Several authors have recently suggested that classic psychedelics might be safe and effective agents of moral enhancement. This raises the question: can we learn anything interesting about the nature of moral experience from a close examination of transformative psychedelic experiences? The interdisciplinary enterprise of philosophical psychopathology attempts to learn about the structure and function of the “ordinary” mind by studying the radically altered mind. By analogy, in this chapter we argue that we can gain knowledge about the everyday moral life (...) by studying extraordinary experiences of altered moral cognition and experience. We focus on a specific class of cases: experiences of forgiveness induced by psychedelics. We argue that close attention to such experiences reveals the importance of thought/emotion coherence and dissonance in the moral life and vindicates some heterodox ideas about moral phenomenology and psychology. (shrink)

Today, anxiety is usually thought of as a pathology, the most diagnosed and medicated of all psychological disorders. But anxiety isn't always or only a medical condition. Indeed, many philosophers argue that anxiety is a normal, even essential, part of being human, and that coming to terms with this fact is potentially transformative, allowing us to live more meaningful lives by giving us a richer understanding of ourselves. In Anxiety, Samir Chopra explores valuable insights about anxiety offered by ancient (...) and modern philosophies-Buddhism, existentialism, psychoanalysis, and critical theory. Blending memoir and philosophy, he also tells how serious anxiety has affected his own life-and how philosophy has helped him cope with it. Chopra shows that many philosophers-including the Buddha, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Freud, and Heidegger-view anxiety as an inevitable human response to existence: to be is to be anxious. Drawing on Karl Marx and Herbert Marcuse, Chopra examines how poverty and other material conditions can make anxiety worse, but he emphasizes that not even the rich can escape it. Nor can the medicated. Inseparable from the human condition, anxiety is indispensable for grasping it. Philosophy may not be able to cure anxiety but, by leading us to greater self-knowledge and self-acceptance, it may be able to make us less anxious about being anxious. Personal, poignant, and hopeful, Anxiety is a book for anyone who is curious about rethinking anxiety and learning why it might be a source not only of suffering but of insight. (shrink)

Today, anxiety is usually thought of as a pathology, the most diagnosed and medicated of all psychological disorders. But anxiety isn't always or only a medical condition. Indeed, many philosophers argue that anxiety is a normal, even essential, part of being human, and that coming to terms with this fact is potentially transformative, allowing us to live more meaningful lives by giving us a richer understanding of ourselves. In Anxiety, Samir Chopra explores valuable insights about anxiety offered by ancient (...) and modern philosophies-Buddhism, existentialism, psychoanalysis, and critical theory. Blending memoir and philosophy, he also tells how serious anxiety has affected his own life-and how philosophy has helped him cope with it. Chopra shows that many philosophers-including the Buddha, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Freud, and Heidegger-view anxiety as an inevitable human response to existence: to be is to be anxious. Drawing on Karl Marx and Herbert Marcuse, Chopra examines how poverty and other material conditions can make anxiety worse, but he emphasizes that not even the rich can escape it. Nor can the medicated. Inseparable from the human condition, anxiety is indispensable for grasping it. Philosophy may not be able to cure anxiety but, by leading us to greater self-knowledge and self-acceptance, it may be able to make us less anxious about being anxious. Personal, poignant, and hopeful, Anxiety is a book for anyone who is curious about rethinking anxiety and learning why it might be a source not only of suffering but of insight. (shrink)

When you gaze out at the night sky with its awe-inspiring display of stars and galaxies, do you ever ask yourself if it could be possible that you are actually looking into a mirror? What if we inhabit a universe that perfectly fits our needs here on Earth -- a truly human universe? That's the bold thesis author Deepak Chopra and physicist Menas Kafatos set out to prove: quite literally, "You are the universe." The startling truth is that the (...) everyday world of physical objects "out there" disguises a hidden dimension. By turning our investigation "in here" to the world of consciousness, the real reality emerges. You Are the Universe guides the reader into a realm in which each of us has the power to transform our personal existence, while at the same time fashioning a new story about how time, space, matter, and energy came into existence. Looking to overturn the traditional model of scientific reality, Chopra and Kafatos hold that each of us is a cocreator of reality and we can uncover the hidden dimensions where consciousness is a field of infinite possibilities. This seemingly impossible proposition follows from the cutting-edge modern thinking of the quantum universe and the great mysteries that must be unriddled before human beings actually know who they are. These include but are not limited to questions such as What came before the big bang? Why does the universe fit together so perfectly? Where did time come from? And do we live in a conscious universe? These mysteries are part and parcel of everyone's life. "All of us live in a participatory universe," the authors write. "Once you decide that you want to participate fully with mind, body, and soul, the paradigm shift becomes personal. The reality you inhabit will be yours to either embrace or change. (shrink)

