This article is based on a discussion held in Athens in April 2002, in the framework of a research visit, supported by the National Technical University of Athens, among the following participants: Alexander Pavlovits Ogurtsov (APO), Svetlena Sergeevna Neretina (SSN), and Michalis Assimakopoulos (MA) who translated and annotated the Russian text. The later wishes to thank his Russian teachers in philosophy, E.A. Mamchur and language, A.A. Nekrasova The translation was reviewed and emended by E.M. Swiderski, editor of SEET.Svetlana Neretina (...) is senior researcher in the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), doctor of philosophy, titled professor for medieval philosophy, author of: The Conceptualism of Peter Abelard (1994), Believing Reason (1995), Tropes and Concepts (1999), Time of Culture (2000, with A. Ogurtsov), articles and translations on Philosophy of culture, email, [email protected]. (shrink)

As we know, the category of practice is a focal point in Marxist philosophy. The revolutionary upheaval in philosophy carried out by Marxism involves the interpretation of the essence of practice and its role in the process of cognition. In the fifty years of the development of Soviet philosophy, much has been done to clarify the nature of this problem, to render it concrete and work it out. The development of Marxist philosophical thought in other countries has also yielded much.

Stalinism is above all a regime, a personal power, an autocracy that repudiates democratic principles of social and political life, unifies culture, and embraces a repressive ideology formed around a mythological cult of a single person—the Master, and one value—Order. Here politics is replaced by intrigue, science—by servicing utilitarian and pragmatic ends, and philosophy—by the ideology of the ruling clique at the helm of a command-bureaucratic system, which also oppressed by the despotic will of the autocrat.

I have several comments and I will try to present the essence of the problem. The papers that we read on the computer give an idea of a certain structure of the future dictionary of culturology, or of culture- I don't know which is intended. It seems to me, that, according their approach, the papers are strictly scientific and attempt to apply the methods and concepts of scientific knowledge to culturology. Indeed, there is a scientific approach to cultural phenomena, for (...) example, the morphology of culture. It proceeds from the ideas of general validity, objectivity, and conceptuality. All this is legitimate and was sufficiently justified. I have some comments on Orlova's text regarding the identification of formal and eidetic logic. It is not exactly so. Eidetic logic has no bearing on contemporary logic, which does not coincide with formal logic. (shrink)

Speech in the publication of A.P. Ogurtsov talks about the contemporary understanding of culture by M. Heidegger, which testifies to the spiritual fall of the world and the replacement of the concept of “spirit” with the concept of “culture” in a specific meaning — as a value, which Heidegger considers “the highest sacrilege”, because God appears among the values. This understanding of culture is associated with “the secularization of thought and the oblivion of being; value thinking is rooted in (...) the will to power”. It is significant that in our time it is not uncommon to understand culture as a value. (shrink)

The article discusses the concept of the humanitarian-anthropological turn formulated by the famous Russian philosopher Alexander Pavlovich Ogurtsov. He analyzes Dilthey's views, showing that he is not only the initiator of humanitarian discourse, but, in fact, is developing a new direction of philosophy alternative to the natural science approach. The author analyzes the situation that necessitated the development of this direction, as well as the concepts of "life", "history", "understanding", "expression" and "experience", which Dilthey puts at the basis of (...) his philosophical system. He shows that the essential feature of these concepts is a double modality. On the one hand, history (respectively, life, understanding, expression, experience) is “singular”, that is, it changes not according to some law, but due to random circumstances, on the other hand, life changes quite lawfully, under the influence of the mechanisms of culture, language, economics, relationships between people, technology. Dilthey's interest in a holistic analysis of life is explained. The author shows that within the framework of humanitarian and anthropological study, the integrity of life is determined by a number of factors: the problem that the researcher solves, the narratives and texts available to him, the methodology of humanitarian knowledge. In other humanitarian studies, these factors will change, and therefore the integrity of life will also change. It turns out that the integrity of life, over which Dilthey struggled, is not independent of the researcher, his personality and life, it is constituted in the very process of humanitarian knowledge, partly as a singular, partly natural phenomenon. (shrink)

В монографии раскрыта одна из современных концепций теории познания и онтологии – континуалистика. Рассмотрены гипотезы становления информационного подхода в естествознании. Показаны предпосылки формирования информационной химии, заданные рядом современных концепций и моделей. Сформулирована концепция химической континуалистики, предстающей в качестве специальной дисциплинарной онтологии, которая восходит к линии «непрерывной химии нормальных состояний». Проведена демаркация онтологического, гносеологического и социологического аспектов становления информационной, континуальной химии. Книга предназначена для специалистов по философии науки и техники, теории познания и онтологии, для студентов старших курсов, магистров, аспирантов, докторантов, преподавателей (...) философских и естественнонаучных дисциплин факультетов классических, педагогических и технологических университетов. (shrink)

В книге отражена деятельность ведущих ученых, специалистов, руководителей, внесших большой вклад в развитие Философского факультета МГУ имени М. В. Ломоносова.

Donald Davidson holds that thought and talk emerge together. His view is an alternative to the views that language precedes thought and that thought precedes language. His basic argument is that in order to understand a language, an interpreter has to simultaneously assign beliefs, not to mention desires and intentions, to the speaker. So bits of language can be interpreted only if thoughts are attributed to the speakers of those bits. Davidson is arguably mistaken because interpretation of nonlinguistic utterances occurs (...) before the interpretation of linguistic ones. (shrink)

Издание содержит: Жанр интеллектуальной биографии в современной российской историографии; Кризис как риторическое псевдособытие в политической истории и др.

Divided into eight sections, each with introductory essays, the selections offer rich and detailed insights into a diverse multinational philosophical landscape. Revealed in this pathbreaking work is the way in which traditional philosophical issues related to ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology, for instance, take on specific forms in Africa's postcolonial struggles. Much of its moral, political, and social philosophy is concerned with the turbulent processes of embracing modern identities while protecting ancient cultures.

When should we make use of the criminal law? Suppose that a responsible legislature seeks to enact a morally justifiable range of criminal prohibitions. What criteria should it apply when deciding whether to proscribe conduct? Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs is a philosophical analysis of the nature, significance, and ethical limits of criminalisation. The authors explore the scope and moral boundaries of harm-based prohibitions, proscriptions of offensive behaviour, and 'paternalistic' prohibitions aimed at preventing self-harm. Their aim is to develop guiding principles (...) for these various grounds of state prohibition, including an analysis of the constraints and mediating factors that weigh for and against criminalisation. Both authors have written extensively in the field. In Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs they have reworked a number of well-known essays and added several important new essays to produce an integrated, accessible, philosophically-sophisticated account that will be of great interest to legal academics, philosophers, and advanced students alike"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

The criminal law presently distinguishes between actions and omissions, and only rarely proscribes failures to avert consequences that it would be an offense to bring about. Why? In recent years it has been persuasively argued by both Glover and Bennett that, celeris paribus, omissions to prevent a harm are just as culpable as are actions which bring that harm about. On the other hand, and acknowledging that hitherto “lawyers have not been very successful in finding a rationale for it,” Tony (...) Honoré has sought to defend the law's differential treatment. He proposes a “distinct-duties theory” that in addition to the general duties we owe to everyone, we also owe distinct duties to a more limited collection of people and associations, specified by features of our relationship with them. Where a distinct duty holds, breach by omission may well be no better than breach by positive action. But absent a distinct duty, omissions, per Honoré, are less culpable. They are mere failures to intervene and improve or rectify things, whereas actions are positive interventions which make things worse. And, thus, the law has good reason to differentiate between them. (shrink)