The man and his times -- Early epistemology -- The new scientific mind -- Fragmentation and the temptation of ontology -- Fire, water, and the material imagination -- Air, earth, and the dynamic imagination -- A phenomenology of the creative imagination.

I argue elsewhere (Roche 2014) that evidence of evidence is evidence under screening-off. Tal and Comesaña (2017) argue that my appeal to screening-off is subject to two objections. They then propose an evidence of evidence thesis involving the notion of a defeater. There is much to learn from their very careful discussion. I argue, though, that their objections fail and that their evidence of evidence thesis is open to counterexample.

Maine de Biran passe à raison pour avoir rénové l'empirisme. Mais il semble qu'on n'ait pas toujours aperçu à quelle distance il a porté de son origine la méthode issue de Locke et de Condillac. Nous voudrions montrer ici comment il a pu infléchir la tradition empiriste dans un sens complètement opposé aux doctrines de ses fondateurs, comment il en a pu tirer une anthropologie tout à fait nouvelle, où l'homme n'apparaissait plus comme un élément de la nature, non plus (...) d'ailleurs que de la pensée, mais comme le principe absolu de tout ce qui est susceptible d'exister pour lui. Nous laisserons de côté le problème purement historique qu'a pu poser l'évolution personnelle de l'auteur par rapport à sa propre philosophic, et qui s'est notamment manifesté par l'abandon de la morale stoïcienne dans la dernière période de sa vie, de même que par la conversion tardive à certaines thèses, platoniciennes et substantialistes, sur la nature du moi. Ce qui sera examiné, c'est le biranisme tel qu'il fut, tel qu'il commença de se constituer, aux alentours de 1799, avec le premier Mémoire sur l'habitude. (shrink)

Les savants de langue syriaque - une branche de l'arameen - ont joue un role aujourd'hui reconnu dans la transmission du patrimoine philosophique et scientifique grec aux auteurs de langue arabe, et cela grace aux nombreuses traductions qu ...

It would be easy enough to support the claim that the man who introduced post-Kantian idealism into the French universities did so primarily because he found in this system a way to demonstrate the Spiritualist doctrine which came from Biran, the Eclectics, and particularly from Ravaisson. Idealism, in effect, was to Jules Lachelier more of a premise than a conclusion. Now although it might be true that post-Kantianism had been able to provide the right kind of support for the main (...) Spiritualist beliefs, notably the thesis of the reality of Spirit, its presence in nature, and indeed its primacy over nature, the fact remains, and this is what I shall attempt to show, that this idealism is incompatible with a notion that plays a prominent role in the Spiritualist doctrine: that of the existence of a transcendent God. Here, then, is what I should like to claim: that the same principles which were used to prove the Spiritual nature of both thought and matter should render impossible not only the proof of a transcendent God, but also the mere entertaining of the hypothesis of such a being. (shrink)

It would be easy enough to support the claim that the man who introduced post-Kantian idealism into the French universities did so primarily because he found in this system a way to demonstrate the Spiritualist doctrine which came from Biran, the Eclectics, and particularly from Ravaisson. Idealism, in effect, was to Jules Lachelier more of a premise than a conclusion. Now although it might be true that post-Kantianism had been able to provide the right kind of support for the main (...) Spiritualist beliefs, notably the thesis of the reality of Spirit, its presence in nature, and indeed its primacy over nature, the fact remains, and this is what I shall attempt to show, that this idealism is incompatible with a notion that plays a prominent role in the Spiritualist doctrine: that of the existence of a transcendent God. Here, then, is what I should like to claim: that the same principles which were used to prove the Spiritual nature of both thought and matter should render impossible not only the proof of a transcendent God, but also the mere entertaining of the hypothesis of such a being. (shrink)

This article is a reflection on the relation between two currents of classical philosophy, postkantian idealism and cartesian spiritualism, as they are found in the work of J. Lachelier. It studies why it was expected that postkantian idealism would bring strong evidence in support of the spiritualist affirmations, even though the kantian critique placed the method that traditionaly justified those affirmations in a state of crisis, and even though ideas as important as those of an afterlife and of a transcendant (...) God where excluded from this new system and taken over by religious belief. However, the analysis of the concept of idealism invites us to think that, even as beliefs, such ideas will always remain redhibitory for a system that begins with the negation of anything beyond thought. (shrink)

