Wann immer wir etwas sehen, horen, fuhlen oder riechen, erscheint uns etwas. Was aber bedeutet es, dass jemandem etwas erscheint? Was ist der mentale Zustand, in dem sich jemand befindet, wenn ihm etwas erscheint (der Zustand des Erscheinens)? Diese nur scheinbar harmlose Frage steht im Zentrum der vorliegenden Untersuchung. Die Antwort, die verteidigt wird, lautet: Zustande des Erscheinens sind ihrem Wesen nach transparent. D. h. in einem Zustand des Erscheinens sind dem Subjekt dieses Zustandes ausschliesslich die Gegenstande dieser Zustande prasent, (...) niemals aber das Subjekt oder der Zustand selbst (zumindest nicht als solche). Diese Antwort widerspricht einigen in der Philosophie des Geistes tief verwurzelten Auffassungen. Eine davon ist die Auffassung, das phanomenale Bewusstsein von Zustanden des Erscheinens bestunde in irgendeiner unmittelbaren Bekanntschaft mit eben diesen Zustanden. In Wahrheit, so wird argumentiert, hat das fragliche Bewusstsein eine auf die Welt gerichtete Struktur. Es ist nichts anderes als das Prasent-Sein von Gegenstanden in Zustanden des Erscheinens. Dieses Ergebnis hat bedeutende Konsequenzen. Es stellt insbesondere die klassische Taxonomie mentaler Zustande in Frage. Einerseits lasst sich die Unterscheidung von intentionalen und phanomenalen Eigenschaften nicht aufrechterhalten. Denn das phanomenale Bewusstsein von Zustanden des Erscheinens ist eine Art der Intentionalitat. Andererseits lasst sich die Einheit des Merkmals der Intentionalitat nicht aufrechterhalten. Denn die Intentionalitat von Zustanden des Erscheinens ist von grundsatzlich anderer Art als die Intentionalitat propositionaler Einstellungen. Es wird daher vorgeschlagen, nicht weiter zwischen intentionalen und phanomenalen Zustanden zu unterscheiden, sondern zwischen verschiedenen Arten intentionaler Zustande. (shrink)

John R. Searle is one of the world's leading philosophers. During his long and outstanding career, he has made groundbreaking and lasting contributions to the philosophy of language, to the philosophy of mind, as well as to the nature, structure, and functioning of social reality. This volume documents the 13th Munster Lectures on Philosophy with John R. Searle. It includes not only 11 critical papers on Searle s philosophy and Searle's replies to the papers, but also an original article by (...) John R. Searle on his overall philosophical enterprise entitled "The Basic Reality and the Human Reality." "I think Munster is probably unique among contemporary universities in its ability to produce such a high level of philosophical production from their philosophy students." - John R. Searle". (shrink)

Modal dualism is the claim that there is a space of epistemically possible worlds that exceeds the space of metaphysically possible worlds. In the present paper, I argue that modal dualism is false. I do so via an argument that differs from most previous arguments against modal dualism in that it does not rely on controversial semantic or epistemological assumptions like descriptivism, internalism or modal rationalism. The point of my argument is, instead, that modal dualism is internally inconsistent because it (...) is the result of the failure to draw the proper conclusions from the abandonment of these semantic and epistemological assumptions. The relevant inconsistency manifests itself in the modal dualist notion of epistemic modality. For this notion to play the explanatory roles assigned to it by modal dualists, it has to be a notion of a genuinely epistemic kind of modality. But the only way to make sense of such a notion is via just those semantic or epistemological assumptions that the modal dualist is keen to avoid. Anyone willing to abandon these assumptions has to go further and detach the epistemic from the modal altogether. (shrink)

The author puts forward and defends a new argument for indirect realism called the argument from pain. The argument is akin to a well-known traditional argument to the same end, the argument from hallucination. Like the latter, it contains one premise stating an analogy between veridical perceptions and certain other states and one premise stating that those states are states of acquaintance with sense-data. The crucial difference is that the states that are said to be analogous to veridical perceptions are (...) pain-states instead of hallucinations. This difference makes the argument from pain immune to the standard objections against the argument from hallucination. (shrink)

