The transgressive ontological character of hybrids—entities crossing the ontological binarism of naturalness and artificiality, e.g., biomimetic projects—calls for pondering the question of their ethical status, since metaphysical and moral ideas are often inextricably linked. The example of it is the concept of “moral considerability” and related to it the idea of “intrinsic value” understood as a non-instrumentality of a being. Such an approach excludes hybrids from moral considerations due to their instrumental character. In the paper, we revisit the boundaries of (...) moral considerability by reexamining the legitimacy of identifying intrinsic value with a non-instrumental one. We offer the concept of “functional value,” which we define as a simultaneous contribution to the common good of the ecosystem and the possibility to disclose the full variety of aspects of a being’s identity. We argue that such a value of hybrids allows us to include them into the scope of moral considerability. (shrink)

The transgressive ontological character of hybrids—entities crossing the ontological binarism of naturalness and artificiality, e.g., biomimetic projects—calls for pondering the question of their ethical status, since metaphysical and moral ideas are often inextricably linked. The example of it is the concept of “moral considerability” and related to it the idea of “intrinsic value” understood as a non-instrumentality of a being. Such an approach excludes hybrids from moral considerations due to their instrumental character. In the paper, we revisit the boundaries of (...) moral considerability by reexamining the legitimacy of identifying intrinsic value with a non-instrumental one. We offer the concept of “functional value,” which we define as a simultaneous contribution to the common good of the ecosystem and the possibility to disclose the full variety of aspects of a being’s identity. We argue that such a value of hybrids allows us to include them into the scope of moral considerability. (shrink)

It is said an attempt to reconcile Heidegger's ontology with the position of deep ecology finds the going rugged. Yet, I believe it is worth hiking this path once again to reexamine the connections between deep ecology and the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Significantly, we will see the importance of Heidegger's critique of the idea of the great chain of being.Taking the perspective of deep ecology requires us to consider whether Heidegger's being-centered approach can indeed justify “the equality of right (...) to live and blossom.” Heidegger's philosophy strongly supports such an egalitarian concept since he rejects the idea of the great chain of being and shows that being does not have.. (shrink)

This article discusses the gap in Martin Heidegger’s ontology pertaining to the transformative affectivity arising in the interactions between beings, particularly how this affectivity is responsible for changes in those beings. It thus explores the possibility of bridging this gap by including an additional dimension of being. For this purpose, it draws upon Aristotle’s concept of affecting/being affected (On Generation and Corruption, Book I), which aims to explain the origin of alteration in beings. The Aristotelian juxtaposition of action and passion (...) serves as a backdrop for the incorporation of the concept of “shapeability” into Heidegger’s ontology. This involves a dimension of revealing being related to the active and passive aspects of beings’ capacity to shape and be shaped by others. Investigating the idea of shapeability, I shall argue, can shed some new light on the multidimensionality of how being is disclosed. (shrink)

The Anthropocene overthrows classical dichotomies like technology and nature and a new class of beings emerges: hybrids. The transitive status of hybrids - which establishes an extra, separate, 'third' ontological category, going beyond the dichotomy between nature and technology - constitutes a significant problem for environmental philosophy and philosophy of technology since they traditionally focus on either 'nature' (natural entities) or 'artefacts' (technological objects). In order to reflect on the ethical significance of hybrids, a classification of different types of hybrids (...) is required. Such a classification is provided by this article, based on insights from both environmental philosophy and philosophy of technology. After explaining why a new class of beings emerges in the Anthropocene, and reflecting on the one-sidedness of philosophy of technology and environmental philosophy in their focus on either technology or nature, we propose a new classification of hybrids in this article that provides a new starting point for reflections on the moral significance of hybrids in environmental philosophy and philosophy of technology. (shrink)

Grasping the identity of hybrids, that is beings which cross the binarism of nature and technology (e.g. genetically-modified organisms (GMOs), syn-bio inventions, biomimetic projects), is problematic since it is still guided by self-evident dualistic categories, either as artefacts or as natural entities. To move beyond the limitations of such a one-sided understanding of hybrids, we suggest turning towards the categories of affordances and the juxtaposition of needs and patterns of proper use, as inspired by the Heideggerian version of phenomenology. Drawing (...) upon selected concepts by Heidegger, we argue that hybrids can be conceptualised as a regenerative design and use to serve the planet. We argue that the ideal type of non-exploitative account of hybrids consists of the adaptive approach to the environment, which does not, however, exclude the possibility of designing and constructing new beings. We also point out that hybrids undermine the divide of being destructive/regenerative which marks the boundaries of nature and technology. (shrink)

