INTRODUZIONE 2 1. POVERA E NUDA VAI, FILOSOFIA… 19 1.1 TRA SCIAMANI E CALCOLATORI 20 1.2 AUTOCASTRAZIONI E DINTORNI 25 1.2.1 Debes, ergo potes 26 1.2.1.1 Scienze della natura e scienze dello spirito 27 1.2.1.2 Orizzonti di responsabilità 32 1.2.1.3 Ritrovare la saggezza 36 1.2.2 Potes, ergo debes 37 1.2.2.1 Disintegrando la frammentazione 40 1.2.2.2 Disarticolando lo smembramento 51 1.2.2.3 Oltrepassando l’autosuperamento 58 1.3 IL (MIO) PUNTO DI VISTA 62 2. GLOBALIZZAZIONE E UNIVERSALISMO 70 2.1 PENSARE LA GLOBALIZZAZIONE 73 2.1.1 (...) Una civiltà universale? 73 2.1.1.1 Quale cultura? 74 2.1.1.2 Singolare e plurale 78 2.1.2 Scontro delle civiltà? 85 2.2 CERCANDO UN’ETICA GLOBALE 89 2.2.1 Il minimalismo morale 92 2.2.1.1 Un confronto con il liberalismo neo-contrattualista 96 2.2.1.2 La quercia, la ghianda e la foresta 100 2.2.2 L’etica mondiale 102 2.3 RIFLESSIONI CRITICHE 107 3. RELATIVISMO 112 3.1 LE RAGIONI DEL RELATIVISMO 114 3.1.1 Ragioni della politica 116 3.1.1.1 Multiculturalismo e neutralità etica 116 3.1.1.2 Antifondazionalismo e democrazia 121 3.1.2 Ragioni dell’antropologia 125 3.1.3 Ragioni dell’ermeneutica 130 3.1.4 Ragioni dell’epistemologia 135 3.1.5 Ragioni dell’etica 143 3.1.5.1 Nel regno della necessità 145 3.1.5.2 In regime di cieca obbedienza 146 3.1.5.3 Il piacere e l’interesse 151 3.1.5.4 Intuizioni, emozioni, prescrizioni 153 3.1.5.5 Accordo, consenso e permesso 159 3.1.5.6 Etica della ragione 166 3.2 LA RAGIONE PRATICA 170 3.2.1 Oltre l’ansia cartesiana 171 3.2.2 Autenticità e ragionamento 176 3.2.3 Ragioni della diversità e ragioni del riconoscimento 181 4. FIGURE DI RAZIONALITÀ PRATICA 185 4.1 UTILITARISMO 186 4.1.1 Cosa è «migliore»? 187 4.1.1.1 Piacere, felicità, bene 188 4.1.1.2 L’atto e la regola 191 4.1.2 Conta solo il risultato? 194 4.2 CONTESTUALISMO 197 4.2.1 Recupero della phrónesis 198 4.2.2 Recupero della prâxis 204 4.2.3 Recupero dell’éthos 208 4.3 ETICA DEL DISCORSO 217 4.3.1 Dalle pretese di validità del discorso al principio di un’etica universale 218 4.3.2 Universalità e formalismo 224 4.3.3 Limiti dell’etica del discorso 226 4.4 ETICA DELLA RELAZIONE 231 4.4.1 Relazione versus rappresentazione 232 4.4.2 L’umanità dell’altro uomo 236 4.5 UN BILANCIO 241 ALCUNE PROSPETTIVE. POSTILLA 245 . (shrink)

