In this chapter, we explore whether agents have an epistemic duty to eradicate implicit bias. Recent research shows that implicit biases are widespread and they have a wide variety of epistemic effects on our doxastic attitudes. First, we offer some examples and features of implicit biases. Second, we clarify what it means to have an epistemic duty, and discuss the kind of epistemic duties we might have regarding implicit bias. Third, we argue that we have an epistemic duty to eradicate (...) implicit biases that have negative epistemic impact. Finally, we defend this view against the objection that we lack the relevant control over implicit bias that’s required for such a duty. We argue that we have a kind of reflective control over the implicit biases that we are duty-bound to eradicate. And since, as we show, we have this control over a wide variety of implicit biases, there are a lot of implicit biases that we have epistemic duties to eradicate. (shrink)

In this paper I articulate a view of doxastic control that helps defend the legitimacy of our practice of blaming people for their beliefs. I distinguish between three types of doxastic control: intention-based, reason-based, and influence-based. First I argue that, although we lack direct intention-based control over our beliefs, such control is not necessary for legitimate doxastic blame. Second, I suggest that we distinguish two types of reason-responsiveness: sensitivity to reasons and appreciation of reasons. I argue that while both capacities (...) are necessary for satisfying the control condition, neither is sufficient. Finally, I defend an influence-based view of doxastic control according to which we have the capacity to execute intentions to engage in reflection that causally influences our beliefs in positive epistemic ways. This capacity is both necessary and sufficient for satisfying the control condition for legitimate doxastic blame. I end by defending the view from two objections: that reflection is not necessary for meeting the control condition, and that it is not sufficient. (shrink)

In this paper, I solve a puzzle generated by three conflicting claims about the relationship between faith, belief, and control: according to the Identity Thesis, faith is a type of belief, and according to Fideistic Voluntarism, we sometimes have control over whether or not we have faith, but according to Doxastic Involuntarism, we never have control over what we believe. To solve the puzzle, I argue that the Identity Thesis is true, but that either Fideistic Voluntarism or Doxastic Voluntarism is (...) false, depending on how we understand "control." I distinguish two notions of control: direct intention-based control and indirect reflective control. I argue that though we have direct intention-based control over neither belief nor faith, we have indirect reflective control over each of them. Moreover, indirect reflective control helps explain how we can be held accountable for each. (shrink)

Numerous studies of the beliefs of people with anorexia nervosa (AN) suggest that a subset of such individuals may experience delusions. We first describe what makes a belief delusional and conclude that such characteristics can be appropriately applied to some beliefs of people with AN. Next, we outline how delusional beliefs may relate to the broader psychopathological process in AN, including: (1) they may be epiphenomenal; (2) they may be an initial partial cause of AN; (3) they may be caused (...) by aspects of AN; or (4) they may be sustaining causes, possibly involved in reciprocal causal relations with aspects of AN. We argue that there is good reason to believe that delusional beliefs of people with AN are not merely epiphenomenal, but rather that they’re causally connected to AN. Because of this, empirical studies can be designed to test for the presence of causal relations. We describe how these studies should be designed. The results of such studies have important implications for understanding the experience of individuals with AN and for the treatment of AN. We outline these implications. (shrink)

All five elements live within you, and experiences like heartache, anxiety, and procrastination are signs that one of them is out of balance. This beginner-friendly book introduces you to each of the elements--Water, Wood, Fire, Earth, and Metal--and shows you how to use them to improve your mental, emotional, and spiritual health. In Our Element weaves together Eastern medicine, Western psychology, Indigenous traditions, and African ancestral principles of spirituality. With a practical approach that incorporates journal prompts, flower essences, yoga poses, (...) and music, Lindsay Fauntleroy teaches you how to tap into the five elements for a balanced and empowered life that aligns with your soul's calling. (shrink)

