David Chalmers has proposed several principles in his attack on the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness. One of these is the principle of organizational invariance , which he asserts is significantly supported by two thought experiments involving human brains and their functional silicon-based isomorphs. I claim that while the principle is an intelligible hypothesis and could possibly be true, his thought experiments fail to provide support for it.

The difficulties encountered by attempts to treat identity as a relation between an object and itself are well-known: "...the sentence 'The morning star is...the morning star' is analytic and a truism, while...'The morning star is the evening star' is synthetic and represents a 'valuable extension of our knowledge'... But if {the morning star} and {the evening star} are the same object, and identity is taken as a relation holding between this object and itself, then it is impossible to explain how (...) the two sentences can differ in cognitive content... ". Russell's solution to these difficulties rejects the identification of logical with grammatical form, in effect denying that such sentences assert relations between the morning star and itself. The logical representations which the Russellian proposes, contain quantifiers, predicate letters, and individual variables, but no expressions standing for particulars. The Fregean solution, while admitting logical representations whose nominal expressions stand for particulars, insists that the meaning of such expressions is different from their reference. Frege-Russell analyses thus both deny that the morning star is involved qua particular in the meaning of the sentences in question. ;Rather than replace the morning star as ontological subject of these sentences, I suggest that their difference in meaning arises from the kind of particular that the identity-relation relates--a particular which, unlike its Frege-Russell counterpart, is two-sided and multi-faceted. Such a particular requires an ambiguous singular term. In Chapter 1, I utilize such a term to provide a surfacist account of belief-context ambiguity requiring neither differences in relative scope nor distinctions between sense and reference. In Chapter 2, I go on to provide an account of negative existentials, necessity- and identity-statements which resolves philosophical problems that Russell-Frege analyses only avoid. To solve these problems, I show that it is necessary to reject two canons of philosophical logic, the Law of Identity and the Indiscernibility of Identicals. (shrink)

Supervaluationism is often described as the most popular semantic treatment of indeterminacy. There’s little consensus, however, about how to fill out the bare-bones idea to include a characterization of logical consequence. The paper explores one methodology for choosing between the logics: pick a logic thatnorms beliefas classical consequence is standardly thought to do. The main focus of the paper considers a variant of standard supervaluational, on which we can characterizedegrees of determinacy. It applies the methodology above to focus ondegree logic. (...) This is developed first in a basic, single-premise case; and then extended to the multipremise case, and to allowdegreesof consequence. The metatheoretic properties of degree logic are set out. On the positive side, the logic is supraclassical—all classical valid sequents are degree logic valid. Strikingly, metarules such as cut and conjunction introduction fail. (shrink)

Bien que Leibniz maintienne que l'examination de l'œuvre de William King, De l'origine du mal, « auroit fourni une bonne occasion d'eclaircir plusieurs difficultés » (GP VI, 400) traitées dans la Théodicée, aucun commentateur n'a encore considéré l'appendice de la Théodicée qui traite du livre de King. Dans cet éssai, je cherche à combler cette lacune. Je commence par présenter le problème de la liberté exploité par Bayle dans le Dictionnaire historique et critique afin de monter l'irrationalité de la (...) foi, et j'esquisse la conception de la liberté présentée dans la Théodicée. Dans la seconde partie de l'éssai, je présente la conception de la liberté défendue par King, avant d'examiner, dans la troisième partie de l'éssai, la critique Leibnizienne de cette conception de la liberté. Dans la dernière partie de l'éssai, j'explique comment ce traitement de l'œuvre de King renforce les arguments de la Théodicée. (shrink)

In this article I argue (against the views of Russell Dancy and Gregory Vlastos, but in support of the views of R. E. Allen, Gail Fine, and Francesco Fronterotta) that Euthyphro 5c-d and 6d-e show that Socrates had a metaphysics, early version of the theory of forms. I disagree with Fronterotta only on the separation of the forms in the Euthyphro.