Preface 1. What is Ethics? 1. 1. Why Study Ethics? 1. 2. Isn’t Faith Enough? 1. 3. Philosophical Methods 1. 4. Specific Characteristics of Philosophical Ethics 2. The Phenomenology of Morality 2. 1. Moral Experiences 2. 2. Essential Characteristics of Moral Experience 3.. Voluntary Behavior 3. 1. Conditions of Voluntary Behavior 3. 2. Emotions and Feelings in Human Action 3. 3. Freedom in Human Action 3. 4. Human Action as Immanent Activity 4. The Virtues in General 4. 1. Importance of (...) the Virtues in Ethical Discourse 4. 2. Virtues and Vices 4. 3. Classification of the Virtues 4. 4. Virtue, Freedom, and Happiness 5. Wisdom 5. 1. Terminology 5. 2. Primacy of Wisdom 5. 3. The Operations of Wisdom 5. 4. Wisdom’s Presuppositions and Their Opposites 6. Justice 6. 1. The Concept of Justice 6. 2. Rights 6. 3. General Justice and Particular Justice 6. 4. The Parts of Justice 6. 5. Injustice 7. Fortitude or Courage 7. 1. Terminology 7. 2. Cultural Aspects 7. 3. Fortitude and Vulnerability 7. 4. Endurance and Aggression 8. Temperance 8. 1. Terminology 8. 2. The Essence of Temperance 8. 3. Virtue of Personal Integration 9. The Foundation of Morality 9. 1. The Good: Objective or Subjective? 9. 2. The True Good 9. 3. The Basis of Human Rights 9. 4. Sources of Morality 10. The Moral Law 10. 1. Attitudes toward Law 10. 2. The Essence of Moral Law 10. 3. The Natural Law 10. 4. The Law’s Limits 11. Conscience 11. 1. Anthropological Value of the Moral Conscience 11. 2. The Judgement of Conscience 11. 3. Types or Forms of Conscience 11. 4. Law, Virtue, and Conscience -/- Epilogue Bibliography . (shrink)

The article studies the treatise De Lege (Summa Theologiae, I-II, qq. 90-108) showing the conceptual development and theological setting: everything comes from the lex aeterna and everything leads to the lex nova. The Thomistic concept of law is not unique or misunderstanding: it is analog. The analogy is applied according to a double movement. According to the analogy of proportionality, the analogiatum princeps is human law; according to the analogy of intrinsic attribution, the analogatum princeps is the eternal law.

Gathers the pre-Sand Country Almanac writings of Aldo Leopold, showing that he was not born an ecologist, but evolved over time through experimentation and thought.

Aldo Giorgio Gargani fait dans ce livre un usage novateur des concepts wittgensteiniens pour soutenir que la formation du savoir scientifique et philosophique n’est pas une progression linéaire, cumulative et définitive de techniques cognitives : le savoir est plutôt un recueil d’instruments, d’habitus conceptuels, de modèles comportementaux, de conduites opérationnelles et de procédures décisionnelles qui naissent des formes de vie des hommes, en tant qu’extensions de leurs contextes anthropologiques. Si l’expression « savoir sans fondements » est maintenant très répandue (...) dans les sciences humaines, c’est Gargani qui a magistralement élaboré toutes les conséquences de cette idée, et son livre est l’analyse la plus riche de ces rituels épistémologiques qui découlent de notre agir humain, lui-même dépourvu de fondements. À travers ce livre on voit comment la pensée de Wittgenstein peut être utilisée comme une « boîte à outils » véritablement efficace. (shrink)

If the laws of nature are as the Humean believes, it is an unexplained cosmic coincidence that the actual Humean mosaic is as extremely regular as it is. This is a strong and well-known objection to the Humean account of laws. Yet, as reasonable as this objection may seem, it is nowadays sometimes dismissed. The reason: its unjustified implicit assignment of equiprobability to each possible Humean mosaic; that is, its assumption of the principle of indifference, which has been attacked on (...) many grounds ever since it was first proposed. In place of equiprobability, recent formal models represent the doxastic state of total ignorance as suspension of judgment. In this paper I revisit the cosmic coincidence objection to Humean laws by assessing which doxastic state we should endorse. By focusing on specific features of our scenario I conclude that suspending judgment results in an unnecessarily weak doxastic state. First, I point out that recent literature in epistemology has provided independent justifications of the principle of indifference. Second, given that the argument is framed within a Humean metaphysics, it turns out that we are warranted to appeal to these justifications and assign a uniform and additive credence distribution among Humean mosaics. This leads us to conclude that, contrary to widespread opinion, we should not dismiss the cosmic coincidence objection to the Humean account of laws. (shrink)