The aim of the present study was to further examine the impact over time of single‐sex and coeducational school environments on girls’ motivation in language arts and mathematics. Two cohorts comprising 340 girls from eight coeducational and two single‐sex schools were followed during a period of three academic years in a longitudinal research scheme. Data were collected with a self‐reported questionnaire including several scales: parental and teachers’ support, competence beliefs, utility‐value and achievement goals. In general, mixed‐design repeated measures analyses of (...) variance indicated no effect of the environment or of the interaction between environment and time of measurement. Significant time effects on several variables indicated a general decline of achievement motivation over time. Consequently, the multiplication of non‐mixed high schools, as proposed by some, would constitute an expensive and inefficient social policy, as far as girls’ motivation is concerned. (shrink)

I develop a probabilistic account of coherence, and argue that at least in certain respects it is preferable to (at least some of) the main extant probabilistic accounts of coherence: (i) Igor Douven and Wouter Meijs’s account, (ii) Branden Fitelson’s account, (iii) Erik Olsson’s account, and (iv) Tomoji Shogenji’s account. Further, I relate the account to an important, but little discussed, problem for standard varieties of coherentism, viz., the “Problem of Justified Inconsistent Beliefs.”.

It is shown that a locally finite polyadic algebra on an infinite set V of variables is a Boolean-algebra object, endowed with some internal supremum morphism, in the category of locally finite transformation sets on V. Then, this new categorical definition of polyadic algebras is used to simplify the theory of these algebras. Two examples are given: the construction of dilatations and the definition of terms and constants.

Some authors have studied in an ad hoc fashion the inclusive logics, that is the logics which admit or include objects or sets without element. These logics have been recently brought into the limelight because of the use of arbitrary topoi for interpreting languages. (In topoi there are usually many objects without element.)The aim of the paper is to present, for some inclusive logics, an axiomatization as natural and as simple as possible. Because of the intended applications to category theory, (...) the logics studied are many-sorted and intuitionistic. (shrink)

According to Michael Friedman’s theory of explanation, a law X explains laws Y1, Y2, …, Yn precisely when X unifies the Y’s, where unification is understood in terms of reducing the number of independently acceptable laws. Philip Kitcher criticized Friedman’s theory but did not analyze the concept of independent acceptability. Here we show that Kitcher’s objection can be met by modifying an element in Friedman’s account. In addition, we argue that there are serious objections to the use that Friedman makes (...) of the concept of independent acceptability. (shrink)

Cette serie est destinee a regrouper des etudes thematiques faisant le point sur differents aspects de l'histoire ou de la culture syriaques, celles des communautes chretiennes dont la langue de culture est le syriaque (maronites, syriaques catholiques et orthodoxes, assyro-chaldeens, communautes du Proche-Orient et de l'Inde...). Cible de jugements malveillants pendant un siecle, la philosophie en syriaque a recemment ete l'objet d'un renouveau d'interet qui en a fait l'un des sujets les plus debattus dans les etudes syriaques. Les Syriaques ont (...) ete regardes dans le meilleur des cas comme de simples transmetteurs aux musulmans de la philosophie grecque, incapables d'une pensee philosophique originale. Si leur role crucial de vecteurs culturels n'est pas en question, ce volume se propose pourtant de montrer aussi la specificite des formes que la philosophie grecque a revetues en monde syriaque au long d'un millenaire, du iie au xiiie siecle. Des le debut, la selection des themes et textes philosophiques par les Syriaques temoigne d'une continuite avec les courants contemporains de l'Empire romain et d'une participation active aux debats qui y avaient cours. Un auteur syriaque comme Bardesane pouvait s'inserer avec originalite dans les controverses du monde imperial sur le determinisme et la providence. La traduction de textes grecs d'ethique et l'utilisation de textes de sagesse attribues aux philosophes grecs attestent un interet pour la philosophie comme " exercice spirituel ", partage par les auteurs chretiens de langue grecque et de langue syriaque, qui dans les memes annees s'interrogeaient sur la valeur de la paideia hellenique pour l'education du chretien. On pourrait donc parler pour ces premiers siecles d'une philosophie chretienne greco-syriaque. A partir du vie siecle, surtout par l'intermediaire des miaphysites, la logique aristotelicienne penetre en monde syriaque. La figure cle pour ce passage est Sergius de Res'ayna (m. 536), et encore une fois la continuite avec le monde grec marque cette entreprise : les commentaires aux uvres logiques d'Aristote ecrits par Sergius et ses successeurs, en particulier au monastere de Qennere, reprennent la structure des commentaires grecs produits a Alexandrie dans l'Antiquite tardive. Des le viiie siecle on assiste aussi au developpement de la logique parmi les elites ecclesiastiques syro-orientales. L'essor de la falsafa, la philosophie d'empreinte grecque en monde musulman, produit une rupture de cette continuite greco-syriaque. Les Syriaques, decisifs dans la transmission de la philosophie a l'Islam, ressentent de plus en plus l'influence de la falsafa. A la fin du premier millenaire, des auteurs chretiens de culture syriaque ecrivent des ouvrages philosophiques en arabe et participent a la phase formative de la falsafa ; au debut du deuxieme millenaire paraissent des ouvrages philosophiques qui, ecrits en syriaque, refletent les structures conceptuelles de la falsafa. C'est la naissance d'une philosophie syro-arabe, qui culmine dans l'uvre de Barhebraeus (xiiie siecle). Le volume s'enrichit de deux contributions bibliographiques qui fourniront au lecteur un panorama exhaustif des sources et des etudes qui ont ete consacrees a la philosophie en syriaque. (shrink)