Through inspirational wisdom, compelling storytelling, and practical advice, this book will help you discover your life's purpose.

In man-machine communication, there is a relationship between what may be described as tacit (human) and explicit (machine) knowledge. The tacit lies in practice and the explicit in the formulation of the processes and content of this practice. However, when a human communicates with another human face to face, we may describe them as communicating aspects of the tacit and explicit dimension of their knowledge, i.e. the expression and its background of meaning for the particular situation. When this is unsuccessful (...) in being communicated, some mediator (not necessarily a third person) is needed to provide the bridge for the particular discrepant aspects of the tacit and explicit dimensions to meet. This is achieved by making the tacit nature of the discrepancy in the communication explicit to both participants such that they both understand the background to their discrepancy. Once they become aware, it is possible for them to begin to resolve it. (shrink)

In a paper entitled ‘Saints and Heroes’ 1 Professor J. O. Urmson has criticised ‘the trichotomy of duties, indifferent actions, and wrongdoing’ , commonly found in moral philosophy, on the ground that it fails to cover an important class of actions, of which saintly and heroic actions are ‘conspicuous” but by no means the only examples. I am inclined to think that this trichotomy is defensible, and that at least it deserves a much longer run for its money than Urmson (...) gives it. The form in which he presents it, however, makes it more implausible than it need be and this is perhaps the main reason why he finds it so indefensible. (shrink)

To understand the role of expert systems as a medium for transferring knowledge and skills within organisations requires an understanding of the nature of expertise within working life contexts. Central to this issue of transfer is the debate on the nature of tacit/implicit knowledge and the problem of formalising it in explicit form. This paper considers the British approach to the development of knowledge-based systems, which is regarded as being predominantly rationalistic, and compares it with the Scandinavian approach, which is (...) regarded as being predominantly humanistic. The paper proposes that crucial to the debate on the transfer of knowledge and skills is the development of expert systems as communications media which aims at enhancing and sharing the knowledge and skills of users. A human-centred approach for the future is proposed which brings the above two traditions together thereby providing a developmental framework for knowledge based systems. (shrink)

Socio-ethics covers the relation of the individual with the group and with society, as the individual acquires the skills for social life with others and the conduct of ‘normal responsible behaviour’ (Leal in AI Soc 9:29–32, 1995) that guides moral action. For a consideration of what it means to be socially skilled in everyday human interaction and the ethical issues arising from the new conditions of interaction that come with the integration of intelligent interactive artefacts, we will provide an analysis (...) at multiple levels of these phenomena and draw on a variety of application domains, for example, healthcare and interactive media. (shrink)

What constitutes our human capacity to engage and be in the same frame of mind as another human? How do we come to share a sense of what ‘looks good’ and what ‘makes sense’? How do we handle differences and come to coexist with them? How do we come to feel that we understand what someone else is experiencing? How are we able to walk in silence with someone familiar and be sharing a peaceful space? All of these aspects are (...) part of human ‘interaction’. In designing interactive technologies designers have endeavoured to explicate, analyse and simulate, our capacity for social adaptation. Their motivations are mixed and include the desires to improve efficiency, improve consumption, to connect people, to make it easier for people to work together, to improve education and learning. In these endeavours to explicate, analyse and simulate, there is a fundamental human capacity that is beyond technology and that facilitates these aspects of being, feeling and thinking with others. That capacity, we suggest, is human entrainment. This is our ability to coordinate the timing of our behaviours and rhythmically synchronise our attentional resources. Expressed within the movements of our bodies and voices, it has a quality that is akin to music. In this paper, disparate domains of research such as pragmatics, social psychology, behaviourism, cognitive science, computational linguistics, gesture, are brought together, and considered in light of the developments in interactive technology, in order to shape a conceptual framework for understanding entrainment in everyday human interaction. (shrink)

