This paper expands on the discussion in the first section of 'Beyond phenomenal naivete'. Let Phenomenal Naivete be understood as the doctrine that some phenomenal characters of veridical experiences are factive properties concerning the external world. Here I present in detail a phenomenological case for Phenomenal Naivete and an argument from hallucination against it. I believe that these arguments show the concept of phenomenal character to be defective, overdetermined by its metaphysical and epistemological commitments together with the world. This does (...) not establish a gappish eliminativism, but a gluttish pluralism, on which there are many imperfect deservers of the name 'phenomenal character'. Different projects in the philosophy of mind -- phenomenology, philosophy of conscious, metaphysics and epistemology of perception -- are concerned with different deservers of the name. (shrink)

Direct realists think that we can't get a clear view the nature of /hallucinating a white picket fence/: is it /representing a white picket fence/? is it /sensing white-picket-fencily/? is it /being acquainted with a white' picketed' sense-datum/? These are all epistemic possibilities for a single experience; hence they are all metaphysical possibilities for various experiences. Hallucination itself is a disjunctive or "multidisjunctive" category. I rebut MGF Martin's argument from statistical explanation for his "epistemic" conception of hallucination, but his view (...) embeds in my view as a "reference-fixer". (shrink)

The hermeneutic tradition divides /physical/ discourse, which takes an 'exterior' point of view in /describing/ its subject-matter, from /mental/ discourse, which takes an 'interior' point of view in /expressing/ its subject-matter: a 'metapsychological dualist' or 'metadualist' approach. The analytic tradition, in its attachment to truth-logic and consequently the 'unity of science', is 'metamonist', and thinks all discourse takes the 'exterior' viewpoint: the 'bump in the rug' moves to the disunification of mind into the functional and (big-'C') Consciousness. Assuming the hermeneuts (...) are correct, the literature's twisty path---from Place and Smart's confused metamonist responses to Ryle's crypto-metadualist /Concept of Mind/ to contemporary metamonist 'phenomenal intentionality'---emerges as an attempt to stabilize theory on a fundamentally wobbly platform. (shrink)

Perception represents colours inexactly. This inexactness results from phenomenally manifest noise, and results in apparent violations of the transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability. Whether these violations are genuine depends on what is meant by 'transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability'.

‘Egalitarian' views of consciousness treat my stream of consciousness and yours as on a par ontologically. A range of worries about Chalmers's philosophical system are traced to a background presupposition of egalitarianism: Chalmers is apparently committed to ‘soul pellets'; the ‘phenomenal properties' at the core of the system are obscure; a ‘vertiginous question' about my identity is raised but not adequately answered; the theory of phenomenal concepts conflicts with the ‘transparency of experience'; the epistemology of other minds verges very close (...) to a priori physicalism; the system predicts that dualism is alluring, when it is not. (shrink)

A direct realist theory of perceptual justification. I take a ground-up approach, beginning with a theory of subjective rationality understood in terms of first-person rational explicability of the stream of consciousness. I mathematize this picture via a Tractarian spin on a semantical framework developed by Rayo. Perceptual states justify by being 'receptive': rationally inexplicable intentional states encoded in sentences that are analytic. Direct realists working within this framework should say that when one is taken in by hallucination one's overall picture (...) of the world is incoherent; in this sense, a belief based on delusive hallucination can be provided with exculpation but not with justification. (shrink)

I argue on linguistic grounds that when Mary comes to know what it's like to see a red thing, she comes to know a certain inexpressible truth about the character of her own experience. This affords a "no concept" reply to the knowledge argument. The reason the Knowledge Argument has proven so intractable may be that we believe that an inexpressible concept and an expressible concept cannot have the same referent.

I argue against such "Relation Intentionalist" theories of consciousness as the higher-order thought and inner sense views on the grounds that they understand a subject's awareness of his or her phenomenal characters to be intentional, like seeming-seeing, rather than "direct", like seeing. The trouble with such views is that they reverse the order of explanation between phenomenal character and intentional awareness. A superior theory of consciousness, based on views expressed by Russell and Price, takes the relation of awareness to be (...) a nonintentional "acquaintance". (shrink)

