Erkenntnis und Irrtum. Skizzen zur Psychologie der Forschung. Von E. MACH Emer. Professor an der Unlversltlt Wlen. LEIPZIG Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth 1905. INTRODUCTION XIII On a number of occasions Mach expressed the sentiment, especially in his correspondence, that America was the land of intellectual freedom and opportunity, the coming frontier for a new radical empiricism that would help to wash metaphysics out of philosophy. In 1901 he sponsored the German edition of Concepts and Theories of Modern (...) Physics (1881) 2 by J. B. Stallo, Cincinnati lawyer and philosopher. Mach warmly endorsed Stallo's book because his scientific aims so closely approximated his own, and because Stallo rejected the latent metaphysical elements and concealed ontological assumptions of the mechanical-atomistic inter­ pretation of the world. The second edition of Wiirmelehre was dedicated to Stallo in 1900. The fourth edition of Populiir-wissenschaftliche Vorlesungen (1910), containing seven new essays, was dedicated to Harvard Professor of physiology, philosophY, and psychology, William James. Mach had a strong intellectual affinity for James' pragmatism because, like himself, he recognized that James had come to radically empirical views from science. Both men took pure pre-conceptualized experience, from which the mental and physical predicates of experience are composed, to be neutral rather than real, unreal, objective or subjective. (shrink)

The sociologist Georg Simmel and the philosopher Ernst Cassirer developed strikingly similar theories of modernity. Both viewed the transition from a substantialist to a functionalist view of the world as the modern age's distinguishing characteristic. But they interpreted this transition from very different philosophical perspectives. Simmel subscribed to a phenomenalism derived from Mach, whereas Cassirer advocated an objectivism inspired by a particular interpretation of Kant. This epistemological disagreement helps account for the two thinkers’ divergent cultural attitudes. Whereas Simmel viewed (...) the complex structures of modernity as an alienation from the flow of subjective life, Cassirer viewed them as a proper expression of humanity's symbolising capacity. Simmel's cultural pessimism developed into an enthusiasm for radical collective action, especially during the First World War. Cassirer's optimism, conversely, guarded him against this temptation. (shrink)

The effective-photon hypothesis postulates a photon energy variable with light intensity according to a relation of the form ε=hv/[1−β 0 f(I)]=hv 1 . This hypothesis has been subjected to direct experimental test. A Mach-Zehnder interferometer is illuminated with aQ-spoiled Nd:glass laser and the time history of the interference fringes is recorded with an image converter camera. The experimental results show that indeed the laser pulse is not monochromatic and that a large frequency change occurs with light intensity. In addition, (...) the analysis of the results indicates that the principle of conservation of energy is not in contradiction with the hypothesis of “effective photon,” provided photons can exchange energy among themselves. (shrink)

Mach's principle is discussed as a fundamental statement on kinematics, and an apparent contradiction is identified in the Lorentz-Minkowski form of the inertial metric. To resolve the incompatibility, length is redefined so that the speed of light is a field-dependent variable, although still constant for all inertial observers at a point in space-time. Gravitational theories with variableG are considered, and it is shown that a redefinition of length and time results in constantG and variablec.