This book provides a unique introduction for business leaders to the philosophical lexicon of classical and contemporary ideas—for and against—that are relevant to business and those destined to lead it. Rather than presenting the reader with a ‘philosophy of leadership’ the author uses his experiences in academia and as a leader in business to illustrate the practical application of philosophical ideas and methodologies covering the art and science of being a business leader: motivating stakeholders to deliver the initial phase of (...) a business plan for a new product or service; processing information (and risky ‘hidden-information’) that brings the company vision into reality; and ethically managing relationships to enhance the quality of decision-making and its outcomes. Creative aspiration, knowledge and ethical character are the three pillars of leadership. Within that construct, this book challenges leaders to seek their own path to self-development inspired by ideas that shape the ecology of capitalism and the opportunities it provides stakeholders to endow meaning and dignity to their lives through their participation in business. (shrink)

One might well wonder—is there a category under which every thing falls? Offering an informative account of such a category is no easy task. For nothing would distinguish things that fall under it from those that don’t—there being, after all, none of the latter. It seems hard, then, to say much about any fully general category; and it would appear to do no carving or categorizing or dividing at all. Nonetheless there are candidates for such a fully general office, including (...) thing, being, entity, item, existent, and—especially—object.[ It is not obvious that there is any fully general category (whether object or otherwise). Accordingly, not all accounts of object assign it to a fully general category, instead allowing that there are non-objects. On those views, object does indeed divide. Accounts of object, then, differ with respect to whether there are non-objects. And this is not the only fault line. Other dimensions of difference include what objects there are and what objects are. Accordingly, this entry will survey three broad questions about the category object: What, if any, is its contrast or complement? What is its extension? What is its nature? (shrink)

This paper seeks to answer the question: Can contemporary forms of artificial intelligence be creative? To answer this question, I consider three conditions that are commonly taken to be necessary for creativity. These are novelty, value, and agency. I argue that while contemporary AI models may have a claim to novelty and value, they cannot satisfy the kind of agency condition required for creativity. From this discussion, a new condition for creativity emerges. Creativity requires curiosity, a motivation to pursue epistemic (...) goods. I argue that contemporary AI models do not satisfy this new condition. Because they lack both agency and curiosity, it is a mistake to attribute the same sort of creativity to AI that we prize in humans. Finally, I consider the question of whether these AI models stand to make human creativity in the arts and sciences obsolete, despite not being creative themselves. I argue, optimistically, that this is unlikely. (shrink)

Mereological nihilism is the view that no objects have proper parts. Despite how counter‐intuitive it is, it is taken quite seriously, largely because it solves a number of puzzles in the metaphysics of material objects – or so its proponents claim. In this article, I show that for every puzzle that mereological nihilism solves, there is a similar puzzle that (a) it doesn’t solve, and (b) every other solution to the original puzzle does solve. Since the solutions to the new (...) puzzles apply just as well to the old puzzles, the old puzzles provide no motivation to be a mereological nihilist. (shrink)

In this paper, I articulate and argue for a new truthmaker view of ontological commitment, which I call the “General Truthmaker View”: when one affirms a sentence, one is ontologically committed to there being something that makes true the proposition expressed by the sentence. This view comes apart from Quinean orthodoxy in that we are not ontologically committed to the things over which we quantify, and it comes apart from extant truthmaker views of ontological commitment in that we are not (...) ontologically committed to the truthmakers of our sentences. (shrink)

In recent years, many philosophers of religion have turned their attention to the topic of faith. Given the ubiquity of the word “faith” both in and out of religious contexts, many of them have chosen to begin their forays by offering an analysis of faith. But it seems that there are many kinds of faith: religious faith, non‐religious faith, interpersonal faith, and propositional faith, to name a few. In this article, I discuss analyses of faith that have been offered and (...) point out the dimensions along which they differ. (shrink)

This is a review essay of Lagasnerie, Judge and Punish and Fassin, The Will to Punish. It explores the way that these two books challenge conventional thinking about the relationship between crime and punishment.