Although J. S. Mill′s essay On Liberty was intended by its author to be read as a self-contained work, 1 and even though a careful reading would justify seeing it in this way, it has far too often been denied this right even by its defenders. There is a crucial distinction to be made between eliciting some point of substance from a particular work by an author and then turning to the rest of his work to throw further light on (...) it, and employing other texts from the corpus of his writings to put the construction on certain things said in it which the work by itself cannot sustain, thus treating the former as essentially a fragment, albeit a most important fragment, of a whole. 2 I would suggest that recourse to the latter course is justified only when the possibilities of treating it autarchically have already been explored. In this paper I propose to treat a celebrated text in the former way only because I believe that the results will show such an approach to be uniquely worthwhile, or at least fruitful enough to justify a paper conceived in this way. And, with a view to putting what I want to say about it in maximum focus I shall with one or two exceptions eschew giving supporting evidence from Mill′s other writings, even when this is permitted by the distinction I have made in this opening paragraph. (shrink)

Skilled cooperative action means being able to understand the communicative situation and know how and when to respond appropriately for the purpose at hand. This skill is of the performance of knowledge in co-action and is a form of social intelligence for sustainable interaction. Social intelligence, here, denotes the ability of actors and agents to manage their relationships with each other. Within an environment we have people, tools, artefacts and technologies that we engage with. Let us consider all of these (...) as dynamic representations of knowledge. When this knowledge becomes enacted, i.e., when we understand how to use it to communicate effectively, such that it becomes invisible to us, it becomes knowledge in co-action. A challenge of social intelligence design is to create mediating interfaces that can become invisible to us, i.e., as an extension of ourselves. In this paper, we present a study of the way people use surfaces that afford graphical interaction, in collaborative design tasks, in order to inform the design of intelligent user interfaces. This is a descriptive study rather than a usability study, to explore how size, orientation and horizontal and vertical positioning, influences the functionality of the surface in a collaborative setting. (shrink)

Possible-world semantics are provided for Parikh’s relevance-sensitive model for belief revision. Having Grove’s system-of-spheres construction as a base, we consider additional constraints on measuring distance between possible worlds, and we prove that, in the presence of the AGM postulates, these constraints characterize precisely Parikh’s axiom (P). These additional constraints essentially generalize a criterion of similarity that predates axiom (P) and was originally introduced in the context of Reasoning about Action. A by-product of our study is the identification of two possible (...) readings of Parikh’s axiom (P), which we call the strong and the weak versions of the axiom. An interesting feature of the strong version is that, unlike classical AGM belief revision, it makes associations between the revision policies of different theories. (shrink)

We propose a new relevance sensitive model for representing and revising belief structures, which relies on a notion of partial language splitting and tolerates some amount of inconsistency while retaining classical logic. The model preserves an agent's ability to answer queries in a coherent way using Belnap's four-valued logic. Axioms analogous to the AGM axioms hold for this new model. The distinction between implicit and explicit beliefs is represented and psychologically plausible, computationally tractable procedures for query answering and belief..

Our everyday interactions increasingly involve both embodied face-to-face communication and various forms of mediated and distributed communication such as email, skype, and facebook. In daily face-to-face communications, we are connected in rhythm and synchrony at multiple levels ranging from the moment-by-moment continuity of timed syllables to emergent body and vocal rhythms of pragmatic sense-making. Our human capacity to synchronize with each other may be essential for our survival as social beings. Moving our bodies and voices together in time embodies a (...) potent pragmatic purpose that of being together. In this synchrony of self with other, witnessing and being present become part of each other. There is growing research into how rhythm and synchrony operate in embodied face-to-face interaction and this provides parameters for investigating the relations and differences in how we connect and are socially present in the embodied and distributed settings, and understanding the effect of one setting upon the other. This paper explores the arena of research into rhythm in human interaction, musical and linguistic, with a focus on the movements of body and voice. It draws together salient issues and ideas that would form the basis for a framework of rhythm in embodied interaction. (shrink)