The article analyzes the influence of Kantian philosophy on the problems and development of Russian empiriocriticism. It is shown that the critical pathos of Kant’s philosophy, as well as his call for intellectual honesty in philosophy, was appreciated first of all. Relying on Kant, Russian empiriocritics proved the inconsistency of metaphysics in both its religious and materialistic forms. In addition, the teachings of the founders of empiriocriticism, E. Mach and R. Avenarius, were also criticized because some dogmatic assumptions were (...) found in them. Attempts to eliminate these assumptions resulted in a dynamic concept of experience, based on which the concepts of empiriomonism (A. Bogdanov), empiriosymbolism (P. Yushkevich), scientific philosophy (V. Lesevich), positive philosophy of life (S. Suvorov), positive aesthetics (A. Lunacharsky), ethics of mutual joy (A. Bogdanov) and many others were developed. Special attention was paid to the analysis of the “thing-in-itself” since this very concept of Kantian philosophy was used by G. Plekhanov to justify “orthodox” Marxism. Russian empiriocritics opposed Plekhanov’s identification of the “thing in itself” and the material object, arguing that the concept of matter is a metaphysical assumption and, for this reason, cannot contribute to refuting dualism and Kantian “agnosticism.” From the monistic point of view, the “thing-in-itself” should be understood on the basis of experience as a necessary form of its organization. According to Bogdanov, there is nothing a priori in the “thing-in-itself”; this idea appeared as a result of substituting the known for the unknown and expressed a process rather than essence. Kant’s aesthetics and moral philosophy were also actively discussed in Russian empiriocriticism. The interpretation of beauty as “expediency without purpose” was extended to the fundamental principle of the “aesthetic worldview,” which gave credibility to the doctrine of the ideal, the practice of social construction, etc. As a result of the polemic with the ethics of compassion, of which Kant was considered the most authoritative defender, an alternative ethic of mutual joy was created. Thus, the influence of Kantian philosophy on Russian empiriocritics was complex and contributed to the development of new ideas. (shrink)

The operational definition of a weak value for a quantum mechanical system involves the limit of the weak measurement strength tending to zero. I study how this limit compares to the situation for the undisturbed system. Under certain conditions, which I investigate, this limit is discontinuous in the sense that it does not merge smoothly to the Hilbert space description of the undisturbed system. Hence, in these discontinuous cases, the weak value does not represent the undisturbed system. As a result, (...) conclusions drawn from such weak values regarding the properties of the studied system cannot be upheld. Examples are given. (shrink)

This article argues that the limited influence of Ludwik Fleck's ideas on philosophy of science is due not only to their indirect dissemination by way of Thomas Kuhn, but also to an incommensurability between the standard conceptual framework of history and philosophy of science and Fleck's own more integratedly historico-social and praxis-oriented approach to understanding the evolution of scientific discovery. What Kuhn named "paradigm" offers a periphrastic rendering or oblique translation of Fleck's Denkstil/Denkkollektiv , a derivation that may also account (...) for the lability of the term "paradigm". This was due not to Kuhn's unwillingness to credit Fleck but rather to the cold war political circumstances surrounding the writing of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions . Following a discussion of Fleck's anatomical allusions, I include a brief discussion of Aristotle (on menstruation and darkened mirrors) and conclude with a reference to the productivity of error in Mach and Nietzsche. (shrink)

Afshar et al. claim that their experiment shows a violation of the complementarity inequality. In this work, we study their claim using a modified Mach-Zehnder setup that represents a simpler version of the Afshar experiment. We find that our results are consistent with Afshar et al. experimental findings. However, we show that within standard quantum mechanics the results of the Afshar experiment do not lead to a violation of the complementarity inequality. We show that their claim originates from a (...) particular technique they use to analyze their results. In their analysis, they assume a classical concept, that particles have a definite trajectory before detection, thus, they obtain which-way information by particle detection plus path extrapolation by applying momentum conservation. This analysis technique is standard in experimental particle physics. Important discoveries such as the detection of vector bosons have been made through the application of this technique. We note that particle detection plus path extrapolation is a suitable technique within de Broglie-Bohm theory of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Chronologically ordered readings varying in length from a high of sixty-two pages from J. S. Mill to a low of twenty-two pages from Brentano, with most of the other eleven philosophers included having between thirty-five and forty-five pages each. Comte, Spencer, and Mach are mild surprises whose presence is explained over that of, say, Marx, by the editor's desire to emphasize epistemological, metaphysical, and methodological themes. The bibliographies accompanying the selections are "non-selective"; sometimes they appear positively random. The general (...) introduction is too brief to be of any real use but one can sympathize with the fact that the editor had to say something by way of introduction. In addition to the philosophers mentioned above, selections from Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Peirce, Bradley, and Frege are included.—E. A. R. (shrink)

