In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and could —paradoxically— be seen as representing the ‘dark matter’ of social neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations, which allow the study of real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in (...) interaction with others rather than merely observing them. In this article, we outline the theoretical conception of a second-person approach to other minds and review evidence from neuroimaging, psychophysiological studies and related fields to argue for the development of a second-person neuroscience, which will help neuroscience to really go social; this may also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders construed as disorders of social cognition. (shrink)

What is the best way of assessing the extent to which people are aware of a stimulus? Here, using a masked visual identification task, we compared three measures of subjective awareness: The Perceptual Awareness Scale , through which participants are asked to rate the clarity of their visual experience; confidence ratings , through which participants express their confidence in their identification decisions, and Post-decision wagering , in which participants place a monetary wager on their decisions. We conducted detailed explorations of (...) the relationships between awareness and identification performance, looking to determine which scale best correlates with performance, and whether we can detect performance in the absence of awareness and how the scales differ from each other in terms of revealing such unconscious processing. Based on these findings we discuss whether perceptual awareness should be considered graded or dichotomous. Results showed that PAS showed a much stronger performance-awareness correlation than either CR or PDW, particularly for low stimulus intensities. In general, all scales indicated above-chance performance when participants claimed not to have seen anything. However, such above-chance performance only showed when we also observed a correlation between awareness and performance. Thus PAS seems to be the most exhaustive measure of awareness, and we find support for above-chance performance in the absence of subjective awareness, but such unconscious knowledge only contributes to performance when we observe conscious knowledge as well. Similarities and differences between scales are discussed in the light of consciousness theories and response strategies. (shrink)

Dienes and Seth (2010) conclude that confidence ratings and post-decision wagering are two comparable and recommendable measures of conscious experience. In a recently submitted paper, we have however found that both methods are problematic and seem less suited to measure consciousness than a direct introspective measure. Here, we discuss the methodology and conclusions put forward by Dienes and Seth, and why we think the two experiments end up with so different recommendations.

In their comment on Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, and Cleeremans , Dienes and Seth argue that increased sensitivity of the Perceptual Awareness Scale is a consequence of the scale being less exclusive rather than more exhaustive. According to Dienes and Seth, this is because PAS may measure some conscious content, though not necessarily relevant conscious content, “If one saw a square but was only aware of seeing a flash of something, then one has not consciously seen a square.” In this (...) reply, we claim that there is a difference between conscious visual experience, which may be partial, and the resulting conscious content, which is conceptual. Whereas PAS measures the first, confidence judgments and post-decision wagering measure the second. (shrink)

In this response we address additions to as well as criticisms and possible misinterpretations of our proposal for a second-person neuroscience. We map out the most crucial aspects of our approach by (1) acknowledging that second-person engaged interaction is not the only way to understand others, although we claim that it is ontogenetically prior; (2) claiming that spectatorial paradigms need to be complemented in order to enable a full understanding of social interactions; and (3) restating that our theoretical proposal not (...) only questions the mechanism by which a cognitive process comes into being, but asks whether it is at all meaningful to speak of a mechanism and a cognitive process when it is confined to intra-agent space. We address theoretical criticisms of our approach by pointing out that while a second-person social understanding may not be the only mechanism, alternative approaches cannot hold their ground without resorting to second-person concepts, if not in the expression, certainly in the development of social understanding. In this context, we also address issues of agency and intentionality, theoretical alternatives, and clinical implications of our approach. (shrink)

A significant part of everyday learning occurs incidentally — a process typically described as implicit learning. A central issue in this domain and others, such as language acquisition, is the extent to which performance depends on the acquisition and deployment of abstract rules. Shanks and colleagues [22], [11] have suggested (1) that discrimination between grammatical and ungrammatical instances of a biconditional grammar requires the acquisition and use of abstract rules, and (2) that training conditions — in particular whether instructions orient (...) participants to identify the relevant rules or not — strongly influence the extent to which such rules will be learned. In this paper, we show (1) that a Simple Recurrent Network can in fact, under some conditions, learn a biconditional grammar, (2) that training conditions indeed influence learning in simple auto-associators networks and (3) that such networks can likewise learn about biconditional grammars, albeit to a lesser extent than human participants. These findings suggest that mastering biconditional grammars does not require the acquisition of abstract rules to the extent implied by Shanks and colleagues, and that performance on such material may in fact be based, at least in part, on simple associative learning mechanisms. (shrink)