In this paper, I offer a new theory of grounding. The theory has it that grounding is a job description that is realized by different properties in different contexts. Those properties play the grounding role contingently, and grounding is the property that plays the grounding role essentially. On this theory, grounding is monistic, but ‘grounding’ refers to different relations in different contexts. First, I argue against Kit Fine’s monist univocalism. Next, I argue against Jessica Wilson’s pluralist multivocalism. Finally, I introduce (...) monist multivocalism, explicate three versions of it (of which the above is one), and show its advantages. (shrink)

South African Military Professionalism: Some Critical Observations and Threats -- Threats to Professionalism in the United States Military -- Higher Education and the Profession of Arms: Explaining the Logic -- Military Professionalism -- An Organizational Challenge by Itself -- The Challenge of Maintaining Military Professionalism in the Face of Transformation: The Indonesian Army Experience -- Threats and Opportunities for Military Professionalism from Social Media -- The Profession of Arms and the Promotion of Ethics: The profession of Arms and the Challenge (...) of Ethics -- The New Economic Togetherness: Globalization of Economics and Some Implications for Security and the Military Profession -- Displaced Pride: Attacking Cynicism at the United States Air Force Acedemy -- Military Professionalism of the Swedish Armed Forces in the 21st Century -- The Dynamic Five-Factor Model as a Compass for Military Professionalism: A Comparison Between Switzerland and the Netherlands -- Complacency: A Threat to (Canadian) Military Professionalism. (shrink)

Monism about being says that there is one way to be. Pluralism about being says that there are many ways to be. Recently, Trenton Merricks and David Builes have offered arguments against Pluralism. In this paper, I show how Pluralists who appeal to the relative naturalness of quantifiers can respond to these arguments.

Despite recognizing the importance of developing authentic corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs, noticeably absent from the literature is consideration for how employees distinguish between authentic and inauthentic CSR programs. This is somewhat surprising given that employees are essentially the face of their organization and are largely expected to act as ambassadors for the organization’s CSR program (Collier and Esteban in Bus Ethics 16:19–33, 2007 ). The current research, by conducting depth interviews with employees, builds a better understanding of how employees (...) differentiate between authentic and inauthentic CSR programs, and how these judgments influence their perceptions of the organization. We find that employees rely on two different referent standards to form authenticity judgments—the extent to which the image put forth in the CSR program aligns with the organization’s true identity and the extent to which the CSR program itself is developmental. To assess the former, employees draw on cues about resource commitment, alignment between elements of the organization’s CSR program, emotional engagement, justice, and embeddedness. The latter assessments are based on the extent to which the organization adopts a leadership role with regards to its CSR initiatives. We also find that perceived authenticity can lead to positive outcomes such as organizational identification and employee connections. This study contributes to the broad literatures on both CSR and authenticity, as well as more specifically adding to the conversation on authenticity as a potentially valuable lens for enriching business ethics theorizing. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

THE PHILOSOPHY OF BERGSON CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION In a passage of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant remarks that " It is a great and essential proof of ...

The patient, an 89-year-old man—let’s call him Mr. Smith—had no known relatives, friends, or advance directives. He was a bright man and served as a scientist in the Reagan administration.

Little is known about the mechanisms by which psychology graduate programs transmit responsible conduct of research (RCR) values. A national sample of 968 current students and recent graduates of mission-diverse doctoral psychology programs completed a Web-based survey on their research ethics challenges, perceptions of RCR mentoring and department climate, whether they were prepared to conduct research responsibly, and whether they believed psychology as a discipline promotes scientific integrity. Research experience, mentor RCR instruction and modeling, and department RCR policies predicted student (...) RCR preparedness. Mentor RCR instruction, department RCR policies, and faculty modeling of RCR behaviors predicted confidence in the RCR integrity of the discipline. Implications for training are discussed. (shrink)

A and B continue their conversation concerning the Identity of Indiscernibles. Both are aware of recent critiques of the principle that haven’t received replies; B summarizes those critiques, and A offers the replies that are due. B then raises a new worry.