Operationism may tentatively be defined as that scientific method which defines its concepts in terms of observable or communicable operations, however carried out. With few exceptions, it has been put forward as representing positivism in contemporary sociology. Sellars refers to it as a new and virulent form of positivism—logical positivism. In philosophy, logical positivism is the culmination of the sensationalism of Berkeley and Hume, the positivism of Mach and Avenarius and Comte, and the logistic of Russell and Wittgenstein. In (...) sociology, the philosophic assumptions of this school have been stated in a naive form, in addition to presenting Kantian idealism contradicted by an assumption of philosophic realism. (shrink)

James argued that time is a sensation, and the main point of this paper is to deny that claim. The concept of the specious present is explained, indicating how it clarifies the concept of "the present moment." But neither it nor an argument used by Mach and James show time to be a sensation. The analysis presented here requires distinguishing concepts of sensation from concepts of temporal relations. James' view is really a theory that time-as-duration is sensed. But this (...) assumes that the description of time as sensed is also a description of time as an objective property of independent events. This is nowhere established, and making it plausible is a recurrent problem for philosophies like neutral monism and radical empiricism. (shrink)

The effort to link philosophical theories with the progress of science has been a persistent one, but most modern scientists do their work quite successfully without giving a thought to philosophical problems or issues. In the earliest days of intellectual curiosity, one could scarcely distinguish between philosophy and science for the Milesian metaphysicians were also physicists. Democritus’s ontological views presaged the atomic theory of matter. The metaphysician Aristotle was so brilliant as a scientist that few questioned his authority until the (...) fifteenth century. As the concerns of science became more particular and experimental, it began to separate itself from philosophy. Since the Renaissance, the two have rather gone their own ways. Philosophers have usually been more interested in what scientists were doing than vice versa. Not many scientists are affected by what philosophers have concluded. A. D. Ritchie once noted that had chemists paid serious attention to Ernst Mach’s reductionist criticisms of science, they would have “murdered a fine and lively science.”. (shrink)

Some epistemological and methodological problems associated with the principle of observability are discussed, especially in relation to this principle's heuristic role and its objective basis and in relation to the philosophical doctrine of Mach.

Quantum mechanical weak values of projection operators have been used to answer which-way questions, e.g. to trace which arms in a multiple Mach–Zehnder setup a particle may have traversed from a given initial to a prescribed final state. I show that this procedure might lead to logical inconsistencies in the sense that different methods used to answer composite questions, like “Has the particle traversed the way X or the way Y?”, may result in different answers depending on which methods (...) are used to find the answer. I illustrate the problem by considering some examples: the “quantum pigeonhole” framework of Aharonov et al., the three-box problem, and Hardy’s paradox. To prepare the ground for my main conclusion on the incompatibility in certain cases of weak values and logic, I study the corresponding situation for strong/projective measurements. In this case, no logical inconsistencies occur provided one is always careful in specifying exactly to which ensemble or sample space one refers. My results cast doubts on the utility of quantum weak values in treating cases like the examples mentioned. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:This article examines the place of Machiavelli’sPrincein the history of ethics and the history of leadership philosophy. Close scrutiny indicates that Machiavelli advances an ethical system for leadership that involves uprooting corruption and establishing rule of law. He draws on history and current affairs in order to obtain a realistic understanding of human behavior that forms a basis for a consequentialist ethics. While he claims a good leader might do bad things, this is in situations where necessity constrains a prince (...) to choosing the “least bad” course of action. Furthermore, Machiavelli advocates winning the goodwill of followers through leadership as a source of power. Machiavelli’s leadership ethics has a sophistication not fully enjoyed by his reputation in management scholarship. He would not score as especially “Machiavellian” on the Mach IV. Many of his ideas contain seeds for theories that are now considered important for leadership today. (shrink)

This paper presents the results of optical interferometry experiments in which the phase of photons in one arm of a Mach-Zehnder interferometer is modified by applying a transverse constriction. An equivalent quantum interferometry experiment using neutron de Broglie waves is discussed in which the observed phase shift is in the spirit of the force-free phase shift of the Aharonov-Bohm effects. In the optical experiments the experimental results are in excellent agreement with predictions.

