This book deals with the ethics of technology and addresses specific ethical problems related to some emerging technologies, mainly in the field of computer science (from machine learning models to extracting value from data to human–robot interaction). The contributions are authored mainly by scholars in ICT and other engineering fields who reflect on ethical and societal issues emerging from their own research activity. Thus, rather uniquely, the work overcomes the traditional divide between pure ethical theory that disregards what practitioners do (...) and mere R&D practice that ignores what theorists conceptualize. Conversely, the reader is enabled to understand what ethics means when it is actually put into work by engineering researchers. The book arises from a joint program between MIT and Politecnico di Milano aimed at training early career researchers in addressing the ethical issues of technology and critically reflecting on the social impacts of the emerging, and even disruptive, technologies they are currently developing through their novel research. Overall, it aims at spreading the task of developing technologies that, from the beginning, are designed to be responsible for human life, society, and nature. (shrink)

Predicting our future as individuals is a central to the role of much emerging technology, from hiring algorithms that predict our professional success (or failure) to biomarkers that predict how long (or short) our healthy (or unhealthy) life will be. Yet, much in western culture, from scripture to mythology to philosophy, suggests that knowing one's future may not be in the subject's best interests and might even lead to disaster. If predicting our future as individuals can be harmful as well (...) as beneficial, why are we so willing to engage in so much prediction, from cradle to grave? This book offers a philosophical answer, reflecting on seminal texts in western culture to argue that predicting our future renders much of our existence the automated effect of various causes, which, in turn, helps to alleviate the existential burden of autonomously making sense of our lives in a more competitive, demanding, accelerated society. An exploration of our tendency in a technological era to engineer and so rid ourselves of that which has hitherto been our primary reason for being - making life plans for a successful future, while faced with epistemological and ethical uncertainties - Predicted Humans will appeal to scholars of philosophy and social theory with interests in questions of moral responsibility and meaning in an increasingly technological world. (shrink)

We continuously talk about autonomous technologies. But how can words qualifying technologies be the very same words chosen by Kant to define what is essentially human, i.e. being autonomous? The article focuses on a possible answer by reflecting upon both etymological and philosophical issues, as well as upon the case of autonomous vehicles. Most interestingly, on the one hand, we have the notion of “autonomy”, meaning that there is a “law” that is “self-given”, and, on the other hand, we have (...) the notion of “automation”, meaning that there is something “offhand” that is “self-given”. Yet, we are experiencing a kind of twofold shift: on the one hand, the shift from defining technologies in terms of automation to defining technologies in terms of autonomy and, on the other hand, the shift from defining humans in terms of autonomy to defining humans in terms of automation. From a philosophical perspective, the shift may mean that we are trying to escape precisely from what autonomy founds, i.e. individual responsibility of humans that, in the Western culture, have been defined for millennia as rational and moral decision-makers, even when their decisions have been the toughest. More precisely, the shift may mean that we are using technologies, and in particular emerging algorithmic technologies, as scapegoats that bear responsibility for us by making decisions for us. Moreover, if we consider the kind of emerging algorithmic technologies that increasingly surround us, starting from autonomous vehicles, then we may argue that we also seem to create a kind of technological divine that, by being always with us through its immanent omnipresence, omniscience, omnipotence and inscrutability, can always be our technological scapegoat freeing us from the most unbearable burden of individual responsibility resulting from individual autonomy. (shrink)

This book argues that our technological era is the most radical form of anarchism we have ever experienced. People are not only removing the role of the expert as a mediator, but also replacing the role of a transcendent god with an omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent technological entity that is totally immanent.

