This book is about the ethical issues that clinicians encounter as they care for patients and is written to assist those who serve on hospital ethics committees as they deliberate about appropriate action in difficult ethical cases.

This book is about the ethical issues that clinicians encounter as they care for patients and is written to assist those who serve on hospital ethics committees as they deliberate about appropriate action in difficult ethical cases.

In November 2018 the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) administered the first Healthcare Ethics Consultant Certification examination to 138 candidates, 136 of whom (98.5 percent) passed and were “certified” as “healthcare ethics consultants.” I believe this certification process is both premature and inadequate.Certification for ethics consultants is premature because, as Kornfeld and Prager state repeatedly in their article in this issue of The Journal of Clinical Ethics, “The Clinician as Clinical Ethics Consultant: An Empirical Method of Study,” there (...) is a lack of “empirical data on the nature of the problems that prompt ethics consultation requests and on the functions required to address them.” These authors proceed to provide a model for the kind of empirical data collection that is needed.Even more relevant, the ASBH model that certifies clinical ethics consultants is inadequate. First, it is inappropriate for a nonclinical organization such as the ASBH to claim the right to certify a clinical process, ethics consultation, involving patients and health professionals. Second, the current certification process requires only a written examination in contrast to the two-step quality attestation process proposed in 2013 by Eric Kodish, MD, and 11 other senior members of the ASBH, including its then president.Third and most importantly, the eligibility criteria for being certified to work on hospital units and to make clinical recommendations for patients and families are minimal and insufficient. The only stated requirements are a bachelor’s degree and 400 hours of healthcare ethics consulting experience. By contrast, practicing physicians and nurses train for many years to gain clinical experience that enables them to apply clinical ethical standards in the care and management of all inpatients and outpatients, not just the small percent for whom an ethics consultation is requested. (shrink)

In 1972, I created the new field of clinical medical ethics (CME) in the Department of Medicine at the University of Chicago. In my view, CME is an intrinsic part of medicine and is not a branch of bioethics or philosophical ethics or legal ethics. The relationship of patients with medically trained and licensed clinicians is at the very heart of CME. CME must be practiced and applied not by nonclinical bioethicists, but rather by licensed clinicians in their routine, daily (...) encounters with inpatients and outpatients. CME addresses many clinical issues such as truth-telling, informed consent, confidentiality, surrogate decision making, and end-of-life care, while also encouraging personal, humane, and compassionate interactions between experienced clinicians and patients.The goals of CME are to improve patient care and outcomes by helping physicians and other health professionals Clinical Medical Ethics: Its History and Contributions to American Medicine Mark Siegler, Guest Editor identify and respond to clinical-ethical challenges that arise in the ordinary care of patients. As Edmund Pellegrino, Peter A. Singer, and I wrote in the first issue of The Journal of Clinical Ethics, 30 years ago: “The central goal of CME is to improve the quality of patient care by identifying, analyzing, and contributing to the resolution of ethical problems that arise in the routine practice of clinical medicine.” Similar to cardiology and oncology consultations, ethics consultations are a small component of a much larger field, and the process of consultations is certainly not at the core of cardiology or oncology or CME.In this article, I intend to discuss the origins of the field of CME, its goals and methods, the relationship between the broad field of CME and the much narrower practice of ethics consultation, the contributions of the MacLean Center at the University of Chicago in developing the field of CME, and, finally, how CME has improved the practice of medicine in the United States. (shrink)

Extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) is a form of life support for cardiac and/or pulmonary failure with unique ethical challenges compared to other forms of life support. Ethical challenges with ECMO exist when conventional standards of care apply, and are exacerbated during periods of absolute ECMO scarcity when “crisis standards of care” are instituted. When conventional standards of care apply, we propose that it is ethically permissible to withhold placing patients on ECMO for reasons of technical futility or when patients have (...) terminal, short-term prognoses that are untreatable by ECMO. Under crisis standards of care, it is ethically permissible to broaden exclusionary criteria to also withhold ECMO from patients who have a low likelihood of recovery, to maximize the overall number of lives saved. Unilateral withdrawal of ECMO against a patient’s preferences is unethical under conventional standards of care, but is ethical under crisis standards of care to increase access to ECMO to others in society. ECMO should only be rationed when true scarcity exists, and allocation protocols should be transparent to the public. When rationing must occur under crisis standards of care, it is imperative that oversight bodies assess for inequities in the allocation of ECMO and make frequent changes to improve any inequities. (shrink)