Contrary to what has been asserted or implied by Mach and more recent writers, the law of illumination and the study of photometry were not ignored in the years between Kepler's first enunciation of the former in 1609 and Bouguer's Essai on the latter in 1729. The law of illumination was in fact denied in 1613 by Aguilonius. It was probably rediscovered independently and certainly reformulated in more modern terms by Mersenne and Castelli in 1634, and by Boulliau in (...) 1638. It was again formulated and this time demonstrated empirically by Montanari no later than 1676, and possibly as early as 1634 by Castelli. Although neither the law nor photometry were major concerns before Bouguer, they were not completely neglected either. (shrink)

This is an excellent addition to Bobbs-Merrill's "Text and Commentary Series." In addition to the text of the Principles, there are eleven critical essays, three of which are original with this volume. Turbayne has arranged the essays to parallel the unfolding of the major themes in the Principles. Thus, he himself opens with "Berkeley's Metaphysical Grammar," which picks up and develops the theme of the centrality of the study of language to the philosophical enterprise, a point Berkeley makes in his (...) "Preface." Next, W. H. Hay and Richard Van Iten are paired together with different perspectives on Berkeley's nominalism. By way of comment on esse is percipi, G. E. Moore and W. T. Stace present their respective refutations of idealism and realism. Richard Popkin discusses skepticism and Berkeley. Popper examines the ways in which Berkeley anticipated Mach and Einstein, as well as significant features of contemporary philosophy of science. Turbayne and Cornman offer differing appraisals of the philosophy of mind that is sketched in the Principles. Paul Olscamp attempts to systematize the elements of Berkeley's critical theory. Finally, J. D. Mabbott treats of "The Place of God in Berkeley's Philosophy" and argues for a radical voluntarism in Berkeley--a not surprising analysis, but one which often gets buried under the epistemological issues raised in the Principles. Turbayne has also supplied an excellent introduction, a chronology of Berkeley's life, a working bibliography, and an analytical index. This enhances the usefulness of an already first-rate book.--E. A. R. (shrink)

Volume VI in Doubleday's Modern Studies in Philosophy series. Martin is responsible for the ten Locke essays, Armstrong for the twelve on Berkeley. The essays on Locke are by Ryle, Yolton, Jackson, Barnes, Bennett, Flew, Monson, Macpherson, and Ryan. The last three cover Locke's political philosophy while the others inevitably concern themselves with Locke's psychology and epistemology. The Berkeley essays are by Broad, Luce, Grave, Marc-Wogau, Cummins, Mabbott, Bennett, Furlong, Beardsley, Thomson, and Popper. Popper's essay is on "Berkeley as Precursor (...) of Mach and Einstein." As with Locke, the other topics are predictable, though a total of three essays are devoted to the role of "God" in Berkeley's philosophy. An index and a short bibliography are appended.--E. A. R. (shrink)

Chronologically ordered readings varying in length from a high of sixty-two pages from J. S. Mill to a low of twenty-two pages from Brentano, with most of the other eleven philosophers included having between thirty-five and forty-five pages each. Comte, Spencer, and Mach are mild surprises whose presence is explained over that of, say, Marx, by the editor's desire to emphasize epistemological, metaphysical, and methodological themes. The bibliographies accompanying the selections are "non-selective"; sometimes they appear positively random. The general (...) introduction is too brief to be of any real use but one can sympathize with the fact that the editor had to say something by way of introduction. In addition to the philosophers mentioned above, selections from Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Peirce, Bradley, and Frege are included.—E. A. R. (shrink)

The book you hold in your hands is the outcome of the "ISCS 2013: Interdisciplinary Symposium on Complex Systems" held at the historical capital of Bohemia as a continuation of our series of symposia in the science of complex systems. Prague, one of the most beautiful European cities, has its own beautiful genius loci. Here, a great number of important discoveries were made and many important scientists spent fruitful and creative years to leave unforgettable traces. The perhaps most significant period (...) was the time of Rudolf II who was a great supporter of the art and the science and attracted a great number of prominent minds to Prague. This trend would continue. Tycho Brahe, Niels Henrik Abel, Johannes Kepler, Bernard Bolzano, August Cauchy Christian Doppler, Ernst Mach, Albert Einstein and many others followed developing fundamental mathematical and physical theories or expanding them. Thus in the beginning of the 17th century, Kepler formulated here the first two of his three laws of planetary motion on the basis of Tycho Brahe’s observations. In the 19th century, nowhere differentiable continuous functions (of a fractal character) were constructed here by Bolzano along with a treatise on infinite sets, titled “Paradoxes of Infinity” (1851). Weierstrass would later publish a similar function in 1872. In 1842, Doppler as a professor of mathematics at the Technical University of Prague here first lectured about a physical effect to bear his name later. And the epoch-making physicist Albert Einstein – while being a chaired professor of theoretical physics at the German University of Prague – arrived at the decisive steps of his later finished theory of general relativity during the years 1911–1912. In Prague, also many famous philosophers and writers accomplished their works; for instance, playwright arel ape coined the word "robot" in Prague (“robot” comes from the Czech word “robota” which means “forced labor”). (shrink)