I discuss the meaning of 'There's something e is like', in the context of a reply to Eric Lormand's 'The explanatory stopgap'. I argue that Lormand is wrong to think it has a specially perceptual meaning. Rather, it has one of at least four candidate meanings: e is some way as regards its subject; e is some way and e's being that way is in the possession of its subject; e is some way in the awareness of its subject; e's (...) subject is the "experiencer" of e. I provide additional argumentation for the view in this paper that in the context, 'like this' functions as a predicate variable. (shrink)

We begin with a theory of the structure of sensory consciousness; a target phenomenon of 'presentation' can be clearly located within this structure. We then defend the rational-psychological necessity of presentation. We conclude with discussion of these philosophical challenges to the possibility of presentation. One crucial aspect of the discussion is recognition of the <cite>nonobjectivity</cite> of consciousness (a technical appendix explains what I mean by that). The other is a full-faced stare at the limitations of rational psychology: much of the (...) dialectic in the philosophy of perception pertains to matters beyond the limits of coherence---a breakwater against which philosophy crashes, and rolls back. (shrink)

Let's be externalists about perceptual consciousness and think the form of veridical perceptual consciousness includes /seeing this or that mind-independent particular and its colors/. Let's also take internalism seriously, granting that spectral inversion and hallucination can be "phenomenally" the same as normal seeing. Then perceptual consciousness and phenomenality are different, and so we need to say how they are related. It's complicated!<br><br>Phenomenal sameness is (against all odds) /reflective indiscriminability/. I build a "displaced perception" account of reflection on which indiscriminability stems (...) from shared "qualia". Qualia are compatible with direct realism: while they generate an explanatory gap (and colors do not), so does /seeing/; qualia are excluded from perceptual consciousness by its "transparency"; instead, qualia are aspects of thought about the perceived environment. <br><br>The asymmetry between my treatments of color and seeing is grounded in the asymmetry between ignorance and error: while inversion shows that normal subjects are ignorant of the natures of the colors, hallucination shows not that perceivers are ignorant of the nature of seeing but that hallucinators are prone to error about their condition. Past literature has treated inversion and hallucination as on a par: externalists see error in both cases, while internalists see mutual ignorance. My account is so complicated because plausible results require mixing it up. (shrink)

The naive realist takes a veridical visual experience to be an immediate relation to external entities. Is this how such an experience is phenomenally, by its phenomenal character? Only if there can be phenomenal error, since a hallucinatory experience phenomenally matching such a veridical experience would then be phenomenally but not in fact such a relation. Fortunately, such phenomenal error can be avoided: the phenomenal character of a visual experience involves immediate awareness of a sort of picture of external entities, (...) as on a representative theory of perception. The attraction of naive realism results from an erroneous projection of the immediacy of the subject's awareness of this picture onto the external entities pictured. (shrink)

Relativized Metaphysical Modality (RMM: Murray and Wilson, 'Relativized metaphysical modality', Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 2012; Murray, Perspectives on Modal Metaphysics, 2017) exploits 'two-dimensionalist' resources to metaphysical, rather than epistemological, ends: the second dimension offers perspective-dependence without contingency, diverting attacks on 'Classical' analyses of modals (in effect, analyses validating S5 and the Barcan Formulae). Here, we extend the RMM program in two directions. First, we harvest resources for RMM from Lewis's 1980 'Context--Index' (CI) framework: (a) the ban in CI on binding (...) into context-arguments (akin to Kaplan's 'monstrosity' ban) projects a bright line between perspective-dependence and contingency; and (b) CI-postulated connections among meaning, content, truth, argument-structure, context, and modality collectively generate a 'Generalized Humphrey Problem' for any non-Classical analysis (examples covered include appeals to accessibility, contingent domains, and counterpart relations). Second, we sharpen the tools of RMM-based metaphysical analysis, and extend their domain of coverage across familiar anomalies for Classical modals: we revisit earlier RMM-based bulwarks for S5 (against 'Chisholm's Paradox' for moderate flexibility of essence, and nomological necessitarianism); and we now similarly shore up the Barcan Formulae (against the apparent contingency of existence and nonexistence). (shrink)

I interpret the anti-idealist manoeuverings of the second half of Moore's 'The refutation of idealism', material as widely cited for its discussion of 'transparency' and 'diaphanousness' as it is deeply obscure. The centerpiece of these manoeuverings is a phenomenological argument for a relational view of perceptual phenomenal character, on which, roughly, 'that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact' is a non-intentional relation of conscious awareness, a view close to the opposite of the most characteristic contemporary view going (...) under the transparency rubric. The discussion of transparency and diaphanousness is a sidelight, its principal purpose to shore up the main line of argumentation against criticism; in those passages all Moore argues is that the relation of conscious awareness is not transparent, while acknowledging that it can seem to be. (shrink)