There are numerous (Bayesian) confirmation measures in the literature. Festa provides a formal characterization of a certain class of such measures. He calls the members of this class “incremental measures”. Festa then introduces six rather interesting properties called “Matthew properties” and puts forward two theses, hereafter “T1” and “T2”, concerning which of the various extant incremental measures have which of the various Matthew properties. Festa’s discussion is potentially helpful with the problem of measure sensitivity. I argue, that, while Festa’s discussion (...) is illuminating on the whole and worthy of careful study, T1 and T2 are strictly speaking incorrect (though on the right track) and should be rejected in favor of two similar but distinct theses. (shrink)

The concept of vulnerability is widely used in research ethics to signal attention to participants who require special protections in research. However, this concept is vague and under‐theorized. There is also growing concern that the dominant categorical approach to vulnerability (as exemplified by research ethics regulations and guidelines delineating vulnerable groups) is ethically problematic because of its assumptions about groups of people and is, in fact, not very guiding. An agreed‐upon strategy is to move from categorical towards analytical approaches (focused (...) on analyzing types and sources of vulnerability) to vulnerability. Beyond this agreement, however, scholars have been advancing competing accounts of vulnerability without consensus about its appropriate operationalization in research ethics. Based on previous debates, we propose that a comprehensive account of vulnerability for research ethics must include four components: definition, normative justifications, application, and implications. Concluding that no existing accounts integrate these components in a functional (i.e., practically applicable) manner, we propose an integrative and functional account of vulnerability inspired by pragmatist theory and enriched by bioethics literature. Using an example of research on deep brain stimulation for treatment‐resistant depression, we illustrate how the integrative‐functional account can guide the analysis of vulnerability in research within a pragmatist, evidence‐based approach to research ethics. While ultimately there are concerns to be addressed in existing research ethics guidelines on vulnerability, the integrative‐functional account can serve as an analytic tool to help researchers, research ethics boards, and other relevant actors fill in the gaps in the current landscape of research ethics governance. (shrink)

Can a perceptual experience justify (epistemically) a belief? More generally, can a nonbelief justify a belief? Coherentists answer in the negative: Only a belief can justify a belief. A perceptual experience can cause a belief but cannot justify a belief. Coherentists eschew all noninferential justification—justification independent of evidential support from beliefs—and, with it, the idea that justification has a foundation. Instead, justification is holistic in structure. Beliefs are justified together, not in isolation, as members of a coherent belief system. The (...) main question of the paper is whether coherentism is consistent. I set out an apparent inconsistency in coherentism and then give a resolution to that apparent inconsistency. (shrink)

Renvoyant au rapport de force entre le Droit et l’Économie, l’ordre public économique a plusieurs natures. En premier lieu, l’on doit distinguer l’ordre public « gardien des marchés », de l’ordre public « promoteur des marchés », de l’ordre public « architecte des marchés ». En passant de l’un à l’autre, la dimension politique, voire souveraine, de l’ordre public économique s’accroît. En second lieu, l’on doit distinguer l’ordre public de « constitution des marchés » de l’ordre public posant des « (...) octrois aux marchés ». En effet, à l’intérieur des marchés, c’est par des règles d’ordre public que le Droit garde les marchés, les bâtit ou les conçoit. Mais un ordre public économique premier plus radical construit des « octrois de marchés » pour empêcher que les objets de désir, objets naturels d’échanges, deviennent de ce seul fait objets de marché. Cet ordre public économique hautement politique brise des élans de désir. Si on ne l’admet pas, alors que cette nature-là concrétise la prétention que constitue l’ordre public économique, le Droit ne serait plus que l’agent d’effectivité de l’Économie, donnant efficacité à une simple société d’ajustement des désirs individuels. (shrink)

