Interpreters of Theaetetus are prone to endorse the view that a god gave Socrates maieutic skill. This paper challenges that view. It provides a different account of the skill’s origins, and reconstructs a genealogy of Socratic philosophy that begins and has its end in human experience. Three distinct origins coordinate to bring forth a radically new conception of philosophy in the image of female midwifery: the state of wonder (1. efficient origin), the exercise of producing, examining and disavowing beliefs in (...) the gradual cultivation of human nature’s lack of skill (2. material origin), and Socrates’ understanding of god’s assistance as an endorsement of his mental infertility and the benefit of a particular form of dialectical training (3. formal origin). The paper concludes by arguing that Socrates transforms philosophy into a pursuit of wisdom that has its telos in becoming like a woman. (shrink)

Interpreters of Theaetetus are prone to endorse the view that a god gave Socrates maieutic skill. This paper challenges that view. It provides a different account of the skill’s origins, and reconstructs a genealogy of Socratic philosophy that begins and has its end in human experience. Three distinct origins coordinate to bring forth a radically new conception of philosophy in the image of female midwifery: the state of wonder (1. efficient origin), the exercise of producing, examining and disavowing beliefs in (...) the gradual cultivation of human nature’s lack of skill (2. material origin), and Socrates’ understanding of god’s assistance as an endorsement of his mental infertility and the benefit of a particular form of dialectical training (3. formal origin). The paper concludes by arguing that Socrates transforms philosophy into a pursuit of wisdom that has its telos in becoming like a woman. (shrink)

Focused on the reference to Socrates’ confession of ignorance at Academica 1.45, this paper challenges the common assumption that the passage transmits Arcesilaus’ conception of Socrates. This paper develops in two steps a more plausible reading of the passage. According to this reading, Cicero presents an interpretation of Arcesilaus’ historical relation to Socrates. In conclusion, the paper argues that traditional readings of Acad. 1.45 underestimate not only Cicero’s originality as an historical thinker, but also his clever reconstruction of Academic history, (...) as it effectively opposes the controversial Academic history defended by Antiochus in the early first century BCE. (shrink)

Focused on the reference to Socrates’ confession of ignorance at Academica 1.45, this paper challenges the common assumption that the passage transmits Arcesilaus’ conception of Socrates. This paper develops in two steps a more plausible reading of the passage. According to this reading, Cicero presents an interpretation of Arcesilaus’ historical relation to Socrates. In conclusion, the paper argues that traditional readings of Acad. 1.45 underestimate not only Cicero’s originality as an historical thinker, but also his clever reconstruction of Academic history, (...) as it effectively opposes the controversial Academic history defended by Antiochus in the early first century BCE. (shrink)

Focused on the reference to Socrates’ confession of ignorance at Academica 1.45, this paper challenges the common assumption that the passage transmits Arcesilaus’ conception of Socrates. This paper develops in two steps a more plausible reading of the passage. According to this reading, Cicero presents an interpretation of Arcesilaus’ historical relation to Socrates. In conclusion, the paper argues that traditional readings of Acad. 1.45 underestimate not only Cicero’s originality as an historical thinker, but also his clever reconstruction of Academic history, (...) as it effectively opposes the controversial Academic history defended by Antiochus in the early first century BCE. (shrink)

Focused on the reference to Socrates’ confession of ignorance at Academica 1.45, this paper challenges the common assumption that the passage transmits Arcesilaus’ conception of Socrates. This paper develops in two steps a more plausible reading of the passage. According to this reading, Cicero presents an interpretation of Arcesilaus’ historical relation to Socrates. In conclusion, the paper argues that traditional readings of Acad. 1.45 underestimate not only Cicero’s originality as an historical thinker, but also his clever reconstruction of Academic history, (...) as it effectively opposes the controversial Academic history defended by Antiochus in the early first century BCE. (shrink)

Focused on the reference to Socrates’ confession of ignorance at Academica 1.45, this paper challenges the common assumption that the passage transmits Arcesilaus’ conception of Socrates. This paper develops in two steps a more plausible reading of the passage. According to this reading, Cicero presents an interpretation of Arcesilaus’ historical relation to Socrates. In conclusion, the paper argues that traditional readings of Acad. 1.45 underestimate not only Cicero’s originality as an historical thinker, but also his clever reconstruction of Academic history, (...) as it effectively opposes the controversial Academic history defended by Antiochus in the early first century BCE. (shrink)

Focused on the reference to Socrates’ confession of ignorance at Academica 1.45, this paper challenges the common assumption that the passage transmits Arcesilaus’ conception of Socrates. This paper develops in two steps a more plausible reading of the passage. According to this reading, Cicero presents an interpretation of Arcesilaus’ historical relation to Socrates. In conclusion, the paper argues that traditional readings of Acad. 1.45 underestimate not only Cicero’s originality as an historical thinker, but also his clever reconstruction of Academic history, (...) as it effectively opposes the controversial Academic history defended by Antiochus in the early first century BCE. (shrink)