‘Fred must open the door’ concerns Fred’s obligations. This obligative meaning is turned off by adding aspect: ‘Fred must have opened/be opening/have been opening the door’ are one and all epistemic. Why? In a nutshell: obligative ’must’ operates on procedural contents of imperative sentences, epistemic ‘must’ on propositional contents of declarative sentences; and adding aspect converts procedural into propositional content.

The view concerning perception developed in ‘There it is’ (Hellie 2011) involves, most centrally, the following theses: I. A. One brings a within the scope of attention only if a is an aspect of one’s perceptual (or sense-perceptual) condition; B. If one sees veridically, one ordinarily brings within the scope of attention such an a partly constituted by the condition of the bodies surrounding one; C. The perceptual condition of a dreaming subject is never partly constituted by the bodies (...) surrounding them; II. One brings a within the scope of attention just if it is situatedly analytic for one that a is genuine (where this is partly constitutive of the character of one’s rational position); III. If two subjects are in distinct rational positions, what it is like for them differs. (shrink)

In every familiar case, a conscious subject has a perspective on the world. From time to time, various things are brought within this perspective: when one sees a mockingbird, or entertains a thought about Tony Blair, the mockingbird---or Blair---comes within one’s perspective. Upon reflection, it seems that not all entries into a subject’s perspective are on a par: the mockingbird when seen seems to be in some sense more intimately within one’s perspective than is Blair when merely thought about. This (...) suggests---and a number of philosophers have found theoretical utility in supposing--- that there may be a maximally intimate way of being in a subject’s perspective. (shrink)

Recent neo-Anscombean work in praxeology (aka ‘philosophy of practical reason’), salutarily, shifts focus from an alienated 'third-person' viewpoint on practical reason to an embedded 'first-person' view: for example, the 'naive rationalizations' of Michael Thompson, of form 'I am A-ing because I am B-ing', take up the agent's view, in the thick of action. Less salutary, in its premature abandonment of the first-person view, is an interpretation of these naive rationalizations as asserting explanatory links between facts about organically structured agentive processes (...) in progress, followed closely by an inflationary project in 'practical metaphysics'. If, instead, praxeologists chase first-personalism all the way down, both fact and explanation vanish (and with them, the possibility of metaphysics): what is characteristically practical is endorsement of nonpropositional imperatival content, chained together not explanatorily, but through limits on intelligibility. A connection to agentive behavior must somehow be reestablished—but this can (and can only) be done ‘transcendentally’: through a constraint on shifts between the first- and third-person views, inaccessible within any single viewpoint. (shrink)

'Post this letter!' does not entail 'Post this letter or drink up my wine!' (the Ross Paradox) because one can be in a state with the content of the former without being in a state with the content of the latter; in turn, because the latter can rationalize drinking up my wine but the former cannot; in turn, because practical rationalization flows toward one's present situation, in contrast with the flow of theoretical rationalization from one's present situation. Formally, this is (...) implemented with a semantics for imperatives involving a partition to set up an issue of significance and a proposition to establish how to settle it. I characterize a series of languages and language-games to implement all this, and appeal to an 'endorsement-theoretic' conception of modals as quantifiers over mental states to explain why 'You must post this letter' does not entail 'You must either post this letter or drink up my wine'. (shrink)

Data-driven historiography of philosophy looks to objective modeling tools for illumination of the propagation of influence. While the system of David Lewis, the most influential philosopher of our time, raises historiographic puzzles to stymie conventional analytic methods, it proves amenable to data-driven analysis. A striking result is that Lewis only becomes the metaphysician of current legend following the midpoint of his career: his initial project is to frame a descriptive science of mind and meaning; the transition to metaphysics is a (...) rhetorically breathtaking escape from this program's (inevitable) collapse. Understanding this process both aids a more focused debate whether it counts as progress, and also presents novel affordances for partisans on both sides to learn from Lewis's right and wrong steps. (shrink)