monsters, virtual legends such as 2001’s HAL or Demon Seed’s Proteus are actually scary because of their mind. Without lingering on the philosophical debates on whether a certain type of mind can exist independent of its specific embodiment or whether any creature can understand a consciousness that is not like his own (recall Lem’s Solaris), the thing that makes HAL and Proteus so human is not so much their ability to think as their possessing something resembling human consciousness. The point (...) is that, whereas consciousness may or may not be required for an artificial agent to think, it is an essential element in creating anything resembling a human-like thinker that would pass the Turing Test. (shrink)

A significant part of everyday learning occurs incidentally — a process typically described as implicit learning. A central issue in this and germane domains such as language acquisition is the extent to which performance depends on the acquisition and deployment of abstract rules. In an attempt to address this question, we show that the apparent use of such rules in a simple categorisation task of artificial grammar strings, as reported by Shanks, Johnstone, and Staggs (1997), can be simulated by means (...) of a simple recurrent network, and may thus turn out not be incompatible with the acquisition of statistical regularities rooted in the processing of exemplars of the presented material. (shrink)

When consciousness is examined using subjective ratings, the extent to which processing is conscious or unconscious is often estimated by calculating task performance at the subjective threshold or by calculating the correlation between accuracy and awareness. However, both these methods have certain limitations. In the present article, we propose describing task accuracy and awareness as functions of stimulus intensity as suggested by Koch and Preuschoff . The estimated lag between the curves describes how much stimulus intensity must increase for awareness (...) to change proportionally as much as accuracy and the slopes of the curves are used to assess how fast accuracy and awareness increases and whether awareness is dichotomous. The method is successfully employed to assess consciousness characteristics on data from four different awareness scales. (shrink)

Niemand dacht oorspronkelijker, speelser en scherper dan Ludwig Wittgenstein, en hij wist het. Van de kristallijnen helderheid in de 'Tractatus' tot de alledaagse onoverzichtelijkheid van de 'Filosofische onderzoekingen' blijft zijn denken één lange worsteling tegen de betovering van ons intellect door de schier eindeloze variatie van vermommingen waarin taal de gedachte aan het oog onttrekt.0Wittgenstein wist dat hij een bijzonder talent had, en zijn visie op zichzelf is zeker zo boeiend als zijn kijk op de wereld. In zijn brieven en (...) dagboeken treedt een geniale, lastige, komische en ontroerende man naar voren die in leven en in sterven een onuitwisbare indruk maakte op de mensen die hem kenden.0Bert Keizer biedt een heldere en toegankelijke introductie in leven en werk van Wittgenstein. Hij bespreekt diens brieven, dagboeken en belangrijkste werken: de 'Tractatus', de 'Filosofische onderzoekingen' en 'Over zekerheid'. Dat doet hij gedreven en enthousiast, zonder belerend te worden.0. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary work draws on research from psychology and behavioral economics to evaluate the plausibility of moral contract theory. In a compelling manner with implications for moral theory more broadly, the author's novel approach resolves a number of key contingencies in contractarianism and contractualism. Acting in accordance with principles that we could all agree to under certain conditions requires that agents are capable of taking up the perspectives of others. Research in social and developmental psychology shows just how challenging this (...) can be. The author discusses in detail what implications findings on perspective-taking have for contract theory. He concludes with cautious optimism that, despite our limitations, it lies within our power to become better at perspective-taking and to adopt a contractarian or contractualist mode of moral thinking. This does however require us to be much more attentive to the standpoints of others than we tend to be. Contract theorists also assume that agents can be moved to comply with principles that would be the object of agreement, with some arguing they can be so moved out of their own interest. The book show that, in contrast to the suspicion of many philosophers, this idea is largely supported by research on the dynamics of trust and our ability to distinguish trustworthy from untrustworthy others. Bringing a welcome dose of realism to the debate on contract theory, the author shows the value of assessing moral theories from an empirical perspective. (shrink)

