Summary The Copernican system was condemned as heretical by a decree of the Roman Inquisition in 1633. This decree was effectively, though not officially, withdrawn in 1757, after which date Catholic astronomers felt themselves free to accept and propagate the system without reserve. Between these dates their attitudes varied greatly. In France the decree was never promulgated and was legally unenforceable. Astronomers could be Copernican without any fear of consequences and most of them were, though some, out of respect for (...) the Church, refrained from declaring themselves publicly. In Italy the possible risks were greater, but a few Copernican or near-Copernican works were published without hostile reactions. The ecclesiastical authorities were tolerant and made little positive effort to enforce conformity. By 1744, the system was being freely propagated in Rome itself. (shrink)

Historians of seventeenth-century science have frequently asserted that Kepler's laws of planetary motion were largely ignored between the time of their first publication and the publication of Newton's Principia . In fact, however, they were more widely known and accepted than has been generally recognized.Kepler's ideas were, indeed, rather slow in establishing themselves, and until about 1630 there are few references to them in the literature of the time. But from then onwards, interest in them increased fairly rapidly. In particular, (...) the principle of elliptical orbits had been accepted by most of the leading astronomers in France before 1645 and in England by about 1655. It also received quite strong support in Holland.The second law had a more chequered history. It was enunciated in its exact form by a few writers and was used in practice by some others without being explicitly formulated, but the majority, especially after 1645, preferred one or another of several variant forms which were easier to use but only approximately correct. The third law attracted less interest than the others, chiefly perhaps because it had no satisfactory theoretical basis, but it was correctly stated by at least six writers during the period under review.Between about 1630 and 1650 Kepler's Epitome Astronomiae Copernicanae was probably the most widely read work on theoretical astronomy in northern and western Europe, while his Rudolphine Tables, which were based upon the first two laws, were regarded by the majority of astronomers as the most accurate planetary tables available.Kepler's work certainly did not receive all the recognition it deserved, but the extent to which it was neglected has been much exaggerated. (shrink)

"Remarkable how well Bouwsma understood Wittgenstein's approach to philosophical problems and how intelligently he was able to recount Wittgenstein's discussions. The bits about sensation are especially good. And the asides about the other philosophers--e.g. Dewey, Russell, Anscombe--are, while not frivolous, gossipy and titillating." --Riley Wallihan, Western Oregon University.

The aim of this paper is to present the Nyāya concept of number in the light of contemporary philosophy and to show that the Frege-Russell concept of number does not contradict the Nyāya concept of number but rather supplements it.

This is unarguably the best short introduction to the whole of Bertrand Russell’s philosophical work. I am sure it is the best introduction of any length to Russell, and I suspect that it might serve as one of the best introductions to modern philosophy. Its greatest virtues are conciseness, comprehensiveness, and lucidity: virtues generally associated with Professor Ayer, but here found in unhoped for abundance. Ayer begins with a brief, austere, and balanced account of Russell’s life: as (...) in Russell’s autobiography this means his thought, books, women, and politics. Tacitus would have found the account exemplary. Ayer ends with a sympathetic and surprisingly detailed survey of Russell’s social philosophy. But the bulk of this book consists of a chapter on Russell’s work in logic and the foundations of mathematics, followed by a chapter on his epistemological views and one on metaphysics: descending in that order, also, in length and emphasis. The chapter on philosophical logic manages a clear and comprehensive elucidation of Russell’s "supreme maxim": "Whenever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities." Both the theory of types and of definite descriptions fall into place within this general project; and the reader is given a crisp, though unavoidably rudimentary, account of how the axioms of infinity and reducibility came to seem indispensable if the logical reduction of numbers and classes were to succeed. The chapter on Russell’s theory of knowledge is also admirably comprehensive and concise. One finds here a very striking, sympathetic but critical, account of the attempt to take tables and chairs, etc., as logical constructions out of sense data. Both Quine and Goodman come into the discussion : This attempt to understand and criticize Russell in terms of contemporary philosophical arguments seems to contribute both vitality and clarity to the discussion. I find it impossible to imagine that this book will not remain indefinitely the very best book of its sort.—J. L. (shrink)

