This article provides somephilosophical ``groundwork'' for contemporary debatesabout the status of the idea(l) of critical thinking.The major part of the article consists of a discussionof three conceptions of ``criticality,'' viz., criticaldogmatism, transcendental critique (Karl-Otto Apel),and deconstruction (Jacques Derrida). It is shown thatthese conceptions not only differ in their answer tothe question what it is ``to be critical.'' They alsoprovide different justifications for critique andhence different answers to the question what giveseach of them the ``right'' to be critical. It is arguedthat (...) while transcendental critique is able to solvesome of the problems of the dogmatic approach tocriticality, deconstruction provides the most coherentand self-reflexive conception of critique. A crucialcharacteristic of the deconstructive style of critiqueis that this style is not motivated by the truth ofthe criterion (as in critical dogmatism) or by acertain conception of rationality (as intranscendental critique), but rather by a concern forjustice. It is suggested that this concern should becentral to any redescription of the idea(l) ofcritical thinking. (shrink)

This article addresses somemethodological questions that are at stake inassessing the influence of the ideas of John Dewey onthe renewal of European education in the twentiethcentury, using examples from the history of Dutcheducation. It is argued that in this kind of researchthe focus should not be on the process of influence assuch, but rather on the activity of reception. This,in turn, requires a contextual reconstruction of theinteraction between Deweyan ideas and practices andexisting ones. The case studies presented in thisarticle exemplify (...) the more general methodologicalobservations. They not only provide an insight in therole of Deweyan ideas and practices in the developmentof Dutch education but also make clear for whatreasons, mostly unrelated to the significance ofDewey's work, these ideas and practices did not haveany lasting influence on the development of Dutcheducation, both on the level of early childhoodeducation and primary and secondary schools. (shrink)

This article addresses some methodological questions that are at stake in assessing the influence of the ideas of John Dewey on the renewal of European education in the twentieth century, using examples from the history of Dutch education. It is argued that in this kind of research the focus should not be on the process of influence as such, but rather on the activity of reception. This, in turn, requires a contextual reconstruction of the interaction between Deweyan ideas and practices (...) and existing ones. The case studies presented in this article exemplify the more general methodological observations. They not only provide an insight in the role of Deweyan ideas and practices in the development of Dutch education but also make clear for what reasons, mostly unrelated to the significance of Dewey’s work, these ideas and practices did not have any lasting influence on the development of Dutch education, both on the level of early childhood education and primary and secondary schools. (shrink)

The idea that professional practices such as education should be based upon or at least be informed by evidence continues to capture the imagination of many politicians, policy makers, practitioners and researchers. There is growing evidence of the influence of this line of thought. At the same time there is a growing body of work that has raised fundamental questions about the feasibility of the idea of evidence-based or evidence-informed practice. In this paper I make a further contribution to this (...) discussion through an analysis of a number of assumptions that inform the discussion. I focus on the epistemological, ontological and praxeological dimensions of the discussion and in each domain identify a deficit. In the epistemological domain there is a knowledge deficit, in the ontological domain an effectiveness or efficacy deficit and in the practice domain an application deficit. Taken together these deficits not only raise some important questions about the very idea of evidence-based practice but also highlight the role of normativity, power and values. Against this background I outline the case for the idea of value-based education as an alternative for evidence-based education. As I am generally concerned about the expectations policy makers hold about what evidence can and should achieve in professional practices such as education, my contribution is primarily meant to provide educators and other professionals with arguments that can help them to resist unwarranted expectations about the role of evidence in their practices and even more so of unwarranted interventions in their practices. (shrink)

This article seeks to reconstruct the early writings of George Herbert Mead in order to explore the significance of his work for the development of an intersubjective conception of education. The reconstruction takes its point of departure in Mead's claim that reflective consciousness has a social situation as its precondition. In a mainly chronological account of Mead's writings on psychology and philosophy from the period 1900–1925, it is shown how Mead explains the social origin of conscious reflection and self-consciousness. It (...) is further shown, how Mead redefines the social in terms of meaningful, creative, radically undetermined, but not yet conscious, interaction. Mead's position thereby implies a reversal of the traditional way in which the relationship between subjectivity and intersubjectivity is conceived. The article ends with an outline of the main implications of this reversal for our understanding of education. (shrink)

This article addresses the question how educational theory can overcome the assumptions of the tradition of the philosophy of consciousness, a tradition which can be seen as the foundation of the modern project of education. While twentieth century philosophy has seen several attempts to make a shift from consciousness to intersubjectivity (Dewey, Wittgenstein, Habermas) it is argued that this shift still remains within the humanistic tradition of modern thought in that it still tries to define, still tries to develop a (...) theory about the human subject. Foucault's thesis of the end of man is interpreted as an attempt to move beyond humanism, an attempt motivated by a sincere concern for the humanity of the subject. Starting from the question as to who comes after the subject, several answers to this question, which all share an interest in the question as to where the subject comes into presence, are discussed (referring to the writings of Tschumi, Arendt and Levinas). In the concluding section it is argued that one way to move beyond the humanistic tradition of modern thought is to conceive of the subject in terms of responsibility and ethics (Levinas) and to conceive of the very task of theory in terms of justice, and not in terms of truth. This, so it is argued, should be the final concern for educational theory and curriculum theory. (shrink)

