Why do American ghettos persist? Decades after Moynihan’s report on the black family and the Kerner Commission’s investigations of urban disorders, deeply disadvantaged black communities remain a disturbing reality. Scholars and commentators today often identify some factor―such as single motherhood, joblessness, or violent street crime―as the key to solving the problem and recommend policies accordingly. But, Tommie Shelby argues, these attempts to “fix” ghettos or “help” their poor inhabitants ignore fundamental questions of justice and fail to see the (...) urban poor as moral agents responding to injustice. (shrink)

An incisive and sympathetic examination of the case for ending the practice of imprisonment Despite its omnipresence and long history, imprisonment is a deeply troubling practice. In the United States and elsewhere, prison conditions are inhumane, prisoners are treated without dignity, and sentences are extremely harsh. Mass incarceration and its devastating impact on black communities have been widely condemned as neoslavery or “the new Jim Crow.” Can the practice of imprisonment be reformed, or does justice require it to be ended (...) altogether? In The Idea of Prison Abolition, Tommie Shelby examines the abolitionist case against prisons and its formidable challenge to would-be prison reformers. Philosophers have long theorized punishment and its justifications, but they haven’t paid enough attention to incarceration or its related problems in societies structured by racial and economic injustice. Taking up this urgent topic, Shelby argues that prisons, once reformed and under the right circumstances, can be legitimate and effective tools of crime control. Yet he draws on insights from black radicals and leading prison abolitionists, especially Angela Davis, to argue that we should dramatically decrease imprisonment and think beyond bars when responding to the problem of crime. While a world without prisons might be utopian, The Idea of Prison Abolition makes the case that we can make meaningful progress toward this ideal by abolishing the structural injustices that too often lead to crime and its harmful consequences. (shrink)

I reply to Mills's critique of my effort to show the relevance of Rawls's theory of justice for thinking about and responding to racial injustices. Contrary to Mills's claims, my suggestion that the fair equality of opportunity principle can remedy socioeconomic disadvantages caused by the legacy of racial oppression is compatible with Rawls's framework, does not conflate distributive justice with corrective justice, and does not confuse racial injustice with economic injustice. I also raise doubts about Mills's project to radically reconstruct (...) contractarian political philosophy. He seeks to displace ideal theory with nonideal theory by foregrounding the realities of past racial domination. Against this approach, I argue that an ideal theory that abstracts away from these realities is not inherently ideological, useless for corrective justice, or too ideal to guide social reform. And I defend the view that ideal theory is indispensible for nonideal theorizing about racial justice. (shrink)

"On the 50th anniversary of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s, assassination, his political thought remains underappreciated. Tommie Shelby and Brandon Terry, along with a cast of distinguished contributors, engage critically with King's understudied writings on a wide range of compelling, challenging topics and rethink the legacy of this towering figure."--Provided by publisher.

In view of the explanatory significance of joblessness, some social scientists, policymakers, and commentators have advocated strong measures to ensure that the ghetto poor work, including mandating work as a condition of receiving welfare benefits. Indeed, across the ideological political spectrum, work is often seen as a moral or civic duty and as a necessary basis for personal dignity. And this normative stance is now instantiated in federal and state law, from the tax scheme to public benefits. This Article reflects (...) critically on this new regime of work. I ask whether the normative principles to which its advocates typically appeal actually justify the regime. I conclude that the case for a pro tanto moral or civic duty to work is not as strong as many believe and that there are reasonable responses to joblessness that do not involve instituting a work regime. However, even if we grant that there is a duty to work, I maintain that the ghetto poor would not be wronging their fellow citizens were they to choose not to work and to rely on public funds for material support. In fact, I argue that many among the black urban poor have good reasons to refuse to work. Throughout, I emphasize what too few advocates of the new work regime do, namely, that whether work is an obligation depends crucially on whether background social conditions within the polity are just. (shrink)