Socrates is one the most important thinkers in western philosophy, yet he remains enigmatic, having left behind no works of his own. Instead, his thought is understood primarily through the work of his followers. In this accessible introduction, William Prior assesses Socrates the man, his famous trial, and the nature of his philosophy.

The idea of role‐playing makes some people nervous – even some people who play role‐playing games (RPGs). So the idea of immersion is central to understanding how Dungeons Dragons and other aspects of participatory culture work. Phenomenology is a kind of “philosophy of mind” associated with the works of twentieth‐century philosophers Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean‐Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau‐Ponty, among others. The domain of phenomenology encompasses the entire range of experiences in the world, paying attention to what Husserl called (...) “intentionality,” or how our consciousness is directed toward particular objects in the world. The fact that this is presented as an atypical approach to play, or at least one that requires some effort, invites us to ask about typical modes of play if visualization of in‐game events is not that mode. This chapter concluded by scratch the surface of a complete phenomenological description of role‐playing. (shrink)

This essay examines the role of non-existent objects in "epistemological ontology"--the study of the entities that make thinking possible. An earlier revision of Meinong's Theory of Objects is reviewed, Meinong's notions of Quasisein and Aussersein are discussed, and a theory of Meinongian objects as "combinatorially possible" entities is presented.

Can one coherently integrate Darwin's view of evolution with an affirmation of the value of existence? In this fresh, lean, and substantive volume, William Meyer addresses this important question. By carefully analyzing Darwin's own writings and by drawing on the philosophical perspectives of William James, Alfred North Whitehead, and others, Meyer persuasively redirects the cultural conversation about Darwin away from the retrospective question of origins toward the prospective question concerning the ultimate significance of evolutionary life. As James recognized, (...) the question about the reality of God is more critical for the forward-looking question of value than it is for the backward-looking question of origins. Darwin was a theist in search of a better theism, and because theology had not yet caught up to him, he became increasingly agnostic and caught between his mechanistic understanding of nature, on the one hand, and his affirmation of the value and beauty of the world, on the other. Whitehead's philosophy of organism offers a way to integrate Darwin's evolutionary insights with his affirmation of the grandeur of nature. Meyer's clearly written and richly argued book enables us to integrate our evolutionary understanding of the world with our experience of value within it. (shrink)

Disney's computer‐animated musical film, Moana tells the tale of Moana, the daughter of Tui, the chief of a Polynesian island, Motunui. Bound by the legendary tradition of her ancestors, Moana is expected to follow her lineage and take over as chief when she grows up. As the authors dig beneath the surface level of the story, they find a metaphorical and philosophical level to Moana's journey. The story of Moana has layers. First, it is literally a tale of Moana's voyage (...) outside beyond the reef so that she can restore the heart of Te Fiti and save the people of Motunui. She closes this tale with a happy ending as she simultaneously lives the life that she freely chooses, becomes the leader of her people (by saving them) as her parents wanted, and honors her tradition insofar as she restores her ancestors' tradition of wayfinding. (shrink)

A response to a recent critique by Cem Bozşahin of the theory of syntactic semantics as it applies to Helen Keller, and some applications of the theory to the philosophy of computer science.

This article compares topographical and archaeological remains of the Thermopylae frontier with the ancient testimonia of the sixth century historian Procopius of Caesareia (De aedificiis4.2.1.–22). It was revealed that: many of the frontier fortifications described were initially built before the sixth century; the fortified κλεισούρα mentioned should be equated with the Dhéma Pass; and the commercial settlement of Myropóles is best identified with the modern village of Káto Dhió Vouná. Written in Attic prose, this passage represents a rhetorical exercise, the (...) climax of which turned not on the ancient battlefield of Thermopylae, but rather on a mountain pass and it's highway that neutralized the Thermopylae defenses if they were ever controlled by the enemy. We were told that only the Emperor Justinian's wisdom could grasp this critical fact. Additionally, Procopius employed many rhetorical devices in this narrative: τóπος, χρóνος,, ἄγαλμα, ἔκφρασις, πανηγρικóς and employed imperial propaganda, praise, and exaggeration as well. In short, the passage is a classic example of selective story telling that may have found its inspiration in the Hunnic raid of 539/540 and the Herodotean account of the Persian invasion of 480 BC. While Procopius' account remains our best topographical description of the late antique Thermopylae frontier, one can only say that more archaeological questions were left unanswered than were resolved. In short, as an archaeological source, theDe aedificiisis a disappointing and vexing resource filled with equivocations. Finally, one may doubt that Procopius ever did visit the Thermopylae frontier, even though during his career he certainly had ample opportunity to do so. His account, therefore, must have been based upon secondary sources, whether imperial archival material, itineraries, or military staff reports and were not the result of personal autopsy. (shrink)