Can stable regularities be explained without appealing to governing laws or any other modal notion? In this paper, I consider what I will call a ‘Humean system’—a generic dynamical system without guiding laws—and assess whether it could display stable regularities. First, I present what can be interpreted as an account of the rise of stable regularities, following from Strevens [2003], which has been applied to explain the patterns of complex systems (such as those from meteorology and statistical mechanics). Second, since (...) this account presupposes that the underlying dynamics displays deterministic chaos, I assess whether it can be adapted to cases where the underlying dynamics is not chaotic but truly random—that is, cases where there is no dynamics guiding the time evolution of the system. If this is so, the resulting stable, apparently non-accidental regularities are the fruit of what can be called statistical necessity rather than of a primitive physical necessity. (shrink)

Certain results, most famously in classical statistical mechanics and complex systems, but also in quantum mechanics and high-energy physics, yield a coarse-grained stable statistical pattern in the long run. The explanation of these results shares a common structure: the results hold for a 'typical' dynamics, that is, for most of the underlying dynamics. In this paper I argue that the structure of the explanation of these results might shed some light --a different light-- on philosophical debates on the laws of (...) nature. In the explanation of such patterns, the specific form of the underlying dynamics is almost irrelevant. The conditions required, given a free state-space evolution, suffice to account for the coarse-grained lawful behaviour. An analysis of such conditions might thus provide a different account of how regular behaviour can occur. This paper focuses on drawing attention to this type of explanation, outlining it in the diverse areas of physics in which it appears, and discussing its limitations and significance in the tractable setting of classical statistical mechanics. (shrink)

Aldo Leopold accorded great significance to the images he used to describe both the land and humankind’s relation to it. Focusing on three key images of Leopold’s “ecological imaginary”—the balance, the pyramid, and the round river—this article argues that the most profound of these is the round river. Contrasting this image with James Lovelock’s portrayal of the earth as Gaia, it further argues that Leopold’s round river can be interpreted as a contemporary, ecological reworking of the primordial, Homeric experience (...) of Being, according to which the foundation of the world is a round river, Oceanus. (shrink)

The “land community” (or “biotic community”) that features centrally in Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic has typically been equated with the concept of “ecosystem.” Moreover, some have challenged this central Leopoldean concept given the multitude of meanings of the term “ecosystem” and the changes the term has undergone since Leopold’s time (see, e.g., Shrader-Frechette 1996). Even one of Leopold’s primary defenders, J. Baird Callicott, asserts that there are difficulties in identifying the boundaries of ecosystems and suggests that we recognize that (...) their boundaries are determined by scientific questions ecologists pose (Callicott 2013). I argue that we need to rethink Leopold’s concept of land community in the following ways. First, we should recognize that Leopold’s views are not identical to those of his contemporaries (e.g., Clements, Elton), although they resemble those of some subsequent ecologists, including some of our contemporaries (e.g., O’Neill 2001, Post et al. 2007, Hastings and Gross 2012). Second, the land community concept does not map cleanly onto the concept of “ecosystem”; it also incorporates elements of the “community” concept in community ecology by emphasizing the interactions between organisms and not just the matter/energy flow of the ecosystem concept. Third, the boundary question can be illuminated by considering some of the recent literature on the nature of biological individuals (in particular, Odenbaugh 2007; Hamilton, Smith, and Haber 2009; Millstein 2009), focusing on concentrations of causal relations as determinative of the boundaries of the land community qua individual. There are challenges to be worked out, particularly when the interactions of community members do not map cleanly onto matter/energy flows, but I argue that these challenges can be resolved. The result is a defensible land community concept that is ontologically robust enough to be a locus of moral obligation while being consistent with contemporary ecological theory and practice. (shrink)

Aldo Leopold’s influence on environmental ethics cannot be overstated. I return to Leopold’s work in order to show the connection between the ethics of integrity and many of the points made by Leopold in his writings. I also show how the spirit of Leopold’s land ethic and his love and respect for wilderness is present and current in the Wildlands Project, and that it is a live part of public policy in North America, albeit a debated one.