The aim of the article is reflecting on a fundamental epistemological issue which characterises our present technological progress: where are we heading to, as humankind, while we are progressively externalising our most crucial decision processes towards algorithms, from which decisive data, coming from human experience and mind, are left out? By reflecting on some cases, I shall try to argue that the most puzzling issue which engineers and philosophers should be aware that they have to jointly challenge may be that (...) what we are actually doing through algorithmic automatisation is developing a novel human condition, according to which: we are progressively thinking that algorithmic abstraction is always better than mental abstraction, because, at least in the Western culture, we come from a history of a progressive restriction of the best use of our minds to the realm of rationality, first, then to the realm of computation, second, and then to the realm of algorithmic automatisation, third, which finally exceeds our minds and in doing so, we are progressively externalising not only human contents, but also human abilities, i.e., we are progressively atrophying ourselves, by becoming creatures who are progressively delegating the core of their very essence, which has always included the epistemological ability, together with the ethical courage, of making complex decisions on both our lives and the others’ lives. (shrink)

In the following article, I shall focus on emerging technologies that increasingly try to predict our death, i.e. when we will die and from what cause. More precisely, I shall focus on the possible answer to the following philosophical question: why are we taking predictive technologies to the extreme? First, I shall reflect upon the results of recent empirical research. Second, I shall address the issue of taking predictive technologies to the extreme, i.e. predicting one’s death, through philosophical tools, from (...) thought experiments to a philosophical perspective on the possible key reason why we are using emerging technologies’ unprecedented power of prediction to improve more and more our knowledge of when we will die and from what cause. The philosophical answer I propose is the following: even death clocks, together with other kinds of emerging technologies that gain an unprecedented power of prediction, may somehow save us by reactivating our sensemaking whenever our life is uncertain and demanding to the point that we cannot face our open future by planning and acting by ourselves. If it is true that the price we pay, i.e. a kind of automation of our own future, is extremely high, it is also true that, in our unprecedentedly uncertain and demanding time, autonomous sensemaking seems to scare us even more. (shrink)

The hendiadys of technology and ethics is neither novel nor what we really need. Even though dialogue between ethicsEthicsand technology, namely the humanitiesHumanities / human scientistand the social sciencesSocial sciences / social scientist, on the one hand, and science and engineeringEngineering / engineer, on the other hand, is explicitly encouraged in various ways, doing this effectively remains difficult. Obstacles to an authentic dialogue are many, ranging from scientific reasons to research policy reasons to institutional reasons. After reviewing these various obstacles, (...) we propose to pursue the following suggestion in order to overcome these difficulties: we do not just need more ethics, we need a qualitative shift. That is to say, rather than delegating the task of evaluating technological outcomes to moral philosophers and social scientistsSocial sciences / social scientist, we need to make the technological system capable of designing technology through ethicsEthics. This is precisely illustrated by the contributions collected in this volume, which are the result of a collaboration between the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Politecnico di Milano. (shrink)

What I intend to do in the following pages is to focus on what might be termed the most important turn in the very dimension of ideality throughout the history of Western culture: the introduction of the notion of ideal drawn from Plato’s notion of idea, and especially its singular contemporary destiny. In the first part of the article, I am going to analyze Kant’s introduction of the notion of ideal and Hegel’s reading of it, and I am going to (...) argue that the former affirms a dualistic relationship which the latter negates. In the second part of the article, I am going to reason on the actual effects of both the affirmation and the negation of the dualism between the ideal and the real, especially focusing on the forms of totalitarianism and anarchism which characterized the twentieth-century history of Western culture. This will lead me to argue that we should try to avoid both the bad uses of the ideal and the death of the ideal in order to work on a notion of ideal which could be an exceedingly promising tool for us to change and improve the real. This change and improvement can be achieved through the affirmation of the dualistic relationship between the ideal and the real, and more specifically through what I will call an evolutionary notion of ideal versus a revolutionary notion of ideal. (shrink)

One of the most typical epistemological mechanisms of the European thought is passing from many to one. This mechanism has two main roots: the first has to do with religious thinking and the second has to do with logical and philosophical thinking. I shall try to argue that these two roots strengthen one and the same thing, namely, the theoretical condition of hospitality itself.

Metaphilosophy, Volume 53, Issue 1, Page 70-84, January 2022.

The article investigates the relationship between aesthetics and the architectural preservation of the past through three issues: the analysis of the ontological status of the object to be preserved, the approaches to it and the taboo of death.