Some philosophers argue that friendship can normatively require us to have certain beliefs about our friends that epistemic norms would prohibit. On this view, we ought to exhibit some degree of doxastic partiality toward our friends, by having certain generally favorable beliefs and doxastic dispositions that concern our friends that we would not have concerning relevantly similar non-friends. Can friendship genuinely make these normative demands on our beliefs, in ways that would conflict with what we epistemically ought to believe? On (...) a widely influential evidentialist approach to thinking about epistemic norms, friendship cannot normatively require things of our beliefs, because friendship cannot generate reasons for belief. And this is due, in part, to the alleged fact that we are incapable of forming beliefs directly in response to, or on the basis of, non-epistemic reasons. In this paper, I argue that this evidentialist response to alleged cases of conflict between friendship and epistemic norms fails. Instead, I argue that friendship cannot generate reasons for belief due to an underappreciated feature of friendship: that being a good friend constitutively involves forming attitudes about one’s friends that are appropriately responsive to the features that one’s friends have that appear to warrant those attitudes. I argue that this feature of friendship helps explain why friendship cannot give us reasons to have beliefs that are doxastically partial. (shrink)

What is it to suspend judgment about whether p? Much of the recent work on the nature and normative profile of suspending judgment aims to analyze it as a kind of doxastic attitude. On some of these accounts, suspending judgment about whether p partly consists in taking up a certain higher-order belief about one's deficient epistemic position with respect to whether p. On others, suspending judgment about whether p consists in taking up a sui generis attitude, one that takes the (...) question of whether p? as its content. In this paper, I defend an account on which suspending judgment about whether p is not a matter of taking up a doxastic attitude, but rather a way of intentionally omitting to judge whether p. I then close with a discussion of how an account like mine, which sees suspending judgment as fundamentally practical, rather than doxastic, can accommodate what appear to be distinctively epistemic reasons to suspend judgment. (shrink)

Explaining how something is possible is a familiar and epistemically important achievement in both science and ordinary life. But a satisfactory general account of how-possibly explanation has not yet been given. A crucial desideratum for a successful account is that it must differentiate a demonstration that something is possible from an explanation of how it is possible. In this paper, I offer an account of how-possibly explanation that fully captures this distinction. I motivate my account using two cases, one from (...) ordinary life and one from ornithology. On my account, a how-possibly explanation is a greater achievement than a mere description of how a state of affairs might possibly obtain. In addition to being a potential explanation of why some state of affairs actually obtains, a how-possibly explanation must involve the relief of an imaginative frustration on the part of its recipient. When a recipient’s imaginative frustration is relieved, she does not just know that the state of affairs in question is possible, but is also able to imagine how it could possibly obtain. (shrink)

All health care systems face problems of justice and efficiency related to setting priorities for allocating a limited pool of resources to a population. Because many of the central issues are the same in all systems, the United States and other countries can learn from the successes and failures of countries that have explicitly addressed the question of health care priorities. We review explicit priority setting efforts in Norway, Sweden, Israel, the Netherlands, Denmark, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the (...) state of Oregon in the US. The approaches used can be divided into those centered on outlining principles versus those that define practices. In order to establish the main lessons from their experiences we consider the process each country used, criteria to judge the success of these efforts, which approaches seem to have met these criteria, and using their successes and failures as a guide, how to proceed in setting priorities. We demonstrate that there is little evidence that establishment of a values framework for priority setting has had any effect on health policy, nor is there evidence that priority setting exercises have led to the envisaged ideal of an open and participatory public involvement in decision making. (shrink)

In recent years, several prominent biologists have pointed to the relatively new field of evolutionary developmental biology (EvoDevo) as evidence of an Extended Synthesis in evolutionary biology. More particularly, these biologists claim that theoretical and empirical EvoDevo research is extending the Modern Synthesis framework of evolutionary theory through investigation of evolutionarily important concepts that are not part of the framework developed during the 20th century. To describe the current changes in evolutionary biology as an Extended Synthesis, however, is incorrect. Through (...) review of Extended Synthesis arguments and analysis of the same biological concepts used to support these arguments, I argue that the foundation of the Modern Synthesis framework, theoretical population genetics, faces significant, perhaps insurmountable challenges from the concepts highlighted by EvoDevo research. As the foundation of the Modern Synthesis framework will require considerable remodeling—if possible—in light of the concepts emphasized by EvoDevo, it is incorrect to describe the ongoing changes in evolutionary biology as an Extended Synthesis. (shrink)