Most of the on-going debate is about “how” to protect archaeological ruins, whilst at the same time allowing the general public to enjoy them. Today it is clear how important it is, from the actual planning stages of excavations, to interact with experts from other disciplines, who are working on their own findings and offering them up for collective enjoyment. Whatever might be feasible for an indoor museum is not always feasible with an architectonic ruin, as regards both presenting objects (...) with explicative apparatus that determines their significance, and exploring them in a new way when interpretations change or new ideologies are introduced. First of all, conserving excavations is the not the same as conserving a transportable object. In the past many countries in Europe preferred to “present” Roman remains simply as “gardens of ruins”, often endeavouring to stand them in sharp contrast with a more recurrent evocation of the original contexts of local life. Recently, with regard to the Roman tradition, there has been a noticeable inversion of trend in musealization operations, according to which the mere “contemplation of ruins” should be replaced by emotional contact with history. The main consequence of these new tendencies is the replacement of an informatics-based and didactic approach to musealization, in favour of a more authentically interpretative approach. Back-up resulting from experimentation in the fields of restoration and conservation becomes indispensible in implementing these new strategies for the musealization of archaeology. Continuous research and the progressive advance of conservation techniques have meant that the need to transfer archaeological remains has been avoided and an improved in situ “presentation” of these remains, both movable and immovable, can now be guaranteed. (shrink)

It is clear that environmentalist are failing in their efforts to avert a global ecological catastrophe. It is argued here that Aldo Leopold had provided the foundations for an effective environmental movement, but to develop his land ethic, it is necessary first to interpret and advance it by seeing it as a form of communitarianism, and link it to communitarian ethical and political philosophy. This synthesis can then be further developed by incorporating advanced ideas in ecology and human ecology. (...) Overcoming the division between the sciences and humanities and granting a place to narratives as a highly developed form of eco-semiosis, these provide the foundation for a new grand narrative committed to creating an ecological civilization, a civilization organized to augment the life of ecosystems, including human ecosystems, by augmenting the conditions for its members to flourish and develop their full potential to augment life. (shrink)

It is not uncommon in the history of science and philosophy to encounter crucial experiments or crucial objections the truth-value of which we are ignorant, that is, about which we suspend judgment. Should we ignore such objections? Contrary to widespread practice, I show that in and only in some circumstances they should not be ignored, for the epistemically rational doxastic attitude is to suspend judgment also about the hypothesis that the objection targets. In other words, suspension of judgment "propagates" from (...) the crucial objection to the hypothesis. In this paper I study under which conditions this phenomenon occurs, and discuss its significance for the topics of skepticism and scientific realism. (shrink)

This doctoral dissertation investigates the notion of physical necessity. Specifically, it studies whether it is possible to account for non-accidental regularities without the standard assumption of a pre-existent set of governing laws. Thus, it takes side with the so called deflationist accounts of laws of nature, like the humean or the antirealist. The specific aim is to complement such accounts by providing a missing explanation of the appearance of physical necessity. In order to provide an explanation, I recur to fields (...) that have not been appealed to so far in discussions about the metaphysics of laws. Namely, I recur to complex systems’ theory, and to the foundations of statistical mechanics. The explanation proposed is inspired by how complex systems’ theory has elucidated the way patterns emerge, and by the probabilistic explanations of the 2nd law of thermodynamics. More specifically, this thesis studies how some constraints that make no direct reference to the dynamics can be a sufficient condition for obtaining in the long run, with high probability, stable regular behavior. I hope to show how certain metaphysical accounts of laws might benefit from the insights achieved in these other fields. According to the proposal studied in this thesis, some regularities are not accidental not in virtue of an underlying physical necessity. The non-accidental character of certain regular behavior is only due to its overwhelming stability. Thus, from this point of view the goal becomes to explain the stability of temporal patterns without assuming a set of pre-existent guiding laws. It is argued that the stability can be the result of a process of convergence to simpler and stable regularities from a more complex lower level. According to this project, if successful, there would be no need to postulate a (mysterious) intermediate category between logical necessity and pure contingency. Similarly, there would be no need to postulate a (mysterious) set of pre-existent governing laws. Part I of the thesis motivates part II, mostly by arguing why further explanation of the notions of physical necessity and governing laws should be welcomed (chapter 1), and by studying the plausibility of a lawless fundamental level (chapters 2 and 3). Given so, part II develops the explanation of formation of simpler and stable behavior from a more complex underlying level. (shrink)

This volume gathers specific investigations dealing with some of the main topics of the research on Democritus: the catalogue of works, music, literary criticism, technics, zoology and the relation to medicine, physics, epistemology, posterity.

