It is often said that knowledge is power, but more often than not relevant knowledge is not used when political decisions are made. This book examines how political decisions relate to scientific knowledge and what factors determine the success of scientific research in influencing policy. The authors take a comparative and historical perspective and refer to well-known theoretical frameworks, but the focus of the book is on three case studies: the discourse of racism, Keynesianism, and climate change. These cases cover (...) a number of countries and different time periods. In all three the authors see a close link between 'knowledge producers' and political decision makers, but show that the effectiveness of the policies varies dramatically. This book will be of interest to scientists, decision makers and scholars alike. (shrink)

This paper puts forward a theoretical framework for the analysis of expertise and experts in contemporary societies. It argues that while prevailing approaches have come to see expertise in various forms and functions, they tend to neglect the broader historical and societal context, and importantly the relational aspect of expertise. This will be discussed with regard to influential theoretical frameworks, such as laboratory studies, regulatory science, lay expertise, post-normal science, and honest brokers. An alternative framework of expertise is introduced, showing (...) the limitations of existing frameworks and emphasizing one crucial element of all expertise, which is their role in guiding action. (shrink)

In late 2009, e-mails from a server at the Climate Research Unit at the University of East Anglia were released that showed some climate scientists in an unfavorable light. Soon this scandal was known as “Climategate” and a highly charged debate started to rage on blogs and in the mass media. Much of the debate has been about the question whether anthropogenic global warming was undermined by the revelations. But ethical issues, too, became part and parcel of the debate. This (...) article aims to contribute to this debate, assessing the e-mail affair in the light of two normative analyses of science, one proposed by Robert Merton, the second by a recent suggestion to use the concept of honest brokering in science policy interactions. On the basis of these analyses, different aspects of malpractice will be discussed and possible solutions will be suggested. (shrink)

ABSTRACTExpertise has come under attack not least since the Brexit vote in the UK and Donald Trump’s election as President of the United States. In this contribution, I will provide some conceptual clarification and suggest a new topology of expertise. I will also examine the historical roots of this challenge to expertise and its social context using a comparative lens. I will ask what it could mean to speak of the rightful place of expertise. I will try to provide an (...) answer by looking more closely at different types of expertise. Expertise, it seems, has been used as an umbrella term for a variety of different knowledge-related activities. I will show that the role of the expert has to be differentiated from the role of the scientist, but also from the role of the specialist. Specialists have different tasks in comparison to experts which need to be emphasized. My argument will draw on the social and historical context of the critique of expertise, and discuss the challenge to the social sciences, espec... (shrink)

Sollen und Sein klaffen bei uns weiter auseinander als bei anderen, weil eben das Sollen sehr hoch gesetzt ist. Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus.

This article compares the cases of ozone layer protection and climate change. In both cases, scientific expertise has played a comparatively important role in the policy process. The author argues that against conventional assumptions, scientific consensus is not necessary to achieve ambitious political goals. However, the architects of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change operated under such assumptions. The author argues that this is problematic both from a theoretical viewpoint and from empirical evidence. Contrary to conventional assumptions, ambitious political regulations (...) in the ozone case were agreed under scientific uncertainty, whereas the negotiations on climate change were much more modest albeit based on a large scientific consensus. On the basis of a media analysis, the author shows that the creation of a climate of expectation plus pressure from leader countries is crucial for success. (shrink)

Sollen und Sein klaffen bei uns weiter auseinander als bei anderen, weil eben das Sollen sehr hoch gesetzt ist.Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus.

This five volume collection brings together a carefully selected array of contributions from a variety of disciplines. Featuring essays from philosophers who have investigated the foundations of knowledge, and addressing different forms of knowledge in society such as common sense and practical knowledge, this collection also discusses the role of knowledge in economic process and gives attention to the role of expert knowledge in political decision making. Including a collection of articles from the sociology of knowledge and science, the set (...) also provides a new introduction and full index by the editors, making it a unique and invaluable research resource for both student and scholar. Coverage includes: 1. Foundations of Knowledge - Knowledge, Experience and Mind - Knowledge and Reality - Knowledge and Skepticism - Knowledge and Ignorance - Knowledge and Uncertainty 2: Knowledge and Society: Forms of Knowledge - Everyday Knowledge - Practical knowledge - Tacit knowledge - Secret Knowledge - Scientific Knowledge - Hermeneutics - Knowledge Construction - Indigenous (traditional) knowledge 3: Knowledge and the Economy - The Economics of Knowledge - Knowledge and Organisations - Knowledge Acquisition - Knowledge Based Systems (firms) - Knowledge Management - Knowledge and Information - Knowledge and Law 4: Politics and Knowledge - Science and Policy-Making - The Power of Ideas and Discourse - The Politics of Knowledge 5: Sociology of Knowledge and Science - Classical Perspectives - Modern Views - Science Studies. (shrink)