Perceptual disjunctivism, as I regard it in this paper, is the view that veridical perceptions and hallucinations, while indistinguishable via introspection, are states of fundamentally different kinds. This fundamental difference can be spelled out in various ways. According to the view I will be concerned with, it is a fundamental difference in the personal-level structure of both states. Against this version of disjunctivism, I will raise a new challenge. It is a variant of what can be seen as the standard (...) challenge against disjunctivism: how to do justice to the indistinguishability of veridical perceptions and hallucinations. It differs, however, from common versions of this challenge in where it locates the potential incompatibility of disjunctivism with the relevant fact of indistinguishability. Commonly, it is the disjunctivist assumption of a fundamental difference between both kinds of states which is regarded as incompatible with the indistinguishability of these states. In contrast, I will suggest that if hallucinations and veridical perceptions differed in the way proposed by structural disjunctivism, this difference would induce a corresponding difference in the psychological processes of their introspection and that the assumption of such a difference in the manner of introspection is most likely incompatible with a properly formulated indistinguishability claim. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue against a view that I call foundationalism about persistence-conditions. The core of this view is that composite physical objects have their specific persistence-conditions in virtue of these conditions being fulfilled by the object’s physical constituents at various times. I will provide two arguments – the argument from the possibility of instantaneous objects and the argument from the presence of persistence-conditions – which show that this view is untenable. These arguments will also point towards a (...) more adequate understanding of what it means for an object to have certain persistence-conditions. I will expound this understanding and suggest, on its basis, an unorthodox, hylomorphist account of the persistence-conditions of objects. (shrink)

Wann immer wir etwas sehen, hören, fühlen oder riechen, erscheint uns etwas. Was aber bedeutet es, dass jemandem etwas erscheint? Was ist der mentale Zustand, in dem sich jemand befindet, wenn ihm etwas erscheint (der Zustand des Erscheinens)? Diese nur scheinbar harmlose Frage steht im Zentrum der vorliegenden Untersuchung. Die Antwort, die verteidigt wird, lautet: Zustände des Erscheinens sind ihrem Wesen nach transparent. D. h. in einem Zustand des Erscheinens sind dem Subjekt dieses Zustandes ausschließlich die Gegenstände dieser Zustände präsent, (...) niemals aber das Subjekt oder der Zustand selbst (zumindest nicht als solche). Diese Antwort widerspricht einigen in der Philosophie des Geistes tief verwurzelten Auffassungen. Eine davon ist die Auffassung, das phänomenale Bewusstsein von Zuständen des Erscheinens bestünde in irgendeiner unmittelbaren Bekanntschaft mit eben diesen Zuständen. In Wahrheit, so wird argumentiert, hat das fragliche Bewusstsein eine auf die Welt gerichtete Struktur. Es ist nichts anderes als das Präsent-Sein von Gegenständen in Zuständen des Erscheinens. Dieses Ergebnis hat bedeutende Konsequenzen. Es stellt insbesondere die klassische Taxonomie mentaler Zustände in Frage. Einerseits lässt sich die Unterscheidung von intentionalen und phänomenalen Eigenschaften nicht aufrechterhalten. Denn das phänomenale Bewusstsein von Zuständen des Erscheinens ist eine Art der Intentionalität. Andererseits lässt sich die Einheit des Merkmals der Intentionalität nicht aufrechterhalten. Denn die Intentionalität von Zuständen des Erscheinens ist von grundsätzlich anderer Art als die Intentionalität propositionaler Einstellungen. Es wird daher vorgeschlagen, nicht weiter zwischen intentionalen und phänomenalen Zuständen zu unterscheiden, sondern zwischen verschiedenen Arten intentionaler Zustände. (shrink)

Current descriptivist accounts of proper names entail two claims: that the expressions we know as different proper names are the bearers of different meanings and that the descriptions corresponding to these meanings contain quotations of the expressions whose meanings they are taken to be. While is the source of a number of intractable problems, descriptivists feel committed to it because it is the only available option to adhere to, which they use to take as a matter of course. In the (...) present paper I will bring up for discussion a, to my knowledge, new descriptivist account, inter-nominal descriptivism, which avoids the commitment to by rejecting. According to this account, all tokens of the expressions known as different proper names express the same descriptive mode of presentation and this descriptive mode of presentation is akin to the character of an indexical. I will try to show that, contrary to first appearance, this idea can be developed in a consistent and plausible manner. (shrink)