In what follows, I shall focus on what may be defined as the engineering of hu- mans from a philosophical perspective. More precisely, I shall reflect upon the way in which our language increasingly changes when we define our relationship with emerging technologies, specifically human digital twins, which, as our tech- nological replica, can serve as privileged standpoints to try to understand the meaning of the shift from using distinguishable words to define humans and technologies (for instance, when we happen (...) to talk about our health in terms of self-perception) to using indistinguishable words to define humans and technol- ogies (for instance, when we happen to talk about our health in terms of human digital twins’ diagnoses and prognoses). The change of our language shows a kind of optimisation that is taken to the extreme, starting with the optimisation of human bodies’ performances: the more engineered humans are (in that they identify their purpose not with feeling good, for instance, but with preforming in faster and more profitable ways), the better they are (in that they measure themselves not against typically human values, such as feeling good, for in- stance, but against typically engineering values, such as efficiency). But a re- markable paradox emerges, whose meaning shall be the core of my philosophical reflection: the more humans work on optimising themselves, the more they (par- adoxically) work on moving optimisation from themselves, i.e. their capabilities as autonomous humans (starting with self-perception), to technologies, i.e. ways of engineering, specifically automating, themselves. (shrink)

One of the most important reasons why beauty has been, is, and will possibly be exceedingly important for us is ethical at its core: by making us undergo the aesthetic experience of recognizing something ideal into something real, beauty can be the clearest symbol of our possibility, and even hope, of working on an ideal human measure, which means both the development of our identities as human beings and the development of more promising relationships between us, artifacts, and nature.

The notion of je ne sais quoi, whose rise characterises the decades in which the first scientific revolution marks a turning point in Western culture, tries to identify the human capacity for grasping what exceeds knowledge resulting from logos. But the further steps of the triumph of logos, starting from the second scientific revolution and its further developments, increasingly determine its fall. Moreover, th e recent history of Western culture may be read as follows: we have been increasingly entrusting our (...) understanding of what is and our prediction of what will be to an even more restricted form of rationality coinciding with logos, first, by progressively restricting logos to computation and, second, by progressively externalising computation from our minds to technologies, specifically algorithmic technologies. As such, should we think that computation is increasingly occupying the realm of je ne sais quoi by increasingly reckoning the unreckonable? The answer seems affirmative. In what follows, I shall critically focus on a promising case in point to try to understand the radical move from je ne sais quoi to computation: the case of the quantified self, which is addressed by medical humanities and sociology, but quite disregarded by philosophy – alternatively, I shall at least try to introduce the reasons why the case of the quantified self deserves a specifically philosophical study, starting from aesthetics and epistemology. (shrink)

La raccolta di saggi di estetica analitica curata da Giovanni Matteucci è introdotta da un contributo di Paolo D’Angelo che conclude: «la reciproca ignoranza che caratterizza l’estetica analitica e quella “continentale” (loro non ci leggono, noi non li leggiamo) è forse più di una stranezza: è uno scandalo che non sarebbe considerato tollerabile in qualsiasi settore della ricerca scientifica». Per cominciare a rispondere allo “scandalo”, che è più italiano che d’Oltralpe, Elementi di estetica...

La raccolta di saggi di estetica analitica curata da Giovanni Matteucci è introdotta da un contributo di Paolo D’Angelo che conclude: “la reciproca ignoranza che caratterizza l’estetica analitica e quella ‘continentale’ (loro non ci leggono, noi non li leggiamo) è forse più di una stranezza: è uno scandalo che non sarebbe considerato tollerabile in qualsiasi settore della ricerca scientifica”. Per cominciare a rispondere allo “scandalo”, che è più italiano che d’Oltralpe, Elementi di estetica...