In recent years, several prominent biologists have pointed to the relatively new field of evolutionary developmental biology as evidence of an Extended Synthesis in evolutionary biology. More particularly, these biologists claim that theoretical and empirical EvoDevo research is extending the Modern Synthesis framework of evolutionary theory through investigation of evolutionarily important concepts that are not part of the framework developed during the 20th century. To describe the current changes in evolutionary biology as an Extended Synthesis, however, is incorrect. Through review (...) of Extended Synthesis arguments and analysis of the same biological concepts used to support these arguments, I argue that the foundation of the Modern Synthesis framework, theoretical population genetics, faces significant, perhaps insurmountable challenges from the concepts highlighted by EvoDevo research. As the foundation of the Modern Synthesis framework will require considerable remodeling—if possible—in light of the concepts emphasized by EvoDevo, it is incorrect to describe the ongoing changes in evolutionary biology as an Extended Synthesis. (shrink)

In this article, we describe what cryptocurrency is, how it works, and how it relates to familiar conceptions of and questions about money. We then show how normative questions about monetary policy find new expression in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. These questions can play a role in addressing not just what money is, but what it should be. A guiding theme in our discussion is that progress here requires a mixed approach that integrates philosophical tools with the purely technical results (...) of disciplines like computer science and economics. Note: this article is the first entry within a two-part sequence on the Philosophy, Politics, and Economics of Cryptocurrency. (shrink)

The fifth book in the series offers an historical and conceptual account of the criminal law, as it has developed in England and spread to common law jurisdictions around the world. It traces how and why criminal law has come to be accorded with a central role in securing civil order in modernity, and justifies who and what should be treated as criminal under the law. Farmer argues that the emergence of the modern state in which criminal law is recognized (...) as an instrument of government is a result of the distinct body of rules which have emerged from the modern criminal law. (shrink)

In this article, we identify three key design dimensions along which cryptocurrencies differ -- privacy, censorship-resistance, and consensus procedure. Each raises important normative issues. Our discussion uncovers new ways to approach the question of whether Bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies should be used as money, and new avenues for developing a positive answer to that question. A guiding theme is that progress here requires a mixed approach that integrates philosophical tools with the purely technical results of disciplines like computer science and (...) economics. Note: this article is the second entry within a two-part sequence on the Philosophy, Politics, and Economics of Cryptocurrency. (shrink)

In this paper, I show how a solution to Lewis’ problem of temporary intrinsics is also a response to McTaggart’s argument that the A-series is incoherent. There are three strategies Lewis considers for solving the problem of temporary intrinsics: perdurantism, presentism, and property-indexing. William Lane Craig (Analysis 58(2):122–127, 1998) has examined how the three strategies fare with respect to McTaggart’s argument. The only viable solution Lewis considers to the problem of temporary intrinsics that also succeeds against McTaggart, Craig claims, is (...) presentism. This gives us prima facie reason to be presentists. But there is a strategy Craig does not consider-indexing, or relativizing, the copula. In this paper, I show that to the degree that indexing the copula solves the problem of temporary intrinsics, it also shows the invalidity of McTaggart’s argument. The upshot: the copula-indexer needn’t affirm the unreality of time, nor need she embrace presentism. (shrink)

There is a growing movement towards construing some classic debates in ontology as meaningless, either because the answers seem obvious or the debates seem intractable. In this paper, I respond to this movement. The response has three components: First, the members of the two sides of the ontological debates that dismissivists have targeted are using different quantifiers. Second, the austere ontologist is using a more fundamental quantifier than her opponent. Third, the austere ontologist’s more fundamental quantifier is a restriction of (...) her opponent’s quantifier. This response takes seriously the intuition that there is something wrong with the ontological disputes, but does not entail dismissivism. (shrink)