John R. Searle is one of the world's leading philosophers. During his long and outstanding career, he has made groundbreaking and lasting contributions to the philosophy of language, to the philosophy of mind, as well as to the nature, structure, and functioning of social reality. This volume documents the 13th Münster Lectures on Philosophy with John R. Searle. It includes not only 11 critical papers on Searle's philosophy and Searle's replies to the papers, but also an original article by John (...) R. Searle on his overall philosophical enterprise entitled "The Basic Reality and the Human Reality". -/- "I think Münster is probably unique among contemporary universities in its ability to produce such a high level of philosophical production from their philosophy students." - John R. Searle. (shrink)

This book focuses on the financing of religions, examining some European church-state models, using a philosophical methodology. The work defends autonomy-based liberalism and elaborates how this liberalism can meet the requirements of liberal neutrality. The chapters also explore religious education and the financing of institutionalized religion. This volume collates the work of top scholars in the field. Starting from the idea that autonomy-based liberalism is an adequate framework for the requirement of liberal neutrality, the author elaborates why a liberal state (...) can support religions and how she should do this, without violating the principle of neutrality. Taking into account the principle of religious freedom and the separation of church and state, this work explores which criteria the state should take into account when she actively supports religions, faith-based schools and religious education. A number of concrete church-state models, including hands-off, religious accommodation and the state church are evaluated, and the book gives some recommendations in order to optimize those church-state models, where needed. Practitioners and scholars of politics, law, philosophy and education, especially religious education, will find this work of particular interest as it has useful guidelines on policies and practices, as well as studies of church-state models. (shrink)

This text provides an introduction to the history and current state of theories of word meanings.

The book explores the impact of manuscript remarks during the year 1929 on the development of Wittgenstein’s thought. Although its intention is to put the focus specifically on the manuscripts, the book is not purely exegetical. The contributors generate important new insights for understanding Wittgenstein’s philosophy and his place in the history of analytic philosophy. -/- Wittgenstein’s writings from the years 1929-1930 are valuable, not simply because they marked Wittgenstein’s return to academic philosophy after a seven-year absence, but because these (...) works indicate several changes in his philosophical thinking. The chapters in this volume clarify the significance of Wittgenstein’s return to philosophy in 1929. In Part 1, the contributors address different issues in the philosophy of mathematics, e.g. Wittgenstein's understanding of certain aspects of intuitionism and his commitment to verificationism, as well as his idea of "a new system". Part 2 examines Wittgenstein's philosophical development and his understanding of philosophical method. Here the contributors examine particular problems Wittgenstein dealt with in 1929, e.g. the colour-exclusion problem, and the use of thought experiments as well as his relationship to Frank Ramsey and philosophical pragmatism. Part 3 features essays on phenomenological language. These chapters address the role of spatial analogies and the structure of visual space. Finally, Part 4 includes one chapter on Wittgenstein’s few manuscript remarks about ethics and religion and relates it to his Lecture on Ethics. -/- Wittgenstein’s Philosophy in 1929 will be of great interest to scholars and advanced students working on Wittgenstein and the history of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

‘Know-that’, like so many natural language expressions, exhibits patterns of use that provide evidence for its context-sensitivity. A popular family of views – call it prag- matic invariantism – attempts to explain the shifty patterns by appeal to a pragmatic thesis: while the semantic meaning of ‘know-that’ is stable across all contexts of use, sentences of the form ‘S knows [doesn’t know] that p’ can be used to communicate a pragmatic content that depends on the context of use. In this (...) paper, the author argues that pragmatic invariantism makes inaccurate predictions for a wide range of well- known use data and is committed to attributing systematic pragmatic error to ordinary speakers. But pragmatic error is unprecedented, and it is doubtful that speakers are systematically wrong about what they intend to communicate. (shrink)

The book explores the impact of manuscript remarks during the year 1929 on the development of Wittgenstein's thought. Although its intention is to put the focus specifically on the manuscripts, the book is not purely exegetical. The contributors generate important new insights for understanding Wittgenstein's philosophy and his place in the history of analytic philosophy. Wittgenstein's writings from the years 1929-1930 are valuable, not simply because they marked Wittgenstein's return to academic philosophy after a seven-year absence, but because these works (...) indicate several changes in his philosophical thinking. The chapters in this volume clarify the significance of Wittgenstein's return to philosophy in 1929. In Part 1, the contributors address different issues in the philosophy of mathematics, e.g. Wittgenstein's understanding of certain aspects of intuitionism and his commitment to verificationism, as well as his idea of "a new system". Part 2 examines Wittgenstein's philosophical development and his understanding of philosophical method. Here the contributors examine particular problems Wittgenstein dealt with in 1929, e.g. the colour-exclusion problem, and the use of thought experiments as well as his relationship to Frank Ramsey and philosophical pragmatism. Part 3 features essays on phenomenological language. These chapters address the role of spatial analogies and the structure of visual space. Finally, Part 4 includes one chapter on Wittgenstein's few manuscript remarks about ethics and religion and relates it to his Lecture on Ethics. Wittgenstein's Philosophy in 1929 will be of great interest to scholars and advanced students working on Wittgenstein and the history of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