Measurement is a process aimed at acquiring and codifying information about properties of empirical entities. In this paper we provide an interpretation of such a process comparing it with what is nowadays considered the standard measurement theory, i.e., representational theory of measurement. It is maintained here that this theory has its own merits but it is incomplete and too abstract, its main weakness being the scant attention reserved to the empirical side of measurement, i.e., to measurement systems and to the (...) ways in which the interactions of such systems with the entities under measurement provide a structure to an empirical domain. In particular it is claimed that (1) it is on the ground of the interaction with a measurement system that a partition can be induced on the domain of entities under measurement and that relations among such entities can be established, and that (2) it is the usage of measurement systems that guarantees a degree of objectivity and intersubjectivity to measurement results. As modeled in this paper, measurement systems link the abstract theory of measuring, as developed in representational terms, and the practice of measuring, as coded in standard documents such as the International Vocabulary of Metrology. (shrink)

Aldo Leopold was a pragmatist in the vernacular sense of the word. Bryan G. Norton claims that Leopold was also heavily influenced by American Pragmatism, a formal school of philosophy. As evidence, Norton offers Leopold's misquotation of a definition of right (as truth) by political economist, A.T. Hadley, who was an admirer of the philosophy of William James. A search of Leopold's digitised literary remains reveals no other evidence that Leopold was directly influenced by any actual American Pragmatist or (...) by Pragmatism (although he may have been indirectly influenced by Pragmatism early in his career). A 1923 reference, by Leopold, to Hadley and Hadley's putative definition of truth, cited by Norton, is dripping with irony. Leopold, as he matured philosophically, regarded a profound cultural shift from anthropocentric dominionism and consumerism to an evolutionary-ecological worldview and an associated non-anthropocentric 'land ethic' to be necessary for successful and sustainable conservation. Hadley espoused a brutal form of Social Darwinism and his philosophy, as expressed in the book of Hadley's that Norton cites, is politically reactionary, militaristic and unconcerned with conservation. Leopold's mature philosophy and Hadley's – far from consonant, as Norton claims – are diametrically opposed. (shrink)

The article studies the treatise De Lege (Summa Theologiae, I-II, qq. 90-108) showing the conceptual development and theological setting: everything comes from the lex aeterna and everything leads to the lex nova. The Thomistic concept of law is not unique or misunderstanding: it is analog. The analogy is applied according to a double movement. According to the analogy of proportionality, the analogiatum princeps is human law; according to the analogy of intrinsic attribution, the analogatum princeps is the eternal law.

Leopold first discusses the conservation of natural resources in the southwestern United States in economic tenns, stressing, in particular, erosion and aridity. He then concludes his analysis with a discussion of the moral issues involved, developing his general position within the context of P. D. Ouspenky’s early philosophy of organism.

In our paper, monadic modal pseudocomplemented De Morgan algebras are considered following Halmos’ studies on monadic Boolean algebras. Hence, their topological representation theory is used successfully. Lattice congruences of an mmpM is characterized and the variety of mmpMs is proven semisimple via topological representation. Furthermore and among other things, the poset of principal congruences is investigated and proven to be a Boolean algebra; therefore, every principal congruence is a Boolean congruence. All these conclusions contrast sharply with known results for monadic (...) De Morgan algebras. Finally, we show that the above results for mmpM are verified for monadic tetravalent modal algebras. (shrink)

Human coalitions frequently persist through multiple, overlapping membership generations, requiring new members to cooperate and coordinate with veteran members. Does the mind contain psychological adaptations for interacting within these intergenerational coalitions? In this paper, we examine whether the mind spontaneously treats newcomers as a motivationally privileged category. Newcomers—though capable of benefiting coalitions—may also impose considerable costs (e.g., they may free ride on other members, they may be poor at completing group tasks). In three experiments we show (1) that the mind (...) categorizes coalition members by tenure, including newcomers; (2) that tenure categorization persists in the presence of orthogonal and salient social dimensions; and (3) that newcomers elicit a pattern of impressions consistent with their probable ancestral costs. These results provide preliminary evidence for a specialized component of human coalitional psychology: an evolved concept of newcomer. (shrink)