Peindre si bien que la toile est un objet vivant est un exploit technique qui fut atteint par peu. Francis Bacon obtint de la toile qu’elle fasse son affaire de préserver en elle la vie, tandis que Carbonnier, avec une semblable modestie devant la toile et le métier, obtint que la Loi ne soit qu’un cadre, mais qu’elle ne laisse pourtant cette place-là à personne et surtout pas à l’opinion publique, afin que chacun puisse à sa façon et dans ce (...) cadre-là faire son propre droit, sur lequel le législateur dans sa délicatesse et pour reprendre les termes du Doyen n’appose qu’un « mince vernis ». Ces deux maîtres de l’art construisaient des cadres avec des principes rudimentaires pour que, sur cette toile, le mouvement advienne par lui-même. Ainsi la Législation créée par Carbonnier offrit à chaque famille la liberté de tisser chaque jour son droit. Mais c’est pourtant bien au Législateur seul que revint et doit revenir l’enfance de l’art consistant à tendre la toile sur le métier. Il est alors possible, comme le fit Bacon, d’obtenir un objet immobile qui permet que surgissent sans cesse les figures mobiles. Les gribouillis réglementaires sont à mille lieues de cet Art législatif-là. (shrink)

Le Droit est aujourd'hui placé devant un impératif stratégique : tourner sa force vers le futur, pour faire face à des enjeux (numérique et climat) sur lesquels la loi et le contrat n'ont pas l'emprise requise, puisque trop locale ou trop peu systémique, tandis que la responsabilité ex post n'est pas adéquate face à l'irréparable. La responsabilité se saisit donc de l'avenir, le juge devenant le personnage central du monde sans qu'il l'ait voulu. Ce déplacement dans le temps peut continuer (...) à s'ancrer dans le passé, du fait d'engagements des États ou des entreprises. Mais cette responsabilité pour le futur engendrant une obligation non de réparer mais de faire peut venir plus directement encore du seul fait que l'entité visée est « en position » d'agir pour qu'autrui soit préservé. Preuves préconstituées, office ex ante du juge, devoir pour autrui mais aussi pouvoirs de l'entreprise et de l'État pour porter cette responsabilité ex ante, pilier du droit de la compliance, droit de l'avenir, sont les nouvelles règles qui se mettent en place. (shrink)