Aquinas' theology can be understood only if one comes to grips with his metaphysics of being. The relevance of this perspective is exhibited in his treatment of topics like creation, goodness, happiness, truth, freedom of the will, the unity of the human being, prayer and providence, God's personhood, divine love, God and violence, God's unknowablility, the Incarnation, the Trinity, God's existence, theological language and even laughter. This book endeavors to treat these questions in a clear and convincing language. Is there (...) a better method for improving one's own theology than by grappling with the arguments of Thomas Aquinas? (shrink)

We review the role of reference within Davidson's T‐theoretic account of language and examine his contention that reference is inscrutable. More generally, we look at the explanatory role of reference in the context of Davidson's philosophy: whether there are explanations that directly appeal to reference, and whether there are explanations that appeal to beliefs about reference.

As identity and authenticity discourses increasingly saturate everyday life, so too have these concepts spread across the humanities and social sciences literatures. Many scholars may be interested in identity and authenticity, but lack knowledge of paradigmatic or disciplinary approaches to these concepts. This volume offers readers insight into social constructionist approaches to identity and authenticity. It focuses on the processes of identification and authentication, rather than on subjective experiences of selfhood. There are no attempts to settle what authentic identities are. (...) On the contrary, contributors demonstrate that neither identities nor their authenticity have a single or fixed meaning. Chapters provide exemplars of contemporary research on identity and authenticity, with significant diversity among them in terms of the identities, cultural milieu, geographic settings, disciplinary traditions, and methodological approaches considered. Contributors introduce readers to a number of established and emerging identity groups from sites around the world, from yogis and punks to fire dancers and social media influencers. Their conceptual work stretches from the micro-analytic to the ethno-national as authors employ a variety of qualitative methods including ethnographic fieldwork, interviewing, and the collection and analysis of naturally-occurring interactions. Several of the chapters look directly at identification and authentication, while others focus on the social and cultural backdrops that structure these practices-what unites them is the adoption of social constructionist sensibilities. This book will appeal to anyone interested in understanding identity and authenticity. (shrink)

Trotz eines verbreiteten Zweifels gegenüber Wahrheitsansprüchen wird in vielen persönlichen und sozialen Lebensbereichen Wahrheit selbstverständlich vorausgesetzt. Ohne Wahrheit kann keine Gesellschaft bestehen. Gewissen, Entscheidungsfreiheit, Menschenrechte, der Glaube an Gott, selbst der Zweifel, die Verständigung über Lebensziele und die Erfahrung von Glück sind ohne Wahrheit nicht möglich. Das Buch ergründet und entfaltet die Einsicht, dass der Mensch das Wahrheitswesen ist. Die Erkenntnis, wie sie sich bei Thomas von Aquin findet, dass Wahrheit auf der höchsten Ebene ihrer Abstraktion gedacht werden muss, dient (...) dabei bis heute als Verständnisschlüssel auch für unseren zeitgenössischen Begriff von Wahrheit. (shrink)

This chapter defends the account of metaphysical indeterminacy of Barnes and Williams against Eklund's objections.

Own Yourself is "hands-on" course in ethics and morality. Its goal is to assist students to come to know who they genuinely are and who they want to become as they move into adulthood.