We show that many large cardinal notions up to measurability can be characterized through the existence of certain filters for small models of set theory. This correspondence will allow us to obtain a canonical way in which to assign ideals to many large cardinal notions. This assignment coincides with classical large cardinal ideals whenever such ideals had been defined before. Moreover, in many important cases, relations between these ideals reflect the ordering of the corresponding large cardinal properties both under direct (...) implication and consistency strength. (shrink)

Environmental philosophy always presents detailed distinctions concerning the kinds of natural beings that can be granted moral considerability, when discussing this issue. In contrast, artifacts, which are excluded from the scope of moral considerability, are treated as one homogenous category. This seems problematic. An attempt to introduce certain distinctions in this regard—by looking into dissimilarities between physical and digital artifacts—can change our thinking about artifacts in ethical terms, or more precisely, in environmentally ethical terms.

METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF THE STUDIES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER This paper presents the methodological problems of studies on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. I discuss the main methods used in the study of Heidegger’s thought, their assumptions and difficulties, which accompany them. I focus on the problem of the metalanguage, which is used in works on Heidegger, and the principles of “reconstructing” Heidegger’s concepts.

This paper enhances postnatural environmentalism (represented by Steven Vogel) by highlighting and incorporating selected concepts from Martin Heidegger's ontology. In particular, I examine Heidegger's detailed analysis of the affinity between phusis and techne, the critique of 'replaceability', the problem of 'proper use', and his earlier concept of a tool structure. This analysis is aimed at grounding the metaphysical and ethical significance of technical artefacts. It shows that Heidegger can support postnatural environmentalism's claim that artefacts should not be jettisoned by environmental (...) thinking because that leads to reckless treatment of them. Exploration of these issues also contributes to environmental interpretations of Heidegger's philosophical legacy, which were limited to natural beings. (shrink)

Given an uncountable cardinal κ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\kappa}$$\end{document} that satisfies κκ=κ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\kappa^{\kappa}=\kappa}$$\end{document}, we provide a forcing that is <κ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${<\kappa}$$\end{document} -closed, has size 2κ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${2^\kappa}$$\end{document} and is κ+\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\kappa^+}$$\end{document} -cc, to introduce a Σ1-definable wellorder of H\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} (...) \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\rm H}}$$\end{document}. This improves the main result of Holy and Lücke :221–236, 2014), where such a wellorder is introduced by a forcing which potentially collapses cardinals, and where the additional requirement that 2κ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${2^\kappa}$$\end{document} be regular is needed. As an application, we use this to infer that Σ1-definable wellorderings of H\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\rm H}}$$\end{document} can be introduced for many different cardinals κ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\kappa}$$\end{document} simultaneously, while preserving a lot of ground model structure, improving results of Friedman and Holy :133–166, 2011) and Friedman and Lücke. Moreover the results of this paper answer Holy and Lücke. (shrink)

“No one can take the other’s dying away from him,” as Martin Heidegger famously claimed, but what he was significantly silent about was that beings, both human and non-human, can mutually contribute to each other’s death. By focusing on the interrelatedness of deaths, this paper presents a reversal of the Heideggerian perspective on the relation between Dasein’s mineness and “being-toward-death.” Drawing upon the structural meaning of death, which consists in the fact that no one can replace me in that I (...) will die, I show that the phenomenon of contributing-toward-the-death-of-others individuates Dasein as well. This will allow us to reread the threat of the They in the context of the Anthro- pocene, elucidating the non-transferable character of my share in others’ death. Finally, the paper aims to deepen our understanding of the change in the character of death which has been brought about by technology in the Anthropocene. (shrink)

Is it possible that Heidegger was a reist? An attempt to reconstruct Heideggerian onticityThe paper aims to answer the following question: does Martin Heidegger’s ontology has its complement in some kind of onticity? In the attempt to reconstruct it, I show that Heidegger’s concept of being is combined with the reistic theory represented i.a. by Tadeusz Kotarbinski, according to which a being is always a thing. I argue that this is the result of the basic principles of Heideggerian being: that (...) being is unfolding of the particularity and peculiarity of each being and that being discloses itself through the structures of time-space, and hence it can occur only in the single, unique, and concrete beings such as things, and not in ideas or general and abstract beings. (shrink)

The paper revisits metaphysical and deontological stances on moral considerability and offers a new criterion for it – “affectability”, that is a capacity of an agent to affect a considered entity. Such an approach results in significant changes in the scope of moral considerability and is relevant for discussing the human position in the Anthropocene. This concept, given especially the assumption of the directness of moral considerability, is also substantial for the decision making process on the ethical, as well as (...) the political plane. (shrink)