In a recent paper Weinberg (2007) claims that there is an essential mark of trustworthiness which typical sources of evidence as perception or memory have, but philosophical intuitions lack, namely that we are able to detect and correct errors produced by these “hopeful” sources. In my paper I will argue that being a hopeful source isn't necessary for providing us with evidence. I then will show that, given some plausible background assumptions, intuitions at least come close to being hopeful, if (...) they are reliable. If this is true, Weinberg's new challenge comes down to the claim that philosophical intuitions are not reliable since they are significantly unstable. In the second part of my paper I will argue that and why the experimentally established instability of folk intuitions about philosophical cases does not show that philosopher's expert intuitions about these cases are instable. (shrink)

In this chapter, I survey and assess various answers to two basic questions concerning experts: (1) What is an expert?; (2) How can laypeople identify the relevant experts? These questions are not mutually independent, since the epistemology and the metaphysics of experts should go hand in hand. On the basis of our platitudes about experts, I will argue that the prevailing accounts of experts such as truth-linked, knowledge-linked, understanding-linked or service-oriented accounts are inadequate. In contrast, I will defend an evidence-linked (...) account of expertise. In the second part of the chapter, I address the question of how laypeople can identify experts in this sense. Here, I will argue that agreement among experts plays a major role. I will outline how laypeople can follow this criterion without running into circularity. (shrink)

This is a survey article about epistemic defeaters: what is defeated, how defeaters work, different kinds of defeaters, indefeasibility and how defeaters fit into epistemic internalism and externalism.

In this paper, I argue that the two most common views of how to respond rationally to peer disagreement–the Total Evidence View (TEV) and the Equal Weight View (EWV)–are both inadequate for substantial reasons. TEV does not issue the correct intuitive verdicts about a number of hypothetical cases of peer disagreement. The same is true for EWV. In addition, EWV does not give any explanation of what is rationally required of agents on the basis of sufficiently general epistemic principles. I (...) will then argue that there is a genuine alternative to both views–the Preemption View (PV)–that fares substantially better in both respects. I will give an outline and a detailed defense of PV in the paper. (shrink)

Michael Walzer is one of the world's most important political thinkers. In this book, Toby J. Reiner provides the most wide-ranging and up-to-date introduction to his work available. Examining Walzer's multivarious writings and work, Reiner develops an illuminating new interpretation of his thought that no political theorist can afford to miss.

Typically, expert judgments are regarded by laypeople as highly trustworthy. However, expert assertions that strike the layperson as obviously false or outrageous, seem to give one a perfect reason to dispute that this judgment manifests expertise. In this paper, I will defend four claims. First, I will deliver an argument in support of the preemption view on expert judgments according to which we should not rationally use our own domain-specific reasons in the face of expert testimony. Second, I will argue (...) that the preemption view does not leave room for rejecting an expert judgment simply because it is outrageous. Third and finally, I will argue that outrageous expert judgments are ambiguous. Whereas some of them should be rationally rejected by laypeople, others are true and rationally acceptable. So, being outrageous is not, in and of itself, a reason to reject the judgment. Finally, I will argue that there are resources available to the preemption view that enable the layperson to reject some but not all outrageous expert judgments. This is sufficient to overcome the challenge from outrageous expert judgments to the preemption view. (shrink)

Das Überleben moderner Gesellschaften hängt davon ab, ob es ihnen gelingt, Strategien zur Lösung von wicked problems wie der Übernutzung natürlicher Ressourcen, Zerstörung der Biossphäre oder Flucht und Vertreibung zu entwickeln. In einer demokratietheoretischen Analyse zum Verhältnis von Demokratie und Ethik zeigt Sven Grundmann, dass ein solches Projekt nur auf Grundlage eines agonistischen, streitbaren, widerstandsfähigen Demokratiemodells gelingen kann. Die notwendige Resilienz lässt sich durch progressiv-inkrementelle Wandlungsprozesse erzielen, die wiederum institutionalisierte Formen ethischer Reflexion in der politischen Entscheidungsvorbereitung und -findung voraussetzen.