We show that it is impossible in quantum mechanics to describe two separated physical systems. This is due to the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics. It is possible to give a description of two separated systems in a theory which is a generalization of quantum mechanics and of classical mechanics, in the sense that this theory contains both theories as special cases. We identify the axioms of quantum mechanics that make it impossible to describe separated systems. One of these axioms (...) is equivalent to the superposition principle. We show how these findings throw a different light on the paradox of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. (shrink)

In "Plato's Ghost" Jeremy Gray presented many connections between mathematical practices in the nineteenth century and the rise of mathematical platonism in the context of more general developments, which he refers to as modernism. In this paper, I take up this theme and present a condensed discussion of some arguments put forward in favor of and against the view of mathematical platonism. In particular, I highlight some pressures that arose in the work of Frege, Cantor, and Gödel, which support adopting (...) a platonist position. The aim of this discussion is to provide an historically informed introduction to the philosophical position of mathematical platonism and to point at some of its mathematical and philosophical roots in the nineteenth century. (shrink)

We propose a characterization of mathematical experiments in terms of a setup, a process with an outcome, and an interpretation. Using a broad notion of process, this allows us to consider arithmetic calculations and geometric constructions as components of mathematical experiments. Moreover, we argue that mathematical experiments should be considered within a broader context of an experimental research project. Finally, we present a particular case study of the genesis of a geometric construction to illustrate the experimental use of hand drawings (...) and computers in mathematical practice. (shrink)

In Miletus, about 550 B.C., together with our world-picture cosmology was born. This book tells the story. In Part One the reader is introduced in the archaic world-picture of a flat earth with the cupola of the celestial vault onto which the celestial bodies are attached. One of the subjects treated in that context is the riddle of the tilted celestial axis. This part also contains an extensive chapter on archaic astronomical instruments. Part Two shows how Anaximander (610-547 B.C.) blew (...) up this archaic world-picture and replaced it by a new one that is essentially still ours. He taught that the celestial bodies orbit at different distances and that the earth floats unsupported in space. This makes him the founding father of cosmology. Part Three discusses topics that completed the new picture described by Anaximander. Special attention is paid to the confrontation between Anaxagoras and Aristotle on the question whether the earth is flat or spherical, and on the battle between Aristotle and Heraclides Ponticus on the question whether the universe is finite or infinite. (shrink)

In this paper we examine some of the astrological content in Proclus' exegesis of the 'nuptial number' in Republic 545d, ff. The downfall of the best city-state is said by Socrates to be due to the fact that the Guardians, for all their wisdom, make a mistake about the timing of the breeding of future rulers and this mistake is somehow due to perception. We argue that Proclus' Republic Commentary is best understood as supposing that the Guardians are highly capable (...) astrologers who can -- up until one fateful day -- reliably hit the astrological trifecta: they combine conception astrology with natal and katarchic astrology. The marriage festivals are timed so that future Guardians are conceived under the right stars, with pregnancies of the right duration, and are born under the right stars, with guardian daemons whose names and natures are known through an astrologically-oriented theurgic practice. All this (and more) Proclus took to be hinted at through Socrates' opaque specification of the marriage number. (shrink)

There has recently been a wave of attempts to make sense of the role of de se thoughts in linguistic communication. A majority of the attempts assume a Perryan or a Lewisian view of de se thought. Views with these assumptions, I suggest, come in four varieties: uncentering (Egan 2007, Kölbel 2013, Moss 2012), recentering (Heim 2004, Weber 2012), multicentering (Kindermann 2014, Ninan 2010, Torre 2009), and no centering (Kaplan 1989, Perry 1979). I argue first that all four varieties of (...) centering are committed to what I call a shifting operation on the hearer's part. I argue second that, against common assumption, there is no real choice to make between the views. By showing that attempts to establish an advantage for some view over the others fail across the board, I make the case for neutralism regarding the varieties of centering – the claim that coverage of the empirical data is exactly the same for each view, and that the views are broadly equal in simplicity and elegance. (shrink)