In The Beautiful Risk of Education, Gert Biesta displays his gift for engaging generously with the thought of others to illuminate what makes education educational, that is, the value in maintaining the complexity and risk involved in a dialogic approach to education. As Biesta puts it, “[education] is therefore, again, a dialogical process. This makes the educational way the slow way, the difficult way, the frustrating way, and so we might say, the weak way” . Such a (...) view of education promises no “results”, in fact the outcomes of education can never be guaranteed. Embracing the risk inherent in this weak notion of education entails welcoming the risk involved in teaching. In this review, we focus on Biesta’s attention to the meaning of teaching and his call for a kind of teacher education that learns from and develops virtuosity. We find Biesta’s use of the term “virtuosity”—rather than the more typical usage for the exercise of wisdom found in educational theory, “virtue”—prod .. (shrink)

The New Testament documents represent a variety of perceptions about the church, showing that the early church was not unitary in practise or theology. How do we explain the diversity in the early church? Existential phenomenological hermeneutics can shine insightful light on this question by utilising Heidegger’s concept of Dasein in an interpretation model. The model used the pre-structure of Dasein and its interactive circular dynamic with the hermeneutical concepts of world and phenomena to table aspects of the hermeneutic situation (...) and the resultant Dasein types as self-understanding developed from various groups’ interpretations of Jesus. In this way, the hermeneutic dynamic explains the variety of pre- and post-Easter groups. The results show that there is no objective, standard view of Jesus and no objective set of Jesus’ teachings available; no ideal Dasein type is presented for faith communities. The kerygma of the Crucified and Risen One as God’s act of salvation is the central presupposition of the church’s Dasein. The historical nature of hermeneutics cannot be denied. Historical–critical exegesis and its circular dynamic of understanding is a legitimate and sound hermeneutic model. Unhistorical hermeneutics have definite limitations and should be deemed insufficient. There is no plain meaning of any phenomenon or text, only the text or phenomenon as it is understood. Faith communities consciously partake in the hermeneutic dynamic and recognise the influence of their pre-understandings, presuppositions and prejudices which constantly be questioned and adjusted to facilitate their authentic Dasein.Contribution: This historical hermeneutical study explains that different hermeneutical situations lead to different Dasein types as various self-understandings developed according to Jesus groups’ interpretations of Jesus varied. No ideal Dasein type for faith communities is presented. These findings resonate with HTS Theological Studies focus and scope regarding historical thought in research. (shrink)

The kingdom of God was a central theme in Jesus' vision. Was it meant to be understood as Utopian as Mary Ann Beavis views it, or existential? In 1st century CE Palestine, kingdom of God was a political term meaning theocracy suggesting God's patronage. Jesus used the term metaphorically to construct a new symbolic universe to legitimate a radical new way of living with God in opposition to the temple ideology of exclusivist covenantal nomism. The analogies of father and king (...) served as the root metaphors for this symbolic universe. They are existential root metaphors underpinning the contextual symbolic universe of God's patronage in reaction to the collapse of the patronage system which left peasants destitute. Jesus' paradoxical use of the metaphor kingdom of God had a therapeutic value and gave the concept new meaning. The initial motivation for proclaiming God's patronage originated in Jesus' primary identity formation by Mary as single parent and was reinforced in his secondary identity formation by John the Baptist. From these results can be concluded that kingdom of God was not meant to be understood as utopian, but existential. In order to clarify the meaning of kingdom of God and God's patronage for the 21st century, demythologisation and deconstruction can be helpful especially by highlighting the existential meaning of the kingdom of God. (shrink)

‘Think before you speak’: The power of the tongue by Philo and James. It is appropriate to reflect on the ability of language in pursuing and establishing peace. This contribution briefly explores the Jewish Wisdom literature, the Jewish-Hellenistic philosophy of the corpus Philonicum and the wisdom genre of James 3 as valuable sources on the power of the tongue. At least five practical guidelines regarding speech and its role in the creation of peace are deduced from these three collections of (...) literature: the tongue might be small, but its effects are powerful; believers’ speech should be characterised by truth and honesty; there are times when one needs to speak up and openly; but there are also times that one should be cautious and rather keep quiet; wisdom is needed in exercising the ability to differentiate when to speak and when to keep quiet. It is important, however, to develop the ability to distinguish when to speak and when to keep quiet. (shrink)

Prologue: on the weakness of education -- Creativity -- Communication -- Teaching -- Learning -- Emancipation -- Democracy -- Virtuosity -- Epilogue: for a pedagogy of the event -- Appendix: coming into the world, uniqueness, and the beautiful risk of education: an interview with Gert Biesta by Philip Winter.