What implications, if any, does evolutionary biology have for metaethics? Many believe that our evolutionary background supports a deflationary metaethics, providing a basis at least for debunking ethical realism. Some arguments for this conclusion appeal to claims about the etiology of the mental capacities we employ in ethical judgment, while others appeal to the etiology of the content of our moral beliefs. In both cases the debunkers’ claim is that the causal roles played by evolutionary factors raise deep epistemic problems (...) for realism: if ethical truths are objective or independent of our evaluative attitudes, as realists maintain, then we lose our justification for our ethical beliefs once we become aware of the evolutionary shaping of our ethical capacities or beliefs, which would not have disposed us reliably to track independent ethical truths; realism, they claim, thus saddles us with ethical skepticism. I distinguish and spell out various evolutionary debunking arguments along these lines and argue that they all fail: the capacity etiology argument fails to raise any special or serious problem for realism, and the content etiology arguments all rely on strong explanatory claims about our moral beliefs that are simply not supported by the science unless it is supplemented by philosophical claims that just beg the question against realism from the start. While the various debunking arguments do bring out some interesting commitments of ethical realism, and even raise some good challenges as realists develop positive moral epistemologies, they fall far short of their debunking ambitions. (shrink)

"This book, one of the most frequently cited works on Martin Heidegger in any language, belongs on any short list of classic studies of Continental philosophy. William J. Richardson explores the famous turn in Heidegger's thought after Being in Time and demonstrates how this transformation was radical without amounting to a simple contradiction of his earlier views." "In a full account of the evolution of Heidegger's work as a whole, Richardson provides a detailed, systematic, and illuminating account of both (...) divergences and fundamental continuities in Heidegger's philosophy, especially in light of recently published works. He demonstrates that the "thinking" of Being for the later Heidegger has exactly the same configuration as the radical phenomenology of the early Heidegger, once he has passed through the "turning" of his way." Including as a preface the letter that Heidegger wrote to Richardson and a new writer's preface and epilogue, the new edition of this valuable guide will be an essential resource for students and scholars for many years to come. (shrink)

The degradation of modern sport--its commercialization, trivialization, widespread cheating, cult of athletic stars and celebrities, and manipulation by the media--has led to calls for its transformation. William J. Morgan constructs a critical theory of sport that shores up the weak arguments of past attempts and points a way forward to making sport more humane, compelling, and substantive. Drawing on the work of social theorists, Morgan challenges scholars and fans alike to explore new spaces in sport culture and imagine the (...) rich cultural and political possibilities to be found in the pastimes we follow with such passion. (shrink)

This essay re-examines Meinong's "Über Gegenstandstheorie" and undertakes a clarification and revision of it that is faithful to Meinong, overcomes the various objections to his theory, and is capable of offering solutions to various problems in philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. I then turn to a discussion of a historically and technically interesting Russell-style paradox (now known as "Clark's Paradox") that arises in the modified theory. I also examine the alternative Meinong-inspired theories of Hector-Neri Castañeda and Terence Parsons.

This essay considers what it means to understand natural language and whether a computer running an artificial-intelligence program designed to understand natural language does in fact do so. It is argued that a certain kind of semantics is needed to understand natural language, that this kind of semantics is mere symbol manipulation (i.e., syntax), and that, hence, it is available to AI systems. Recent arguments by Searle and Dretske to the effect that computers cannot understand natural language are discussed, and (...) a prototype natural-language-understanding system is presented as an illustration. (shrink)

My argument will proceed as follows. I will first sketch out the broad internalist case for pitching its normative account of sport in the abstract manner that following Dworkin’s lead in the philosophy of law its adherents insist upon. I will next show that the normative deficiencies in social conventions broad internalists uncover are indeed telling but misplaced since they hold only for what David Lewis famously called ‘coordinating’ conventions. I will then distinguish coordinating conventions from deep ones and make (...) my case not only for the normative salience of deep conventions but for their normative superiority over the abstract normative principles broad internalists champion. (shrink)