Deprivationism cannot accommodate the common sense assumption that we should lament our death iff, and to the extent that, it is bad for us. Call this the Nothing Bad, Nothing to Lament Assumption. As such, either this assumption needs to be rejected or deprivationism does. I first argue that the Nothing Bad, Nothing to Lament Assumption is false. I then attempt to figure out which facts our attitudes concerning death should track. I suggest that each person should have two distinct (...) attitudes toward death: one determined by agent’s reasonable expectations about when she will die and one determined by the amount of metaphysically possible good one reasonably believes death precludes. (shrink)

I defend the bold claim that self-described speciesists are not really speciesists. Of course, I do not deny that self-described speciesists would assent to generic speciesist claims (e.g. Humans matter more than animals). The conclusion I draw is more nuanced. My claim is that such generic speciesist beliefs are inconsistent with other, more deeply held, beliefs of self-described speciesists. Crucially, once these inconsistencies are made apparent, speciesists will reject the generic speciesist beliefs because they are absurd by the speciesists’ own (...) lights. (shrink)

Hoewel depressie veel voorkomt, tasten we wat betreft de aard en behandeling ervan nog altijd in het duister. Dit komt volgens Van den Bergh omdat de stoornis vooral wordt benaderd als hersenziekte of hersenaandoening. De nadruk wordt daarbij gelegd op onze (neuro)biologische gevoeligheid zonder dat we echt stilstaan bij de maatschappelijke factoren die op deze gevoeligheid inwerken. Nog minder, aldus de auteur, wordt ingegaan op de culturele bronnen van deze impact. Deze blinde vlek in de depressieduiding stelt Van den Bergh (...) in zijn boek centraal, en werpt zo een tegenlicht op het gangbare begrip van deze ‘stemmingsstoornis’. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Originality of Descartes’s Conception of Analysis as DiscoveryBenoît TimmermansAccording to Descartes, his Meditations employ the method of analysis. This method of proof, says Descartes, “shows the true way by means of which the thing in question was discovered methodically and as it were a priori.” 1 Such a definition of analysis poses a problem that seems to have attracted little attention among commentators until now, namely, why Descartes (...) considers analysis a method of discovery whereas the Scholastic tradition asserts just the contrary, that synthesis allows the discovery of new things, whereas analysis is a method for judging findings or verifying them a posteriori. What is more, the definition that Descartes gives of his analysis contains another divergence, this time brought up by the commentators, 2 for he curiously considers analysis an a priori movement and not an a posteriori movement as dictated by tradition.These issues are all the more important as the analytical method acquired particular prestige in the seventeenth century. This prestige concerned not only philosophy (Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, etc.) but science as well. Thus algebra lost some of its rough edges and gradually took on the name of “analysis.” 3 Descartes created a type of geometry that was soon dubbed “analytic,” and Leibniz developed his analysis infinitorum or differential and integral calculus. If the scientific revolution and the new philosophies that were associated with it attached so much importance to a method that had already been known in ancient Greece, was it not due to a change of the meaning of analysis or at least a rearranging of some of its functions? This is the question that we propose to [End Page 433] tackle while trying to determine to what extent Cartesian analysis breaks with the forms of analysis that preceded it. 4To do this we shall first examine the teachings of Scholastic philosophy concerning the connections between analysis and discovery in general and then study the logical possibilities of discovery through analysis that draw their inspiration from Aristotle’s Analytics and that were developed extensively by the School of Padua in the sixteenth century. Finally, we shall attempt to determine whether the mathematical definition of analysis derived from the works of Euclid and Pappus gives grounds for the correlation with discovery.The Link Between Analysis and Discovery According to the ScholasticsOne might well think that Descartes was completely unaware of the contradiction between his definition of analysis and the teachings of the Scholastics. Had not he always exhibited a true disdain for the latter? However, in September 1640, that is, four months before writing his text on analysis, Descartes began girding for the Jesuit Fathers’ objections to his Meditations. This involved looking for an “abstract of the whole of scholastic philosophy, this would save the time it would take to read their huge tomes.” 5 He finally found what he was looking for in the shops of Leiden, namely, Eustachius a Sancto Paulo’s Summa Philosophiae. There is reason to believe that Descartes read this opus with interest, for two months later he referred to it as “the best book of its kind ever made.” 6 Later he said that he would definitely have chosen the Summa Philosophiae as the basis for refuting the School’s doctrine if he had not given up such a project. 7 Now, Eustachius a Sancto Paulo’s Summa Philosophiae is categorical on the subject of analysis versus synthesis. Analysis of a definition “is perfectly compatible with the doctrines for teaching and learning; as for the other disciplines of discovery, the other method, that is the composite or synthetic method, must be used.” 8According to the Scholastic doctrine as stated by Eustachius a Sancto Paulo, analysis thus plays a part in the teaching of well-known things and in all processes of appraisal, assessment, or judgment. This is easy to explain if one considers that, etymologically, analysis breaks links (ana-luein), goes backward, or climbs back up from the consequences to the principles. Starting from an observation, proposition, or question, it wends its way back to the simplest, [End Page 434] surest items of knowledge that shed light on and verify said starting... (shrink)