The central themes of Jesus’ preaching, the kingdom and household of God, are root metaphors expressing the symbolic universe of God’s patronage subverting patronage and patriarchy structuring contemporary Mediterranean society, thus legitimising an anti-hierarchical community of faith. This dominant focus of Jesus’ message was discarded, as society’s prevalent patronage and patriarchy became the societal structure of the later faith communities. Today, patronage and patriarchy still forms the social structure for a large sector of Christian communities and many cultures, resulting in (...) inequality, injustice, exploitation and suffering. This article proposes that the only remedy for the faithful is a return to Jesus’ essential message, by investigating the social dynamics suggested by these root metaphors using metaphor theory and social scientific methods. Patronage is studied within contemporary Roman and Mediterranean aristocratic patriarchal society, forming an a-typical broad-based needle-like power pyramid with multiple similarly structured power pyramids within, based on a morality of indebtedness, honour and power. Jesus accepted God as his father and declared the advent of God’s patronage as king (kingdom of God) and father of the faithful (children of God). Within the kingdom and household of God, there was no hierarchy, except for the primate of the first born son, whom Jesus symbolises as broker for God’s patronage to all his followers. Within the faith communities there should be no hierarchy or any form of clientage other than God’s patronage. Rather, the faithful are equal and should serve each other and their communities with compassion, responsibility and justice.Contribution: The contribution of this research is its focus on similarity and dissimilarity of these patronage metaphors and their application to subvert the power dynamics of patronage and patriarchy within the community of the faithful, in order to proffer God’s patronage of a society of caring, selfless equals today. This research falls within the scope of HTS Theological studies, as it is a multi-disciplinary study of key biblical metaphors investigated with accepted methodology resulting in valid conclusions which are ethically sound. (shrink)

The ‘Hervormde’ blend of Barthian view of Scripture leads to a specifically nuanced concept of biblical truth. Biblical truth is neither knowledge, dogma or faith propositions, nor historical, scientific or geographical truth. Biblical truth is a Person, sharing in dialogue with humanity regarding a relationship of God for humanity. Biblical truth is relational and metaphorical. Its imperatives are demythologisation, and ideological and cultural critique. This concept of truth is in contrast to the truth concept of most church members, because of (...) their literal and often fundamentalist views of Scripture. In order to convey understanding of the truth concept, the ‘Hervormde’ view of Scripture should be discussed with them. A confession should be formulated for post-modern believers. (shrink)

The development in Ricoeur’s concept of time did not receive as much attention as his move from eidetic to hermeneutic phenomenology and his Time and Narrative, with which it coincided. This paper attends to the lacuna, specifically departing from Ricoeur’s Husserlian eidetics and moving towards the influence of Augustine’s discussion of the main aporias of time. Initially, Paul Ricoeur’s philosophic approach can be described as a Husserlian eidetic phenomenology, which influenced the way in which he understood time. This changed somewhat (...) when Ricoeur moved from eidetic to hermeneutic phenomenology. Ricoeur has developed his understanding of the concept of time since his initial writings up to the end of his academic career of 70 years. This article focusses on Ricoeur’s initial eidetic approach in Freedom and Nature and, in more existential terms, in Fallible man, but also focusses on the initial phase of his turn to hermeneutics in Volume 1 of Time and Narrative with his exposition of Augustine’s views on time. His eidetic approach stems from his appreciation for and extension of the work of Husserl, Marcel and Kant, while he also drew much from Heidegger and Gadamer after his hermeneutic turn. His initial arguments on the hermeneutic phenomenology of time flow from Augustine’s discussions of the aporias of time. The later extension of his understanding of time to include emplotment was a logical next step. (shrink)

In §66 ofPhilosophical Investigations Wittgenstein looks for something common to various games and finds only an interconnecting network of resemblances. These are family resemblances. Sympathetic as well as unsympathetic readers have interpreted him as claiming that games form a family in virtue of these resemblances. This assumes Wittgenstein inverted the relation between being a member of a family and bearing family resemblances to others of that family. (The Churchills bear family resemblances to one another because they belong to the same (...) family, they don't belong to the same family because they resemble one another.) A close reading ofInvestigations gives no evidence that Wittgenstein made this mistake. Rather, family resemblances may play a role like the one criteria play for psychological terms. They give excellent but fallible evidence for membership in the extensions of some terms. (shrink)

In her later writings Jean Hampton develops an expressive theory of punishment she takes to be retributivist. Unlike Feinberg, Hampton claims wrongdoings as well as punishments are expressive. Wrongdoings assert that the victim is less valuable than victimizer. On her view we are obligated to punish because we are obligated to respond to this false assertion. Punishment expresses the moral truth that victim and wrongdoer are equally valuable. We argue that Hampton's argument would work only if she held that exerting (...) power over another provides evidence (albeit defeasible) of one's greater value. This is clearly a premise that neither she nor her readers are likely to accept. (shrink)