Semantic gaps between physical and mental discourse include the 'explanatory', 'epistemic' (Black-and-White Mary), and 'suppositional' (zombies) gaps; protosemantics is concerned with what is fundamental to meaning. Our tradition presupposes a truth-based protosemantics, with disastrous consequences for interpreting the semantic gaps: nonphysicalism, epiphenomenalism, separatism. Fortunately, an endorsement-based protosemantics, recentering meaning from the world to the mind, is technically viable, intuitively more plausible, and empirically more adequate. But, of present significance, it makes room for interpreting mental discourse as expressing simulations: this blocks (...) the disastrous consequences; and, as a bonus, accommodates hitherto anomalous asymmetries among the various semantic gaps. (shrink)

This somewhat odd paper argues against a representational view of visual experience using an intricate "inversion" type thought experiment involving double vision: two subjects could represent external space in the same way while differing phenomenally due to different "spread" in their double images. The spatial structure of the visual field is explained not by representation of external space but functionally, in terms of the possible locations of an attentional spotlight. -/- I'm fond of the ideas in this paper but doubt (...) I'll be returning to it soon. (shrink)

The representationalist theory of consciousness is the view that consciousness reduces to mental representation. This view comes in several variants which must explain introspective awareness of conscious mental states.

Justin makes a novel case, based on reflection on the “telos” of color vision, for a dispositional theory of colors. Justin’s case is highly suggestive, and comes tantalizingly close to resolving the debate in the metaphysics of color. But I have a few questions which I would like to see answered before I am converted.

A mainstay assumption in natural-language semantics is that \emph{if}-clauses bind indexical argument-places in \emph{then}-clauses. Unfortunately, recent work (compare \citealt{santorio12}) suggests that \emph{if}-clauses can somehow act to `shift the context'. On the framework of Kaplan's `Demonstratives' \citep{kaplan77}, that would be `monstrous' and somehow impossible `in English'. The superseding framework of Lewis's `Index, context, and content' \citep{lewis80icc} instead maintains that an indexical argument-place is just one that is bindable (compare~\citealt[ch.~1]{stalnaker14}), but maintains that these are rare---whereas the lesson of recent work is that (...) they are pervasive. -/- This brief technical note observes that it is possible to `hack' the Lewis framework to make use of a resource that is doing little work: the `postsemantic' stage, whereby nonpropositional semantic values are transformed into propositional contents. I provide a semantics for \emph{if}-clauses on which they \emph{restrict} the domain of definedness of their operanda to those in which the antecedent is correct, and then \emph{test} for the correctness of the consequent: postsemantically, then, we `seek out' the closest context in which the antecedent is correct; if it is one in which the consequent is correct, the conditional is correct in our context. The result has the structure of a Stalnaker-conditional, but over contexts rather than worlds. -/- The `hack' has the radical consequence that this the mainstay assumption in natural-language semantics is wrong: if \emph{if}-clauses act postsemantically rather than in the course of semantic composition, then nothing about their behavior can teach us anything about the distribution of indexical argument-places. (shrink)

Jenann’s central metaphysical thesis is that there is an objective conditional probability function PrG(A/B), the domain of which includes a great many, perhaps all, pairs of contingent propositions. This pair can be synchronic or diachronic: both can concern how things are at the same time, or not. Jenann’s central epistemological thesis is antiskepticism about PrG, in the following sense: prima facie, the subjective credence functions of epistemically reasonable agents converge on PrG: roughly, if you’ve done a lot of science, for (...) all A, B, your C(A/B) is similar to PrG(A/B). (Compare antiskepticism about perceptual knowledge: prima facie, if circumstances are good and one’s visual experience represents that p, p.) These theses have two cool consequences: first, the possibility of a novel approach to objective Bayesianism; second, a way of doing away with dynamical laws. (shrink)

Jane’s fleeting glimpse of a mockingbird conscious is Jane’s taking a perspective on, or representing, that glimpse; or one might say that the specific feel of that fleeting glimpse can be understood by saying how things are from Jane’s perspective, or how Jane represented things to be (it was to Jane as if a mockingbird flashed by).

