Despite the growing public awareness of social sustainability issues, little is known about what drives firms to emphasize social criteria in their supplier management practices and what the precise benefits of such efforts are. This is especially true for relationships with international suppliers from the world's emerging economies in Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. Building on stakeholder theory, we address the issue by examining how pressures from customers, the government, and employees as primary constituencies of the firm determine the (...) extent to which firms consider social aspects in the selection of emerging economy suppliers. Further, we analyze how such socially sustainable supplier selection relates to the capabilities of the firm's suppliers, its market reputation, and the learning in its supply management organization. We test the developed research framework empirically using data from 244 U. S. and German corporations. Our findings, consistent with our hypothesized model, suggest that middle-level supply managers as internal stakeholders play a major driving role for firms' socially sustainable supplier selection, and that strong positive links exist between that selection and the investigated outcomes. (shrink)

Multinational enterprises venturing into emerging economies operate in relatively unfamiliar environments that, compared with their home countries, often display a high degree of administrative distance. At the same time, many MNEs face the question of how intensely to commit to corporate social responsibility in emerging economies, given the often relatively lower social standards in those countries. This research addresses the question of how administrative distance, MNE subsidiary size, and experience in the host country relate to the extent to which MNEs (...) strategically commit to CSR in their emerging economy subsidiaries. We argue that the greater the administrative distance between MNEs’ home and host countries, the lesser the MNE subsidiaries strategically commit to CSR. At the same time, we predict that the larger the size of MNE subsidiaries, and the longer their experience in the host country, the more the MNE subsidiaries strategically commit to CSR. To test our hypotheses, we use data from a large-scale, cross-industry survey of 213 subsidiaries of Western MNEs in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America. We complement the survey data with country-level data from the World Bank Governance Indicators. (shrink)

The main item in the present volume was published in 1930 under the title Das Unendliche in der Mathematik und seine Ausschaltung. It was at that time the fullest systematic account from the standpoint of Husserl's phenomenology of what is known as 'finitism' (also as 'intuitionism' and 'constructivism') in mathematics. Since then, important changes have been required in philosophies of mathematics, in part because of Kurt Godel's epoch-making paper of 1931 which established the essential in completeness of arithmetic. In the (...) light of that finding, a number of the claims made in the book (and in the accompanying articles) are demon strably mistaken. Nevertheless, as a whole it retains much of its original interest and value. It presents the issues in the foundations of mathematics that were under debate when it was written (and in some cases still are);, and it offers one alternative to the currently dominant set-theoretical definitions of the cardinal numbers and other arithmetical concepts. While still a student at the University of Vienna, Felix Kaufmann was greatly impressed by the early philosophical writings (especially by the Logische Untersuchungen) of Edmund Husser!' He was never an uncritical disciple of Husserl, and he integrated into his mature philosophy ideas from a wide assortment of intellectual sources. But he thought of himself as a phenomenologist, and made frequent use in all his major publications of many of Husserl's logical and epistemological theses. (shrink)

In speaking of empirical science as a self-correcting process one implies that a proposition accepted in accordance with the rules of procedure may have to be eliminated later according to these very rules. Taking this for granted one realizes that a particular empirical science, say physics, should be defined in terms of rules of method rather than as a system of propositions representing our knowledge at a given time. Obviously both the science of Galileo and Newton and the science of (...) Einstein and Bohr are called ''physics'' and we do not regard this as a mere equivocation. It may, however, be objected that a definition of a science in terms of rules of method is incompatible with the view that a science consists of a set of propositions. To meet this objection I propose that we distinguish between the structure of a science as defined in terms of the rules of method and the corpus of this science at a given time, i.e., the set of propositions accepted at this time in accordance with the rules of method of this science. The relation between the structure of a science and the corpus of a science is similar to that obtaining between the structure of a legal order, e.g., American law, which is defined by the rules of the process of legislation in the broadest sense and the legal norms which are the corpus of law at a given time. It should then be noted that the assertion that a certain proposition belongs to a given science is incomplete without a time-index. The scientist changes the corpus of his science either by introducing new propositions to it or by eliminating propositions which were previously accepted and did not stand further control. The significance of whatever else he does in the course of his inquiry can be determined only in the light of this selection. There are two stages in this process of selection. The first is exclusively concerned with meanings as such. The scientist has to ascertain that a given aggregate of words represents a proposition, that this proposition contains only objective meanings, that it is not self-contradictory, that it belongs to the subject-matter of the particular science. The second phase of the selection, exhibited in scientific procedure in the strict sense, applies only to such propositions which have passed this preexamination. We shall call those rules of method in terms of which the first stage of selection is defined rules of the language of science and those rules in terms of which the second stage is defined rules of the procedure of science. In this paper I shall try to show how important it is to distinguish clearly between these two types of rules. I shall first deal with the rules of the language of science and confine myself to sciences dealing with the physical world. (shrink)

La communication se divise ainsi : 1° elle indique l’ambiguïté du terme « formel », puisqu’on le dit d’une part de la logique classique et d’autre part d’un calcul, considéré comme ensemble désignés sans signification ; 2° elle éclaircit, grâce à l’analyse d’une opération de calcul, ce qu’il y a de commun aux deux concepts ; 3° elle montre comment les concepts formels sont liés aux concepts non formels, qui ont un contenu. Cette question est étroitement connexe de celle du (...) rapport de la logique et de la mathématique pure d’une part, de l’expérience d’autre part ; 4° elle analyse le concept des nombres naturels, et elle étend les résultats obtenus à la mathématique pure. (shrink)