Was sind systematische Metaphern? Wie intelligent ist die Buchstabenschrift? Müssen Wahrheitstheorien wahr sein? Wie ist das Verhältnis von Sachen (i.e. kulturellen Gegenständen) und Sätzen (d.h. sprachlichen Einheiten) zu beschreiben? Dirk Westerkamps grundlegende Untersuchung widmet sich dem noch kaum systematisch behandelten Verhältnis von Sprach- und Kulturphilosophie. - Die Aufgabe der Kulturphilosophie besteht in der theoretischen Reflexion kultureller Tatsachen. Sprache wird ihr dabei nicht nur als Medium des kulturellen Gedächtnisses zum Thema: Die Sprache ist sowohl selbst eine kulturelle Tatsache als auch (...) Bedingung der Möglichkeit kultureller Faktizität überhaupt. Die Kulturphilosophie muss sich daher der Sprachanalyse bedienen, um ihren Gegenstand, das sich ständig neu anordnende Ensemble kultureller Tatsachen, angemessen bestimmen zu können. In einer Reihe von gründlichen Einzelstudien untersucht Dirk Westerkamp das Verhältnis von Sachen und Sätzen als systematisches Problem, das die Formen der symbolischen Reflexivität der Sprache in zwei ihrer wichtigsten philosophischen Facetten zu diskutieren erlaubt: in sowohl sprachphilosophischer wie wahrheitstheoretischer Hinsicht. Sprache und Schrift werden damit auf doppelte Weise thematisch: einmal als symbolische Ordnung kultureller Tatsachen und zweitens als Medien unseres Wahrheitsverständnisses. Entsprechend geht es im ersten Teil des Buches anhand des Leitbegriffs der symbolischen Reflexion um Verstehen und Nichtverstehen, Metaphern und Schrifttheorie und im zweiten um die Problematik einer sprachpragmatischen Wahrheitstheorie kultureller Tatsachen. In der hierfür gewählten Perspektive wechseln nicht nur historische und systematische, sondern auch methodische Zugänge: Sprachanalyse, Hermeneutik und Kulturphilosophie gehen eine ebenso spannungsreiche wie produktive Verbindung ein. (shrink)

Plato's Tim. 90b1-c6 describes a pathway to the soul's salvation via the study of the heavens. This paper poses three questions about this theme in Platonism: 1. The epistemological question: How is the paradigmatic function of the visible heavenly bodies to be reconciled with various Platonic misgivings about the faculty of perception? 2. The metaphysical question: How can »assimilation« to the motions of bodies in the realm of Becoming provide for the salvation of souls when souls are »higher«- a mid-point (...) between Being and Becoming? 3. The psychological question: What can it mean for an incorporeal soul to utilise the motions of a body for an ethical and cognitive paradigm? And provides an account of how Proclus and some of his fellow Neoplatonists answered these questions. (shrink)

In honour of Detlef Dürr, we report on a mathematical rigorous computation of the electric vacuum polarisation current and extract the well-known expression for the second order perturbation. Intermediate steps in the presented calculation demonstrate, to the knowledge of the authors for the first time, mathematical rigorous versions of the combined dimensional and Pauli-Villars regularisation schemes. These are employed as computational tools to infer convenient integral representations during the computation. The said second order expression is determined up to a remaining (...) degree of freedom of a real number–without ill-defined terms from start to end. (shrink)