La relazione tra bellezza e utilità in architettura appare più complicata nel presente che nel passato. In particolare, nella cultura contemporanea si manifesta un antagonismo paradossale tra la prima e la seconda: più nascondiamo, e addirittura neghiamo, la dimensione dell’utilità di un oggetto architettonico più abbiamo la possibilità di aumentare la dimensione della sua bellezza. Ragionare sul significato della nozione di forma, articolata in morphe (la forma concreta, reale) ed eidos (la forma astratta, ideale), può portarci verso una soluzione possibile, (...) secondo la quale parlare di un eidos, che è eteronomo e referenziale e risponde ai bisogni e alle aspirazioni degli esseri umani, significa parlare di un eidos che include, e non esclude, l’idea che l’oggetto architettonico sia utile alle richieste umane – in particolare, a qualcosa che potremmo chiamare “misura umana ideale”. Allora, un oggetto architettonico può essere bello se la sua dimensione estetica afferma, e non nega, la sua utilità, perché affermare la sua utilità significa affermare una parte essenziale del suo statuto identitario. In ultimo, la relazione tra morphe ed eidos può essere istruttiva anche a proposito di altri due casi: il primo riguarda una morphe che sembra generare un eidos inedito; il secondo riguarda l’utilità di un elemento ornamentale. (shrink)

Between 1942 and 1943 seventeen important Italian architects published in “Domus”, which is one of the most prestigious journals of architecture, the designs of their ideal houses. The analysis of their proposals is singularly instructive for those philosophers who are interested in reasoning on the notion of ideal: the results of a precise concrete use of it clarify its philosophical meaning both in regard with the notion of ideal in general and in regard with the notion of ideal human being (...) in particular, if it is true that these architects’ exercises of imagination prove that there is no thought of ideal house if there is no thought of ideal human being as its foundation. (shrink)

The aim of the article is reasoning on an analogy which may help understand what an algorithm can do and, especially, cannot do. The analogy is given by Poe’s Philosophy of composition, in which, by making reference to his poem The raven, he argues for a singular strategy of composition we may compare with an algorithmic writing. KeywordsAlgorithm, Philosophy of technology, Poe.

Nelle pagine che chiudono la monografia The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: a Philosophy of Art Danto osserva che lo stile segue il destino che la sua etimologia determina: c’è stile quando lo stilus, che è lo strumento di scrittura latino che ha la caratteristica di lasciare «qualcosa del proprio carattere sulla superficie che segna», lascia sulla “superficie” “qualcosa” «del carattere della mano che lo dirige». Lo stile è una questione di “carattere” nel senso nel quale Aristotele descr...

Between 1942 and 1943 the editor of the journal «Domus» invited the most important Italian architects to design their ideal houses: fifteen projects designed by seventeen architects were published. They are most instructive to try to understand, firstly, what the philosophical notion of ideal means and, secondly, why mathematical and geometric tools are extensively used to work on ideality, namely, to design ideal houses. The first part of the article focuses on the philosophical foundations of ideality and, after an overview (...) of the fifteen projects, on the use of the golden ratio in two particularly meaningful cases. The second part of the article focuses on the cases in which there is a hidden use of the golden ratio, on the use of the modulus and on the use of the number 2. (shrink)

The phenomenon of the quantified self, which is especially addressed by sociology and medical humanities, is still quite disregarded by philosophy. Yet, the philosophical issues it raises are various and meaningful, from the realm of epistemology to the realm of ethics. Moreover, it may be read as a key symptom to investigate the complex technological era in which we live, starting from the meaning of contemporary technology itself from a philosophical perspective. I shall focus on one of the epistemological issues (...) raised by the phenomenon of the quantified self by arguing that it may be read in terms of epistemological anarchism, which also leads to other epistemological issues, such as a possibly detectable crisis of the notions of knowledge in general and science in particular as founded on the relationship between particularity and universality, as well as between reality and ideality. I shall select cases that are peculiarly representative of the founding epistemological stance I shall focus on. Yet, the reason why they deserve special attention is that they are also representative of an increasingly widespread attitude characterising not only the community of the quantified self but also, at least to some extent, anyone of us who may happen to use technologies to try to self-diagnose. (shrink)

