem. Lastly, the chapter highlights why the division between essentialist and anti-essentialist accounts of sex and gender is not clear. (shrink)

Political theology as a normative discourse has been controversial not only for secular political philosophers who are especially suspicious of messianic claims but also for Jewish and Christian thinkers who differ widely on its meaning. These essays mount an argument for a "messianic political theology" rooted in an interpretation of biblical (especially Pauline), Augustinian, and radical reformation readings of messianism as a thoroughly political and theological vision that gives rise to what the author calls "diaspora ethics." In conversation also with (...) Platonic, Jewish, and Continental thinkers, Kroeker argues for an exilic practice of political ethics in which the secular is built up theologically "from below" in the form of public service that flows from messianic political worship. Such a "weak messianic power" practiced by the messianic body inhabits an apocalyptic political economy in which the mystery of love and the mystery of evil are agonistically unveiled together in the power of the cross--not as an instrument of domination but in the form of the servant. This is not simply a matter of "pacifism" but of a messianic posture rooted in the renunciation of possessive desire that pertains to all aspects of everyday human life in the household (oikos), the academy, and the polis. --Book cover. (shrink)

Notion complexe et problématique objet de crainte et de crispation, la stásis renvoie tout autant à la discorde, à la sédition, à la guerre civile, qu'à la division. Loin de lire dans cette équivocité le signe de son indétermination, cette enquête se propose de mettre en lumière l'unité et la cohérence de ce concept dans la philosophie pratique d'Aristote. Sans être banalisée, comment la stásis devient-elle le corrélat direct et explicite de la cité? En quel sens la théorie aristotélicienne rompt-elle (...) avec la tradition grecque, pour laquelle la stásis, figure du mal absolu, constituait pourtant un impensé de la cité grecque? (shrink)

Governments, companies, and citizens all think trust is important. Especially today, in the networked era, where we make use of all sorts of e-services and increasingly interact and buy online, trust has become a necessary condition for society to thrive. But what do we mean when we talk about trust and how does the rise of the Internet transform the functioning of trust? This books starts off with a thorough conceptual analysis of trust, drawing on insights from - amongst others (...) philosophy and sociology - to sharpen our understanding of the topic. The book explains how the arrival of large systems - such as the internet - has changed the character of trust which today is no longer based on interpersonal interactions but has become completely mediated by technologies. Based on the layered building plan of the Internet itself, a new conceptual lens called 4 Cs is developed to analyse and understand trust in the networked era. The 4Cs refer to the 4 layers which all have to be taken into account to assess trust online, namely: context, code, codification, and curation. The 4Cs bring together the firsthand experiences of the user (context), the sort of technology that is being used (code), the legal implication (codification) and business interests (curation) in order to get a clear picture of the trust issues that may arise. In the final part of the book some real-life cases are discussed (digital hotel keys, Airbnb, online personalization) to illustrate how trust -analysed through the 4 Cs lens- might flourish or be challenged in our current networked era. (shrink)

The overall goal of this target article is to demonstrate a mechanism for an embodied cognition. The particular vehicle is a much-studied, but still widely debated phenomenon seen in 7–12 month-old-infants. In Piaget's classic “A-not-B error,” infants who have successfully uncovered a toy at location “A” continue to reach to that location even after they watch the toy hidden in a nearby location “B.” Here, we question the traditional explanations of the error as an indicator of infants' concepts of objects (...) or other static mental structures. Instead, we demonstrate that the A-not-B error and its previously puzzling contextual variations can be understood by the coupled dynamics of the ordinary processes of goal-directed actions: looking, planning, reaching, and remembering. We offer a formal dynamic theory and model based on cognitive embodiment that both simulates the known A-not-B effects and offers novel predictions that match new experimental results. The demonstration supports an embodied view by casting the mental events involved in perception, planning, deciding, and remembering in the same analogic dynamic language as that used to describe bodily movement, so that they may be continuously meshed. We maintain that this mesh is a pre-eminently cognitive act of “knowing” not only in infancy but also in everyday activities throughout the life span. Key Words: cognitive development; dynamical systems theory; embodied cognition; infant development; motor control; motor planning; perception and action. (shrink)

The life, works, and philosophy of rabbi Hasdai Crescas.