The philosophical essays collected here are predicated on the conviction that we live in a time when all-encompassing philosophical systems can no longer be seriously entertained as a true reflection of extant reality. Instead, an indefinite number of perspectives on - or discursive appropriations of - what is thought of as 'reality' are possible. Sometimes they diverge and sometimes they intersect in surprising ways, as these essays show. While the belief in an all-inclusive philosophical system is rejected, the author shows (...) that every perspective displays a coherence and illuminating power of its own.<BR> The collection is divided into two parts. The first considers philosophy, the individual and society, covering themes including the deleterious effects of capitalism on natural ecosystems, the modern conception of 'immortality' in Nietzsche's thought, Lacan's provocative interpretation of capitalist discourse, the current status of the humanities in universities, individual autonomy, the meaning of 'identification', global 'terrorism', and Plato's philosophical self-subversion. The second part gathers together perspectives on the arts and society, with the author arguing that reflections on cinema, architecture and music never isolate these arts from social concerns, but demonstrate their interconnectedness. (shrink)

The essays brought together in this volume are written from the dual perspectives of philosophy and psychoanalytic theory.

This collection of philosophical essays addresses important issues in the arts, encompassing painting, sculpture, photography, film and architecture.

Unter welchen Bedingungen kann es als ethisch vertretbar gelten, Menschen in biomedizinischen Experimenten als Probanden einzusetzen? Bert Heinrichs unternimmt es, die Ethik der Forschung am Menschen grundlegend und systematisch zu erschließen. Seine ethische Rahmentheorie wird im Hinblick auf drei kontrovers diskutierte Problemkomplexe ausgewertet, nämlich die Forschung mit Minderjährigen, randomisierte klinische Studien und Forschung in Entwicklungsländern. Sie soll helfen, wesentliche Orientierung bei der konkreten Problemlösung zu geben.

This volume compares the western ideas of knowledge with the African. It aims at creating a mirror through which the western knowledge culture can look at itself through an unusual and interesting angle. The culture of Sub-Saharan Africa is the substance from which we, in this book, have tried to construe an epistemological mirror.

Foucault nous a donne de multiples potentialites pour repenser certaines des questions classiques posees par l histoire et les sciences des religions. Cet ouvrage fait etat des nombreux excursus du philosophe vers les domaines de la spiritualite antique, de l histoire du christianisme primitif, de l ascetisme chretien, ou encore de la question des marginalites religieuses. Il est l occasion, surtout, de reflechir sur quelques uns des - outils - mis en place par le philosophe et de montrer comment ceux-ci (...) peuvent se reveler pertinents pour saisir les phenomenes religieux de notre modernite. Des phenomenes qui se comprennent a l interieur de problemes historiques, politiques et sociaux, culturels. Seule maniere, repete Foucault, de nous proteger contre les syntheses toutes faites et les decoupages familiers, mais aussi d ouvrir la reflexion a l epreuve de la realite et de l actualite. Jean-Francois Bert est Maitre d enseignement et de recherche a l Universite de Lausanne. Specialiste de l histoire des sciences humaines, il developpe une nouvelle approche qui se veut attentive aux pratiques et aux techniques savantes. Il a codirige le Cahier de l Herne sur Foucault (2011), et a participe a l edition, en Pleiade, des oeuvres du philosophe.". (shrink)