The notion of ideal is surely one of the most important legacies of Western philosophy, yet it has been much neglected by contemporary philosophy, probably because of the negative destiny it has suffered during the last century, by being firstly abused through forms of totalitarianism and secondly censured through forms of anarchism. But there are two interesting exceptions: two monographs written by two noteworthy philosophers, the first being Nicholas Rescher, who published in 1987 Ethical Idealism. An Inquiry into the Nature (...) and Function of Ideals, and the second being Dorothy Emmet, who published in 1994 The Role of the Unrealisable. A Study in Regulative Ideals. In this article I shall take into account their positions arguing that both Rescher and Emmet work on a very important topic, as they highlight the essential role the notion of ideal played, and still plays, in human life, yet, the role of the notion of ideal they highlight may be notably increased by more precisely understanding its own genesis and history. (shrink)

The article: 1. analyzes the Anglo-American philosophical works which, in the last thirty years, focus on the notion of beauty by making reference to Kant’s work ; 2. argues that choosing Kant’s work means choosing a strategy which opens to a notion of beauty which is relative, but not relativistic, subjective, but not anarchic, that is, universal, but not absolute; 3. argues that the most powerful tool Kant introduces to make it possible relativizing the way not to relativize the aim (...) may be his notion of ideal, since it includes, and does not exclude, the most relative, particular and variable cases in its very genesis. (shrink)

The article analyzes the relationship between the philosophical notion of beauty and the ethical and political life of human beings through the history of Western philosophy, from Plato to contemporary authors.

This book offers an extensive historical, philosophical and ethical discussion on the role of autonomous technologies, and their influence on human identity. By connecting those different perspectives, and analysing some practical case studies, it guides readers to dissect the relationship between machine and human autonomy, and machine and human identity. It analyses how the relationship between human and technology has been evolving in the last few centuries. Last, it aims at proposing an explanation on the reason/s why humans have been (...) keen on developing their own autonomy’s perfect avatar. (shrink)

The bacchantic feast, especially as it is described in Euripides’s Bacchae, is a powerful example of what may be thought of as the most essential cornerstone of Wes- tern culture: the dualism between the dimension of reality (represented by Pentheus) and the dimension of ideality (represented by the bacchantic feast). In particular, why must the former die after having seen the latter? That is, why the dimension of idea- lity (as well as the dimension of the sacred) can be essential, (...) and even a saviour, for the dimension of reality (as well as for the dimension of the profane) if and only if the dualism between them is rigorously respected? I shall try to answer this question, and to use my answer as a clue to start investigating another essential structure of the dualism between reality and ideality which founds Western culture, by passing from its religious meaning to its epistemological meaning. (shrink)

The article aims to use Feyerabend’s powerful analogy between the epistemological anarchist and the Dadaist in order to show something that has deeply characterized last century’s Western culture, and still characterizes it: an anarchistic attitude in epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics, and, above all, what seems to be its main cause, that is, the desertion of the notion of ideal, which means the desertion of the very foundation of Western culture.

The article tries to answer the following question: what is the most promising epistemological strategy if my objective is the construction of a theory which gives me the opportunity to decrease the risk of getting to what is actually absolute, that is, to irreversible negative actions (irreversible as a theory might not be, but as an action often is)? The answer proposed is a form of epistemological dualism which means that I metaphysically believe (that is, I programmatically and systematically believe, (...) without certainly knowing it) that the epistemological relationship between any theory and any reality is dualistic. More specifically, I metaphysically believe that the epistemological relationship between any theory and any reality is not saturated: in any theory there is an ideal error, because there is no theory which is totally saturated by reality, and any reality can actualize the ideal error, because there is no reality which is totally saturated by theory. (shrink)

What I intend to do in the following pages is to focus on what might be termed the most important turn in the very dimension of ideality throughout the history of Western culture: the introduction of the notion of ideal drawn from Plato’s notion of idea, and especially its singular contemporary destiny. In the first part of the article, I am going to analyze Kant’s introduction of the notion of ideal and Hegel’s reading of it, and I am going to (...) argue that the former affirms a dualistic relationship which the latter negates. In the second part of the article, I am going to reason on the actual effects of both the affirmation and the negation of the dualism between the ideal and the real, especially focusing on the forms of totalitarianism and anarchism which characterized the twentieth-century history of Western culture. This will lead me to argue that we should try to avoid both the bad uses of the ideal and the death of the ideal in order to work on a notion of ideal which could be an exceedingly promising tool for us to change and improve the real. This change and improvement can be achieved through the affirmation of the dualistic relationship between the ideal and the real, and more specifically through what I will call an evolutionary notion of ideal versus a revolutionary notion of ideal. (shrink)