Collaborative filtering recommender system (CFRS) plays a vital role in today’s e-commerce industry. CFRSs collect ratings from the users and predict recommendations for the targeted product. Conventionally, CFRS uses the user-product ratings to make recommendations. Often these user-product ratings are biased. The higher ratings are called push ratings (PRs) and the lower ratings are called nuke ratings (NRs). PRs and NRs are injected by factitious users with an intention either to aggravate or degrade the recommendations of a product. Hence, it (...) is necessary to investigate PRs or NRs and discard them. In this work, opinion mining approach is applied on textual reviews that are given by users for a product to detect the PRs and NRs. The work also examines the effect of PRs and NRs on the performance of CFRS by evaluating various measures such as precision, recall, F-measure and accuracy. (shrink)

Chopra and Weiss address perhaps the fundamental issue in international relations today: the sacrosanct sets of sovereignty. The word "sovereignty" explains why the international community has difficulty countering human rights violations.

Edited by David Rondel and Samir Chopra, The Moral Psychology of Anxiety presents new work on the causes, consequences, and value of anxiety. Straddling philosophy, psychology, clinical medicine, history, and other disciplines, the chapters in this volume explore anxiety from an impressively wide range of perspectives. The first part is more historical, exploring the meaning of anxiety in different philosophical traditions and historical periods, including ancient Chinese Confucianism, twentieth-century European existentialism, and the Roman Stoics. The second part focuses on (...) a cluster of questions having to do with anxiety’s nature and significance: Is anxiety something biological or cultural, or perhaps both? What is at the root of anxiety? Why should human beings suffer in this way? What is the experience of anxiety like, and what, if anything, are the benefits associated with it? Does anxiety have the potential to make us more virtuous or improve the quality of our inquiry? Addressing an area where newer work in moral psychology is sorely needed, this collection and the varied perspectives it offers will be of great interest to scholars, professionals, and students across philosophy, psychology, and related fields. (shrink)

We provide a formal study of belief retraction operators that do not necessarily satisfy the postulate. Our intuition is that a rational description of belief change must do justice to cases in which dropping a belief can lead to the inclusion, or ‘liberation’, of others in an agent's corpus. We provide two models of liberation via retraction operators: ρ-liberation and linear liberation. We show that the class of ρ-liberation operators is included in the class of linear ones and provide axiomatic (...) characterisations for each class. We show how any retraction operator can be ‘converted’ into either a withdrawal operator ) or a revision operator via the Harper Identity and the Levi Identity respectively. (shrink)

Routledge (New Media and Cyberculture Series), July 2007.

The axiom of recovery, while capturing a central intuition regarding belief change, has been the source of much controversy. We argue briefly against putative counterexamples to the axiom—while agreeing that some of their insight deserves to be preserved—and present additional recovery-like axioms in a framework that uses epistemic states, which encode preferences, as the object of revisions. This makes iterated revision possible and renders explicit the connection between iterated belief change and the axiom of recovery. We provide a representation theorem (...) that connects the semantic conditions we impose on iterated revision and our additional syntactical properties. We show interesting similarities between our framework and that of Darwiche–Pearl (Artificial Intelligence 89:1–29 1997). In particular, we show that intuitions underlying the controversial (C2) postulate are captured by the recovery axiom and our recovery-like postulates (the latter can be seen as weakenings of (C2)). We present postulates for contraction, in the same spirit as the Darwiche–Pearl postulates for revision, and provide a theorem that connects our syntactic postulates with a set of semantic conditions. Lastly, we show a connection between the contraction postulates and a generalisation of the recovery axiom. (shrink)

Traditional accounts of belief change have been criticized for placing undue emphasis on the new belief provided as input. A recent proposal to address such issues is a framework for non-prioritized belief change based on default theories (Ghose and Goebel, 1998). A novel feature of this approach is the introduction of disbeliefs alongside beliefs which allows for a view of belief contraction as independently useful, instead of just being seen as an intermediate step in the process of belief revision. This (...) approach is, however, restrictive in assuming a linear ordering of reliability on the received inputs. In this paper, we replace the linear ordering with a preference ranking on inputs from which a total preorder on inputs can be induced. This extension brings along with it the problem of dealing with inputs of equal rank. We provide a semantic solution to this problem which contains, as a special case, AGM belief change on closed theories. (shrink)