Drawing on his extensive experience as both a medical practitioner and a patient, acclaimed author, award-winning physician, and ethicist Philip Hébert creates a brave and intimate portrait of the complex ethical questions raised by revolutionary advances in medical diagnosis and treatment. Philip Hébert addresses the complex ethical questions raised by revolutionary advances in medical treatment. This work expands upon Hébert's previous book, "Doing Right," and extends his knowledge of the field beyond medical professionals to reach the patients they treat.

In this article, I present two conceptual problems for Craver's mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms. First, constitutive relevance threatens to imply causal relevance despite Craver (and Bechtel)'s claim that they are strictly distinct. Second, if (as is intuitively appealing) parthood is defined in terms of spatio-temporal inclusion, then the mutual manipulability account is prone to counterexamples, as I show by a case of endosymbiosis. I also present a methodological problem (a case of experimental underdetermination) and formulate two (...) partial, but fallible solutions based on the notions of parthood and synchronicity. (shrink)

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to develop an ethical framework for the marketing of corporate social responsibility. Methods The approach is a conceptual one based on virtue ethics and on the corporate identity literature. Furthermore, empirical research results are used to describe the opportunities and pitfalls of using marketing communication tools in the strategy of building a virtuous corporate brand. Results/conclusions An ethical framework that addresses the paradoxical relation between the consequentialist perspective many proponents of the marketing of (...) CSR adopt, and ethical perspectives which criticize an exclusive profit-oriented approach to CSR. Furthermore, three CSR strategies in relation to the marketing of CSR are discussed. For each CSR strategy it is explored how a corporation could avoid falling into the promise/performance gap. (shrink)

"Op 9 december 2011 was het precies zeventig jaar geleden dat de Joodse rechtsfilosoof, vrijdenker en humanist Leo Polak (1880-1941) in het concentratiekamp Sachsenhausen overleed. De essentie van zijn vrijdenken en humanisme getuigt van het besef van de verbondenheid van alle mensen als wezens die zich zo volledig en harmonieus mogelijk moeten kunnen ontplooien, en de erkenning van de mensheid als hoogste eenheid, hoger dan alle andere collectiviteiten die loyaliteit van mensen zouden kunnen eisen: kerk, Christendom, natie. Deze bundel bevat (...) als kern een drietal beroemde en beruchte redevoeringen van Polak uit de jaren 1931-1933; deze waren idealistisch van aard en vonden veel instemming bij met name ongelovigen. Daarnaast zijn er diverse bijdragen die een goed en soms nieuw beeld geven van de rol en betekenis van Polak voor de vrijdenkers; zo had hij op belangrijke momenten een koersbepalende rol in de geschiedenis van de vrijdenkerij."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Der Begriff ‚Bioethik‘ bezeichnet zumeist denjenigen Teilbereich der Angewandten Ethik, der sich mit dem Umgang mit Leben bzw. Lebewesen beschäftigt. Die Bioethik lässt sich ihrerseits in die Teilbereiche Medizinethik, Tierethik und Umweltethik untergliedern. Auch wenn diese Untergliederung durchaus gebräuchlich ist, zeigt sie doch, dass thematische Zuordnungen und disziplinäre Grenzziehungen in der Angewandten Ethik nicht unproblematisch sind.

Die Forschungs- und Wissenschaftsethik ist diejenige Teildisziplin der Angewandten Ethik, die sich mit ethischen Problemen von Forschung und Wissenschaft beschäftigt. Man kann die Forschungsethik in drei Bereiche gliedern: Ein erster Bereich hat Prinzipien und Normen zum Gegenstand, die für alle Wissenschaftler als Wissenschaftler gelten. Ein zweiter Bereich ist mit Methoden befasst, die in der Wissenschaft zur Anwendung kommen. Ein dritter Bereich der Forschungsethik beschäftigt sich schließlich mit den Zielen von Forschung bzw. mit ethischen Fragen, die solche Ziele aufwerfen.