A new theory about the origins of consciousness that finds learning to be the driving force in the evolutionary transition to basic consciousness. What marked the evolutionary transition from organisms that lacked consciousness to those with consciousness—to minimal subjective experiencing, or, as Aristotle described it, “the sensitive soul”? In this book, Simona Ginsburg and Eva Jablonka propose a new theory about the origin of consciousness that finds learning to be the driving force in the transition to basic consciousness. Using (...) a methodology similar to that used by scientists when they identified the transition from non-life to life, Ginsburg and Jablonka suggest a set of criteria, identify a marker for the transition to minimal consciousness, and explore the far-reaching biological, psychological, and philosophical implications. After presenting the historical, neurobiological, and philosophical foundations of their analysis, Ginsburg and Jablonka propose that the evolutionary marker of basic or minimal consciousness is a complex form of associative learning, which they term unlimited associative learning (UAL). UAL enables an organism to ascribe motivational value to a novel, compound, non-reflex-inducing stimulus or action, and use it as the basis for future learning. Associative learning, Ginsburg and Jablonka argue, drove the Cambrian explosion and its massive diversification of organisms. Finally, Ginsburg and Jablonka propose symbolic language as a similar type of marker for the evolutionary transition to human rationality—to Aristotle's “rational soul.”. (shrink)

Simona Giordano investigates the moral concerns raised by current clinical options available for transgender and gender diverse children and adolescents. From the time young children express gender incongruent preferences and attitudes, up to the time in which older adolescents might apply for medical or surgical treatment, moral questions are likely to be asked: should children be enabled to express themselves freely inside and outside the domestic environment? What are the implications of the choices that parents might make early on? (...) How should clinicians respond to distress around sexual anatomy? Is it ethical to suspend pubertal development? What level of evidence should we seek for medications to be used in paediatric care? What are the risks and benefits of various forms of hormonal treatment? Is it ethical to defer surgical interventions till adulthood? Giordano provides a detailed ethical analysis of these and many other questions that are likely to arise at various stages of a person's life and proposes a moral formula to answer these questions, as well as others, that are likely to arise in a fast-changing landscape. Children and Gender combines a detailed ethical analysis with an accurate clinical description of gender development and available clinical pathways. (shrink)

In the last decade, we have witnessed the return of one of the most controversial terms in the political lexicon: totalitarianism. What are we talking about when we define a totalitarian political and social situation? When did we start using the word as both adjective and noun? And, what totalitarian ghosts haunt the present? Philosopher Simona Forti seeks to answer these questions by reconstructing not only the genealogy of the concept, but also by clarifying its motives, misunderstandings, and the (...) controversies that have animated its current resurgence. Taking into account political theories and historical discussions, Totalitarianism especially focuses on philosophical reflections, from the question of totalitarian biopolitics to the alleged totalitarian drifts of neoliberalism. The work invites the relentless formulation of a radical question about democratic age: the possibilities it has opened up, the voids it leaves behind, the mechanisms it activates, and the "voluntary servitude" it produces. Forti argues that totalitarianism cannot be considered an external threat to democracy, but rather, one of the possible answers to those questions posed by modernity which democracies have not been able to solve. Her investigation of the uses and abuses of totalitarianism as one of the fundamental categories of 20th and 21st centuries promises to provoke much-needed discussion and debate among those in philosophy, politics, ethics, and beyond. (shrink)

I argue that disposition ascriptions—claims like ‘the glass is fragile’—are semantically equivalent to possibility claims: they are true when the given object manifests the disposition in at least one of the relevant possible worlds.