Animals populate our artistic and philosophical discourses in critical ways. From Jacques Derrida's or Karen Barad's cat, to Donna Haraway's dog, to the fish in Lucien Castaing-Taylor and Véréna Paravel's Leviathan, these animals feature heavily in discussions regarding limits – the limits of the human and thus its relation with non-humans, but also the limits of knowledge itself. Cute or dangerous, real or fantasised, dead or alive: in this article, I juxtapose the various ways that such animals confront us with (...) what Jacques Derrida describes as “the point of view of the absolute other”. Similarly, recent texts stage encounters with animals – thus distributing agency towards a larger variety of beings, carving out space for a previously excluded non-human other. Yet these encounters are mediated in profoundly different ways. In researching how encounters with the animal are differentially inflected and “defracted” respective to the medium in which they are staged, this article invokes questions of form and style within the critical dialogue that attempts to centre non-human animals. Highlighting how formal decisions are not accidental, but rather integral, to the praxis of the philosophy of animality, this article aims to draw attention to how specific forms and styles allow for a moment of contact with a non-human other. To this end, this article examines three oft-cited encounters: Derrida's encounter with his cat, an intense stare with a fish in Leviathan, and Barad's inflection of Schrödinger's cat. This juxtaposition gives insight into the limits of certain styles of producing thought and critically reflects on these works in their discussion of non-human life and agency. (shrink)

A compreensão epistemológica da Educação Inclusiva expressa um funcionamento diaspórico, isto é, as formas de construção do seu conhecimento, operam através de uma dispersão do conhecimento, distribuída por uma multiplicidade de geografias epistêmicas, entre elas, Feminismo, Teoria Queer, Estudos Postcolonial, entre outros. Neste caso, as contribuições do Feminismo e dos Estudos Queer, tornam-se instâncias chave do conhecimento para promover a proposta de uma nova racionalidade - cada vez mais ampla em suas propostas e sistemas de raciocínio - para justificar a (...) relevância da inclusão para além da produção de ficções baseadas na inclusão no mesmo - dentro da Ciência da Educação no século XXI. Retornando à idéia de Educação Inclusiva como "categoria de análise" e "dispositivo macroeducativo", esta entrevista analisa as interseções políticas, epistêmicas e pedagógicas que a Pedagogia Queer compartilha com a Educação Inclusiva; reconhecendo o primeiro como uma das suas principais memórias epistêmicas de transformação. Nessa ocasião, o Dr. Nilson Dinis, acadêmico do Departamento de Educação e Não-Programa de Graduação em Educação da Universidade Federal de São Carlos, nos dá reflexões interessantes sobre a configuração de um campo que, embora exprima uma longa história em epistemologias subalternas, é conhecida e entendida a partir de uma posição de afastamento e periferia na educação e no treinamento de professores. O Dr. Dinis também aprofunda a compreensão do trans, sua agência e repercussões políticas nas gramáticas educacionais. Ao mesmo tempo, dá idéias-chave para abordar o currículo, as lógicas operacionais das instituições educacionais e a co-gestão das identidades sexuais no contexto educacional. Indubitavelmente, suas contribuições contribuem para posicionar um tópico que as políticas públicas e educacionais no campo da produção de Educação Inclusiva, é subalternizado, gerando novas estratégias de apartheid do conhecimento ou em termos de Spivak ou Foucault, a violência epistêmica, se tornam os chamados "vazios da diversidade", que são apenas declarações que atraem a noção de diferença para o centro do capitalismo, sem abordá-lo, deixando-o em uma situação permanente de desvalorização social e indefesa. Em suma, a entrevista espelha uma crescente complexidade, convidando-nos a superar as simplicidades pedagógicas a este respeito. Palavras-chave: pedagogia queer, educação inclusiva, multiplicidade de diferenças, ação e resistência política. (shrink)