Today, mechanisms and mechanistic explanation are very popular in philosophy of science and are deemed a welcome alternative to laws of nature and deductive‐nomological explanation. Starting from Mitchell's pragmatic notion of laws, I cast doubt on their status as a genuine alternative. I argue that (1) all complex‐systems mechanisms ontologically must rely on stable regularities, while (2) the reverse need not hold. Analogously, (3) models of mechanisms must incorporate pragmatic laws, while (4) such laws themselves need not always refer to (...) underlying mechanisms. Finally, I show that Mitchell's account is more encompassing than the mechanistic account *Received August 2008; revised January 2010. †To contact the author, please write to: Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, B‐9000 Belgium; e‐mail: Bert[email protected]. (shrink)

4e de couv.: Les écrits de Michel Foucault sont stratifiés, hiérarchisés, entre les livres, les entretiens et les cours au Collège de France, mais ils sont surtout disséminés dans leurs usages. Désormais, et en plus de l'histoire des sciences et de la philosophie, les "effets" Foucault sont palpables sur la théorie de la littérature et du cinéma, l'histoire culturelle et sociale, les théories du genre, la pensée politique, les sciences de gestion, etc. C'est dans ce chantier ouvert que se situe (...) cet ouvrage. Il s'agit pour Jérôme Lamy, Jean-François Bert et leur équipe de spécialistes de resituer et d'analyser une pensée empruntant des questionnements à d'autres champs, de la psychologie à l'économie, de la science politique à la géographie, tout en ne se réclamant pas de ces sciences humaines et sociales. Pour comprendre la position de Foucault, les grands axes méthodologiques qu'il a parcourus sont retracés, telle l'archéologie, l'épistémè, la problématisation. Les concepts, des ouvrages maintenant classiques aux cours et à l'histoire de la sexualité, sont également revisités. Cette lecture critique des écrits et des usages de Foucault permet de le confronter aux analyses les plus récentes en sciences sociales, comme les postcolonial studies, ou de suivre les dialogues engagés (parfois à distance) avec des auteurs comme Norbert Elias, Michel de Certeau et Pierre Bourdieu. Un inventaire aussi rigoureux qu'éclairant. (shrink)

The rule of law offers legal certainty, laying down boundaries to the state's playing field. The precautionary approach stipulates that the absence of scientific certainty is no reason not to act to prevent harm. Here, uncertainty frames action. The precautionary approach potentially expands the state's playing field, and this expansion might well undermine the precepts of the rule of law. The certainty-uncertainty axis exposes a tension between the rule of law and the precautionary approach in what Ulrich Beck has termed (...) the world risk society in second modernity. It is this tension that is the focus of analysis in this article. (shrink)

Many theories about human number representation stress the importance of a central semantic representation that includes the magnitude information of small integer numbers, and that is conceived as an abstract, compressed number line. However, thus far there has been little or no direct evidence that units and teens are represented on the same number line. In two masked priming experiments, we show that single-digit and two-digit Arabic numerals are equally well primed by an Arabic numeral with the same number of (...) digits as by an equally distant Arabic numeral with a different number of digits (e.g. the priming effect of 7 on the target 9 is the same as the priming effect of 11 on the target 9). The finding was obtained both with a number naming task and with a parity judgement task. This is in line with the hypothesis that units and teens are part of a continuous number line. (shrink)

While most people believe the best possible life they could lead would be an immortal one, so‐called “immortality curmudgeons” disagree. Following Bernard Williams, they argue that, at best, we have no prudential reason to live an immortal life, and at worst, an immortal life would necessarily be bad for creatures like us. In this article, we examine Bernard Williams' seminal argument against the desirability of immortality and the subsequent literature it spawned. We first reconstruct and motivate Williams' somewhat cryptic argument (...) in three parts. After that, we elucidate and motivate the three best (and most influential) counterarguments to Williams' seminal argument. Finally, we review, and critically examine, two further distinct arguments in favor of the anti‐immortality position. (shrink)