Abstract:In this paper, Heidegger's lifelong interest in usable things is combined with his critique of aesthetics and environmental reading of his works to build the framework for reexamining his notion of authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) as the category which environmental aesthetics can employ to reconceptualize our aesthetic judgment of everyday artifacts and how, by doing so, that contributes to reducing the ecologically harmful effects of consumerism. To this end, I draw upon the ambiguous position of usable artifacts in Heidegger's philosophy. I shall (...) unpack this ambiguity by explaining that it mirrors tensions in Heidegger's idea of truth as inherently agonistic dis-closure. I argue that although everyday artifacts—as opposed to artworks—are situated closer to the pole of hiddenness, they can participate aesthetically in revealing being. Elucidating this requires re-appropriating Heidegger's concept of being 'authentic' as being 'one's own' (eigen). I show that applying the category of (Heideggerian) authenticity to everyday artifacts should consist in unfolding their ontological uniqueness, which is irrespective of their ontic replicability. Finally, I develop an understanding of authenticity by exploring environmental-aesthetical implications of some of Heidegger's remarks on things related to their susceptibility to changes. (shrink)

We investigate properties of the ineffability and the Ramsey operator, and a common generalization of those that was introduced by the second author, with respect to higher indescribability, as introduced by the first author. This extends earlier investigations on the ineffability operator by James Baumgartner, and on the Ramsey operator by Qi Feng, by Philip Welch et al., and by the first author.

The technique of forcing is almost ubiquitous in set theory, and it seems to be based on technicalities like the concepts of genericity, forcing names and their evaluations, and on the recursively defined forcing predicates, the definition of which is particularly intricate for the basic case of atomic first order formulas. In his [3], the first author has provided an axiomatic framework for set forcing over models of $\mathrm {ZFC}$ that is a collection of guiding principles for extensions over which (...) one still has control from the ground model, and has shown that these axiomatics necessarily lead to the usual concepts of genericity and of forcing extensions, and also that one can infer from them the usual recursive definition of forcing predicates. In this paper, we present a more general such approach, covering both class forcing and set forcing, over various base theories, and we provide additional details regarding the formal setting that was outlined in [3]. (shrink)

The minimal ordinal-connection axiom $$MOC$$ was introduced by the first author in R. Freire. (South Am. J. Log. 2:347–359, 2016). We observe that $$MOC$$ is equivalent to a number of statements on the existence of certain hierarchies on the universe, and that under global choice, $$MOC$$ is in fact equivalent to the $${{\,\mathrm{GCH}\,}}$$. Our main results then show that $$MOC$$ corresponds to a weak version of global choice in models of the $${{\,\mathrm{GCH}\,}}$$ : it can fail in models of the (...) $${{\,\mathrm{GCH}\,}}$$ without global choice, but also global choice can fail in models of $$MOC$$. (shrink)

The class forcing theorem, which asserts that every class forcing notion ${\mathbb {P}}$ admits a forcing relation $\Vdash _{\mathbb {P}}$, that is, a relation satisfying the forcing relation recursion—it follows that statements true in the corresponding forcing extensions are forced and forced statements are true—is equivalent over Gödel–Bernays set theory $\text {GBC}$ to the principle of elementary transfinite recursion $\text {ETR}_{\text {Ord}}$ for class recursions of length $\text {Ord}$. It is also equivalent to the existence of truth predicates for the (...) infinitary languages $\mathcal {L}_{\text {Ord},\omega }$, allowing any class parameter A; to the existence of truth predicates for the language $\mathcal {L}_{\text {Ord},\text {Ord}}$ ; to the existence of $\text {Ord}$ -iterated truth predicates for first-order set theory $\mathcal {L}_{\omega,\omega }$ ; to the assertion that every separative class partial order ${\mathbb {P}}$ has a set-complete class Boolean completion; to a class-join separation principle; and to the principle of determinacy for clopen class games of rank at most $\text {Ord}+1$. Unlike set forcing, if every class forcing notion ${\mathbb {P}}$ has a forcing relation merely for atomic formulas, then every such ${\mathbb {P}}$ has a uniform forcing relation applicable simultaneously to all formulas. Our results situate the class forcing theorem in the rich hierarchy of theories between $\text {GBC}$ and Kelley–Morse set theory $\text {KM}$. (shrink)

This book is a detailed study of how, according to Thomas Aquinas and his works, God's Holy Spirit is continuously at work in and through human moral activity.