C’est par le Droit que l’être humain a acquis en Occident une unité (I). Ce que la Religion avait pu faire, le Droit l’a également fait en posant sur chaque être humain la notion indétachable de lui de « personne » (I.A). Mais c’est cela qui est remis en cause aujourd’hui, non pas la personnalité et le pouvoir que l’être humain a d’exprimer sa liberté mais l’unité que cela implique dans la disposition que l’on a de soi en repoussant le (...) désir qu’autrui a toujours eu de disposer de nous. Le Droit actuel tend en effet à « pulvériser » les êtres humains en données et à transformer en prestations juridiques neutres ce qui était considéré comme de la dévoration d’autrui. La notion juridique de « consentement », cessant d’être une preuve d’une volonté libre mais devenue une notion autonome, y suffirait (I.B.). Pour empêcher que ne règne plus que la « loi des désirs », laquelle ne fait que traduire l’ajustement des forces, il faut requérir ici et maintenant la souveraineté éthique du Droit, parce que le Droit ne peut pas être qu’une technique d’ajustement des intérêts (II). L’on peut former cette requête si l’on ne veut pas vivre dans un univers a-moral (II. A), si l’on constate que l’unité de la personne est l’invention juridique qui protège l’être humain faible (II.B.). Si on en admet l’impératif, il faut alors se demander enfin qui en Droit va l’exprimer et l’imposer, notamment de la Loi, ou du Juge, car nous semblons avoir perdu la capacité de rappeler ce principe de la Personne sur laquelle l’Occident fut si centré. Or, les principes qui ne sont plus dits disparaissent. Il ne resterait plus alors que l’ajustement au cas par cas des intérêts entre êtres humains dans le champ mondial des forces particulières. À cette aune, le Droit ne serait plus qu’une technique de sécurisation des ajustements particuliers. (II. C). Réduit à cela, le Droit aurait perdu son lien avec l’Éthique. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Best Love of the Child: Being Loved and Being Taught to Love as the First Human Right ed. by Timothy P. JacksonMary M. Doyle RocheReview of The Best Love of the Child: Being Loved and Being Taught to Love as the First Human Right EDITED TIMOTHY P. JACKSON Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011. 416 pp. $28.00With The Best Love of the Child, Eerdmans adds to an already (...) impressive roster of books on children and families. While previous contributions to the field have challenged the appropriateness of rights in addressing the needs of children, Best Love explores the “best interest” standard that is commonly used by courts and international bodies to adjudicate cases involving children. The book’s fundamental claim is that what is “best” for children involves being loved and being taught to love. Although the essays in this volume acknowledge that the primary locus for the love and care of children is the family, they also engage other contexts including religious communities, courts, and legislative bodies.In a section dealing with social-psychological perspectives on this theme, Peter Benson and Eugene Roehlkepartain make the case that doing the best for children requires shifting from a deficit model that focuses on what children lack to a model that emphasizes their developmental assets. Other chapters in this section highlight the ways parents can pursue the best for children by introducing them to spiritual practices rooted in love for God and compassion [End Page 231] toward others, and by providing them with a narrative-rich environment that deepens bonds between adults and children.A section on historical perspectives continues this trajectory by highlighting the vocations of children from the late thirteenth century on to the early modern period. In his concluding essay in this section, Charles Reid links historical and contemporary concerns by focusing on the right to life and its implications for analyses of war and healthcare access.In a section on philosophical and theological perspectives, Cynthia Willett challenges liberal understandings of rights in view of the experiences of children and argues for an approach that recognizes a central paradox of human freedom: that relationships of interdependence do not weaken freedom but rather enhance it. This paves the way for developing a sense of collective responsibility for children based on shared commitments to justice and solidarity that reach beyond the privatized family. Richard Osmer tackles the concept of original sin in order to advance a vision of a missional church in which congregations work with families to encourage authoritative—rather than authoritarian—styles of parenting that model mutual forgiveness. Marcia Bunge’s contribution is the most practical, offering a list of practices for children, families, and congregations for nurturing children’s vocations.In a concluding section on legal perspectives, Michael Broyde notes that, in the context of custody cases in Jewish law, the primary question is not who loves the child the most but rather who can best meet the child’s needs in an atmosphere of respect. Margaret Brinig and Steven Nock argue that law can, in fact, foster the love of children and the potential children have for becoming loving themselves by promoting family structures that are stable and afforded status in the community. In this way families can model the covenantal relationships of unconditional love in which children thrive. The collection concludes with an essay by Don Browning that emphasizes weaving together love’s affective elements with the very practical activities of caring for children and respecting their emerging selves.By inviting thoughtful reflection on how loving and being loved are central to the well-being of children in families and other institutions, Best Love makes an important contribution to the interdisciplinary field of childhood studies. The book is best suited for graduate students, although the essays by Osmer and Bunge are relevant to pastoral settings. [End Page 232]Mary M. Doyle RocheCollege of the Holy CrossCopyright © 2015 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Turing's programme, the idea that intelligence can be modelled computationally, is set in the context of a parallel between certain elements from metamathematics and Popper's schema for the evolution of knowledge. The parallel is developed at both the formal level, where it hinges on the recursive structuring of Popper's schema, and at the contentual level, where a few key issues common to both epistemology and metamathematics are briefly discussed. In light of this connection Popper's principle of transference, akin to Turing's (...) belief in the relevance of the theory of computation for modelling psychological functions, is widened into the extended principle of transference. Thus Turing's programme gains a solid epistemological footing. *I am grateful to Claude Lamontagne and Jean-Pierre Delage for their comments on this paper. (shrink)

The implementation of sustainable development goals forces the leaders of organizations to develop cognitive and behavioural capacities to manage the resulting complexity. These abilities can be associated with authentic leadership. Reflective approaches are recognized as showing promise for developing this type of leadership. However, they are rarely used in the context of university training. This article compares two learning approaches that target leadership development in master’s level students. It emerges that experiential learning through collaborative action games would help to develop (...) certain components of authentic leadership more than coaching. (shrink)