Background: Moral distress, which is especially high in critical care nurses, has significant negative implications for nurses, patients, organizations, and healthcare as a whole. Aim: A moral distress workshop and follow-up activities were implemented in an intensive care unit in order to decrease levels of moral distress and increase nurses’ perceived comfort and confidence in ethical decision-making. Design: A quality improvement (QI) initiative was conducted using a pre- and post-intervention design. The program consisted of a four-hour interactive workshop, followed by (...) two individual self-reflection activities at 2–3 weeks and 5–6 weeks after the workshop. Participants: Critical care nurses working in a heart and vascular intensive care unit at a large academic medical center. Ethical Considerations: This study was deemed to be a QI project by the institution’s Institutional Review Board. Participation was voluntary. Findings: Nurses experienced a significant decrease in moral distress. The participants’ average ethical confidence increased in four areas (ability to identify the conflicting values at stake, knowing role expectations, feeling prepared to resolved ethical conflict, and being able to do the right thing), with knowledge of role expectations and feeling prepared to resolve ethical conflict yielding statistically significant increases. Qualitative findings resulted in consistent themes related to causes of moral distress and ways nurses approached addressing moral distress. Discussion: This study reinforces previous evidence on moral distress and its causes in critical care nurses, and provides a mechanism for improving moral distress and ethical confidence. Conclusions: This QI study demonstrates the effectiveness of an evidence-based program for decreasing critical care nurses’ moral distress and increasing their ethical confidence. The strategies described in this paper can replicated by nursing leaders who wish to effect change at their local level, or adapted and expanded to other professions and clinical care units. (shrink)

The puzzle of petitionary prayer: if we ask for the best thing, God was already going to do it, and if we ask for something that's not the best, God's not going to grant our request. In this paper, we give a new solution to the puzzle.

The central dispute between evidentialists and pragmatists about reasons for belief concerns whether or not non-evidential considerations can be reasons for belief. In recent work, some pragmatists about reasons for belief have made their case for pragmatism by appealing, in part, to a broad range of cases in which facts about one’s relationships with significant others (friends, romantic partners, and the like) appear to give one non-evidential reasons to have beliefs skewed in their favor. This chapter explores whether and how (...) such relationships might provide non-evidential reasons for belief. After first making the case against the evidentialist’s claim that there cannot be non-evidential reasons for belief, this chapter turns to examine different accounts of how our personal relationships might ground reasons for doxastic partiality. These are accounts on which reasons for doxastic partiality are grounded in facts about what attitudes are partly constitutive of being a good significant other to someone, and accounts on which reasons for doxastic partiality are grounded in reasons, more broadly, to benefit one’s significant others. This chapter argues that our personal relationships do not provide non-evidential reasons for belief, even if the pragmatist is right that there can be non-evidential reasons for belief. (shrink)

This paper critically reflects on a social work student placement experience at an Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) service. It utilises ethical concepts to analyse the goals and working methods of the medical-dominated service alongside the professional and personal values taken to the role. Discussion focuses on the organisation's assessment process and use of Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT), concluding that the utilitarian and managerialist principles embodied in their procedure conflict with anti-oppressive social work ethics. Particular attention is given to (...) the role and power of a student including personal reflection on the social work methods used and how practice would be changed in the future. (shrink)

Populated by lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans*, queer (LGBTQ) and allied youth, school-based gay straight alliances (GSAs) offer a unique opportunity to re-imagine or redefine youth subjectivity, especially with regards to the intersections of sexual orientation, gender identity, and civic rights. Tracing the evolution of youth subjectivity from the emergence of Canadian schooling in the 1860s, I turn to Ontario’s Bill 13 as a recent example of how GSAs are subverting, or resisting these norms, and in so doing, operate as a (...) kind of counter-public. Drawing from Jenks’ (2005) archetypes of the Dionysian and Apollonian child, I assert that GSAs can embody a third type of child subjectivity, the Athenian child (Smith, 2011; 2014) and, in so doing, provide theoretical space to reconstitute subjectivity for all youth. (shrink)

One of Hume's most well-known works and a masterpiece of philosophy, A Treatise of Human Nature is indubitably worth taking the time to read.

: There is a concern that genetic engineering will exacerbate existing social divisions and inequalities, especially if only the wealthy can afford genetic enhancements. Accordingly, many argue that justice requires the imposition of constraints on genetic engineering. However, it would be unwise to decide at this time what limits should be imposed in the future. Decision makers currently lack both the theoretical tools and the factual foundation for making sound judgments about the requirements of justice in a genetically transformed society. (...) Moreover, focusing on the uncertain inequities of the future may result in failure to give priority to more pressing inequities of the present. Especially in a country that recently has enacted tax legislation that will widen existing wealth disparities, concern about the distant threat of a genetic aristocracy appears misplaced. (shrink)