The common account of the analog vs digital distinction is based on features of physical systems, being related to the usage of continuous vs discrete supports respectively. It is proposed here to alternatively characterize the concepts of analog and digital as related to coding systems, of which a formal definition is given, by suggesting that the distinction refers to the strategy adopted to define the coding function: extensional in digital systems, isomorphic intensional in analog systems. This thesis is supported by (...) examples, in particular of analog systems exploiting discrete supports, and is discussed to explain why digital coding is currently so widespread in technological and social practice. (shrink)

Using the Chinese Ring Puzzle, we studied the effect on rule discovery of having to plan actions or not in order to reach a goal state. This was done by asking participants to predict legal moves as in implicit learning tasks and by asking participants to make legal moves as in problem-solving tasks. Our hypothesis was that having a specific goal state to reach has a dual effect on rule discovery. The first effect is positive and related to feedback from (...) moves done in order to attain the goal: generalising the results of action and associating them to the conditions in which they were obtained allows discovery of the rule and learning it. The second effect is negative. In attempting to reach a specific goal, participants first tend to reduce the distance that separates the current state from the goal state and so neglect the kind of exploration that facilitates rule and procedure discovery because this would seem to be a detour from the goal. Results show that having to plan actions improved performance in implicit learning tasks, yet it impaired performance in problem-solving tasks. Although implicit learning and problem solving are based on rule discovery, and entail noticing regularities in the material, in both cases, rule discovery processes appear to be task-dependent. (shrink)

How can a metaphysics of abstract entities be built upon a metaphysics of time? In this paper, I address the question of how to accommodate abstract entities in a presentist world. I consider both the traditional metaontological approach of unrestricted fundamental quantification and then ontological pluralism. I argue that under the former we need to impose two constraints in the characterization of presentism in order to avoid undesired commitments to abstract entities: we have to characterize presentism as a thesis only (...) about the concrete, and we also need to avoid the widely held distinction between tensed and tenseless senses of existence. Under ontological pluralism, instead, I argue that we can naturally accommodate any view of abstract objects in a presentist world. (shrink)

Possediamo un testo parallelo delle prime sei lezioni sul terzo libro, in cui possiamo mettere a con-fronto la dottrina di Pietro con quella di s. Tommaso. Il confronto proposto verte sul tema delle inclinazioni naturali e, segnatamente, sul loro rapporto con il bene e con il diritto naturale. Si presentano in sinossi su tre colonne il testo di Aristotele (nella traduzione latina di Guglielmo di Moerbeke utilizzata dai due commentatori), il commento di s. Tommaso ed il commento di Pietro d’Alvernia. (...) Alla fine di ciascuna sezione ho sviluppato alcune considerazioni conclusive di taglio teoretico. L’elemento teoreticamente più interessante introdotto da Pietro è costituito dall’affermazione che l’uomo “è nato per perfezionarsi” quanto al corpo e quanto all’anima ed ha a questo una esplicita in-clinazione naturale: “[Homo] natus est perfici et naturaliter inclinatur ad hoc quod perficiatur”. Qui si riecheggia l’ontologia tommasiana delle inclinazioni naturali e la metafisica del bene che le è sotte-sa. Bonum est quod omnia appetunt, ma le sostanze appetunt quella perfezione a cui sono inclinate in virtù della loro propria forma, cum unumquodque sit id quod est per suam formam. Il bene è dunque ciò che viene richiesto dalla forma dell’ente, per giungere alla piena realizzazione del dinamismo insito nella forma stessa, dinamismo che si placa solo nella piena attualizzazione di sé, ossia nella perfezione dell’ente. Bisogna notare l’attitudine di Pietro ad usare la categoria dell’inclinazione naturale, anche quando il testo aristotelico non la contiene. È necessario indugiare un po’ su questo tema, giacché in esso - a nostro giudizio - è possibile leggere il fondamento dell’etica classica, così spesso frainteso dai moderni. L’uomo è una creatura strutturalmente “indigente”: homo pluribus indiget. Quest’indigenza, per usare la terminologia di Hume contro lo stesso Hume, è un is da cui consegue rigorosamente un ought. L’indigenza è un fatto, è una carenza costatabile empiricamente; ma costatare una carenza significa scoprire nell’essere fattuale il dover essere: lo stato in cui la carenza è tolta. L’uomo, imperfectus et ex parte animae et ex parte corporis, in ragione della sua stessa imperfezione, rimanda all’uomo “perfetto”, come la potenza rimanda all’atto ed anzi è preceduta dall’atto. (shrink)