Focused on the reference to Socrates’ confession of ignorance at Academica 1.45, this paper challenges the common assumption that the passage transmits Arcesilaus’ conception of Socrates. This paper develops in two steps a more plausible reading of the passage. According to this reading, Cicero presents an interpretation of Arcesilaus’ historical relation to Socrates. In conclusion, the paper argues that traditional readings of Acad. 1.45 underestimate not only Cicero’s originality as an historical thinker, but also his clever reconstruction of Academic history, (...) as it effectively opposes the controversial Academic history defended by Antiochus in the early first century BCE. (shrink)

Focused on the reference to Socrates’ confession of ignorance at Academica 1.45, this paper challenges the common assumption that the passage transmits Arcesilaus’ conception of Socrates. This paper develops in two steps a more plausible reading of the passage. According to this reading, Cicero presents an interpretation of Arcesilaus’ historical relation to Socrates. In conclusion, the paper argues that traditional readings of Acad. 1.45 underestimate not only Cicero’s originality as an historical thinker, but also his clever reconstruction of Academic history, (...) as it effectively opposes the controversial Academic history defended by Antiochus in the early first century BCE. (shrink)

Focused on the reference to Socrates’ confession of ignorance at Academica 1.45, this paper challenges the common assumption that the passage transmits Arcesilaus’ conception of Socrates. This paper develops in two steps a more plausible reading of the passage. According to this reading, Cicero presents an interpretation of Arcesilaus’ historical relation to Socrates. In conclusion, the paper argues that traditional readings of Acad. 1.45 underestimate not only Cicero’s originality as an historical thinker, but also his clever reconstruction of Academic history, (...) as it effectively opposes the controversial Academic history defended by Antiochus in the early first century BCE. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In his 1981–82 lectures The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Michel Foucault claims that a significant portion of the modern historiography of ancient philosophy tends to discredit the ethical framework of epimeleia heautou (“care of the self”). The thematic analysis of knowledge in the historiography of ancient philosophy overshadows the theme of care of the self. Taking Foucault’s claim as a point of departure, the aim of this paper is twofold. First, the paper provides a genealogy of the early Hellenistic (...) Academy, from Polemo to Arcesilaus. Second, the paper demonstrates that for Arcesilaus, the alleged pioneer of what modern historiography has designated the Academy’s epistemological scepticism, philosophy is not restricted to a continual search for knowledge at a theoretically rarefied level of challenging arguments or discursive statements. This paper situates Arcesilaus’ opposition to early Stoic epistemology within the framework of Academic epimeleia heautou, and defends the thesis that under Arcesilaus the Hellenistic Academy undergoes a shift in the practice of care of the self. (shrink)

Interpreters of Theaetetus are prone to endorse the view that a god gave Socrates maieutic skill. This paper challenges that view. It provides a different account of the skill’s origins, and reconstructs a genealogy of Socratic philosophy that begins and has its end in human experience. Three distinct origins coordinate to bring forth a radically new conception of philosophy in the image of female midwifery: the state of wonder, the exercise of producing, examining and disavowing beliefs in the gradual cultivation (...) of human nature’s lack of skill, and Socrates’ understanding of god’s assistance as an endorsement of his mental infertility and the benefit of a particular form of dialectical training. The paper concludes by arguing that Socrates transforms philosophy into a pursuit of wisdom that has its telos in becoming like a woman. (shrink)

The Victorian period in Britain was an “age of reform.” It is therefore not surprising that two of the era’s most eminent intellects described themselves as reformers. Both William Whewell and John Stuart Mill believed that by reforming philosophy—including the philosophy of science—they could effect social and political change. But their divergent visions of this societal transformation led to a sustained and spirited controversy that covered morality, politics, science, and economics. Situating their debate within the larger context of Victorian society (...) and its concerns, _Reforming Philosophy_ shows how two very different men captured the intellectual spirit of the day and engaged the attention of other scientists and philosophers, including the young Charles Darwin. Mill—philosopher, political economist, and Parliamentarian—remains a canonical author of Anglo-American philosophy, while Whewell—Anglican cleric, scientist, and educator—is now often overlooked, though in his day he was renowned as an authority on science. Placing their teachings in their proper intellectual, cultural, and argumentative spheres, Laura Snyder revises the standard views of these two important Victorian figures, showing that both men’s concerns remain relevant today. A philosophically and historically sensitive account of the engagement of the major protagonists of Victorian British philosophy, _Reforming Philosophy_ is the first book-length examination of the dispute between Mill and Whewell in its entirety. A rich and nuanced understanding of the intellectual spirit of Victorian Britain, it will be welcomed by philosophers and historians of science, scholars of Victorian studies, and students of the history of philosophy and political economy. (shrink)