Siegler identifies the elderly as a population vulnerable to discrimination as society seeks to contain health care costs by rationing medical care. Traditional decision making by physicians and patients, which is based upon medical indications and the wishes of the patient, may yield to decision making based upon institutional and social expediency and economic concerns. Siegler predicts that as a consequence of cost containment measures, certain groups of patients, of whom the elderly constitute a large percentage, will find (...) their access to medical care limited, and the extent of that care reduced. He suggests that this threat to the elderly can be counteracted by retaining the traditional physician patient relationship, by basing care decisions upon clinical criteria, and by beginnning rationing with those groups of patients best able to defend themselves. (shrink)

It is a clinician’s cliché that a physician only challenges a patient’s capacity to make a treatment decision if that decision is not what the physician wants. Agreement is proof of decisional capacity; disagreement is proof or at least evidence of capacity’s absence. It is assumed that this asymmetry cannot be justified, that the asymmetry must be a form of physicians’ paternalism. Instead what is at issue when patient and physician disagree are usually two laudable impulses. The first is physicians’ (...) commitment to patients’ well-being: physicians have a professional obligation as well as, ideally, a personal commitment to take care of patients—to do their best to bring about a positive medical outcome. The second impulse is common to much of human life, namely, the urge to find and to understand the source of our disagreements with one another. In this article we argue that, jointly, these impulses justify the asymmetry with regard to examining patients’ capacity. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 12, December 2019, Page 1-2.

Many states prohibit patients from appointing their physicians as health care proxies, fearing paternalism and conflict of interest. But the potential for conflict is not unique to physicians, and patients may have compelling reasons to prefer that their doctor make decisions on their behalf. Managing potential conflicts serves patients better than denying them the right to choose who will make health care decisions for them when they are no longer competent.

Book reviewed in this article: Clinical Ethics: A Practical Approach to Ethical Decisions in Clinical Medicine. By Albert R. Jonsen, Mark Siegler, and William J. Winslade.

Liver transplantation is the treatment of choice for many forms of liver disease. Unfortunately, the scarcity of cadaveric donor livers limits the availability of this technique. To improve the availability of liver transplantation, surgeons have developed the capability of removing a portion of liver from a live donor and transplanting it into a recipient. A few liver transplants using living donors have been performed worldwide.Our purpose was to analyze the ethics of liver transplants using living donors and to propose guidelines (...) for the procedure before it was introduced in the United States. We used a process of research ethics consultation that involves a collaboration between clinical investigators and clinical ethicists. We concluded that it was ethically appropriate to perform liver transplantation using living donors in a small series of patients on a trial basis, and we published our ethical guidelines in a medical journal before the procedure was introduced. We recommend this prospective, public approach for the introduction of other innovative therapies in medicine and surgery. (shrink)

Novel cellular therapy techniques promise to cure many haematology patients refractory to other treatment modalities. These therapies are intensive and require referral to and care from specialised providers. In the USA, this pool of providers is not expanding at a rate necessary to meet expected demand; therefore, access scarcity appears forthcoming and is likely to be widespread. To maintain fair access to these scarce and curative therapies, we must prospectively create a just and practical system to distribute care. In this (...) article, we first review previously implemented medical product and personnel allocation systems, examining their applicability to cellular therapy provider shortages to demonstrate that this problem requires a novel approach. We then present an innovative system for allocating cellular therapy access, which accounts for the constraints of distribution during real-world oncology practice by using a combination of the following principles: maximising life-years per personnel time, youngest and robust first, sickest first, first come/first served and instrumental value. We conclude with justifications for the incorporation of these principles and the omission of others, discuss how access can be distributed using this combination, consider cost and review fundamental factors necessary for the practical implementation and maintenance of this system. (shrink)

A decade ago, we reviewed the field of clinical ethics; assessed its progress in research, education, and ethics committees and consultation; and made predictions about the future of the field. In this article, we revisit clinical ethics to examine our earlier observations, highlight key developments, and discuss remaining challenges for clinical ethics, including the need to develop a global perspective on clinical ethics problems.