This volume is intended for use in an undergraduate philosophy course employing the problems' approach. Chapter I provides a clear presentation of Cartesian rationalism. Following the exposition of Descartes' position, there is a section on the standard criticisms levelled by B. Russell. Aune defends the rationalist position with an outline of the traditional arguments for the validity of intuitive knowledge. Chapter I terminates with a list of "Study Questions" and an annotated bibliography suggesting further readings. Chapter II considers classical (...) English empiricism, taking the thought of Hume as paradigmatic. There is a discussion of a priori and a posteriori knowledge as well as a section on the problems of induction and solipsism. Chapter III outlines the attempts of contemporary empiricists to eschew Hume's skepticism by envisioning the world as a construct of our sensory experiences. To avoid the solipsism still implicit in the latter position, a re-evaluation of Hume's theory of perception is offered. Wittgenstein and Strawson are briefly treated in this section. Chapter IV explains the pragmatist's attempt to reduce to the same untenable position the rationalist and empiricist views of the a priori. Chapter V concentrates on the pragmatic theory of justification and includes a treatment of N. Goodman's "new riddle of induction." Aune's book is a readable account of conflicting theories of knowledge and undergraduates should find it of value.--W. J. L. (shrink)

This book is essential for those interested in Russell, or in the philosophy of logic and mathematics. Only two of the fifteen selections are readily available elsewhere: "On Denoting" and "Mr Strawson on Referring." Amazingly, three substantial selections have never been published previously: "On the Substitutional Theory of Classes and Relations," "The Regressive Method of Discovering the Premisses of Mathematics," and "Is Mathematics Purely Linguistic?". Three other papers have appeared previously only in French : one of these is a (...) better introduction to the theory of types than the classic "Mathematical Logic as based on the Theory of Types." Finally, of the five remaining papers, which are not easily available, three are commentaries on Meinong, one is a note on the axiom of infinity, and the most substantial piece is a discussion of three notions of sets—in effect, Zermelo-Frankel, New Foundations, and Russell’s own "no-classes" theory, which required a theory of types applied to propositional functions. What is striking throughout these essays—all but one from the first decade of the century-is Russell’s persistent sympathy with some sort of realism in foundation theory, and his perception that the theory of definite descriptions, the "no-classes" proposals, and the theory of types, were very closely interrelated. Also included are three bibliographies. The chronological bibliography includes several still unpublished mss in the McMaster University Russell Archives.—J.L. (shrink)

In this book Dummett develops the view of his essay "Truth" that a full development of the Wittgensteinian "meaning-as-use" view of language will displace truth from its central position in the philosophy of language in favor of verifiability. He adds the provision, however, that one must first liberalize the extreme constructivism in favor of a suitably nonpsychologistic intuitionism. His view gradually emerges in a careful reconstruction and criticism of the most viable and coherent of Frege’s positions in philosophic logic. In (...) the process the views of Russell, Quine, Geach, Strawson, and Wittgenstein are measured, winnowed, and assessed; even Kripke’s recent claims about names and identity are dismissed in an appendix, though this is one of the few parts of the book that does not seem to compel agreement. Though undoubtedly the most masterful book ever written about Frege, and a joy to read, one can hardly call it a definitive intellectual biography: there is only one direct quote from Frege and no footnotes. But it just may be the most solid and brilliant reflection currently available on the core philosophic problems of the last hundred years.—J.L. (shrink)

Philosophical Studies Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 163, l. 24 for ‘Pocreon’ read “Creon’ and p. 165, l.4 for “Nereus” read “Nessus”, l. 16 for “Corrolate” read “Correlate” and l. 27 for “ Trachinae ” read “ Trachiniae ”. Proffessor Mackinnon should also have been described as Norris-Hulse Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge and Fellow of Corpus Christi College.

In previous articles I have been concerned with various aspects of science; and I have now to endeavour to look at scientific activity as a whole, and to view it in its relation to other activities of man. I have been trying to avoid those pleasant sweeping generalizations which strike the imagination and which are so easy to write and to read about: such as that science is our only avenue to truth; or that science is abstract and tells us (...) nothing about the concrete nature of things; or that knowledge of particular facts is the object of science, generalizations being merely a means thereto; or that generalizations are the object of science, investigation of particular facts being merely a means thereto; all of which can be defended by a rich array of arguments, none of which can finally stand confrontation with the actual nature of scientific activity as a whole. The situation seems to be much more complicated than any such generalizations would suggest. (shrink)

The author discusses what he feels to be a significant way of testing beliefs, Namely, The process in which people judge attitudes and the beliefs supporting those attitudes favourably or unfavourably in the light of the social situations which they take to be the outcome of the attitudes, And of the potentialities for the future which they take to be foreshadowed by those situations. (staff).

The question I shall deal with is often put in the form “What is the meaning of life?” I shall consider this form later on, but I do not want to begin with it, partly because it assumes that life has a meaning which can be called “the” meaning, an assumption which will have to be looked into, and partly because I want to start with something which looks very much more vague.