“It was the best of times. It was the worst of times.” Charles Dickens easily could have been describing our time and the dilemma in which victims of nonmalignant chronic pain find themselves.I am a forty-six-year-old registered nurse who specializes in oncology care and education. I am also a patient who suffers from chronic nonmalignant pain, and this malady has been the most frightening, the most humiliating, and the most difficult ordeal of my life.The morning of February 1983 severed (...) my life into “before” and “after,” as clearly as if it has been cut by a sharp knife. The “before” included my career as an oncology nurse, a college nursing professor, and a writer; but that was abruptly ended by the catastrophic rupture of a deep cerebral aneurysm. Surgery saved my life, but something unforeseen occurred during the procedure; and so, in the “after,” I have had to live with a serious seizure disorder and memory loss. (shrink)

“It was the best of times. It was the worst of times.” Charles Dickens easily could have been describing our time and the dilemma in which victims of nonmalignant chronic pain find themselves.I am a forty-six-year-old registered nurse who specializes in oncology care and education. I am also a patient who suffers from chronic nonmalignant pain, and this malady has been the most frightening, the most humiliating, and the most difficult ordeal of my life.The morning of February 1983 severed (...) my life into “before” and “after,” as clearly as if it has been cut by a sharp knife. The “before” included my career as an oncology nurse, a college nursing professor, and a writer; but that was abruptly ended by the catastrophic rupture of a deep cerebral aneurysm. Surgery saved my life, but something unforeseen occurred during the procedure; and so, in the “after,” I have had to live with a serious seizure disorder and memory loss. (shrink)

It is common for young Christians to go off to college assured in their beliefs but, in the course of their first year or two, they meet what appears to them to be powerful defenses of scientific naturalism and crushing critiques of the basic Christian story (BCS), and many are thrown into doubt. They think to themselves something like this: "To be honest, I am troubled about the BCS. While the problem of evil, the apparent cultural basis for the diversity (...) of religions, the explanatory breadth of contemporary science, naturalistic explanations of religious experience and miracle reports, and textual and historical criticism of the Bible, among other things, don’t make me believe the BCS is false , I am in serious doubt about it, so much so that I lack belief of it. In that case, how can I have Christian faith? And if I don’t have faith, how can I keep on praying, attending church, affirming the creed, confessing my sins, taking the sacraments, singing the hymns and songs, and so on? I can’t, unless I’m a hypocrite. So integrity requires me to drop the whole thing and get out." Of course, our student is not alone. Many Christians find themselves for some portion of their lives somewhere on the trajectory from doubt to getting out. Indeed, Christians in the West struggle with intellectual doubt more than they used to, especially university-educated Christians. What should we say to them? Some will say “Get out!,” welcoming the development as a path to liberation. We explore a different response in this essay. (shrink)

A brief article on faith as a psychological attitude.

A core commitment of Bob Hale and Crispin Wright’s neologicism is their invocation of Frege’s Constraint—roughly, the requirement that the core empirical applications for a class of numbers be “built directly into” their formal characterization. According to these neologicists, if legitimate, Frege’s Constraint adjudicates in favor of their preferred foundation—Hume’s Principle—and against alternatives, such as the Dedekind–Peano axioms. In this paper, we consider a recent argument for legitimating Frege’s Constraint due to Hale, according to which the primary empirical application of (...) the naturals is transitive counting, or answering ‘how many’-questions using numerals. We make two claims regarding Hale’s argument. First, it fails to legitimate Frege’s Constraint in virtue of resting on unsupported and highly contentious assumptions. Secondly, even if sound, Hale’s argument would vindicate a version of Frege’s Constraint which fails to adjudicate in favor of Hume’s Principle over alternative characterizations of the naturals. (shrink)

Basic concepts -- Identifying arguments -- Logic and language -- Informal fallacies -- Categorical logic: statements -- Categorical logic: syllogisms -- Statement logic: truth tables -- Statement logic: proofs -- Predicate logic -- Induction -- Probability.

A critique of Plantinga's free will defense. For an updated version of this critique, with a reply to objections from William Rowe and Alvin Plantinga, see my "The logical problem of evil: Plantinga and Mackie," in Justin P. McBrayer & Daniel Howard‐Snyder (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, pp. 19-33.