Global meta-philosophical skepticism (i.e. completely unrestricted skepticism about philosophy) based upon disagreement faces the problem of self-defeat since it undercuts its motivating conciliatory principle. However, the skeptic may easily escape this threat by adopting a more modest kind of skepticism, that will be called “extensive meta-philosophical skepticism”, i.e., the view that most of our philosophical beliefs are unjustified, except our beliefs in epistemically fundamental principles. As I will argue in this paper, this kind of skepticism is well-motivated, does not undercut (...) the conciliatory principle, but still poses a radical challenge to philosophy as a cognitive discipline. Moreover, I will argue that non-global skepticism that is still extensive undermines itself as well. The deeper reason for this is that this more modest kind of skepticism can only be motivated by the assumption that disagreement with philosophical peers is abundant and that we can identify peers only by relying on track-record arguments. But then one can argue for extensive meta-philosophical skepticism only if one presupposes that those philosophical beliefs that form the basis of track-record evaluations are justified. Here, the threat of self-defeat looms again. I will proceed by first defending the premises of this new anti-skeptical argument against standard objections from the literature. Second, I will show in more detail where the epistemic inconsistency arises in the argument for extensive meta-philosophical skepticism. I conclude with an assessment of the scope and the limits of my argument. (shrink)

This is not a work of mine. For some reason, I am unable to remove it from my page. It is a list of Dr. Reiner Schürmann's lecture notes for courses that he taught at the New School for Social Research (aka The New School).

Ecologists use a remarkable range of methods and techniques to understand complex, inherently variable, and functionally diverse entities and processes across a staggering range of spatial, temporal and interactive scales. These multiple perspectives make ecology very different to the exemplar of science often presented by philosophers. In Philosophical Foundations for the Practices of Ecology, designed for graduate students and researchers, ecology is put into a new philosophical framework that engages with this inherent pluralism while still placing constraints on the ways (...) that we can investigate and understand nature. The authors begin by exploring the sources of variety in the practice of ecology and how these have led to the current conceptual confusion. They argue that the solution is to adopt the approach of constrained perspectivism and go on to explore the ontological, metaphysical, and epistemological aspects of this position and how it can be used in ecological research and teaching"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

Von den modernen philosophischen Emotionstheorien ausgehend wird gezeigt, dass der Mensch nicht nur in seiner physischen Natur als unfrei anzusehen ist. Der Mensch leidet nicht bloß an seiner Unfreiheit, sondern sein Lebensgefühl wie sein Gefühlsleben verändern sich, wenn er ein Bewusstsein von seiner Unfreiheit erlangt. Im Gegenzug wird die Frage einer möglichen Freiheit aufgefächert auf dem Boden der Ontologie, der Anthropologie und der Ethik. Als Gesprächspartner werden vor allem vier Philosophen aufgerufen: Spinoza, Nietzsche, Whitehead und Jaspers. Die Aufsätze haben den (...) Charakter von Meditationen, die sich in eine große Tradition meditativer Philosophie (Descartes, Husserl, Wittgenstein) einreihen. (shrink)

Standard Analytic Epistemology typically relies on conceptual analysis of folk epistemic terms such as ‘knowledge’ or ‘justification’. A cross-cultural and cross-linguistic perspective on this method leads to the worry that there might not be universally shared epistemic concepts, and that different languages might use folk notions that have different extensions. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that our epistemic common-sense terms pick out what is epistemically most significant or valuable. In my paper, I take these issues as a starting (...) point for exploring the prospects of an alternative methodological approach that I call ‘alethic instrumentalism’. The core idea behind this approach is to start with a properly designed epistemic goal and then to develop a framework of instrumentally valuable methods oriented towards this goal. This results in a somewhat revisionary framework of newly constructed core epistemic terms. In the paper, I elucidate the foundations of this new framework and address a number of methodological and content-related objections to the approach. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Reflexion und Gefühl" verfügbar.