In his article, Shelby critically engages with a conception of racism that locates racism in the “heart” of individuals. Such a volitional conception, which has been proposed by Jorge Garcia, suffers from several defects, the most important of which are that it is difficult to identify racist attitudes without recourse to racist beliefs and that such a conception of racism does not allow to see how individuals can be complicit in race-based oppression in the absence of racial hatred or (...) ill will. In lieu of a volitional conception of racism, Shelby advances a conception of racism as ideology which makes racist beliefs and their social consequences central to our understanding of racism. (shrink)

How should one live? This central philosophical question can be separated into at least two parts. The first concerns the conduct and attitudes morality requires of each of us. The second is about the essential elements of a worthwhile life; it's about what it means to flourish, which includes meeting certain moral demands but is not exhausted by this. Answering this two-pronged question traditionally falls within the subdiscipline of ethics, broadly construed. Philosophers have also sought to explain what makes a (...) society just or good, to specify the values and principles by which we are to evaluate institutional arrangements and political regimes. This is the traditional domain of political philosophy. This essay addresses a question that arises where ethics and political philosophy meet. (shrink)

The essay provides both an interpretation and a theoretical reconstruction of the political philosophy of Martin Delany, a mid-nineteenth-century radical abolitionist and one of the founders of the doctrine of black nationalism. It identifies two competing strands in Delany's social thought, “classical” nationalism and “pragmatic” nationalism, where each underwrites a different conception of the analytical and normative underpinnings of black political solidarity. It is argued that the pragmatic variant is the more cogent of the two and the one to which (...) Delany is most committed. It is also suggested that pragmatic nationalism can still serve usefully as a theoretical schema through which African Americans can understand and carry out their current political projects. (shrink)

The essay provides both an interpretation and a theoretical reconstruction of the political philosophy of Martin Delany, a mid-nineteenth-century radical abolitionist and one of the founders of the doctrine of black nationalism. It identifies two competing strands in Delany's social thought, "classical" nationalism and "pragmatic" nationalism, where each underwrites a different conception of the analytical and normative underpinnings of black political solidarity. It is argued that the pragmatic variant is the more cogent of the two and the one to which (...) Delany is most committed. It is also suggested that pragmatic nationalism can still serve usefully as a theoretical schema through which African Americans can understand and carry out their current political projects. (shrink)

Replies to symposium commentaries on the book Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform.

Marxists often make claims about the content, causes, and social functions of ideologies. Perhaps the most iconoclastic of these is the thesis that mortality is ideological . But given certain other commitments of Marxism, it is difficult to make sense of this thesis, let alone assess its truth. For while clearly the moral ideology thesis is meant as a severe criticism of morality, one that seems to preclude Marxism from consistently offering a moral critique of class societies, Marxists seem to (...) be employing a form of moral critique when they claim that class societies are exploitative. This is, of course, one version of the familiar "paradox" of Marxism's attitude toward morality. ;There are roughly three ways to dissolve this "paradox" within Marxism: Reject, or weaken, the moral ideology thesis so that Marxism can consistently offer a moral critique of class-structured societies; accept the moral ideology thesis and treat Marxism as a non-evaluative "science," rejecting the critical enterprise of Marxism altogether; or accept the moral ideology thesis, along with its implication that the moral critique of class societies is incompatible with certain basic commitments of Marxism, but show that this does not undermine the Marxist critical project. In this dissertation, I defend the moral ideology thesis in accordance with strategy . ;I argue that ideologies are illusory forms of social consciousness that function to stabilized relations of domination and exploitation and that tend to be accepted by agents because of the unconscious influence of their class interests or class position on their beliefs. I defend the moral ideology thesis by showing that morality exhibits these ideological characteristics. To resolve the tension between the moral ideology thesis, the thesis that class societies are exploitative, and the Marxist critique of class society, I explain how the Marxist theory of exploitation forms the basis of a nonmoral critique of class societies. And I argue that the critique of moral ideology in fact supports, rather than undermines, the thesis that class societies are exploitative. (shrink)