This book explores and defends George Saunders’ causal thesis that successful stories are those that establish causation well. The book includes an in-depth discussion of causation’s role in several different key craft elements of fiction writing and examines different theories of causation and their implications for causation in fiction. Other discussions include the role of causation in building suspense, character and causation, causation in dialogue and connections between fiction and counterfactuals (or hypotheticals). The book also considers a number of objections (...) to the causal thesis and offers a reply. (shrink)

Most philosophers are familiar with the metaphysical puzzle of the statue and the clay. A sculptor begins with some clay, eventually sculpting a statue from it. Are the clay and the statue one and the same thing? Apparently not, since they have different properties. For example, the clay could survive being squashed, but the statue could not. The statue is recently formed, though the clay is not, etc. Godehart Link 1983’s highly influential analysis of the count/mass distinction recommends that English (...) draws a distinction between uncountable “stuff” and countable “things”. There are two mereological relations, related in specific ways. Our primary question here is whether an empirically adequate account of the mass/count distinction really does require distinguishing “things” from “stuff”, and thus postulating two corresponding mereological relations, or if instead positing only one sort of entity and corresponding mereological relation is sufficient, as other semantic theories would have it. This question is meant to be one of what we call natural language mereology. We are asking about the mereological commitments of English, or perhaps competent speakers of English, and not about ultimate reality as such. There is no pretense that we will definitively solve the metaphysical puzzle of the statue and clay. (shrink)

The concept of minimal risk has been used to regulate and limit participation by adolescents in clinical trials. It can be understood as setting an absolute standard of what risks are considered minimal or it can be interpreted as relative to the actual risks faced by members of the host community for the trial. While commentators have almost universally opposed a relative interpretation of the environmental risks faced by potential adolescent trial participants, we argue that the ethical concerns against the (...) relative standard may not be as convincing as these commentators believe. Our aim is to present the case for a relative standard of environmental risk in order to open a debate on this subject. We conclude by discussing how a relative standard of environmental risk could be defended in the specific case of an HIV vaccine trial among adolescents in South Africa. (shrink)

We often hear stories of people in terrible and seemingly intractable situations that are preyed upon by individuals offering empty promises of help. Frequently these cases are condemned as "exploiting the hope" of another. These accusations are made in a range of contexts, including human smuggling, the beauty industry, and unproven medical interventions. This concept is meant to do heavy lifting in public discourse, identifying a specific form of unethical conduct. However, it is poorly understood what is intended to be (...) wrong by exploiting hope, the range of activities that can accurately be captured under this concept, and what should be done about it. Thus, it is an ethical concept that is ripe for extended analysis and discussion. (shrink)

Many of us think that we just aren't enough. Not good enough, not pretty enough, not rich enough, and not happy enough. But just because we think something doesn't mean it's true. You are more than you think you are teaches you how to revise your belief system, fulfill your deepest dreams and desires, and create an epic, successful, and inspiring life. Unlocking your True Self is the key to new levels of joy, beauty, and peace. But what is the (...) True Self, and how can you realize its infinite potential? In this easy-to-read book, Kimberly Snyder answers these questions and shows you how to tap into this unstoppable force to transform every aspect of your life for the better. Drawing inspiration from the teachings of the great guru Paramahansa Yogananda along with personal stories and the latest scientific research, Kimberly offers simple exercises, potent ancient practices, and in-depth meditations to help you overcome negative beliefs and see yourself as you truly are--a goddess, a warrior, a lover, and a creator of your extraordinary destiny" -- Back cover. (shrink)

Most philosophers are familiar with the metaphysical puzzle of the statue and the clay. A sculptor begins with some clay, eventually sculpting a statue from it. Are the clay and the statue one and the same thing? Apparently not, since they have different properties. For example, the clay could survive being squashed, but the statue could not. The statue is recently formed, though the clay is not, etc. Godehart Link 1983’s highly influential analysis of the count/mass distinction recommends that English (...) draws a distinction between uncountable “stuff” and countable “things”. There are two mereological relations, related in specific ways. Our primary question here is whether an empirically adequate account of the mass/count distinction really does require distinguishing “things” from “stuff”, and thus postulating two corresponding mereological relations, or if instead positing only one sort of entity and corresponding mereological relation is sufficient, as other semantic theories would have it. This question is meant to be one of what we call natural language mereology. We are asking about the mereological commitments of English, or perhaps competent speakers of English, and not about ultimate reality as such. There is no pretense that we will definitively solve the metaphysical puzzle of the statue and clay. (shrink)

The stories in this book offer strategies and practices for applying systems thinking in education to unleash human energy for the journey of continuous improvement.

The Management of Scientific Integrity within Academic Medical Centers discusses the impact scientific misconduct has in eight complex case studies. Authors look at multifaceted mixtures of improper behavior, poor communication, cultural issues, adverse medical/health issues, interpersonal problems and misunderstandings to illustrate the challenge of identifying and managing what went wrong and how current policies have led to the establishment of quasi legal processes within academic institutions. The book reviews the current global regulations and concludes with a section authored by a (...) US federal court judge who provides his perspective on the adequacy of current regulations and policies. (shrink)