Obwohl der Stringansatz als Versuch einer nomologisch vereinheitlichten Erfassung aller Wechselwirkungen, inklusive der Gravitation, schon über drei Jahrzehnte existiert, sind die ihm zugrundeliegenden physikalischen Prinzipien noch völlig unklar; und es gibt nicht die geringste empirisch überprüfbare, quantitative Vorhersage. Ohne empirische Daten, die mit den etablierten Theorien - quantenfeldtheoretischem Standardmodell und Allgemeiner Relativitätstheorie - unvereinbar wären, liefert nur die konzeptionelle Inkompatibilität beider, gemeinsam mit der Vereinheitlichungsidee, eine Motivation für den Stringansatz. Mit diesem droht jedoch die Physik, unter konsequenter Weiterführung ihrer bisher (...) erfolgreichen Strategien, den methodologischen Rahmen der empirischen Wissenschaften zu überschreiten. (shrink)

The article presents the sociology of knowledge approach to discourse (SKAD). SKAD, which has been in the process of development since the middle of the 1990s, is now a widely used framework among social scientists in discourse research in the German-speaking area. It links arguments from the social constructionist tradition, following Berger and Luckmann, with assumptions based in symbolic interactionism, hermeneutic sociology of knowledge, and the concepts of Michel Foucault. It argues thereby for a consistent theoretical and methodological grounding of (...) a genuine social sciences perspective on discourse interested in the social production, circulation and transformation of knowledge, that is in social relations and politics of knowledge in the so-called ‘knowledge societies’. Distancing itself from Critical Discourse Analysis, Linguistics, Ethnomethodology inspired discourse analysis and the Analysis of Hegemonies, following Laclau and Mouffe, SKAD’s framework has been built up around research questions and concerns located in the social sciences, referring to public discourse and arenas as well as to more specific fields of (scientific, religious, etc.) discursive struggles and controversies around problematizations (Foucault). (shrink)

Hamanns letztes Werk wird hier begriffen als Selbstdeutung und bewusster Abschluss der Autorschaft. Hamann formuliert in diesem Text seinen prophetischen Anspruch, mit dem er der Philosophie seiner Zeit entgegentrat. Die Basis dieses Anspruchs, Hamanns figurales Denken, erweist sich als Zentrum seines Denkens überhaupt. Daraus ergibt sich auch eine differenzierte Einschätzung seiner Aufklärungskritik. Im «Anhang» wird eine neue Edition des «Fliegenden Briefes» mit kritischem Apparat und Kommentar geboten.

Modern societies are characterized by a division of epistemic labor between laypeople and epistemic authorities. Authorities are often far more competent than laypeople and can thus, ideally, inform their beliefs. But how should laypeople rationally respond to an authority’s beliefs if they already have beliefs and reasons of their own concerning some subject matter? According to the standard view, the beliefs of epistemic authorities are just further, albeit weighty, pieces of evidence. In contrast, the Preemption View claims that, when one (...) discovers what an authority believes, it is not permissible to rely on any of one’s own reasons concerning the subject matter. The original version of this view, as proposed by Linda Zagzebski, has recently been severely criticized for recommending blind trust and for abandoning even minimal standards for critical thinking. In our paper, we defend a new version of the Preemption View—Defeatist Preemptionism—in a way that differs radically from Zagzebski’s. We argue that our view can be derived from certain widely accepted general epistemic principles. In particular, we claim that preemption can be identified as a special case of source sensitive defeat. Moreover, we argue that Defeatist Preemptionism does not lead to the undesirable consequences that critics ascribe to the Preemption View. The paper thus articulates the foundations and refinements of the Preemption View, such that it adequately captures the phenomenon of epistemic authority and the rational requirements related to it. (shrink)

This paper provides a novel argument for granting memory the status of a generative source of justification and knowledge. Memory can produce justified output beliefs and knowledge on the basis of unjustified input beliefs alone. The key to understanding how memory can generate justification and knowledge, memory generativism, is to bear in mind that memory frequently omits part of the stored information. The proposed argument depends on a broadly reliabilist approach to justification.