American Christians have developed a long list of expectations about what the life with God will feel like. Many Christians rightly deny the Prosperity Gospel-the idea that God wants you to be healthy and wealthy- but instead embrace its more subtle spin-off, the Emotional Prosperity Gospel, or the belief that God wants you to always experience happiness and fulfillment. Our society has become increasingly averse to sadness and emotional discomfort. Too often, people of faith assume that difficult feelings are a (...) result of either God's judgment or our own lack of spiritual maturity. Some even equate happiness with holiness. In Holy Unhappiness, Amanda Held Opelt, author of A Hole in the World, grapples with her own experience of disillusionment when life didn't go the way she expected. She examines some of the historic, religious, and cultural influences that led to the idolization of positive feelings and the marginalization of negative feelings. Unpacking nine elements of life that have been tainted by the message of the Emotional Prosperity Gospel - including work, marriage, parenting, calling, community, and church - she points to a new path forward, one that reimagines what the "blessed" life can be like if we release some of our expectations and seek God in places we never thought to look. While Opelt acknowledges the dignity of desiring happiness, she ultimately pleads for the normalization of sadness, anger, grief, disappointment, and other uncomfortable feelings as a part of the Christian experience, making a case that there is holiness to be found even in our unhappiness. (shrink)

FROM THE INSTITUTE OF MARXISM-LENINISM The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Critique. Against Bruno Bauer and C0. is the first joint work of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. At the end of August 1844 Marx and Engels met in Paris ...

This article is a précis of Mark C. Murphy’s _Divine Holiness and Divine Action_ (Oxford University Press, 2021), which offers an account of God’s holiness and of the difference this view of God’s holiness should make to our understanding of divine action.

In response to prevailing perceptions, I contend that Søren Kierkegaard (1813–55) conceives of the wholly otherness of God via his dialectical category of the ‘infinite qualitative difference’ between the human and the divine, initially through the self's consciousness of sin and ultimately through the self's acceptance of the gift of forgiveness. Therefore, I claim that while the common designation of Kierkegaard's God as ‘Wholly Other’ may initially evoke the alterity of sin; it is not ultimately sufficient to describe the divine (...) alterity which Kierkegaard regards as more faithfully manifest in the ‘impossible possibility’ of forgiveness. Through this reading, I finally suggest that the ‘Wholly Other’ is not ultimately representative of God in Kierkegaard's writings and might be more faithfully supplemented by the appellation of the Holy Other. (shrink)

This paper explores Pope Francis’ and the Holy See’s reaction to the war in Ukraine, and attempts to explain the logic behind it. After introducing the Holy See’s statements since the start of Russia’s aggression, the author reads them through the background of Catholic social teaching. In particular, he claims that the ambiguities of the Holy See’s position are due to the unresolved tension between the traditional just war approach and a tendency towards nonviolence. The latter has (...) acquired prominence over the last decades, in particular with Francis’ Fratelli Tutti. The author concludes that the war in Ukraine represents a pivotal moment in the Catholic Church’s thinking on war and peace. (shrink)

It is tempting to regard the perpetrators of the September 11th terrorist attacks as evil incarnate. But their motives, as Bruce Lincoln’s acclaimed Holy Terrors makes clear, were profoundly and intensely religious. Thus what we need after the events of 9/11, Lincoln argues, is greater clarity about what we take religion to be. Holy Terrors begins with a gripping dissection of the instruction manual given to each of the 9/11 hijackers. In their evocation of passages from the Quran, (...) we learn how the terrorists justified acts of destruction and mass murder “in the name of God, the most merciful, the most compassionate.” Lincoln then offers a provocative comparison of President Bush’s October 7, 2001 speech announcing U.S. military action in Afghanistan alongside the videotaped speech released by Osama bin Laden just a few hours later. As Lincoln authoritatively demonstrates, a close analysis of the rhetoric used by leaders as different as George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden—as well as Mohamed Atta and even Jerry Falwell—betrays startling similarities. These commonalities have considerable implications for our understanding of religion and its interrelationships with politics and culture in a postcolonial world, implications that Lincoln draws out with skill and sensitivity. With a chapter new to this edition, “Theses on Religion and Violence,” Holy Terrors remains one of the essential books on September 11 and a classic study on the character of religion. “Modernity has ended twice: in its Marxist form in 1989 Berlin, and in its liberal form on September 11, 2001. In order to understand such major historical changes we need both large-scale and focused analyses—a combination seldom to be found in one volume. But here Bruce Lincoln . . . has given us just such a mix of discrete and large-picture analysis.”—Stephen Healey, Christian Century “From time to time there appears a work . . . that serves to focus the wide-ranging, often contentious discussion of religion’s significance within broader cultural dynamics. Bruce Lincoln’s Holy Terrors is one such text. . . . Anyone still struggling toward a more nuanced comprehension of 9/11 would do well to spend time with this book.”—Theodore Pulcini, Middle East Journal. (shrink)