We present a method for relevance sensitive non-monotonic inference from belief sequences which incorporates insights pertaining to prioritized inference and relevance sensitive, inconsistency tolerant belief revision. Our model uses a finite, logically open sequence of propositional formulas as a representation for beliefs and defines a notion of inference from maxiconsistent subsets of formulas guided by two orderings: a temporal sequencing and an ordering based on relevance relations between the putative conclusion and formulas in the sequence. The relevance relations are ternary (...) (using context as a parameter) as opposed to standard binary axiomatizations. The inference operation thus defined easily handles iterated revision by maintaining a revision history, blocks the derivation of inconsistent answers from a possibly inconsistent sequence and maintains the distinction between explicit and implicit beliefs. In doing so, it provides a finitely presented formalism and a plausible model of reasoning for automated agents. (shrink)

Recommender system depends on the thoughts of numerous users to predict the favourites of potential consumers. RS is vulnerable to malicious information. Unsuitable products can be offered to the user by injecting a few unscrupulous “shilling” profiles like push and nuke attacks into the RS. Injection of these attacks results in the wrong recommendation for a product. The aim of this research is to develop a framework that can be widely utilized to make excellent recommendations for sales growth. This study (...) uses the methodology that presents an enhanced clustering algorithm named as modified density peak clustering algorithm on the consumer review dataset to ensure a well-formed cluster. An improved recurrent neural network algorithm is proposed to detect these attacks in hybrid RS, which uses the content-based RS and collaborative filtering RS. The results are compared with other state of the art algorithms. The proposed method is more suitable for E-commerce applications where the number of customers and products grows rapidly. (shrink)

Thinking about how the law might decide whether to extend legal personhood to artificial agents provides a valuable testbed for philosophical theories of mind. Further, philosophical and legal theorising about personhood for artificial agents can be mutually informing. We investigate two case studies, drawing on legal discussions of the status of artificial agents. The first looks at the doctrinal difficulties presented by the contracts entered into by artificial agents. We conclude that it is not necessary or desirable to postulate artificial (...) agents as legal persons in order to account for such contracts. The second looks at the potential for according sophisticated artificial agents with legal personality with attendant constitutional protections similar to those accorded to humans. We investigate the validity of attributes that have been suggested as pointers of personhood, and conclude that they will take their place within a broader matrix of pragmatic, philosophical and extra-legal concepts. (shrink)

The standard theory for belief revision provides an elegant and powerful framework for reasoning about how a rational agent should change its beliefs when confronted with new information. However, the agents considered are extremely idealized. Some recent models attempt to tackle the problem of plausible belief revision by adding structure to the belief bases and using nonstandard inference operations. One of the key ideas is that not all of an agent's beliefs are relevant for an operation of belief change.In this (...) paper we incorporate the insights pertaining to local change and relevance sensitivity with the use of approximate inference relations. These approximate inference relations offer us partial solutions at any stage of the revision process. The quality of the approximations improves as we allow for more and more resources to be used. We are provided with upper and lower bounds to what would be obtained with the use of classical inference. (shrink)

In a paper entitled ‘Saints and Heroes’1 Professor J. O. Urmson has criticised ‘the trichotomy of duties, indifferent actions, and wrongdoing’, commonly found in moral philosophy, on the ground that it fails to cover an important class of actions, of which saintly and heroic actions are ‘conspicuous” but by no means the only examples. I am inclined to think that this trichotomy is defensible, and that at least it deserves a much longer run for its money than Urmson gives it. (...) The form in which he presents it, however, makes it more implausible than it need be and this is perhaps the main reason why he finds it so indefensible. (shrink)

The introduction of explicit notions of rejection, or disbelief, into logics for knowledge representation can be justified in a number of ways. Motivations range from the need for versions of negation weaker than classical negation, to the explicit recording of classic belief contraction operations in the area of belief change, and the additional levels of expressivity obtained from an extended version of belief change which includes disbelief contraction. In this paper we present four logics of disbelief which address some or (...) all of these intuitions. Soundness and completeness results are supplied and the logics are compared with respect to applicability and utility. (shrink)