The liar paradox can be shown semantically defective if we distinguish the /sentence/ ''snow is white' is true' from the /string/ that constitutes it. This paper develops the String-to-Sentence Theory of Truth---for short, String Theory---according to which, while the /string/ contains the string 'true', the /sentence/ is merely 'snow is white', which contains no such occurrence: more generally, a string like 'S is true' constitutes, relative to an assessor, the sentence which, to the assessor, means the same as S. So (...) suppose we attempt to define a singular term 'L' referring to the sentence 'not: L is true'. Relative to an assessor, 'L' refers to the sentence negating the assessor's sentence meaning the same as the referent of 'L'. So the referent of 'L' means the same as its negation. But no sentence means the same as its negation, so 'L' does not refer. The act of naming with which the liar paradox commences is semantically defective; so there can be no liar paradox. (shrink)

The opening paragraph of Papineau’s The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience, states the book’s Central Question (CQ): ‘What is the metaphysical nature of the conscious properties we enjoy when we hav...

Benj’s paper is a characteristically thoughtful, imaginative, and wide-ranging exploration of the relationship between certain direct realist theories of perception and the nature of perceptual justification — with some formal semantics thrown in for good measure. Here I’ll focus on just one of the many topics about which Benj has something to say: his remarks on the topic of the relationship that must obtain between a perceptual state and a belief in order for the former to immediately justify (...) the latter. (shrink)

This is a reply to commentaries on my book, The Character of Consciousness, by Benj Hellie, Christopher Peacocke, and Susanna Siegel. The reply to Hellie focuses on issues about acquaintance and transparency. The reply to Peacocke focuses on externalism about spatial experience. The reply to Siegel focuses on whether there can be Frege cases in perceptual experience.

Ανέκδοτα ψηφίσματα από τη Λάρισσα (3) Συνεχίζοντας τις δΰο προηγούμενες δημοσιεύσεις που αφορούσαν σε ψηφίσματα της Λάρισσας (BCH 128-129 (2005), p. 377-417 ; BCH 130 (2006) [20081, Ρ· 435-483), παρουσιάζουμε εδώ μια τρίτη στήλη, η οποία φέρει τρία κείμενα: δύο ψηφίσματα της Λάρισσας, που ψηφίστηκαν κατά τη διάρκεια της στρατηγείας του Παυσανία, υιού του Θρασυμήδη από τις Φέρες (περίπου 130/129 π. Χ.), το ένα για έναν Αθηναίο φιλόσοφο και το άλλο για τρεις πολίτες της Κω· ένα τρίτο ψήφισμα προέρχεται από (...) τη Συνομοσπονδία των Μολοσσών και ανταμοίβει δικαστές από τη Λάρισσα, οι οποίοι εστάλησαν στην Ήπειρο για να διαιτητεύσουν σε μια διαμάχη μεταξύ Μολοσσών και Ακαρνάνων. Τα κείμενα αυτά, γραμμένα σε θεσσαλική διάλεκτο, η οποία την εποχή εκείνη χρησίμευε στη μεταγραφή εγγράφων της καγκελλαρίας των ελληνιστικών πόλεων σε μια γλώσσα που χάνει προοδευτικά τη συνοχή και την ιδιομορφία της και καταλήγει να διατηρεί μόνο μια «θεσσαλίζουσα» απόχρωση, έχουν αξία για την ιστορία της Λάρισσας, αφού αναφέρονται στην πνευματική ζωή και σε ορισμένες εκφάνσεις των πολιτικών ή οικονομικών δραστηριοτήτων των Λαρισσαίων στο δεύτερο μισό του 2ου αι. π. Χ. (shrink)

Athanasios Tziafalias, Bruno Helly Two Unpublished Decrees from Larisa p. 377-420 Among the epigraphical documents found at Larisa in recent years, two of the city's decrees have a particular interest. The first, a proxenia decree for a Mytilinian, that can be dated to the earliest years of the 2nd c. BC, is in a dialect and reflects the relations that were established before the engagement of the Second Macedonian War and were renewed, for the admission of the Asclepieia of Mytilini, (...) between the Thessalian Confederation and the cities that composed it on the one hand and the Mytilinians on the other. This casts new light on a well-known document, the Mytilini decree for the Thessalian Confederation IG XII Suppl., 3, and supplements the history of the relations between the two parties, which were prolonged up to the period of Augustus, as we know from the fragments of decrees in honour of the Mytilenian Potamon, son of Lesbonax. The second Larisa decree, which was voted for two citizens of Chalkis in Euboea and which is in koine, should be placed more than a century later, towards 70 BC; it shows the procedure by which a foreigner who had received the proxenia of the Thessalian Confederation could acquire, at his request, citizenship in a member city of this Confederation. (shrink)