Tra i numerosi autori attivi nel campo delle scienze naturali che Friedrich Nietzsche ebbe modo di conoscere nel corso della propria vita, Ernst Mach rappresenta certamente un caso significativo. La sua presenza all'interno degli scritti del filosofo è pressoché nulla, ma la comunanza dei temi trattati e la particolare affinità delle prospettive adottate in materia di teoria della conoscenza invitano ad avvicinare questi due autori e a ipotizzare un qualche tipo di influsso diretto tra loro. Ciononostante, fino ad oggi (...) non era mai stato svolto uno studio critico e completo che esaminasse e discutesse tale relazione. Muovendo dai contenuti di una delle principali opere di Mach, i "Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen" (1886) questo volume delinea un quadro esegetico che fa di Mach non tanto un referente diretto, quanto piuttosto il segnale di una prospettiva di ricerca che in qualche modo stimolò l'interesse di Nietzsche e che per molti aspetti egli mostra di condividere. (shrink)

Como conciliar as repetidas críticas ao fenomenismo de Mach, um pouco por toda a obra de Husserl, com o papel proeminente que Husserl parece nele reconhecer em seus últimos trabalhos, quanto à gênese de sua própria fenomenologia? Para responder a essa questão, examinaremos, primeiramente, a relação estreita que Husserl estabelece entre o método fenomenológico e o descritivismo de Mach à luz do debate que opõe nativismo e empirismo sobre a origem da percepção do espaço. Em seguida, examinaremos dois (...) aspectos da crítica que Husserl faz ao positivismo de Mach: o primeiro se refere ao fenomenismo e sua doutrina dos elementos, enquanto o segundo, ao princípio de economia de pensamento, que Husserl associa a uma forma de psicologismo em Prolegômenos. A hipótese que nos guiará nesse estudo é que as opiniões aparentemente contraditórias de Husserl sobre o positivismo de Mach se explicam em parte pelo estatuto duplo que a fenomenologia recebe em seus últimos trabalhos: enquanto programa filosófico, ela se opõe explicitamente ao positivismo; enquanto método, ela se aparenta ao descritivismo de Mach. Concluiremos com a ideia de que esses dois filósofos de origem checa perseguiam o objetivo comum de apreender o sentido originário de positividade. (shrink)

Ernst Mach (1838-1916) è stato una figura di riferimento per la cultura scientifica e filosofica tardo-ottocentesca e dei primi decenni del Novecento. Le sue ricerche in fisica e psicologia, così come il lavoro epistemologico che emerge dalle pagine di opere quali La meccanica nel suo sviluppo storico-critico e Conoscenza ed errore, hanno influito notevolmente su molti autori a lui contemporanei. In questi testi, Mach delinea una concezione antimetafisica del pensiero scientifico e una concezione biologico-evolutiva della conoscenza umana che (...) si ritrovano elaborate in vario modo nella teoria della relatività di A. Einstein, nell’epistemologia evoluzionistica di K. Popper e D. Campbell, nel pragmatismo di W. James e, più in generale, nelle idee che animarono il primo Circolo di Vienna. I saggi raccolti nel presente volume si propongono di commemorarne la figura e l’opera, guardando a Mach come figura di confine tra prospettive di indagine che la storia della filosofia dell’ultimo secolo ha spesso visto contrapposte. (shrink)