Today political competition and thus the politicians’ incentives to cater for the citizens’ preferences are weakened by protectionist regulations aiming at the politicians’ origin, their incomes and the ‘production process of politics’. This paper suggests abolishing these regulations and institutionalizing an open, international market for politics. Foreign as well as profit-seeking ‘policy producers’ should be allowed to run directly for office without nominating specific individuals. This enables a policy supplier to become active in several countries and jurisdictions and thus to (...) build up an international reputation for being credible, i.e. of sticking to his promises and not exploiting the voters after election. The deregulation programme strengthens the influence of the weakly organized social groups and the governments' incentives to pursue what is of general interest. (shrink)

Cooperative discourse procedures produce consensual siting proposals for NIMBY-projects-but only if these proposals do not affect the final siting decision. Then, the members of the discourse commissions stay independent and face few incentives to pursue consequentialist interests. However, the more influential discourse procedures become, the stronger the interest groups’ incentives are to take advantage of them. Thus, cooperative discourses turn into competitive, interest-centred procedures whose outcome is rejected by the less influential groups. The evolution of discourse procedures into functionally specialized (...) parliaments or even into FOCJ (Functional, Overlapping, Competing Jurisdictions) seems worth pursuing. (shrink)

There are several reasons which suggest that the role of nuclear weapons for deterrence in Europe is gradually diminishing. Thus, Europeans are confronted with the question whether and under what conditions strategic stability can be obtained in a post-nuclear world. From the analysis of a simple conceptual model of military conflict the conclusion is reached that, in order to preserve crisis stability in a non-nuclear world and to dampen the arms race, the antagonistic land forces in Europe need to be (...) gradually restructured in a manner so that neither side may perceive the other as a potential threat to its territorial integrity. The requisite structural changes ought to be brought about before nuclear weapons become altogether invailable for deterrence in Europe, otherwise the War saw Pact’s conventional superiority would, in a serious crisis, leave Western Europe only the choice between military defeat and a priori capitulation. There should be military as well as economic incentives for the implementation of structural changes toward a reduction of the offensive capabilities of conventional forces, if the so-called ‘defense efficiency hypothesis’ were to be validated. Otherwise, a deterioration of crisis stability must be expected during the transition period. (shrink)

On Heidegger's Being and Time is an outstanding exploration of Heidegger's most important work by two major philosophers. Simon Critchley argues that we must see Being and Time as a radicalization of Husserl's phenomenology, particularly his theories of intentionality, categorial intuition, and the phenomenological concept of the a priori. This leads to a reappraisal and defense of Heidegger's conception of phenomenology. In contrast, Reiner Schürmann urges us to read Heidegger 'backward', arguing that his later work is the key to (...) unravelling Being and Time . Through a close reading of Being and Time Schürmann demonstrates that this work is ultimately aporetic because the notion of Being elaborated in his later work is already at play within it. This is the first time that Schürmann's renowned lectures on Heidegger have been published. The book concludes with Critchley's reinterpretation of the importance of authenticity in Being and Time . Arguing for what he calls an 'originary inauthenticity', Critchley proposes a relational understanding of the key concepts of the second part of Being and Time : death, conscience and temporality. (shrink)

Am Leitfaden des Begriffs Malum oeconomicum fuhrt das Buch seine Leser in einen Dialog mit klassischen und zeitgenossischen Denkern uber die abgrundigen Seiten der Wirtschaft und ihre Spiegelungen in der Seele. In der Wirtschaft erscheinen Menschen tendenziell fureinander als blosse Werkzeuge ihrer Bedurfnisbefriedigung, andererseits wird wirtschaftliche Leistung mit Bedeutungen aufgeladen, die an das Heil in der religiosen Sphare gemahnen. Im Kapitalismus der Moderne entfaltet sich aus der Wechselwirkung zwischen einer entfesselten Produktion und den Antrieben des Innenlebens eine zuvor unbekannte Dynamik. (...) Ist diese in liberalen Theorien ein Anlass, das Malum oeconomicum fur verschwunden zu erklaren, so machen Fundamentalkritiker des globalen Kapitalismus geltend, dass dieser illusionare Bedurfnisse weckt und unversohnliche Gegensatze zwischen Arm und Reich hervorruft, deren Sprengkraft jeden sozialen Zusammenhalt gefahrdet. Aus der Lekture von Platon, Aristoteles, Thomas Hobbes, Bernard Mandeville, Adam Smith, Thomas Robert Malthus, Karl Marx, Max Weber, Georg Simmel, John Maynard Keynes, Martin Heidegger, Herbert Marcuse, John Rawls und Amartya Sen ergeben sich Aussichten auf das Wirtschaftsgeschehen, die uber die Engfuhrungen heutiger Debatten weit hinausweisen. (shrink)