Volume IV (which comprises two half-volumes) focuses on the life sciences, whose object of research is life itself, that which (necessarily) mediates between the physical and the psyche. Typical philosophical questions in this context include: What is “life” in the sense of the term relevant to the life sciences? How do we know that life has not “always existed” but must have arisen in the course of abiogenesis from inanimate nature? And how is it possible to know something about how (...) evolution has occurred? These are explored in the first half-volume. In its second half-volume, the book first deals with methodological and conceptual questions regarding the concrete natural history of mankind. Examples for pertinent questions in this context are: "What would be adequate criteria for singling out autapomorphic traits defining the genus "homo"?" and "Has the concept of "race" biological meaning and reality?" (Spoiler: The answer to the latter question is "no".) In the context of that question, a considerable part of the second half-volume deals with the history of "scientific" theories of race from the 17th century up until the 1990ies. In particular, Kant's theory of race and his racism (as well as his sexism) are discussed thoroughly. Pertinent questions are: "Did Kant invent the concept of race?", "Was Kant the founder of "scientific racism"?", "Did Kant invent and promote a concept of "racial purity"?" and "Did Kant endorse slave trade?". Furthermore, for anyone whose own philosophical positions rest on Kantian premises, the following questions will be of special importance: "Is Kant's racism implied by his transcendental philosophy?" and "Is Kant's racism implied by his ethics?" Regarding all these questions, the contributions of important authors like Eze, Bernasconi, Kleingeld and Mills are discussed and critically examined. Finally, the second half-volume closes with a thorough exploration of the methodological foundations of neuroscience and its limitations as a contribution to philosophy of mind (which as such will have its say in Volume VI). (shrink)

Gesprekken tussen filosoof en ecoloog Johan Braeckman en moraalfilosoof Dirk Verhofstadt over de evolutietheorie van Darwin, religie, irrationalieit, humanisme en atheïsme."--Publisher information.

Aus den wirtschaftlichen Turbulenzen des vergangenen Jahrzehnts leitet sich die Frage nach der Verantwortung fur die Gestaltung der Wirtschaftslandschaft ab. Die Arbeit untersucht daher, ob betriebswirtschaftliche Hochschullehrer die Werte ihrer Studierenden beeinflussen wollen und entwickelt ein detailliertes konzeptionelles Modell. Zur Modellvalidierung werden deskriptive Analysen, Strukturgleichungsmodelle und Clusteranalysen auf Daten aus einer weltweiten Befragung von 1.741 betriebswirtschaftlichen Hochschullehrern angewendet. Die Analysen zeigen weltweit eine starke Intention zur Wertebeeinflussung, mit besonderer Werteskepsis in Deutschland. Die Unterstutzung von Kollegen und Verbanden erwies sich als (...) wichtige Voraussetzung fur die Steigerung der Beeinflussungsintention.". (shrink)

To this day, there persists a widespread assumption that Adorno's references to Marx - and especially to Marx's critique of political economy - represent a relic from an early and short-lived stage of Adorno's theoretical development. On the basis of relevant and largely unpublished textual sources, this book refutes this thesis while showing that the centre of Adorno's critical theory of society is occupied by a critique not only of political economy, but of economy in general.

Dirk Paul Bogner widmet sich der Frage, welche Relevanz Kurt Lewins Feldtheorie im Bereich der pädagogischen Diagnostik haben könnte. Er untermauert die These, dass die Lewin’sche Feldtheorie eine völlig neue Sicht auf Lern-, Entwicklungs- und Erziehungsprozesse eröffnen würde, und legt dar, inwiefern die Einbeziehung der Dimension des Raumes die Analyse dieser erziehungswissenschaftlich relevanten Topoi verfeinern könnte. Er erörtert mittels hermeneutischer Textauslegung und vergleichender Dokumentenanalyse, warum Lewin keine erziehungswissenschaftliche Resonanz erzeugen konnte, obwohl in der Erziehungswissenschaft auch heute noch intensiv Begriffe, (...) die entweder direkt aus der Feldtheorie stammen oder aber von dieser konsequent definiert wurden, verwendet werden. (shrink)

The thesis of mental fragmentation has recently attracted increased attention as a way of explaining facts about mind and language. This volume provides an accessible introduction and essays on foundations and applications of fragmentation.

It has been argued that organizational structures (the way tasks are defined, allocated, and coordinated) can influence moral agency in organizations. In particular, low values on different structural parameters (functional concentration, specialization, separation, and formalization) are said to foster an organizational context (allowing for relating to the goals and output of the organization, moral deliberation, and social connectedness) that is conducive to moral agency. In this paper, we investigate the relation between the organizational structure and moral agency in the case (...) of a.s.r. (a large Dutch insurance company). While our empirical results fit the thesis that low values on structural parameters positively relate to moral agency, they also refine our understanding of the influence of structural parameters. In particular, our data suggest that the influence of functional concentration not only depends on whether it is low, but also on the type of criterion used for identifying business units; they suggest that the specific organizational context may put a limit to lowering design parameters and points at several non-structural factors that have an influence on the relation between structure and moral agency. In all, the paper contributes to a more detailed understanding of the conditions conducive to moral agency in organizations. (shrink)