The question I investigate concerns the ethics of clinical ethics consultation. To begin, I reconstruct and critically assess a widespread understanding of clinical medical ethics, one most prominently advanced by Mark Siegler. That examination reveals an overtly political strategy designed to reinforce physician authority. Next, John La Puma's work is discussed. Arguably the most prominent of Siegler's students, and certainly the most prolific, La Puma appears attentive to the problems in Siegler's view regarding clinical judgment. I (...) conclude, however, that La Puma assumes a relatively flexible system of formal rules and more extensive informal codes which define the concepts and procedures of medical consultation and which he simply transcribes for ethics consultation. ;Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin have apparently endorsed this medicalized strategy. They contend that the view of ethics advocated by these physicians represents a "new" casuistry consistent if not identical to their own theory. I show that the casuist method of clinical ethical decision making simply appropriates features of the diagnostic apparatus embedded in the political economy of the enterprise of medicine and makes the role of ethicist parasitic on that of the physician as expert. Their casuistry, I argue, merely serves as a means to reinforce the standardized apparatus of professional authority exercised in medical procedures and concepts. ;Finally, I sketch an alternative way to think about how experience with other persons informs ethical decision making. On the basis of an extensive and nuanced account of an ethics consultation, I argue that to consult as a clinical philosopher in any situation is, necessarily, to be focused on that individual situation for its own sake. Clinical philosophy, as a result, must be done by attending strictly to what appears as it appears: the issues, concerns, and questions expressed, in their own terms, by those individuals whose situation it is. (shrink)

How do humans, their needs, and technology interact in society? Marcel Siegler explores the dialectical relationship between human needs and desires, the demands and requirements of the built world, and the forms of organization that hold both humans and the built world together. He argues that complex societal constellations emerge from the actions individuals perform with the technological means at hand to satisfy their needs and desires in the short and long run. Based on a novel, complementary reading of (...) French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, the study develops a conceptual framework for analyzing the intricate machinations of sociotechnical systems from a perspective on situated human-technology interaction. (shrink)

Mark Jago presents an original philosophical account of meaningful thought: in particular, how it is meaningful to think about things that are impossible. We think about impossible things all the time. We can think about alchemists trying to turn base metal to gold, and about unfortunate mathematicians trying to square the circle. We may ponder whether God exists; and philosophers frequently debate whether properties, numbers, sets, moral and aesthetic qualities, and qualia exist. In many philosophical or mathematical debates, when (...) one side of the argument gets things wrong, it necessarily gets them wrong. As we consider both sides of one of these philosophical arguments, we will at some point think about something that’s impossible. Yet most philosophical accounts of meaning and content hold that we can’t meaningfully think or reason about the impossible. -/- In The Impossible, Jago argues that we often gain new information, new beliefs, and, sometimes, fresh knowledge through logic, mathematics, and philosophy. That is why logic, mathematics, and philosophy are useful. We therefore require accounts of knowledge and belief, of information and content, and of meaning which allow space for the impossible. Jago’s aim in this book is to provide such accounts. He gives a detailed analysis of the concept of hyperintensionality, whereby logically equivalent contents may be distinct, and develops a theory in terms of possible and impossible worlds. Along the way, he provides a theory of what those worlds are and how they feature in our analysis of normative epistemic concepts: knowledge, belief, information, and content. (shrink)

In domains with multiple competing goals, people face a basic challenge: How to make their strategy use flexible enough to deal with shifting circumstances without losing track of their overall objectives. This article examines how young children meet this challenge in one such domain, tic‐tac‐toe. Experiment 1 provides an overviews of development in the area; it indicates that children's tic‐tac‐toe strategies are rule based and that new rules are added one at a time. Experiment 2 demonstrates that even young children (...) flexibly tailor their strategy use to meet shifting circumstances. Experiment 3 indicates that these adaptations are accomplished through a process of goal‐based resource allocation, whereby children focus their cognitive resources on applying rules most consistent with their current primary goal. A computer simulation specifies how this process works and demonstrates its sufficiency for producing behavior much like that of the children. The findings are discussed as part of a broader framework of mechanisms for generating problem‐solving approaches. (shrink)