Aldo Leopold’s land ethic calls for an extension of ethical consideration to nonhuman components of the complex system he called “the land.” Although the basis for this extension was holistic, interpretations of Leopold’s holism leave one baffled at how he could see his land ethic as an extension of a system which recognizes individual human rights. Leopold’s critics and exponents alike have focused on the holism expressed in his definition of right and wrong. Both regard it as a working (...) criterion of morality to be applied directly to conduct, act by act. Both are mistaken. Leopold was an indirect holist, not a direct one. That is, he applied his holistic definition of right and wrong not as a role for judging conduct directly, case by case, but as a principle for judging conduct only indirectly by judging the roles, tastes, predilections, practices, and attitudes which influence it. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta uma abordagem inicial sobre a caracterização do campo meta-teórico de pesquisa em educação inclusiva e, em particular, examina as forças que produzem seu discurso na pesquisa documental. É reconhecida a necessidade de avançar na exploração de uma perspectiva epistêmica que permita superar o absentismo teórico enfrentado pela educação inclusiva em tempos complexos. O desenvolvimento atual da pesquisa em educação inclusiva é alimentado por vários campos de confluência fora da pedagogia, o que resultou na cristalização de um discurso (...) crítico e não crítico sobre si mesmo. As diferenças entre as perspectivas crítica e acrítica residem na ausência de raciocínio para politizar a discussão sobre a inclusão como mecanismo de transformação de todos os campos da vida do cidadão. Isso confirma a presença de políticas de produção de conhecimento que impõem fundamentos intelectuais binários e poucos pontos de fuga para problematizar as relações estruturais da desigualdade. Soma-se a isso as fortes raízes de padrões que impõem modelos epistêmicos quebrados para pensar nas opressões objeto das diversas identidades que chegam ao espaço escolar e demarcam novas formas de expressão cidadã. Conclui-se com base em um modelo pré-construído de tipo normativo para refletir sobre as questões fundamentais do desenvolvimento humano e cidadão. É necessário promover um processo de descolonização em todos os campos da Ciência da Educação, bem como uma crítica genealógica dos fundamentos híbridos que este modelo propõe, dada a uniformidade de seu discurso em todos os ciclos e níveis de ensino. Palavras-chave: educação inclusiva, políticas de produção de conhecimento, epistemologia, identidades e temas educacionais. (shrink)

Universities have long been involved in knowledge transfer activities. Yet the last 30 years have seen major changes in the governance of university–industry interactions. Knowledge transfer has become a strategic issue: as a source of funding for university research and (rightly or wrongly) as a policy tool for economic development. Universities vary enormously in the extent to which they promote and succeed in commercializing academic research. The identification of clear-cut models of governance for university–industry interactions and knowledge transfer processes is (...) not straightforward. The purpose of this article is to critically discuss university knowledge transfer models and review the recent developments in the literature on research collaborations, intellectual property rights and spin-offs, those forms of knowledge transfer that are more formalized and have been institutionalized in recent years. The article also addresses the role played by university knowledge transfer organizations in promoting commercialization of research results. (shrink)

Frege's logicist program requires that arithmetic be reduced to logic. Such a program has recently been revamped by the "neologicist" approach of Hale and Wright. Less attention has been given to Frege's extensionalist program, according to which arithmetic is to be reconstructed in terms of a theory of extensions of concepts. This paper deals just with such a theory. We present a system of second-order logic augmented with a predicate representing the fact that an object x is the extension of (...) a concept C, together with extra-logical axioms governing such a predicate, and show that arithmetic can be obtained in such a framework. As a philosophical payoff, we investigate the status of the so-called Hume's Principle and its connections to the root of the contradiction in Frege's system. (shrink)