A orientação filosófica de João Mendes Júnior, por E. de Figueiredo Ferraz.--Pressupostos filosófico-jurídicos da revisão constitucional, por T. Cavalcanti Filho.--A justiça como história, por R. Cirell Czerna.--As regras de trato social em confronto com o direito, por D. de Santis Garcia.--Estado e direito, por C. Ashcar.--Doutrinas interpretativas do fenômeno jurídico, por J. Cretella Júnior.

"In 'Mag ik Orpheus zijn?' legt Esther Jansma messcherp uit wat het lezen en schrijven van poëzie en proza voor haar inhoudt. Wat betekent het om 'ik' te zeggen in een gedicht, mag een tekst worden herleid tot de persoon van de maker, in hoeverre wordt wat wij 'het leven' noemen bepaald door wat we hebben gelezen, zijn er grenzen aan de verbeelding en waar zouden die dan moeten liggen, wie bepaalt wat wel en niet mag of kan in (...) een tekst? Voor deze essays bewerkte zij vier lezingen die zij in Berkeley en als gastschrijver aan de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen heeft gegeven."--Back cover. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss how Nietzsche’s critique of nihilism concerns the complicity between Christian morality and modern atheism. I unpack in what sense Schopenhauer’s ascetic denial of the will signifies a return to nothingness, what he calls the nihil negativum. I argue that Nietzsche’s formulation of nihilism specifically targets Schopenhauer’s pessimism as the culmination of the Western metaphysical tradition, the crucial stage of its intellectual history in which the scientific pursuit of truth finally unveils the ascetic will to nothingness (...) that motivates it. I contend that Nietzsche’s critique of Schopenhauer anticipates current scholarly debates around the significance of the nihil negativum and offers a compelling objection against contemporary proponents of philosophical nihilism such as Eugene Thacker and Ray Brassier. (shrink)

Your artistry involves you intimately with the world around and beyond you. So your artistry involves profound but simple philosophical matters. As a human person, you are artful and philosophical, at the core of your being. Doorway to Artistry offers a playful, everyday philosophical approach necessary for life, integration, healing, and thriving in artistry. It reflects on the real and how we are involved with it, especially in our creative effort. In short, the real hospitably welcomes us, and in our (...) artistry we reciprocate in noble courtesy. Human persons were made for this communion with the real. Find in this book a hospitable welcome to belong at home beyond where you are. (shrink)

Reasoning about bedrock abstract concepts such as time, number, and valence relies on spatial metaphor and often on multiple spatial metaphors for a single concept. Previous research has documented, for instance, both future-in-front and future-to-right metaphors for time in English speakers. It is often assumed that these metaphors, which appear to have distinct experiential bases, remain distinct in online temporal reasoning. In two studies we demonstrate that, contra this assumption, people systematically combine these metaphors. Evidence for this combination was found (...) in both directly elicited and spontaneous co-speech gestures about time. These results provide first support for the hypothesis that the metaphorical representation of time, and perhaps other abstract domains as well, involves the continuous co-activation of multiple metaphors rather than the selection of only one. (shrink)

This paper enquires into the politics of real-time in online media. It suggests that real-time cannot be accounted for as a universal temporal frame in which events happen, but explores the making of real-time from a device perspective focusing on the temporalities of platforms. Based on an empirical study exploring the pace at which various online media produce new content, we trace the different rhythms, patterns or tempos created by the interplay of devices, users’ web activities and issues. What emerges (...) are distinct forms of ‘realtimeness’ which are not external from but specific to devices, organized through socio-technical arrangements and practices of use. Realtimeness thus unflattens more general accounts of the real-time web and research, and draws attention to the agencies built into specific platform temporalities and the political economies of making real-time. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).